THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what Beak actually did.
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to break off. What I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in a memorandum and offered to resign, and that was some minutes ago, and since then he was talking and had not told us what Beck did.
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We sill adjourn now.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday morning but will be sitting in closed session. BY DR. DIX: General Beck---when he offered his resignation, what were the details of that speech? in office but Beck refused and he insisted upon his resignation. Subsequently, both Hitler and Brauchitsch continued to ask Beck, to ask him not to have his resignation published at least and they asked him if he, Beck, would not formally defer his resignation for a few months. Beck, who hadn't gone the way to high treason at that time, believed that Frick's request ought to be complied with. This loyal attitude of his was later deeply regretted by him. The facts are, that as early as the end of May or the beginning of June, his successor, General Halder, was handling the business of the Chief of General Staff and from that moment onward, Beck no longer in effect was carrying out his duties. derived from which observations and what conversations, with whom? G oerdeler, schacht and a whole group of people, and the question why Beck did not publicize his retirement was weighing on his mind so much later that it was a frequent subject of all our conversations.
Q That was Beck's resignation, but then in the consideration there was the ghost of the problem of the possible resignation on Schacht's part. signation on Schacht's part, was that discussed as far as you know, between Schacht and Beck?
A Yes, it was discussed in great detail. It was Beck's opinion that his resignation alone might not be sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore with the request whether Schacht would not in turn join Beck's resignation and resign himself. The subject was discussed in great detail between Beck and Schacht personally on one part and also on the other part between Oster and myself, who were the two intermediaries. During these conferences, I must confess that I, too, was of the opinion that Schacht should retire in all circumstances and that was the sense in which I advised him. It was Oster's opinion, however, and he asked Schacht that he should remain in office in any case, since it was necessary for the influence of Beck to boar on the generals that Schacht should remain a minister and remain in office. Respectfully, I must say here that my advice given to Schacht was wrong. The events which I shall come to describe later and will have confirmed this, how important it was for Oster and others that Schacht should remain in office.
Q That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht's conscience. You have put in evidence before this Tribunal, saying what your opinions were and what Oster's opinions were, but perhaps it may be assumed ---
THE PRESIDENT: Go on. BY DR. DIX:
Q But now, what pangs of conscience did Schacht suffer; what were the pro's and con's of his consideration and did he discuss them with you? Did he discuss his final decision?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don't object to the defendants trying their ease in their own way, but I do think we are passing beyond the limits of profitable inquiry here.
Schacht is present; he is the man who can tell us about his conscience, and I know of no way that another witness can do so, and I think it is not a question to which the answer would have probative value, and I object respectfully.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us as to what Schacht did, not tell us, but get from the witness what Schacht did.
DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is true, of course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his own reasons best and that the witness can't make statements on the subject, but in a question which is as tricky as this, and the justification of which is subject to argument -- even Justice Jackson seems to be inclined to consider Schacht's thoughts not justified at the time -- it appears to me that at least, based on our type of evidence, it is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye and car witness what considerations there were and whether they were in reality given at the time, so it may not be considered that Schacht, ex post facto, might give an explanation, which after all is a suspicion under which a defendant must always labor.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell us what Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought.
DR. DIX: Quite true, your Lordship, and he only meant to say what he, Schacht, told the witness about his opinions at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think we need have any further discussion about it. The witness has heard what I have said, and you can ask him what Schacht said or what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought. BY DR. DIX: his resignation? experienced there was no certainty that the generals would ever really revolt. For that reason, he as a politician considered it his duty to prepare himself for such possibilities which might bring about a change in conditions in Germany without a revolution. For that, he had a plan which he explained to me at the time. Schacht told me, "I have got Hitler by the throat." He meant by that, as he explained to me in great detail, that now the day was approaching where the debts which had been incurred by the Reich Bank, by the Reich Minister of Finance, and thereby the High Reich Cabinet, would have to be repaid.
