During those years -- and defendant Keitel has been asked about that when he was examined here -- it has been stated by Keitel that armament expenditure amounted to the following figures:
Budget year '35, '36 -- 7 Billions Budget year '36, '37 -- 7 Billions And at that stage the assistance of the Reichsbank ceased.
In spite of that, during the following year and without any assistance from the Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament amounted to 11 billions, and in the following year it climbed to twenty and a half billions. Schacht, they managed to get hold of the cash. Just how they did, that's another question.
Q. Some time ago, Dr. Schacht, I put figures before the witness Keitel. I don't think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now available and has the Exhibit No. 7. It is pare 15 of the German text and page 21 of the English text. Mr. Keitel could, of course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total expenditure, but there is a second and a third column in this balance sheet, and these two columns are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding those figures which were split with the help, and without the help of the Reichsbank.
I don't intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely like to have your permission to put the question to Schacht whether the figures in column 2 and 3 of the document were calculated by him and whether they are calculated correctly.
A I have got the copy of the document before me. The figures are absolutely correct, and again I want to declare that during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued their assistance, no less than five and a quarter billions more were spent without the assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of 11 billions. and extensive rearmament and that you did so by putting the hand in the money bag. Did you not act against undue rearament in any other way, for instance, by means of giving lectures? have often spoken, by arrangement with the Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy, before high ranking officers. During all the lectures I have continuously referred to the financial and economic limitations which would stand agains German rearament, and I have warned against excessive rearmament. ment was excessive and exaggerated?
A It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning in 1935, I made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of rearmament. On one occasion Hitler had said--just a moment, I have got it--that until the spring of 1936 the speed of rearament would have to be continued. I adhered to that as much as possible, although beginning during the second half of 1935 I continuously applied the brake But after 1935 I told myself that since the Fuehrer himself had said that after the spring of 1936 then the speed wouldn't be necessary any more--something which is contained in Document PS-1301, in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements which I have communicated to the so-called Smaller Cabinet Council. Goering contradicted me during that meeting, but I of course maintained the things which I said at the time. of slowing down the speed of rearament in the interest of general economy, since I wanted to see the economic system work for exports. Proof for the fact of just how much I urged the Minister of War is contained in my letter dated the 24th of December 1935. and when I was already applying the brake, I wrote a letter to him, which has also been used by the Prosecution and submitted to the Tribunal.
It has the document dumber, PS-1301. In the English version of the document it is on page 25.
I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly. All my quotations are brief from that document. In that case I am writing a letter to the Reich Minister of War, and I quote. And then come the reference numbers.
"Reference letter dated 29th of November, from which I gather that increased demands by the armed forces for copper and lead are to be expected, which will amount to practically double the present consumption. This appears only to be current demands, whereas the aqually urgent demands to be expected are not contained in the figures.
"You are expecting me to obtain the necessary foreign currency for these demands of yours, and to that I respectfully reply that under the existing circumstances I see no possibility of doing so." End of quotation. currency, and I am stating quite clearly that I don't see any possibility of doing so. I quote:
"In all the conferences held with the Fuehrer and Vice Chancellor up to now, also held together with the leading military departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would be possible, regarding the existing degree of rearmament until the first of April 1936, to supply the necessary foreign currencies and raw materials for these purposes.
"Although, due to our cultural policy which is being turned down everywhere abroad and althouh this has been made extremely difficult for me, and continues to be difficult, I still hope that my original proposal may still be carried out first of April, but that, over and above that, I thought I couldn't. raise credits for railway purposes.
What was your attitude as president of the Reichsbank regarding these wishes of Dortmueller? during which the Fuehrer supported strongly Dortmueller's demands, I turned that credit down straightway, and he didn't get it. Cabinet Council, presided over by Goering, dated the 27th of May 1936, that it was the opinion by all the Prosecution that during that meeting the intention of an aggressive war became apparent. Have you any knowledge of that meeting?
A What was the date, please?
A No. I was present during that conference, and I see nothing contained in the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. I have studied that document very carefully. report of Ambassador Bullit, M-151, dated 23rd of November 1937. You have heard of course that the Prosecution is drawing the conclusion from that report that there were aggressive intentions on Hitler's part. Will you make a statement on that subject? to start an aggressive war. The intention of Hitler to bring about an Anschluss of Austria is all I an talking about in this connection, and the hope that the Sudeten Germans would be given autonomy. Neither of those two actions would be aggressive war, and apart from that, Mr. Bullit is saying with reference to me in his report about this conversation that-- and I quote:
"Schacht then went on to speak on the absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe". End of quotation. and it is Exhibit Number 22. It is on page 64 of the English text and page 57 of the German text.
