Fritsch turned to the chief of the general staff, Beck. Chief of the general staff Beck intervened with Hitler. A tremendous struggle came about to have an investigation made about these terrible accusations against Fritsch. That struggle lasted about a week. There were dramatic disputes in the Reich Chancellory. At the end the famous 4th of February approached, at which date the generals were ordered to come to Berlin, who until that day--that is to say, ten days since the dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch--had no idea that both their superiors were no more in office. that they also were completely confused and had to be satisfied to accept that the affair should be investigated by the courts.
Q And did you know about the participants of that meeting?
A Yes. At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the report that they had a new commander in chief, General von Brauchitsch. Some of the generals had in the meantime been relieved from duty, and on the previous evening that report appeared in the newspapers in which Hitler, under the pretense of a concentration of conditions in the government, had dismissed the foreign minister, von Neurath, affected a change in the ministry of economics, had relieved a number of diplomats from duty, and then, as an appendix to that report, made a change in the war ministry and in the leadership of the army. of the court-martial which would have, to decide about the rehabilitation of General Fritsch. That was for everyone of us the moment when we believed we were able to prove before a supreme court with what means the Gestapo got rid of their political adversaries. Here was the only opportunity to hear witnesses under oath as to how that entire intrigue had been spun. So we went to work to prepare for that trial.
Q What do you mean by "we"? an honest judge and jury and participated in that Reich war court. He was a Reich court counsellor and later chief judge of the army, ministerial director Dr. Sack.
He was a man who believed that he owed it to the idea of law to work with all possible means for the clarification of these things. He did it, and he also went the way of death after the 20th of July. heard on their part the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated the records of the Gestapo, and it did not take long until, with the aid of the criminologist: Nebe, they found out definitely that in that entire affair one dealt with a double, not the General von Fritsch but a long-time before pensioned Captain von Fritsch.
In the course of that investigation the judges found out one more thing; they could prove that the Gestapo, as far back as the 15th of January, had been in the apartment of that double of von Fritsch and had questioned his mate.
May I come once mere to the dates. On the 15th of January the Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not the culprit. On the 24th of January the Defendant Goering brings the prisoner and witness into the Reich Chancellery in order to incriminate General Fritsch. incredible extent. Here we believed that now the most sceptical general could see that not only in the lower regions of the Gestapo, invisibly hidden, even in the ranks of the ministers in the Reich Chancellery, who knew nothing about it, things occurred which would force any person of decency to work against them. That was the reason that we found ourselves in a larger group united now, and that now we saw that from now on we did not have to collect secret material about the Gestapo. That, indeed, had been the great difficulty under which we had operated.
We heard a great deal, but when we would have passed on that material, every time we would have endangered these men who had given us that material and exposed them to Gestapo terror methods. fluence General von Brauchitsch and to persuade him to put the necessary material over to the Reich War Court.
Q. What do you mean "we"?
A. There was a group, of which I have to mention Dr. Schacht, who was extremely active at that time, who at that time went to Admiral Raeder, to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Guertner, and who tried at that time to explain everywhere: "Now the great crisis has arisen. Now we have to act. Now it is the task of the generals to rid us of that regime of terror."
But I have to mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 already Schacht had introduced me to Dr. Goerdler. I had the honor to set the same pace with that brave man from then on until the 20th of July. Now that I mentioned his name for the first time, in this room where so many terrible things are know, I want to make sure that also the name of the German I mentioned is a brave fighter for decency, and of whom I believed that one day, not only in Germany, he will be an ideal to prove that one can do his duty also under Gestapo terror faithfully until death. That Dr. Goerdler, who had always been a forceful and unerring fighter, at that time had courage beyond description similar to Dr. Schacht. He went from one ministry to the other, from one general to the next, and he always believed that now the hour had come where we had to form the great front of the decent one led by the General. Brauchitsch did not refuse at that time. He did not refuse to act to Guertner. In fact, he gave Guertner assurances for a putsch way into the limits of religion. And I man mention that Brauchitsch also gave me the solemn assurance that now he would use that opportunity to fight against the Gestapo; but Brauchitsch made one condition and that condition was accepted by the generals as a whole.
Brauchitsch said, "Hitler still is such a popular man. We are afraid of the Hitler might. We want to give to the German people and the world the last proof in the form of the session of the Reich War Court and its verdict.
Therefore, Brauchitsch postponed his action until the day when the verdict of the Reich War Court would be handed down.
The Reich war Court met. It began the session. The session was interrupted suddenly under dramatic circumstances. I have to add, however, that Hitler appointed as president of that Reich war Court the defendant Goering. And now the Reich War Court, under the chairmanship of Goering, met. I know from Nebe how thoroughly Goering during the preceding days had consulted Himmler and Heydrich. I know that Heydrich told Nebe that the Riech War Court will be the end of my career.