Schacht doubted that the Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared to take ever the moral and legal duty of repaying the credits which had been given. resignation, with the direct threat of the Reich Bank, and he was hoping that in that situation the other ministers of the Reich, who in their majority were still civil at the time, would follow suit.
That is what he meant when he said to me, "I have still got one arrow which I can shoot, and this is the moment when von Neurath, Guertner and Seldte cannot refuse to become my followers." such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the steps which would betaken to dispose of him would be much mere commonplace. Schacht did not believe me, and he told me that he would achieve one thing, that these things would have to be discussed in the Cabinet, and then he would achieve a similarly alarming situation in Germany as had existed in February 1938 on the occasion of the Fritzsch crisis. He therefore expected a reformation of the cabinet in the radical sense, which Would enable the psychological interference on the part of the generals. on the generals to make a revolution. which generals was he referring to, and what did he mean? situation which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May to September 1938 when we drifted into the crisis of the war against Czechoslovakia, was that Beck, on the occasion of his resignation, had assured us -- and I mean Goerdeler, Schacht and other politicians -- that he would leave to us a successor who would be more energetic than he himself, and he was determined to cause a revolution if Hitler should decide on a war. As a matter of fact, General Halder, immediately after he came, took steps to get in touch with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our entire group, and toopen conversations of that type. A few days after he took over his office, he sent. for Oster and informed him that he considered that matters were drifting into a war, and that he would then carry out a revolutionary act.
He asked Oster what he, for his part, had done to include the civilians in the plot. and Schacht? since there were only a few, he replied that to the best of his knowledge he only know two civilians with whom Halder could have preliminary political conversations; one was Goerdeler, the other, Schacht. Goerdeler. He based that on the assumption that it was too dangerous for him then to receive a man whom he didn't even know. Whilst there were no official motives to have a conference with Sohacht, Halder asked Oster to act as intermediary for such a conference with Schacht. Through my agency, Oster addressed Schacht and Schacht was prepared. A meeting was to be arranged in a third place, and I warned Schacht and told him, "Have Halder come to your apartment to that you are sure of the facts." of 1938 in his apartment, and he informed him that matters had reached a stage where war was imminent, and that he, Halder, would then cause a revolution and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared to aid him politically.
Q That is what Schacht told you at the time? Oster, and Oster told it to me since I was the intermediary.
Schacht replied, immediately after this visit of Halder's, assuring me that he was prepared to do everything if the generals were to decide to remove Hitler.
The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him about the conversation, and he asked Oster whether everything had now been prepared for such a revolt as far as the police were concerned.
Oster suggested that Halder should talk to me personally about these matters. I had a long conference in the dark of the night with Halder about this revolt. Halder stated to me as his intention at that time. First of all Halder assured me that he had no doubt whatever, contrary to many other generals, that Hitler wanted war. Halder described Hitler to me as being bloodthirsty, a drinker of blood, and Halder referred to the blood bath of the 30th of June. Halder also told no that it was, unfortunately, terribly difficult to convince the generals, in particular the junior officers, just what Hitler's real intentions were, because outwardly the slogan with which the officers corps was being influenced was still that that was only a colossal bluff, that the army could be absolutely certain that Hitler would not start a war, and that he was only carrying out a diplomatic maneuver of blackmail of a great size and scale. necessary that even the last captain should be given the evidenc proving that Hitler was not Fluffing at all, but that in fact the order for war had been given. Halder, therefore, was decided a that time to have the German nation informed, and for the sake of the officers he would even tolerate the outbreak of war.
But even then Halder was afraid of the Hitler myth and so he suggested to me that the day after the outbreak of war one should remove Hitler by means of a bomb and to tell the German people, as far as possible, that Hitler had been killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Fuehrer's train. at any rate that I could not understand that at least not afterwards he would not want to tell the people, the German people, what the generals had been doin Then, for a few weeks there was no news from Halder.