We shall now have to deal with your so-called knowledge of Hitler's intentions to start war. First of all, quite generally, did Hitler -
SIR DAVID MZXWELL-FYFE: (Interposing) My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if he would object if the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing to a new point, to mention the question of the Reader documents. I had a discussion with Dr. Sie mers. There are still some outstanding points, and we should be grateful if the Tribunal would hear us this afternoon, if possible, because the translating division is waiting for the Raeder documents to got on with their translations.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department is waiting, perhaps we had better do it at 2:00 o'clock.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It isn't likely, I suppose, to take more than that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't think it will take mere than that.
THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2:00 o'clock, and now we will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
Official transcript of the International Military
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: May it please your Lordship, the Tribunal should have in front of them a statement of our objections to certain of the documents arranged in six groups. Attached to that sheet, they will find an English summary of the documents, presenting shortly the contents of each one of them. My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make two erasures from our objection to No. 19, which has been allowed in the case of Schacht and, if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly, he doesn't press for No. 76.
Now, my Lord, the others in that group, No. 9, are a series of quotations from Learner's book on "Versailles."
No. 10, the quotation from a book by the German leftwing publicist, Thomas Mann.
No. 17 is "The Failure of a Mission," by Sir Neville Henderson.
No. 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill's.
No. 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about an article in the News Chronicle, criticizing Hitler.
My Lord, No. 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would be good enough to lock at it, it is a report by a German lawyer. Dr. Moesler, I think his name should be, who is an authority on international law, dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has been of course absolutely frank with me and he said that it would be convenient to him to have these, what is really legal argument, embodied in his document book. Of course, that is not really the purpose of these document bocks but, of course, it is a matter of the Tribunal and we felt we had to draw attention to it. prosecution submit, have no evidential value. prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues in the case.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn't deal with 109, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am sorry, my Lord, it is on the second line. That is another legal argument, the effect of the war on the legal position of I eland, which is a quotation from the British Journal of Information in Public Law and International Law.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the prosecution submits, are irrelevant.
No. 22 is a Belgian Decree of 1937, dealing with the possible evacuation of the civil population in time of war.
63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and another by Mr. Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece, at the end of 1940, some two months after the beginning of the Italian campaign against Greece.
No. 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of routes in Belgium, which doesn't seem to us to have any evidential importance.
76 comes out as "The Altmark".
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, my Lord, that is "The Altmark". It is the same one that is in 71. I am sorry, my Lord, it should have been marked out again. the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a suggestion of Monsieur Paul Reynaud, with regard to the Swedish or mines and it was long after the Norway campaign and it was never, of course, acted upon in Norway, and it seems to us to have no relevance for this trial.
102 to 107, I have dealt with under one. They have certain very small unimportant memorandum relating to the Low Countries. statement from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, which again doesn't seem of much importance in 1946. Tribunal when applied for by the defendant Ribbentrop. The first two deal with British rearmament and the others deal with the Balkans and Greece. The Tribunal will probably remember the group which they did reject in the Ribbentrop application; and the fourth group are other documents of the same series as these rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the defendant von Ribbentrop.
The fifth group, they are really objectionable on the tu quoque basis. I think they are entirely French documents which deal with proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged but never followed out, with regard to the destruction of the oil fields or the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with the most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The plans were never put into operation. after the occupation, of France. As I understand Dr. Siemer's argument, it is not suggested that these documents were within the knowledge of the defendants at the time that they carried out the aggression against Norway but it is stated that they had other information. Of course, as to their own information, we have not made any objection at all, and that these documents might be argued, to be corroborative of their agents' reports. Actually, as assumed by document 83, to which we make no objection, they also deal with tentative proposals which were not put into effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission of the prosecution, the important matter must be, what was within the knowledge of the defendants before the 9th April 1940, and it is irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which are only debatable, consistent with the information which the defendants stated they had. the Tribunal on the time but I hoped that I have indicated very clearly what our objections were.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Raeder): High Tribunal, it is extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many documents, especially since I know that the documents have not been translated and that the contents are not known as yet in their entirety. Therefore, I would like to point out that there is a certain danger in the treating of these documents. In part, we are concerned with the basic parts of my defense. right at the beginning, that I might be forced, in order to give the reasons for the relevancy of this evidence, to point out passages which I will not need to read in their entirety, for as soon as the document book is completed they will be known to the Tribunal and it will be possible to read them at that time.
