Perhaps in a halfhour's time I can deal with and dispose of the question of right, but without this piece of material I will not be able to consider this matter in a half-hour's time. If the Prosecution does not object to the using of more time, then of course I will be in agreement with having this document taken away from me.
No. 76 has been granted me. papers, Isvestia and Pravda. These statements prove that at least at that time Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action in Norway coincided with the German opinion. If the Tribunal is of the opinion that these very brief excerpts and quotations should not be granted as documents, I will not interpose too many or too great difficulties, for I have been forced to tell with just what we are concerned. friends, and that the Soviet opinion was significant as far as a purely legal matter was concerned.
Then, on No. 101, I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am not mistaken Dr. Braun mentioned this document. Very well, then, 101 to 107. Here we are concerned, as I have already mentioned, with a problem of international law concerning the action against Norway, and the problem was whether a country may violate the neutrality of another country if there is reason to believe that another belligerent nation will also wish to violate the neutrality of the aforementioned state. In my case I shall show that Admiral Raeder, in autumn of 1939, had numerous reports to the effect that the Allies were planning to undertake the protection of the sovereign waters of Norway, to land in Norway, in order to have bases in Norway. When we deal with the Norway documents, I will return to this point. to prove that the attitude taken by the Allies, as far as law is concerned, to the question of the violation of the neutrality of a neutral country in the years 1939 and 1940, was entirely the same as the attitude of the defendant Raeder was at the same time.
this was a basic opinion, which may be proved through parallel cases. These parallel cases apply, first of all, to the example of the planning of the Allies with respect to the Balkans; and secondly, the plans of the Allies as far as the Caucasian oil fields are concerned. these things under the attitude of tu quoque, that is, the attitude that the defendant had done something which the Allies had also done or wanted to do. We are concerned only with the judgement and right of the actions of the defendant Raeder. These actions can only be understood if the entire aspect and complex is brought to light, in my opinion.
I would like to refer to the expert report of Dr. Mosler, Exhibit No. 66. I would like to show that the defendant cannot be accused. the law of self-determination and self-preservation.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don't want to go into these matters in great detail at this stage. If you state what your reasons are in support, and state them shortly, we shall be able to consider the matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I am sorry that I have to enter into these details, but if through the objection of the prosecution -
THE PRESIDENT: I have said that the Tribunal does not wish to hear you in detail.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to have the High Tribunal take into consideration the principle laid down by Kellogg in 1929. the right of self-defense. For that reason I would like to use these documents; if the Allies acted according to this principle, then Raeder did too.
Document 22 is next. I have just given basic theories which apply to a large number of my subsequent documents, so I can refer to my statements already made. Documents 22 and 39 fall into this group. these documents deal with Greece, and not only these two, but a group of perhaps ten or twelve documents, which I will refer to briefly later on.
So far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows:
to these documents, about 14 in number. The document C-12, GB-226, accuses Raeder that on the 30th of December 1939 he decreed, and I quote:
"Greek merchant-men are to be considered hostile in the zone around England." actions, to give this decree. If these documents are stricken, I cannot refute the evidence given, and I do not believe that it is the intention of the prosecution to hinder me and limit me in carrying out my work in this way. herself at the disposal of England, England was at war with Germany, and therefore the would be treated as hostile ships.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: I would like to say that I should have told the Tribunal I would make no objection to documents 53 and 54, because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the British Government.
THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn't object to 53 or 54.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don't object to them.
THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64.
Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; strike that out.
DR. SEIMERS: There is no objection to 53 and 54?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing with the Greek fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I hisheard.
DR. SEIMERS: Then we turn to document number 71. The same thing applies as I have stated regarding documents 101 and 107. to make these remarks right now. All of these documents are concerned with Norway -- that is, thos documents which deal with the plans that the Allies had with respect to Norway. They deal with the landing at Narvik and other cities, the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases and so on; the documents deal with all of these matters, for example, that the possibility of having ore fall into German hands should not be allowed. the same plan as the Finnish-Russian war, which had already been concluded.