The press campaign of hatred against Czechoslovakia took a more and more threatening character and we guessed that new it would be only a few weeks or perhaps months and the outbreak of war would come. once again and to remind him of his word. I thought it a good thing that a witness should bepresent during that conversation and for that reason I accompanied Schacht. I did not have the impression that Halder was too pleased about the presence of a witness. Halder once again confirmed that he was quite decided to cause a revolt but once again he wished to wait until the Germa nation had received proof of Hitler's final intentions to wage war by means of a final order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous danger of such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that it could not possibly be tolerated that a war should start only to prove to the German nation that the legend of Hitler was false and in a detailed and very excited conversation Halder now declared that he was prepared to start the revolt not after the official start of the war but at that very moment when Hitler had given the final order to march to the armed forces. situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him by a blitz. Halder replied literally:
"No, he cannot cheat me. I have designed my general staff plans in such a way that I shall know it forty-eight hours in advance." events when the period between the order to march and the actual march itself was shortened considerably.
armored division ready in Thuringia which was under the command of General von Hoeppner which could possibly deal with the life guard station in Munich and stop them from marching to Berlin. impression, after that conference, that there was something bitter attached to it. Halder had told Schacht that he, Schacht, appeared to push him, press him to cause this revolt prematurely and Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder might let us down at the last moment. We informed Oster immediately of the bad impression which we had had and we told Oster that something must be done so as to win another general over to us. Halder might not act at the last minute. Oster agreed and this is the preliminary history as to how General Field Marshal von Witzleben first turned to our circle of conspirators.
Q Who won Von Witzleben over?
Q Who did? Consequently Witzleben sent for me and I told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as commanding general of the Army Corps, stationed in Berlin, could dare to cause a revolt and Witzleben put the question to me which ever general was putting to us at that time, whether it was true that a diplomatic incident in the east could really lead to war or whether it was not true that Hitler and Ribbentrop had told the generals confidentially and confidentially again and again that there was a silent agreement with the western powers according to which Germany would be given a free hand in the east. Witzleben said in that case, if such an agreement really existed then he could, of course, not cause such a revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht could no doubt give him information based on his excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality.
A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben brought with him the Division General von Brockdorf, who was to carry out the Putsch in practice and he joined us during thatconference. Witzleben, Brockdorf and I, together, went to Schacht's country house to have a conference which lasted for hours.
The final result was that Witzleben felt himself convinced by Schacht that the western powers would not under any circumstances allow Germany to move into the eastern territories and that now had come the end of Hitler's policy of surprises. Witzleben made his decision that he, on his part and independentl from Halder, would make all preparations which were necessary if he wanted to act. so that I would be under his personal protection there and could make all the political and police preparations which might be necessary. He detailed General von Brockdorf and he and I visited all locations in Berlin which Brockdorf intended to occupy with his division from Potsdam. Von Struenk was at the wheel and we discussed the problems and made detailed investigations of what would bee necessary.
I owe you a brief explanation as to why Witzleben's cooperation was so utterly necessary. It was not so easy to find a general who had the actual power and authority to have his troops march. For instance, there were certain generals in the provinces who could not give their troops the order to march.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter in such detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in?
DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben should have joined are perhaps not essential for us and we can perhaps drop the subject. BY Dr. DIX:
Q Will you please, Dr. Gisevius, tell me did these military andpolice preparations which you have described come to Schacht's knowledge currently?
A Schacht was being currently informed about all these matters. We met in the evening in the apartment of von Witzleben and everything that I had done and put into writing I would show them. It was then discussed in great detail. mentioned, were political measures gone into?
A Yes, of course. We had to prepare in great detail what the German nation would be told in such a case just as there were certain preparations which had to be made regarding foreign countries.
Q Do you mean foreign politically?