A. Did Nebe tell you that?
A. Nebe told me that, yes. On the same day, the very some day. The Reich War Court will be the great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Reich War Court met for several hours and was postponed under dramatic circumstances because that was the day on which the decision was made to have theGerman armies march into Austria.
At that time, already, we harbored no doubt as to why the chairman of that War Court had such an exorbitant interest to see to it that on that day the troops should get the march order and that he let then march with an apparent purpose on the outside. Only one week later the Reich War Court could meet again, but then Hitler was in his great triumph. The Germans had their first campaign of flowers behind them. The plebescite had been proclaimed. There was jubilation, and the confusion in the minds of the generals wasn't greater. So that War Court was dissolved, Frick's innocence was proclaimed. But Brauchitsch said, in that new psychological situation created by the annexation of Austria, he could no mere take the responsibility to recede to a putsch. deprived of its leading men. The generals were thrown into confusion without example, and from that moment on they continued steeply upward into radicalism.
DR. DIX: May I ask the Tribunal to be permitted to quote one sentence from a document which I will submit later as Schacht's Exhibit No. 15. My document book is still in the process of translation, but I hope that on the day of the hearing of Schacht it will be printed. It is only one sentence but it is interesting in this connection. It is from the bi-annual report.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal at all?
DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed for the question of translation and then for the question of admissibility; and then they have been mentioned here before the Court. So, I am of the conviction that the Prosecution knows about the documents. It is only one sentence. I do not believe that there will be any objections on the part of the Prosecution. Otherwise, it will be tern from its context and I would like to bring it in now. I can save that time later. It is one sentence from the bi-annual report of the Chief of Staff of the United States about the time -
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, Your Honor. I should like to know because we may want to ask some questions about it. I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do not have a copy of it and I do not know just what it is yet.
DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings, but, if I see that there are any difficulties and there will be a long discussion, I would rather not do it now and will present it then later on with my document book. It would not serve any purpose otherwise. BY DR. DIX: you please give some information as to the position of the German in a court investigation?
A Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you are better informed andcould answer better about the competency of the Chairman of the German Court, but I would like to say the following: documents of which we thought we would be able one day to submit to the public, and I hope we will find it. From that we can see that the defendant Goering as president decided the tone of the entire proceedings as well as the questions.
be put which could have been disagreeable. every way to cloak the true facts by the manner in which he led the proceedings. crisis the decisive preparatory step to the war, and you have accepted that term. After conclusion of the description of the Fritsch crisis, would you like to give us the reason for that opinion, and what was the impression on your group, especially on Schacht? cult in the ranks of the German opposition to utter the mere thought of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany the groups in opposition were so sure of the strength of the army and of the leading men that they believed it would be sufficient to put a man of honor, like Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. This thiught seemed inconceivable, that Fritsch would cultivate a sliding into terror or into war. one day it gees beyond the limits of its own people. We believed from past history to have to apply that fact as a threat also concerning the National Socialist Revolution. Therefore, those of us who were convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not only a dictatorship, warned again and again that one day those revolutionaries would revert to war as a last means, and all the more new, in the course of the Fritzsch crisis, it became clear that radicalism was victorious. It became also clear to a large group that the danger of war could no more be denied.
Q Did also the defendant Schacht belong to that group?
A Yes. During those days of the Fritzsch crisis, Schacht, such as many others, said "This is war." And, without doubt, that also was told to the Commander in Chief of the Army, General Brauchitsch. beginning, the rearmament?
A Schacht always told me his reason. He had financed the rearmament for defense purposes. Schacht was convinced for many years that such a great people, such a large people in the center of Europe, should at least have the means for defense.
convinced of the thought that possibly from the East an offensive danger could arise. We cannot forget with what means of propaganda the German people were swamped at that time, and especially that danger arising from the East, and hints about the Polish aspirations concerning East Prussia were presented. ment served political purposes in so far as the discussion about rearmament could be started again?
A I bog your pardon. I forgot on my part to emphasize that point. Schacht was of the opinion that by all means the discussion about rearmament should be started again. He had the ides that very soon--I think he had that opinion since 1935the other side would point to German rearmament, and then Hitler would be forced on account of that wellknown rearmament, to resume the talks at the disarament conference. Scacht at that time, or is that your judgement now? not quite understand that Hitler would be inclined to go to a disarmament conference. I thought Hitler was of an entirely different mentality, and was surprised that Schacht expected such thoughts in Hitler's mind. the manner, extent, and speed of rearmament he was well informed in detail? personally, whether we could help him to get information about the extent of rearmament by questions to the Reich War Ministry. I have described yesterday the efforts he made through Oster and Thomas to got details. limit armament expenses and when these efforts started?