To show that these documents are relevant, I must quote. Since the High Tribunal has told me that I should not quote, I am requesting that we deal only with these points. The facts, as found in these documents, agree, point by point, with those reports which Admiral Raeder, from September 1939 until March 1940, received from the Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht, which was headed by Admiral Canaris. These facts agree with the reports which Raeder received through the Marine Attache in Oslow, Schreiber, in the same period of time; and they also agree with the reports which he received in the form of a letter through Karl at the end of the year 1939.
out the large danger, which consisted in the fact that Norway might fall into the hands of the Allies and that then the war would be lost for Germany. Therefore, this is purely a strategic idea. The occupation of Norway was not, as contended by the prosecution, concerned with prestige or desire for conquest, but was because of these positive reports. reports, and second, that these reports were objective.
THE PRESIDENT You are dealing with 99, are you not?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B.
DR. SIEMERS: The group mentioned under the letter "F", the last on the page, is objected to by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the prosecution to that document was that it was a document of the 27th of April, 1940, at a time after Germany had invaded Norway. You haven't said anything about that.
DR. SIEMERS: Your Honor, I wanted to avoid dealing with each document separately, because I believed that I might treat them generally. However, in this specific case -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't want you to deal with each document separately. I thought you were dealing with document 99. If you can deal with them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great deal of the Tribunal's time.
DR. SIEMERS: In this document number 99 we are concerned with the meeting of the Combined Cabinet Council on the 27th of April, the leadership between England and France. Indubitably the heading shows that it was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal objection. discussed the happenings before the period of the occupation, and at this session the most essential leaders of the Allies took part. Alexander Cadogan, and so forth.
gentlemen discussed the previous plan that I admit had misfired through German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss the matter of how the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should have come into the hands of the Allies and now what was to be done to prevent there being used by Germany, and how it could be brought about that these iron-ore deposits could be destroyed. I believe, therefore, that even though formally, the period of time was later the trend of thought I have just pictured is of significance.
Then we turn to Document 100. This deals with the session of the French War Cabinet, of the 9th of April, 1940. And the same problem is dealt with here, that the planning on the part of the Allies was then what should be done since the report had just come in about an action on the part of Germany. already in May 1940 expected an intervention on the part of America. Spring of 1941 he was instrumental in bringing about a war against the U.S.A., through Japan, I want to say this document is of the utmost importance to me. I will leave this matter to the Prosecution and to the High Tribunal. the case of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I have not had the opportunityin the Ribbentrop case to define my position as far as justification is concerned. Therefore, in summary I would like to say that these documents were refused Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully-considered the arguments and decided those documents were inadmissible.
DR. SIEMERS: I have believed, your Honor, that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop case, for the point of view would be different. It is a different case. The accusation is leveled against Raeder, referring to Document C-152, that Raeder was responsible for the occupation of Greece.
That is an accusation that was not made against Ribbentrop. How can I contradict this accusation if these documents are not granted?
THE PRESIDENT: But the Tribunal know the documents and know the charges against Raeder, and they don't desire to hear any further argument on it. They will consider the matter.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the High Tribunal. Under these circumstances I am compelled to compare whether our documents were covered in Ribbentrop's case. According to my notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, they do not agree. Perhaps after the session I might point out that the documents are not exactly identical.
As a matter of fact, the documents in Ribbentrop's case are not used in their entirety. That is, the High Tribunal does not know the documents in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn was using exactly the same excerpts I wish to use, I am not able to say at this point. I know only that in the large majority the reproduction of the document is not complete in Dr. Horn's case, because his case is different, as he was interested -
THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us those extracts are the same ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents so far. We haven't seen the extracts.
(Brief consultation between Sir David and an associate.)
My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in German and we haven't had them translated. We did the best we could in German.
THE PRESIDENT: Twenty-four and 25, at any rate, are speeches in English.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, my Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, my Lord; these ones are.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as were rejected in Ribbentrop's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I didn't do the actual checking myself, but Major Barrington who checked the Ribbentrop documents went through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the basis of our note.
