Since I was perfectly certain or the policy or the director of the Reichsbank, that all of these men agreed with no perfectly on the financial policy, that was the first possibility -- of applying the brakes, if things got too far out of hand; and of course, we will come to that later. The second safeguard, the certain limitation, was contained in the agreement which the Minister of Finance and the Government and with that, of course, Hitler, had made; and according to which Mefo Bills, the means of these credits, were to be paid back when they expired. On the other hand, Mefo Bills were repayable after five years, and I have already said that if that repayment had been carried out, means for rearmament would have had, of course, to decrease. That, in other words, was the second possibility of limiting the rearmament. you were dealing with at the time?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have no desire to enter into controversy about the figures of finance and rearmament. It seems that the details of dollars and cents -- or Reichsmarks -- are unimportant to this issue here, and terribly involved. We aren't trying whether the cost was too much or too little; the purpose of this rearmament is the only issue. I don't see that the statistics or cost has anything to do with it.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we would like to know what figures you are talking about.
DR. DIX: The sums that Schacht as President of the Reichsbank placed at the disposal of the rearmament program, or was ready to; That, no doubt, is relevant, because if these sums remained within such limits as might possibly be considered adequate for defensive rearmaments, then, of course, the extent of that financial assistance is a final piece of evidence regarding the intentions which Schacht was pursuing at the time.
That is the very thing that in the case of Schacht is relevant namely, whether he was preparing for an aggressive war.
If, on the other hand, he was considering the possibility of a defensive war in his financing and only placed suns at the disposal of the rearmanent program which would never have enabled that program in the position of carrying out an aggressive war, then that would be a contradiction of the accusation raised by the Prosecution against the accused, and I think that the relevance of that question cannot be doubted.
THE PRESIDENT: And you saying that if the Defendant placed at the disposal of the Reich, say, 100,000,000, or whatever the figure is, it would be defensive, and if he placed 150,000,000 it would not be defensive, or what? Is it simply the amount?
DR. DIX: No, I want to say that if, as will be proved, he only wanted to give nine and later on gave hesitatingly twelve million for the purpose, then that contribution can never have been aimed at an aggressive war.
THE PRESIDENT: It is simply the amount?
DR. DIX: Yes, only the amount.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that can be stated very shortly, but as for details of finance -
DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion, but it is not my fault that we have talked about it at such great length. I was only going to ask, what sum did you give, and at that moment the objection was raised, and thus the discussion was drawn out. May I put the question?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
Q Well, then which figure did you want to contribute? important. I have placed at their disposal -- to give one figure and to be very brief -- until 31 March 1938, credits amounting to a total of 12 milliards of reichsmarks. about the subject, and we have agreed that that was about one third of the amount which has been spent on re-armament. 1938, the figure stated in that budget year for rearmament was eleven milliards, and in the subsequent year, twenty and one half, and of that, not a penny came from the Reichsbank.
Q That was after you have left, was it not?
DR. DIX: For the record, I should like to say that I made a mistake the other day. I said millions instead of billions, but I think it is obvious.
Q Now, then, Dr. Schacht, the prosecution have stated that on 19 February 1935, the Ministry of Finance received authority to borrow unlimited amounts of money if Hitler ordered them to do so. The President of the Reichsbank is not responsible for the actions of the Ministry of Finance of the Reich.
I think the President of the Federal Reserve Bank in New York could hardly be held responsible for the things done by the Secretary of State in Washington, for instance. times during the time when you were president of the Reichsbank. fact that the birth rate in Germany rose during the time I was President of the Reichsbank. I just want to emphasize the fact that I was not participating.
Q For the same reason you were not responsible? that you in 1938 were drafting a new finance program?
A To the contrary I had turned it down. I had refused to do anything for the financing of rearmament, and the program of finance was compiled by the Secretary of State in the Reich Finance Ministry, and by God, it looked like it. of Economy, which have been accused as being in preparation for war, were the so-called New Plan. What was that? with rearmament. Germany, according to the Treaty of Versailles, had been put into a state of emergency, economically speaking.