I will follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, I shall deal with the first group, Documents 9 and 10. The note by Sir David which has been submitted to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents is in conflict with the resolution given by the Tribunal on the 29th of March. Therefore, I would like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is in error. The resolution by the Tribunal said that no documents might be submitted showing the injustice of the Versailles Treaty, and stressing the fact that it was given under duress. These documents do not deal with these two points of injustice and duress. On the other hand, they show the subjective attitude of a man such as Noske, who was a Social Democrat and assuredly did not want to carry through any wars of aggression. the thought of the regime and public spending at the time, which were intentions of defense and the danger that in case of an attack, for instance on the part of Poland, the German Wehrmacht would be too weak. These are facts pure and simple, and I give you my assurance that I will never quote any sentences which might have a polemic interpretation. I just need this as a basis for my trial brief.
No. 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson "Failure of a Mission". This dates back to the year 1940. I wish to quote perhaps 15 lines which I would like to use in my trial brief to show that Henderson, who know Germany extremely well, believed even in 1940 that he could see positive signs of the regime at that time.
I believe one cannot expect that a military commander in chief would be more of a sceptic than the British ambassador at that time.
Then we turn to Document No. 45. This document is taken from a book by Churchill, but this excerpt deals with the fact which I would like to prove, the fact that many years before the First World War the British Committee for Defense existed. In the table of contents which Sir David submitted, the word Reichsverteidigungsausschuss is used, and I conclude therefrom that the Prosecution was in error on this point and the German Reichsverteidigungsausschuss is not meant; that is a mistake. This document shows how it came about that the Prosecution over-estimated the importance of this German Committee, for the Prosecution confused the German committee with the British committee, the British committee being of much greater importance and authority than the German one.
Turning to No. 47, this proves that an article against Hitler appeared in a British paper, in the News Chronicle, and Lord Halifax at that time pointed out that it was not in his sphere to influence papers and newspapers. I must point out -- and I would like to state it at this point -- that the Prosecution pictured Raeder in such a way as though he were in some way connected with the rather regrettable article in the Voelkischer Beobachter saying that Churchill had sunk the Athenia. Raeder had no more connection with that article than had Lord Halifax with the article in the News Chronicle.
No. 60 deals with the approval of Dr. Mosler who was a specialist on international law. It applies to the Norway action, and this is a passage which I am sure the Tribunal will agree with me on, that in the framework of my defense as far as the Norway action is concerned, I must speak about the basis of international law involved. The basis of international law is not an entirely simple matter. I am not against the matter of having to present this material myself. I was guided by the thought that the Tribunal has asked again and again that we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this matter is granted me so that I shall not be obligated to use the numerous excerpts and quotations from authors singly, and to give the basis in law for each specific case.
Perhaps in a halfhour's time I can deal with and dispose of the question of right, but without this piece of material I will not be able to consider this matter in a half-hour's time. If the Prosecution does not object to the using of more time, then of course I will be in agreement with having this document taken away from me.
No. 76 has been granted me. papers, Isvestia and Pravda. These statements prove that at least at that time Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action in Norway coincided with the German opinion. If the Tribunal is of the opinion that these very brief excerpts and quotations should not be granted as documents, I will not interpose too many or too great difficulties, for I have been forced to tell with just what we are concerned. friends, and that the Soviet opinion was significant as far as a purely legal matter was concerned.
Then, on No. 101, I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am not mistaken Dr. Braun mentioned this document. Very well, then, 101 to 107. Here we are concerned, as I have already mentioned, with a problem of international law concerning the action against Norway, and the problem was whether a country may violate the neutrality of another country if there is reason to believe that another belligerent nation will also wish to violate the neutrality of the aforementioned state. In my case I shall show that Admiral Raeder, in autumn of 1939, had numerous reports to the effect that the Allies were planning to undertake the protection of the sovereign waters of Norway, to land in Norway, in order to have bases in Norway. When we deal with the Norway documents, I will return to this point. to prove that the attitude taken by the Allies, as far as law is concerned, to the question of the violation of the neutrality of a neutral country in the years 1939 and 1940, was entirely the same as the attitude of the defendant Raeder was at the same time.
this was a basic opinion, which may be proved through parallel cases. These parallel cases apply, first of all, to the example of the planning of the Allies with respect to the Balkans; and secondly, the plans of the Allies as far as the Caucasian oil fields are concerned. these things under the attitude of tu quoque, that is, the attitude that the defendant had done something which the Allies had also done or wanted to do. We are concerned only with the judgement and right of the actions of the defendant Raeder. These actions can only be understood if the entire aspect and complex is brought to light, in my opinion.