Q Was the Foreign Office included or what do you mean "when you say "foreign politically."? foreign countries during war time or immediately before the war is a matter which can only be discussed under difficulties and we are touching upon a very difficult and tricky subject. If I am to talk about it then it is at least as important that the dates and the timing of what I say should be mentioned and what caused the people in question to get into touch with foreign countries.
Q I am quite sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do so. I think that the Tribunal will allow you to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going into too great detail over these matters.
DR. DIX: But, in my opinion, I should have to touch upon the seriousness and intensity of the activities of these conspirators, and I should substantiate them in detail. I don't really think it is enough that some one had such plans.
THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon then since 10 o'clock this morning.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now using the technique of letting the witness tell the political developments.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you would be half hour longer. Do you remember saying that? Perhaps it was a mis-translation.
DR. DIX: Oh no, that is a terrible misunderstanding. I said that if I wer to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, then that would take a half hour; that is, the Fritsch crisis alone.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, this is the situation. We are now hearing the work and the history of the political opposition, in which Schacht played a lea ding role. If the defendant Goering and others had time to tell the story of th events from their point of view, for days, then I think it would be a matter of justice that those men too, who are represented in this court room by the defendant Schacht who fought against that system under the most terrible conditions of terror, should also be given a chance to tell the story of their opposition. fluous things now -- to give me permission so that the witness may complete his story of the measures taken by the conspirator's group, Schacht, Canaris, and others. I consider that of the greatesr importance. And I assume, Your Lordship that if it is not done now, then the prosecution will very probably do so during cross-examination; and since it is now being told coherently, it will probably occupy less time than if we had to wait for the cross-examination by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you how you are to prove your case, but they hope that you will deal with it as shortly as possibl and without unnecessary details.
DR. DIX: Please, gentlemen, be convinced of that.
BY DR. DIX: and you were just going to talk about the motives which some of you had when you called upon foreign countries for support of your movement. Will you talk about that briefly? that very moment there were considerable and substantial discussions with foreign countries so as to try absolutely everything to prevent the outbreak, or at least the spreading, of that war. However, as long as I am not in a position to bring up the motives of such an extremely tricky matter, where at least in Germany we had been accused of high treason -- as long as that is the case, I shall not say more than just the fact that these conversations had taken place. producing your motives. Therefore, you may state them. who are now dead, that I should state here that in those matters which I have described we suffered from tremendous pressure upon our consciences. We knew that we would be accused of conspiring with countries abroad.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these matters were not conducted without danger, but we are not really here for the purpose of conside ring people who have, unfortunately, lost their lives. We are considering the case of the Defendant Schacht at the moment.
DR. DIX: I think the witness' intentions have been misunderstood.
He was not going to talk about those men who had lost their lives, and he does not want to talk about the dangers. He wants to talk about the conflicts of their consciences, which was suffered by those who inaugurated those steps and who undertook them. I think that privilege should be granted the witness if he is to talk about this very delicate matter in public here.
I should, therefore, beg you to allow it. Otherwise, the witness will confine himself to general hints which do not help my defendant, and I am sure that the prosecution, perhaps, would ask him that question anyway.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the point? We, of course, can't tell what he wants to talk about. We can only tell about what he does talk about. BY DR. DIX: those who took up these connections, and I think you ought to refer to the actual connections you made.
A Mr. President, it wasn't a question of conscience. I was concerned with the fact that dependents are still alive who may be subject to unjust accusations, and that is why I had to say, with reference to those conferences abroad which I shall describe, that our more intimate friends too were not aware of, or had not decided upon the measures which were admissible. One went further, while another considered himself more limited. mistakes which had been made in the reports of the press should be rectified, that he had turned around to conspire with foreign countries. And I must oppose the fact that anything I might say now should be applied to men whom I had mentioned earlier. That is the reason why I wanted to make that statement. did that sort of thing refused to be accused of high treason, because we felt that these attempts were our humane duty.
Q Well, then, what happened?