That is the position. I can't tell your Lordship that I have actually checked these myself.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers tells us that is not correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying he didn't know whether they were the same extracts -
DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please? I am not exactly certain that I can say in each specific case which extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but that some of them do not agree -- I know for certain that they do not agree, and I know that in order to alleviate the labor of the translating department I compared them and in a very few cases, in which agreement did take place, I told the translation division that such documents were identical, because I did not want them translated a second time. But I am sorry to say a large number of the documents were not the same, but they were different because of the point of view. Group D which are enumerated here as Ribbentrop documents 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, despite my every effort, cannot be found in the Ribbentrop document book, and the list does not show which numbers should be those in the Ribbentrop case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is suggested that those in the same series deal with the same subject. That is the question of Greece and the Balkans, and these documents the Tribunal ruled upon in the case of Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading C and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop's case, and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the documents rejected in Ribbentrop's case, to show they have some relevance to your case, and we shall expect to have that by five o'clock.
DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps say one word to what Sir David said regarding group "D"? There was no objection because they were already mentioned in Ribbentrop's case, but only because they deal with the same subject matter -- yes, the same subject matter is dealt with, and that is Greece, but I cannot say more than what I have said. worked for the occupation of all of Greece. In connection with the note of three lines, I can only make use of this if I may bring my Greek documents and if they are not turned down because, generally, in Ribbentrop's case the Greek documents were turned down.
Now, we turn to the document contained in the group "E", which begins with document 26. The same applies as I have already set out to the documents 101 through 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions in neutral Roumania and in the neutral Caucasus, as I would like to just say parenthetically, have already been dealt with in this proceeding. The High Tribunal will remember that in referring to the diary of Jodl, I asked Goering in his cross-examination, and he already testified as to the reports received by Germany, and pages 36 and 38 dealing with it gave testimony on this point; and this testimony is only concerned with the subjective side, that is the knowledge in the hands of Germany. I must prove that the objective side, that is the plans, are in accord with the subjective side, and my documents here are to serve this purpose. Document 26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 until 44, then number 99, which I have already dealt with, which seems to be here in duplicate, 101; 110 seems to be a duplicate, also. the attack on Norway. I have already set forth my basic principles and I beg the High Tribunal not to strike these documents. If I am not granted these documents, I am simply not in a positionto carry on my case in a reasonable manner without telling everything myself. I can only carry on the proof about the question of such importance if I have documents at my disposal, the same way as the Prosecution. But, if all of my documents, in fact, on this phase are stricken and taken from me, then I do not know how I shall treat this complex, and I believe that the High Tribunal will wish to assist me in this matter.
I am requesting them especially for the following reasons: When I gave my reasons for wanting evidence, I made the motion that the files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which dealt with the preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is in Norway. Sir David did not object at that time, but said only that he would have to consult the British Admiralty. The High Tribunal decided in accordance with my motion and granted my motion. In the meantime, the British Admiralty has reprieved it, and I assume that Sir David agrees with me. May I give the answer which has been put at my disposal? This answer is as follows: May I just make a preliminary remark?
THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not? We have had the answer and transmitted it to you.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Thank you very much. Therefore, even though I have the approval, I cannot do anything with it. Further, we can see that certain facts, which are essential to my evidence, are admitted by the British Admiralty, but, unfortunately, I do not have the possibility to prove my case through documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, at least please grant me the other possibility of presenting evidence, that is the documents contained in the German White Books. These are recognized documents. In all cases they are facsimiles, but these matters may be checked and investigated and I believe -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your application for particular documents. We are not dealing with any general argument or general criticisms that you have to make. We are only hearing you in answer to certain objections on behalf of the British Prosecution.
DR. SIEMERS: Your Honor, if I am not quite mistaken, in which case please correct me, Sir David, under the heading "F", which contains many documents, 59 to 91, with just a few exceptions, defined his position to these documents in general, and not each document separately. I will refer to each document separately, if you wish, but, in fact, I will have to say the same thing to practically each document and ask only that I be granted these documents on toto, for I cannot make much headway without these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. You were referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not prepared to disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these documents at all.