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you. Your Lordship, if the Tribunal is of the
THE PRESIDENT: If you say, and the defendant has just said, that the I might leave it to the Prosecution to bring it out during the cross-examination. I cannot see, at any rate, what it can have to do with the preparation for war.
remove the Versailles Treaty by means of peaceful negotiations, or anxious to change it.
Were there any such means for a peaceful change of the Versailles Treaty at the time? The change of the Versailles Treaty by means of a war was a crime. preparations for war were part of your doing, and that re-armaments, without preparation of an aggressive war, re-armaments as such alone were a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. I assume that you at the time when you decided to assist financially in that re-armament had made both legal and moral inquiries and had thought about it from that point of view.
A I think I have answered that question in detail earlier. I have nothing to add.
Q Good. This attitude of yours, the attitude of a pacifist and as one who was definitely opposed to the extension of living space in Europe, was that attitude of yours known abroad? from March 1933--and I am, of course, only talking about the Hitler regime-my friends abroad and my acquaintances were efficiently and perfectly well informed about my attitude and views. I had many friends and acquaintances abroad, not only because of my profession but also outside of that, and particularly in Basle, Switzerland, where we had our monthly meeting at the International Bank. All the presidents of the large banks in all the large countries met, and I have always used all these meetings to tell these gentlemen quite clearly what the situation in Germany was. conferences or conversations. If one is not allowed to talk to foreigners any more, then one can, of course, not cone to any understanding with them. Those silly accusations that one had to avoid contact with foreigners appears to be perfectly unnecessary, and if the witness Gisevius thought-- and this corporal the other day--that he should protect his dead comrades, who were my dead comrades too, from being accused of committing high treason, then I should like to say that I consider it quite unnecessary. Never at anytime did any member of our group give away any German interests or violate them.
To the contrary, he fought for the interests of Germany, and to emphasize that, I should like to give you proof of that.
After we had occupied Paris, the files of the Quai d'Orsay were confiscated and were carefully screened by officials from the German Foreign Office. I need not assure you that on that occasion they were looking for proof whether there were not so-called defeatists circles in Germany who might be traced there in this foreign country. All the files of the Quai d'Orsay referring to my person and many discussions were of course recorded which I had had with Frenchmen, were searched by the Foreign Office officials at that time, without my knowledge, of course. received a letter from a German professor who had participated in that search that was carried out by the Foreign Office. I shall mention the name so that, if necessary, he can testify. It is Professor of Finance and National Economy, Professor Stuckenbeck of Erlangen, and he read to me-
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot see any point in this, so far as this trial is concerned. In any event, if the defendant says that he did not in any way give away the interests of Germany, surely that is sufficient. We do not need all the details about it. What it has to do with this trial, I do not know.
DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, that that was not the point of the statement. What he wants to say is that capable men abroad knew him and that they, in turn, knew that he was certainly a man of peace and not a man who prepared aggressive wars, and that applies to the period of re-armament.
THE PRESIDENT: But he said that five minutes ago.
DR. DIX: I do not think the question of Professor Stuckenbeck is so important. Lot us turn to the next problem. This is contained in Exhibit No. 18 of my document book. It is page 43 of the German text, and page 49 of the English text. May I read one paragraph, and may I ask Schacht briefly whether that statement of Ambassador Davies corresponds to his recollection?
It is Davies' report -- I beg your pardon. It isn't a report; it is an extract from his book "Mission to Moscow". It is a report to the Secretary of State in the United States, and the passages on page 108 and 109.
"In accordance to the plans made, I visited Foreign Kommissar Litvinov. Before leaving for the States, I presented my respects to him. I then stated that the European situation in its elementals looked simple and that it was difficult to understand why the statesmanship of Europe could not provide that England, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia should agree to preserve the territorial integrity of Europe and, through trade agreements, provide Germany with raw materials, thereby giving a guarantee that she could live. They would relieve the peoples of Europe and the world of these terrific burdens of armament and relieve the world of the fear of catastrophic war. The prompt rejoinder coming from Litvinov was: 'Do you think that Hitler would ever agre to anything like that?' I said that I didn't know that, but that in my opinion there was a considerable circle of influence and responsible men existed in Germany who would understand such a train of thoughts. Litvinov, the Foreign Kommissar, himself, replied that he thought that this might be the right way and that Schacht was such a man. He did not believe, however, that they could prevail against Hitler and the political and military forces dominant in Germany."