A What happened was this. Immediately after Hitler announced his intention to bring war to Czechoslovakia, friends currently attempted to inform the British Government of the first intention, until the last decision.
The chain of these attempts began with the journey of Goerdeler in the spring of 1938 to London, where he talked about the existence of such an opposition group, saying that they were resolved to take the last step. In the name of that group the British Government was continuously being informed about what was beginning to happen, and that it was absolutely essential that the German people should be clearly told, and so should the generals, that every step across the Czech border, as far as the Western Powers were concerned, would be a reason for a war. completed to the last detail, we took a step which was unusual because of its form and context: we had the British Government informed that during the pending diplomatic negotiations there would not, as Hitler stated, be the question of the Sudeten countries discussed only, but that Hitler had decided to bring war to the entire Czechoslovakian State; and that if the British Government were to remain firm, we in turn could give the assurance that the war would not happen. tance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation of a revolution. the Munich Conference. What were the activities of your conspirator's group at that time? convince Halder that he should cause that revolution at once. When Halder didn't seem to be quite clear about the facts and the actions, Witzleben prepared everything in great detail. I shall only describe the last two dramatic days. was going out to the lastin order to make the German people interested in a war. He ordered a raid of the armies in Berlin, and Witzleben had to carry it through. The effect the raid had was exactly the opposite. The population, being under the impression that these groups were going to war, showed openly that they were not pleased, and the troops did not receive enthusiasm, but, instead, clenched fists.
Chancellery, had an attack of fury. He stepped back from his window and said, "With such a people I cannot run a war." Witzleben, in turn, discussed it and said that he would have liked to have had troops, with bayonets, outside of the Reich Chancellery. Chancellery? And where do you derive your knowledge from regarding Hitler's remarks when he stepped back from the balcony?
the opportunity had come to start The revolt. On that morning too it had become known to us that Hitler had received the last offer from The British Prime Minister Chamberlain and had turned it down, and that an intermediary Wilson, had taken back a negative answer.
Witzleben received that letter and took it to Halder. He believed that now the proof for Hitler's will for a war had been established, and Halder agreed. Halder in turn visited von Brauchitsch while Witzleben was waiting in Halder's room. After a few moments Halder came back and said that now Brauchitsch too had realized that one would have to act and that he was merely going over to the Reich Chancellory to make quite sure whether Witzleben and Halder's description was correct. him over the telephone that everything was prepared. That is that midday of the 28th of September, when suddenly and against our expectation Mussolini's intervention took place in the Reich Chancellory and when Hitler, under the impression of Mussolini's stop, agreed to go to Munich. So that in fact in the last hour The action was made impossible.
Q You mean through Munich, don't you?
Q And now Munich was over. What were things like in your group of conspirators?
A We were extremely depressed. We were convinced that now Hitler would take his last stop, and quite soon. We did not doubt that Munich was the signal for the world war. Some of our friends were wondering whether they would emigrate, but Goerdeler and Schacht, with whom it was discussed, reacted differently. Goerdeler, under this consideration, wrote a letter to a political friend in America in which to him he put that question expressedly--whether the opposition people should now emigrate. Goerdeler said, "There is only one other possibility, and that is that by other methods we will be able to continue our political work in Germany."
We decided to hang on, and things hurried along past the Jewish pogroms to the occupation of Prague. Jewish pogrom in November, 1938, I take it. Do you know or can you recollect how Schacht acted on the occasion of those events? a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank.
Q I shall submit that speech later as evidence. And then how did things go on from there? We have come to the end of 1938. Were there now political events coming over the horizon which were stimulating to you conspirators? the directorate of the Reichsbank, and Schacht's wish that the cabinet would consult did not come true. Ourhopes to cause a cabinet crisis did not fulfil themselves. Thus our opposition group had no starting point, and we had to wait to see how things would develop. On the occasion of the conquering of Prague-
Q I am going to mention Schacht's resignation or dismissal from his position as president of the Reichsbank. Do you know anything about these events and the accompanying circumstances and the affect these things had on Schacht? in the Reichsbank, which became less and less strongly worded. I was there when the dismissal came. A few minutes after the letter of dismissal had arrived from Hitler Schacht read it to me, and he was disgusted about the contends. He repeated to me that passage in which Hitler is praising him because of his participation in the German rearmament program, and Schacht said, "And now he is even trying to pin me down to his policy of war."