DR. DIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your Honor. Previously, I set forth very clearly why I need these documents for the carrying on of evidence regarding the Norway action but, beyond that I said, if these documents are not granted me, then I cannot carry on my case and I cannot defend my case. But I did ask the High Tribunal to take into consideration that the documents from London, which I had planned on, are not at my disposal, and I do not know why the request, which I submitted to the Tribunal in setting forth my reasons, is hold against me by the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?
DR. SIEMERS: I have concluded then, Your Honor. I may say only that it is not my intention at all to submit these documents in their entirety or read them in their entirety, but I wish to say that, if I am granted these documents, I can carry on my case much more easily and expeditiously, for these groups of documents show development in periods of time and the plans that were going on at that time. If I have a certain number of documents, I do not have to read each one; but, if I am just granted one document, I will be put in an extremely difficult position and will have to be more circumstantial which, if I can just refer to these documents -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it.
Now, Dr. Dix. BY DR. DIX (Counsel for defendant Schacht): co-knowledge as to the direct war objectives of Hitler. You rather skimmed the fact that Hitler never mentioned war to you. Do you have anything to add to this original statement? peaceful intentions and his intention to disarm.
attitude? Did the various members of the cabinet speak to you about their intent about the war? cabinet, did I ever hear anything that would point to the fact that anyone had the intention or would hail the fact if Germany would start a war.
Q Now, we will turn to your own attitude towards the war. You rather generally have indicated your position when you told us your ideology as a pacifist. I believe, therefore, it is more expedient if I refer to my document book and read an extract, and read the voice of a third party, a party who knows you very well, that is the former member of the Reichsbank directorate, Mr. Huelse. It is the document book Schacht 37-C, page 160 of the German text, and 168 of the English text. It is an affidavit. And there, beginning with paragraph 2, Huelse says:
"I recall several occasional talks with Dr. Schacht during the years 1935 to 1939 concerning war and armament. During these talks he always expressed his aversion toward any war and any war-like conduct. He represented the firm viewpoint that a war would bring even the winner only disadvantages and that a now European war would on the whole be a crime against culture and humanity. He hoped for Germany for a long period of peace which she needed more than other countries in order to improve and stabilize its unstable economic situation.
"To my knowledge until early in 1938, Dr. Schacht in meetings of the Reich Bank Board of Directors and in private conversations on the subject of armament spoke only of defense measures. I believe I can recall that he told me in the middle of the year 1938 that Hitler's provocative measures against Austria and the Sudeten country would from the military standpoint have been worse then thoughtless. He said that Germany had undertaken only a defensive armament plan, which was to serve as a defense against an attack by a larger power, but Hitler would really not have to count on that Probably he had never heard that the Wehrmacht was suitable or armed for a war of attack.
"When the war did break out and expanded more and more, he repeatedly said that he had erred in his judgment of the personality of Hitler; that he had hoped for long that Hitler would actually develop into a statesman who, after the experiences of the first World War, would avoid each and every war." Now, please give me your concrete statement to the actual Anschluss which took place and tell me about the manner and the attitude you took about the manner in which the Anschluss took place. that, and the Austrians did, too, and the various political negotiations which had taken place between Hitler, Schuschnigg, and so forth, pro and con, but, naturally, I was not advised about these negotiations, neither were the other ministers of the cabinet, with the exception of Goering and von Ribbentrop, and, perhaps, one or two more. The actual Anschluss in March was a complete surprise to us. I do not mean the fact of the Anschluss, but I mean the date. It was a complete surprise, as I said, and I and my acquaintances were not prepared for this.
Q How did you judge the manner and the phase of the Anschluss?
A. I believe as far as the form and the manner is concerned, I can say that the things that I have heard subsequently and also in these proceedings are not entirely gladsome, but I believe the fact of the Anschluss had very little practical influence. The whole thing was more or less of a demonstration to the outside world, as, perhaps, the marching into the Rhineland, but as far as the actual turn of events was concerned, the marching in of the troops was more or less of a solemn reception.