And now I ask you, do you remember that conversation with Davies?
A. I think there must be a mistake. I didn't speak to Davies; I spoke to Litvinov. This is a report of Davies to the Secretary of State, about which I did not know.
Q. Yes, you're perfectly right. ledge of Hitler's intentions of war must have been arising from your knowledge as Plenipotentiary for War Economy and from your membership of the Reich Defense Counsel. Goering has made a detailed statement on it. Have you anything to add to Goering's statement, anything new?
A. I think the witness Lammers has also talked about it. I should like to merely confirm that the first Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 was nothing other than the legal justification of a committee which existed before '33, and which contained ministerial officials who had to deal with economic matters, too, who had to deal with administration, and who, in the event of a threat of war against Germany, would have to act.
Q. How often did you meet the Ministry of War and the Plenipotentiary for Administration?
A. This famous three-men group mentioned by one of the Prosecutors as the cornerstone of war policy never met at all, and it isn't a miracle that we lost the war, if that was the cornerstone.
Q. The Prosecution have also referred to the report of the Ministry of War regarding the task of the Peich Defense Counsel. It is document EC-128, US-623. Have you anything in particular to add to that?
A. Yes, I should like to have permission to quote one very brief paragraph. As I can see, there are only two sentences. This report contains the following statement: It is, incidentally, with reference to the first World War and the experiences made during it, that is 1914 to 1918, and I quote -- I shall have to do it in English since I only have the English translation. I quote:
"At that time we were able to extend our bases for raw materials and production towards the West. For a long time we took from Antwerp (textiles), and enlarged towards the East and Southwest (in Serbia and Turkey) (mineral oils in Rumania). Today we have to reckon with the possibility of dealings thrown back in our country and even of being deprived thereby of most valuable industrial and raw material in the West and in the East." expected in September that one would have to protect oneself against the possibility of such a situation, that this is the best proof that an aggressive war wouldn't possibly have been meant in this connection.
Q. In that connection, under the heading of peaceful efforts, can you perhaps tell the Tribunal what your peaceful efforts were, stipulating that reparations should become less severe or to an end?
A. Right from the very first moment, after I heard of the sums of the reparations which took place, in 1921, I think I fought against this nonsense, using the evidence that the carrying out of these reparations would throw the entire world into economic chaos.
One cannot during one generation pay two billions of marks as they are here.
Q. Well, all right. Will you please be brief and talk about your peaceful efforts and don't talk about economy?
A. Rightfully I thought about it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing the public of all this nonsense which in terms meant that in July, if I'm not mistaken, of 1932, the then Chancellor Papen of the Reich was in a position to affix his signature to an agreement at Lusanne, which reduced reparations, in fact, to an impending sum of three billions, but which, in fact, can celled reparations altogether.
Q. Regarding your definitely peaceful efforts, did you continue them elsewhere? That is the question of the negotiations in Paris. You've touched on it regarding the colonial questions. Have you anything to add to that in this connection?
A. I don't remember at the moment how far I had gone there at the time, but I think I reported on the negotiations in detail, so I needn't repeat.
Q. George Messersmith, the often-mentioned former Consul General of the United States in Berlin, states in his affidavit EC-451, US Exhibit No 626, to which the Prosecution has referred, that he is of the opinion that the National Socialist regime could not have been in a position to stay in power and that its war machine could not have been prepared if there hadn't been your activities and participation. At the end of the case for the Prosecution, the Prosecution are using that thesis of Messersmith's, and I should like you to make a statement on this subject.