I would like to refer to the expert report of Dr. Mosler, Exhibit No. 66. I would like to show that the defendant cannot be accused. the law of self-determination and self-preservation.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don't want to go into these matters in great detail at this stage. If you state what your reasons are in support, and state them shortly, we shall be able to consider the matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry that I have to enter into these details, but if through the objection of the prosecution -
THE PRESIDENT: I have said that the Tribunal does not wish to hear you in detail.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to have the High Tribunal take into consideration the principle laid down by Kellogg in 1929. the right of self-defense. For that reason I would like to use these documents; if the Allies acted according to this principle, then Raeder did too.
Document 22 is next. I have just given basic theories which apply to a large number of my subsequent documents, so I can refer to my statements already made. Documents 22 and 39 fall into this group. these documents deal with Greece, and not only these two, but a group of perhaps ten or twelve documents, which I will refer to briefly later on.
So far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows:
to these documents, about 14 in number. The document C-12, GB-226, accuses Raeder that on the 30th of December 1939 he decreed, and I quote:
"Greek merchant-men are to be considered hostile in the zone around England." actions, to give this decree. If these documents are stricken, I cannot refute the evidence given, and I do not believe that it is the intention of the prosecution to hinder me and limit me in carrying out my work in this way. herself at the disposal of England, England was at war with Germany, and therefore the would be treated as hostile ships.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I would like to say that I should have told the Tribunal I would make no objection to documents 53 and 54, because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the British Government.
THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn't object to 53 or 54.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don't object to them.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64.
Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; strike that out.
DR. SEIMERS: There is no objection to 53 and 54?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing with the Greek fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I hisheard.
DR. SEIMERS: Then we turn to document number 71. The same thing applies as I have stated regarding documents 101 and 107. to make these remarks right now. All of these documents are concerned with Norway -- that is, thos documents which deal with the plans that the Allies had with respect to Norway. They deal with the landing at Narvik and other cities, the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases and so on; the documents deal with all of these matters, for example, that the possibility of having ore fall into German hands should not be allowed. the same plan as the Finnish-Russian war, which had already been concluded.
To show that these documents are relevant, I must quote. Since the High Tribunal has told me that I should not quote, I am requesting that we deal only with these points. The facts, as found in these documents, agree, point by point, with those reports which Admiral Raeder, from September 1939 until March 1940, received from the Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht, which was headed by Admiral Canaris. These facts agree with the reports which Raeder received through the Marine Attache in Oslow, Schreiber, in the same period of time; and they also agree with the reports which he received in the form of a letter through Karl at the end of the year 1939.
out the large danger, which consisted in the fact that Norway might fall into the hands of the Allies and that then the war would be lost for Germany. Therefore, this is purely a strategic idea. The occupation of Norway was not, as contended by the prosecution, concerned with prestige or desire for conquest, but was because of these positive reports. reports, and second, that these reports were objective.
THE PRESIDENT You are dealing with 99, are you not?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B.
DR. SIEMERS: The group mentioned under the letter "F", the last on the page, is objected to by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the prosecution to that document was that it was a document of the 27th of April, 1940, at a time after Germany had invaded Norway. You haven't said anything about that.
DR. SIEMERS: Your Honor, I wanted to avoid dealing with each document separately, because I believed that I might treat them generally. However, in this specific case -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't want you to deal with each document separately. I thought you were dealing with document 99. If you can deal with them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great deal of the Tribunal's time.
DR. SIEMERS: In this document number 99 we are concerned with the meeting of the Combined Cabinet Council on the 27th of April, the leadership between England and France. Indubitably the heading shows that it was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal objection. discussed the happenings before the period of the occupation, and at this session the most essential leaders of the Allies took part. Alexander Cadogan, and so forth.
gentlemen discussed the previous plan that I admit had misfired through German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss the matter of how the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should have come into the hands of the Allies and now what was to be done to prevent there being used by Germany, and how it could be brought about that these iron-ore deposits could be destroyed. I believe, therefore, that even though formally, the period of time was later the trend of thought I have just pictured is of significance.