Q. The Prosecution contends that in March, 1938 the relationship between the schilling and the mark was regulated by you in the case of an Anschluss, and the Prosecution, I am sure, wants to prove that you had previous knowledge of this step of the Anschluss. Will you please tell us your position.
A. The facts to which the Prosecution refer are in the report of Oberstleutnant Zimmermann. On the 11th, in the afternoon about three o'clock, I believe I recall that, but I can not say whether it was by telephone or personally, that some lieutenant -- it may have been Heilemann -- inquired from me how the means of purchasing power for the troops would be regulated if German troops should march into Austria. He was interested in the currency problem. He wanted to know whether there were to be certain regulations in this regard, and I told him that, of course everything had to be paid for, that anything the troops bought would have to be paid for by them, and that the rate of exchange, if they paid in schillings rather than in marks, would be one mark as against two schillings. That was the rate which prevailed at the time. It had been fairly stable, and that was the active rate of exchange between the schilling and the mark. is the best proof that I had no prior knowledge of these matters.
Q. The Prosecution further accuses you that in your speech after the marching in of the troops you gave a National Socialist speech, used National Socialist phraseology and hailed the Anschluss. Perhaps we can use this opportunity to save time and to really define our position to the repeated accusation by the Prosecution that in speeches you used a tone of which it might perhaps be said that it was tinged with National Socialist phraseology.
That is something of which you have been accused. Will you please define your position and give reasons for your attitude?
A. If I did so in the first few years, I did so only in order to remind the Party and the people of the original Party program, to which the behavior of the Party dignitaries was in sharp opposition. I also tried to prove that the basic facts which I maintained in many political things agreed completely with the basic facts of the National Socialist program and were indicated in the wording of the program. That is equal rights for all, dignity of the individual, admiration for the church and so forth. phraseology, for, beginning with my speech at Koenigsberg, the antipathy between my opinions and Hitler's was entirely clear as far as the Party was concerned, and slowly I received the reputation among the Party as an enemy of the Party; that is, I was considered a man who had an opinion contrary to that of the Party. From that moment on, the possibility of my existence was endangered and in such moments when I saw my life, my freedom and my activity especially threatened, I laid a special emphasis on National Socialist phraseology to show that I wanted to remain in the sphere of the Party and of politics and that I wanted to cooperate with this policy in order to protect myself against these attacks.
Q. Therefore, to remind you of Gisevius and his word that you used certain methods. I am not completely familiar with them. May I read a brief extract in this connection from the affidavit of Schwiewind which has been quoted repeatedly. It is Exhibit No. 34. I have repeatedly indicated this page. It is German page 118, and 126 of the English text. It is quite brief. Schwiewind says:
"If Schahct on the other hand occasionally made statements which could be construed as more intensive identifiaction with the Hitler regime, then these statements were naturally known to us, but what Schacht thought in reality was known by almost every official in the Reichsbank and in the Reich Ministry for Economics. Above all, of course, by his closest co-workers.
"On Several occasions we asked Dr. Schacht if he had not gone too far in these statements.
He always replied that he was so strongly under fire from the Party and the SS that he could camouflage himself only with strong slogans and statements." official at the Ministry of Economics and worked directly under Schacht and with him. that you admitted that you thought Hitler capable of the intention of attack. Will you please tell us about that?
A. That affidavit of the British Major Tilly is entirely correct. I talked with Sir Tilly in preliminary interrogations, and I told him that in the year 1938, in the course of the events of the Fritsch affair and during the sunsequent time, I had reached the conviction that Hitler would not wish to avoid a war at all costs and that possibly he might seek to bring about a war, and I contemplated a series of statements by Hitler and asked myself the reason why Hitler in the course of the years had reached a conviction of this sort, that he might not avoid a war. my impression. My impression in fact was that Hitler had fallen into the role of each and every dictator who did not wish to resign in time from his seat of power -- that he must of necessity be ready to bring a certain amount of victory to his people, and I figured that that was the development of thought that took place in Hitler.