A. I don't know whether that completely unsubstantiated private opinion of Mr. Messersmith has any value as evidence. Nevertheless, I should like to contradict it by means of a few figures. I had stated earlier that until the 31st of March, 1938, the Reichsbank had contributed twelve billions; that is to say, during the first budget year, two and a half quarter billions, and during the subsequent three years, three and a quarter billions per annum.
During those years -- and defendant Keitel has been asked about that when he was examined here -- it has been stated by Keitel that armament expenditure amounted to the following figures:
Budget year '35, '36 -- 7 Billions Budget year '36, '37 -- 7 Billions And at that stage the assistance of the Reichsbank ceased.
In spite of that, during the following year and without any assistance from the Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament amounted to 11 billions, and in the following year it climbed to twenty and a half billions. Schacht, they managed to get hold of the cash. Just how they did, that's another question.
Q. Some time ago, Dr. Schacht, I put figures before the witness Keitel. I don't think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now available and has the Exhibit No. 7. It is pare 15 of the German text and page 21 of the English text. Mr. Keitel could, of course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total expenditure, but there is a second and a third column in this balance sheet, and these two columns are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding those figures which were split with the help, and without the help of the Reichsbank.
I don't intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely like to have your permission to put the question to Schacht whether the figures in column 2 and 3 of the document were calculated by him and whether they are calculated correctly.
A I have got the copy of the document before me. The figures are absolutely correct, and again I want to declare that during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued their assistance, no less than five and a quarter billions more were spent without the assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of 11 billions. and extensive rearmament and that you did so by putting the hand in the money bag. Did you not act against undue rearament in any other way, for instance, by means of giving lectures? have often spoken, by arrangement with the Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy, before high ranking officers. During all the lectures I have continuously referred to the financial and economic limitations which would stand agains German rearament, and I have warned against excessive rearmament. ment was excessive and exaggerated?
A It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning in 1935, I made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of rearmament. On one occasion Hitler had said--just a moment, I have got it--that until the spring of 1936 the speed of rearament would have to be continued. I adhered to that as much as possible, although beginning during the second half of 1935 I continuously applied the brake But after 1935 I told myself that since the Fuehrer himself had said that after the spring of 1936 then the speed wouldn't be necessary any more--something which is contained in Document PS-1301, in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements which I have communicated to the so-called Smaller Cabinet Council. Goering contradicted me during that meeting, but I of course maintained the things which I said at the time. of slowing down the speed of rearament in the interest of general economy, since I wanted to see the economic system work for exports. Proof for the fact of just how much I urged the Minister of War is contained in my letter dated the 24th of December 1935. and when I was already applying the brake, I wrote a letter to him, which has also been used by the Prosecution and submitted to the Tribunal.
It has the document dumber, PS-1301. In the English version of the document it is on page 25.
I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly. All my quotations are brief from that document. In that case I am writing a letter to the Reich Minister of War, and I quote. And then come the reference numbers.
"Reference letter dated 29th of November, from which I gather that increased demands by the armed forces for copper and lead are to be expected, which will amount to practically double the present consumption. This appears only to be current demands, whereas the aqually urgent demands to be expected are not contained in the figures.
"You are expecting me to obtain the necessary foreign currency for these demands of yours, and to that I respectfully reply that under the existing circumstances I see no possibility of doing so." End of quotation. currency, and I am stating quite clearly that I don't see any possibility of doing so. I quote:
"In all the conferences held with the Fuehrer and Vice Chancellor up to now, also held together with the leading military departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would be possible, regarding the existing degree of rearmament until the first of April 1936, to supply the necessary foreign currencies and raw materials for these purposes.
"Although, due to our cultural policy which is being turned down everywhere abroad and althouh this has been made extremely difficult for me, and continues to be difficult, I still hope that my original proposal may still be carried out first of April, but that, over and above that, I thought I couldn't. raise credits for railway purposes.
What was your attitude as president of the Reichsbank regarding these wishes of Dortmueller? during which the Fuehrer supported strongly Dortmueller's demands, I turned that credit down straightway, and he didn't get it. Cabinet Council, presided over by Goering, dated the 27th of May 1936, that it was the opinion by all the Prosecution that during that meeting the intention of an aggressive war became apparent. Have you any knowledge of that meeting?