Then we turn to Document 100. This deals with the session of the French War Cabinet, of the 9th of April, 1940. And the same problem is dealt with here, that the planning on the part of the Allies was then what should be done since the report had just come in about an action on the part of Germany. already in May 1940 expected an intervention on the part of America. Spring of 1941 he was instrumental in bringing about a war against the U.S.A., through Japan, I want to say this document is of the utmost importance to me. I will leave this matter to the Prosecution and to the High Tribunal. the case of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I have not had the opportunityin the Ribbentrop case to define my position as far as justification is concerned. Therefore, in summary I would like to say that these documents were refused Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully-considered the arguments and decided those documents were inadmissible.
DR. SIEMERS: I have believed, your Honor, that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop case, for the point of view would be different. It is a different case. The accusation is leveled against Raeder, referring to Document C-152, that Raeder was responsible for the occupation of Greece.
That is an accusation that was not made against Ribbentrop. How can I contradict this accusation if these documents are not granted?
THE PRESIDENT: But the Tribunal know the documents and know the charges against Raeder, and they don't desire to hear any further argument on it. They will consider the matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the High Tribunal. Under these circumstances I am compelled to compare whether our documents were covered in Ribbentrop's case. According to my notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, they do not agree. Perhaps after the session I might point out that the documents are not exactly identical.
As a matter of fact, the documents in Ribbentrop's case are not used in their entirety. That is, the High Tribunal does not know the documents in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn was using exactly the same excerpts I wish to use, I am not able to say at this point. I know only that in the large majority the reproduction of the document is not complete in Dr. Horn's case, because his case is different, as he was interested -
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us those extracts are the same ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents so far. We haven't seen the extracts.
(Brief consultation between Sir David and an associate.)
My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in German and we haven't had them translated. We did the best we could in German.
THE PRESIDENT: Twenty-four and 25, at any rate, are speeches in English.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, my Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, my Lord; these ones are.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as were rejected in Ribbentrop's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I didn't do the actual checking myself, but Major Barrington who checked the Ribbentrop documents went through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the basis of our note.
That is the position. I can't tell your Lordship that I have actually checked these myself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers tells us that is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying he didn't know whether they were the same extracts -
DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please? I am not exactly certain that I can say in each specific case which extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but that some of them do not agree -- I know for certain that they do not agree, and I know that in order to alleviate the labor of the translating department I compared them and in a very few cases, in which agreement did take place, I told the translation division that such documents were identical, because I did not want them translated a second time. But I am sorry to say a large number of the documents were not the same, but they were different because of the point of view. Group D which are enumerated here as Ribbentrop documents 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, despite my every effort, cannot be found in the Ribbentrop document book, and the list does not show which numbers should be those in the Ribbentrop case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is suggested that those in the same series deal with the same subject. That is the question of Greece and the Balkans, and these documents the Tribunal ruled upon in the case of Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading C and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop's case, and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the documents rejected in Ribbentrop's case, to show they have some relevance to your case, and we shall expect to have that by five o'clock.
DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps say one word to what Sir David said regarding group "D"? There was no objection because they were already mentioned in Ribbentrop's case, but only because they deal with the same subject matter -- yes, the same subject matter is dealt with, and that is Greece, but I cannot say more than what I have said. worked for the occupation of all of Greece. In connection with the note of three lines, I can only make use of this if I may bring my Greek documents and if they are not turned down because, generally, in Ribbentrop's case the Greek documents were turned down.
Now, we turn to the document contained in the group "E", which begins with document 26. The same applies as I have already set out to the documents 101 through 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions in neutral Roumania and in the neutral Caucasus, as I would like to just say parenthetically, have already been dealt with in this proceeding. The High Tribunal will remember that in referring to the diary of Jodl, I asked Goering in his cross-examination, and he already testified as to the reports received by Germany, and pages 36 and 38 dealing with it gave testimony on this point; and this testimony is only concerned with the subjective side, that is the knowledge in the hands of Germany. I must prove that the objective side, that is the plans, are in accord with the subjective side, and my documents here are to serve this purpose. Document 26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 until 44, then number 99, which I have already dealt with, which seems to be here in duplicate, 101; 110 seems to be a duplicate, also. the attack on Norway. I have already set forth my basic principles and I beg the High Tribunal not to strike these documents. If I am not granted these documents, I am simply not in a positionto carry on my case in a reasonable manner without telling everything myself. I can only carry on the proof about the question of such importance if I have documents at my disposal, the same way as the Prosecution. But, if all of my documents, in fact, on this phase are stricken and taken from me, then I do not know how I shall treat this complex, and I believe that the High Tribunal will wish to assist me in this matter.