Q But then Schacht remained as minister without portfolio. The problem whether to do so or not, or whether he could have acted differently, was that ever discussed between you and Schacht at the time?
which happened whenever he wanted to resign. He talked to Lammers, and I assume that Lammers gave him the customary reply. he was forced to remain? spook about Prague. Will you please describe the affects upon your group of conspirators, as far as Schacht was included? attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically called the "March Uproar." Since it was quite openly discussed in Berlin, we were hoping that news of this action would roach the American and British embassies. be were firmly convinced that this time there would not be a successful surprise. But Halder had already adopted a different view. He thought that Hitler had been given a free road to Prague by the western powers, and he refused to have preliminary conferences and wanted to wait. Whether this Prague action could be achieved without a fight, that of course happened. British and American embassy.
A Oh, no, I haven't.
Q Were you going to talk about it? Do you have something to say? hoping that the news would reach the embassies. went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group, is that correct? We were of the opinion that Prague would have incredible psychological effects upon the Germans. As far as foreign countries were concerned, Prague was the signal that there was no peace one could make with Hitler. But inside Germany we had to notice unfortunately that now the generals and the people were convinced that this Hitler can do whatever he wants to do; nobody will stop him: he is protected by Providence. This, of course, alarmed us. On one side we saw that the western powers were now no longer allowing these things to happen. On the other side we saw that within Germany the illusion grew that the western powers would not go as far as a war.
We could see that a war could only be prevented if the western powers would clearly not only tell the foreign minister and not only Hitler, but with all means of propaganda tell the German nation that now any further step towards the eat would mean war. That appeared to us to be the only possibility to warn the generals and to get them to revolt. In the conversation which Schacht, Goerdeler, and I were having outside, in Switzerland, immediately after Prague, that is what we were aiming at, governments. This man reported very exactly, at least to the French government. That is so nothing to which I can testify, because I have seen a copy of his report later after Paris was occupied. It was found among the secret papers of Daladier.
This man was informed in great detail, and we told him that, at the latest, in the autumn the fight for Danzig would start.
We told him that we as good Germans were without doubt of the opinion that Danzig was a German city and that one day that point would have to be discussed peacefully; but we also warned him that these conferences regarding Danzig were now being conducted in their particular way because Hitler didn't only want the whole of Poland; and because he didn't only want the whole of Poland but the Ukraine; and that was the reason why the foreign propaganda machine should become effective in Germany and make it abundantly clear that the limit had now been reached and that the Western powers would intervene. We said that only that would give us the possibility for a revolution.
Q And did that confidence man report at that stage as you had said?
A Yes, he had; and I must say that quite true public statements on the part of the British, partly through the radio and partly through the press, made in the House of Commons began to remove these doubts on the part of the German generals and the German people. Beginning at that time everything had been done by the British that could be done to alarm the German generals. at that time and did he talk with him in the same sense? Do you know? Were you there?
A Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to talk to a great friend of Prime Minister Chamberlain should not be allowed to pass, and Schacht had a very detailed discussion with Montague-Norman, so that he, too, would understand thepsychological atmosphere in Germany after Prague, and because he wanted to persuade him that the British Government should now carry out the necessary clarifying steps.
Q Wasn't the word predominant? You must say the Nazis were up against it in Germany at that time/
A Yes, it was the sense of all our discussions. We wanted it made clear to the German people that the Western powers weren't against Germany but only against those Nazis and their policy of suprise and their methods of terror, both in the country as well as outside.