A What was the date, please?
A No. I was present during that conference, and I see nothing contained in the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. I have studied that document very carefully. report of Ambassador Bullit, M-151, dated 23rd of November 1937. You have heard of course that the Prosecution is drawing the conclusion from that report that there were aggressive intentions on Hitler's part. Will you make a statement on that subject? to start an aggressive war. The intention of Hitler to bring about an Anschluss of Austria is all I an talking about in this connection, and the hope that the Sudeten Germans would be given autonomy. Neither of those two actions would be aggressive war, and apart from that, Mr. Bullit is saying with reference to me in his report about this conversation that-- and I quote:
"Schacht then went on to speak on the absolute necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe". End of quotation. and it is Exhibit Number 22. It is on page 64 of the English text and page 57 of the German text.
We shall now have to deal with your so-called knowledge of Hitler's intentions to start war. First of all, quite generally, did Hitler -
SIR DAVID MZXWELL-FYFE: (Interposing) My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if he would object if the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing to a new point, to mention the question of the Reader documents. I had a discussion with Dr. Sie mers. There are still some outstanding points, and we should be grateful if the Tribunal would hear us this afternoon, if possible, because the translating division is waiting for the Raeder documents to got on with their translations.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department is waiting, perhaps we had better do it at 2:00 o'clock.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It isn't likely, I suppose, to take more than that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don't think it will take mere than that.
THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2:00 o'clock, and now we will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
Official transcript of the International Military
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: May it please your Lordship, the Tribunal should have in front of them a statement of our objections to certain of the documents arranged in six groups. Attached to that sheet, they will find an English summary of the documents, presenting shortly the contents of each one of them. My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make two erasures from our objection to No. 19, which has been allowed in the case of Schacht and, if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly, he doesn't press for No. 76.
Now, my Lord, the others in that group, No. 9, are a series of quotations from Learner's book on "Versailles."
No. 10, the quotation from a book by the German leftwing publicist, Thomas Mann.
No. 17 is "The Failure of a Mission," by Sir Neville Henderson.
No. 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill's.
No. 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about an article in the News Chronicle, criticizing Hitler.
My Lord, No. 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would be good enough to lock at it, it is a report by a German lawyer. Dr. Moesler, I think his name should be, who is an authority on international law, dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has been of course absolutely frank with me and he said that it would be convenient to him to have these, what is really legal argument, embodied in his document book. Of course, that is not really the purpose of these document bocks but, of course, it is a matter of the Tribunal and we felt we had to draw attention to it. prosecution submit, have no evidential value. prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues in the case.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn't deal with 109, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am sorry, my Lord, it is on the second line. That is another legal argument, the effect of the war on the legal position of I eland, which is a quotation from the British Journal of Information in Public Law and International Law.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the prosecution submits, are irrelevant.
No. 22 is a Belgian Decree of 1937, dealing with the possible evacuation of the civil population in time of war.
63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and another by Mr. Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece, at the end of 1940, some two months after the beginning of the Italian campaign against Greece.
No. 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of routes in Belgium, which doesn't seem to us to have any evidential importance.
76 comes out as "The Altmark".
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, my Lord, that is "The Altmark". It is the same one that is in 71. I am sorry, my Lord, it should have been marked out again. the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a suggestion of Monsieur Paul Reynaud, with regard to the Swedish or mines and it was long after the Norway campaign and it was never, of course, acted upon in Norway, and it seems to us to have no relevance for this trial.
102 to 107, I have dealt with under one. They have certain very small unimportant memorandum relating to the Low Countries. statement from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, which again doesn't seem of much importance in 1946. Tribunal when applied for by the defendant Ribbentrop. The first two deal with British rearmament and the others deal with the Balkans and Greece. The Tribunal will probably remember the group which they did reject in the Ribbentrop application; and the fourth group are other documents of the same series as these rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the defendant von Ribbentrop.