Q. Then, does the same explanation given about Napoleon by Count Metternich apply?
A. Yes.
Q. In parentheses and in passing, that first suspicion came to you with the Fritsch affair. The witness Gisevius has described the Fritsch affair at length to the Tribunal. We do not wish to repeat anything. Therefore, I am asking you to testify in the case of the Fritsch affair only as to those points over and above the testimony of Gisevius or those which differ.
DR. DIX: If that would take a considerable period of time, -- of course I can not judge that -- then I might perhaps suggest that we have our recess now, if the High Tribunal wishes.
A. I have just a brief remark.
DR. DIX: It is a brief remark. May he answer the question briefly?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if he can do it briefly, we had better have it not.
A. It is just a single remark that I have to add. The picture given by Gisevius about the happenings of the Fritsch affair is, in my knowledge and my experience with the matter, completely correct in each and every detail. I have nothing to add. I can only confirm the report given by Gisevius, but on the other hand I would like to refer to one speech of Hitler which he made on 20 February 1938 in the Reichstag. On that occasion, he made a remark which even at that time aroused my attention. He said -- and I quote this speech according to "Die Dokumente Der Deutschen Politik", which was available:
"The changes in the Reich Cabinet and in military administration from 4 February --" That is these changes which were made subsequent to the Fritsch affair -- "realized the strengthening of the military means to power and were to reach those military means of power, which the general times may indicate today." turning point from a peaceful to a military policy on Hitler's part, and I did not wish to avoid making reference to this so that I might complete the picture given by Gisevius.
DR. DIX: This is exhibit Number 28 of my document book, page 81 of the English text, page 74 of the German text. That is where you will find this passage.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. DIX: (Counsel for Defendant Schacht) about his intention to wage a war. By either speaking directly or indirectly did you participate in any such meetings? and Hitler. Did you not say so or did you follow Hitler's instructions at all times and can you in particular refer to your actual attitude for instance to the Jewish, Church Gestapo, Free Masons and other such questions? instructions, which were against my convictions and that I have not done anything either which was against my convictions. That from the beginning to Hitler personally I spoke my convictions and not only to my circle of friends and in the party circles, but before the entire public I spoke of my own convictions and I never concealed my views. soon after the cleaning-out action of the party on June 30th, I pointed out to Hitler that his actions were illegal. been presented by the Prosecution in half, which is a written report made by me on May 3, 1935, when I handed it to Hitler personally. The reason why I remember the date so exactly is because it came during a trial run of the Lloyd Steamer Scharnhorst, during which Hitler and I were both present. formed a sort of unit. Half concerned the fact that the wild and continuous collections made by various organizations of the party were to be stopped. being used for the purposes of the party, particularly for institutions and the building up of the party, but that the money was needed by us urgently for the expenses of the state, which had to of course include rearmament.The second half of that Document dealt with the culture questions.
The defense and I have made efforts for months to procure that second half of the Document from the Prosecution since the first half of the Document was submitted as evidence to this Tribunal. It has been impossible to obtain that second half. I must therefore confine myself to reiterating the contents.
I want to say, to begin with, that all such statements regarding the erroneous cultural and legal stand of the party and of Hitler could only be raised by me by giving as a reason my sphere of influence.
I stated therefore that my foreign policy was not seriously being damaged through the illegal and inhuman cultural and illegal policy as it was being carried out by Hitler. I pointed to the hostile attitude to the churches and in particular to the illegal treatment of the Jews. Furthermore I referred to the absolute illegal and willful handling of the actions of the Gestapo regime. I remember in that connection, I referred to the British Habeas Corpus Act, which for centuries in the past had been protecting the rights of the individuals and I expressed the fact that this wilfull attitude in the Gestapo was considered be me to be despicable before the entire world. run of the Lloyd Steamer Scharnhorst. Immediately after he read it, he called me to him and tried to quiet me down by making a statement similar to those which he made in July of 1934 when he told me these were temporary symptons of Revolutionary developments and that as time went by this would indeed sort itself out and disappear.