The fifth group, they are really objectionable on the tu quoque basis. I think they are entirely French documents which deal with proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged but never followed out, with regard to the destruction of the oil fields or the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with the most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The plans were never put into operation. after the occupation, of France. As I understand Dr. Siemer's argument, it is not suggested that these documents were within the knowledge of the defendants at the time that they carried out the aggression against Norway but it is stated that they had other information. Of course, as to their own information, we have not made any objection at all, and that these documents might be argued, to be corroborative of their agents' reports. Actually, as assumed by document 83, to which we make no objection, they also deal with tentative proposals which were not put into effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission of the prosecution, the important matter must be, what was within the knowledge of the defendants before the 9th April 1940, and it is irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which are only debatable, consistent with the information which the defendants stated they had. the Tribunal on the time but I hoped that I have indicated very clearly what our objections were.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for defendant Raeder): High Tribunal, it is extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many documents, especially since I know that the documents have not been translated and that the contents are not known as yet in their entirety. Therefore, I would like to point out that there is a certain danger in the treating of these documents. In part, we are concerned with the basic parts of my defense. right at the beginning, that I might be forced, in order to give the reasons for the relevancy of this evidence, to point out passages which I will not need to read in their entirety, for as soon as the document book is completed they will be known to the Tribunal and it will be possible to read them at that time.
I will follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, I shall deal with the first group, Documents 9 and 10. The note by Sir David which has been submitted to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents is in conflict with the resolution given by the Tribunal on the 29th of March. Therefore, I would like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is in error. The resolution by the Tribunal said that no documents might be submitted showing the injustice of the Versailles Treaty, and stressing the fact that it was given under duress. These documents do not deal with these two points of injustice and duress. On the other hand, they show the subjective attitude of a man such as Noske, who was a Social Democrat and assuredly did not want to carry through any wars of aggression. the thought of the regime and public spending at the time, which were intentions of defense and the danger that in case of an attack, for instance on the part of Poland, the German Wehrmacht would be too weak. These are facts pure and simple, and I give you my assurance that I will never quote any sentences which might have a polemic interpretation. I just need this as a basis for my trial brief.
No. 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson "Failure of a Mission". This dates back to the year 1940. I wish to quote perhaps 15 lines which I would like to use in my trial brief to show that Henderson, who know Germany extremely well, believed even in 1940 that he could see positive signs of the regime at that time.
I believe one cannot expect that a military commander in chief would be more of a sceptic than the British ambassador at that time.
Then we turn to Document No. 45. This document is taken from a book by Churchill, but this excerpt deals with the fact which I would like to prove, the fact that many years before the First World War the British Committee for Defense existed. In the table of contents which Sir David submitted, the word Reichsverteidigungsausschuss is used, and I conclude therefrom that the Prosecution was in error on this point and the German Reichsverteidigungsausschuss is not meant; that is a mistake. This document shows how it came about that the Prosecution over-estimated the importance of this German Committee, for the Prosecution confused the German committee with the British committee, the British committee being of much greater importance and authority than the German one.
Turning to No. 47, this proves that an article against Hitler appeared in a British paper, in the News Chronicle, and Lord Halifax at that time pointed out that it was not in his sphere to influence papers and newspapers. I must point out -- and I would like to state it at this point -- that the Prosecution pictured Raeder in such a way as though he were in some way connected with the rather regrettable article in the Voelkischer Beobachter saying that Churchill had sunk the Athenia. Raeder had no more connection with that article than had Lord Halifax with the article in the News Chronicle.
No. 60 deals with the approval of Dr. Mosler who was a specialist on international law. It applies to the Norway action, and this is a passage which I am sure the Tribunal will agree with me on, that in the framework of my defense as far as the Norway action is concerned, I must speak about the basis of international law involved. The basis of international law is not an entirely simple matter. I am not against the matter of having to present this material myself. I was guided by the thought that the Tribunal has asked again and again that we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this matter is granted me so that I shall not be obligated to use the numerous excerpts and quotations from authors singly, and to give the basis in law for each specific case.