A These efforts started, to my knowledge, in 1936; and in heated debates about Schacht's resignation as Minister of Economics in 1937 those efforts played an important part. I recall that practically every conversation was concerned with that point. prosecution that the reasons Schacht gave for the necessity of these limitations were based primarily in the field of finance--that is to say, that he, as economic leader and president of the Reichsbank, was concerned and not as a patriot who is afraid that his country may be plunged into war.
Did you also have conversations with Schacht of which you can remember anything to that extent? Schacht was going to make. They were discussed in the circle of friends. To mention one example, Schaht repeatedly discussed such letters with Goerdeller. Always there was one main question: What can one say so that such a letter would not be considered a provocation, but so that it could serve the purpose to interest the rest of the well meaning ministers and also the War Ministersvon Blomberg and get them at Schacht's side? or Schwerin-Krosigk, who were more loyal to Hitler--how could we convince them to join Schacht rather than to say that Schacht once again, with his well known sharp tongue, had provoked Hitler and Goering. have mentioned, had been discussed with the leading men of the opposition group. conspiracy which you and your friends had with Schacht?
A I want to deal with that word of "conspiracy." Whereas up to that moment our activity could only be a called appositional, now, indeed, a conspiracy started. And from now on one man steps into the foreground, who later played an important part and was to play an important part as head of that conspiracy.
The Chief of General Staff at that time. General Beck, was of the opinion that the time had come when a German General should give the signal for the nation and for abroad. I believe it is important for the Tribunal to know the last reason which may have determined Beck to that step. Juterberg. held a speech before the Generals. That speech was intended as rehabilitation for Fritsch. time, quite frankly, before German Generals, a large group--about Hitler's intention to cover Czechoslovakia with warefare. Beck heard that speech. He was indignant that he, as chief of the General Staff, now for the first time heard of an intention of that kind in an audience of that form without having been informed or consulted about it previously.
an immediate interview. Brauchitsch refused it and kept Beck waiting for several weeks. Beck was not patient. He wrote a censored memorandumin which he, as Chief of General Staff, contested against the fact that the German people were thrown into war adventures. it is the right time to say a word about that.
Q One moment, Doctor. Will you only tell us what is the thought of your knowledge about Beck's thoughts and the negotiations between Beck and Brauchitsch? with him. and until the last hour of his life on the 20th of July I was close to him. again and again has struggled with the problem as to what a Chief of General Staff should do if he recognizes that everything is driving to a war. Therefore, I owe it to his memory, and to my oath here, to say that Beck took the consequences as the only German General to leave his post voluntarily in order to show I that also with Generals in leading positions there is a limit, where under the sacrifice of their position and their life they have to resign rather than to accept any more orders. of war technicians. Beck saw in the German Staff the conscience of the German Army, and so in this way he educated his staff. He suffered during the last year of his life under the fact that men whom he had trained in that sense did not go that way of conscience, that path of their conscience. I owe it to that man to say that he was a man of character.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what Beak actually did.
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to break off. What I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in a memorandum and offered to resign, and that was some minutes ago, and since then he was talking and had not told us what Beck did.
DR. DIX: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We sill adjourn now.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday morning but will be sitting in closed session. BY DR. DIX: General Beck---when he offered his resignation, what were the details of that speech? in office but Beck refused and he insisted upon his resignation. Subsequently, both Hitler and Brauchitsch continued to ask Beck, to ask him not to have his resignation published at least and they asked him if he, Beck, would not formally defer his resignation for a few months. Beck, who hadn't gone the way to high treason at that time, believed that Frick's request ought to be complied with. This loyal attitude of his was later deeply regretted by him. The facts are, that as early as the end of May or the beginning of June, his successor, General Halder, was handling the business of the Chief of General Staff and from that moment onward, Beck no longer in effect was carrying out his duties. derived from which observations and what conversations, with whom? G oerdeler, schacht and a whole group of people, and the question why Beck did not publicize his retirement was weighing on his mind so much later that it was a frequent subject of all our conversations.
Q That was Beck's resignation, but then in the consideration there was the ghost of the problem of the possible resignation on Schacht's part. signation on Schacht's part, was that discussed as far as you know, between Schacht and Beck?
A Yes, it was discussed in great detail. It was Beck's opinion that his resignation alone might not be sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore with the request whether Schacht would not in turn join Beck's resignation and resign himself. The subject was discussed in great detail between Beck and Schacht personally on one part and also on the other part between Oster and myself, who were the two intermediaries. During these conferences, I must confess that I, too, was of the opinion that Schacht should retire in all circumstances and that was the sense in which I advised him. It was Oster's opinion, however, and he asked Schacht that he should remain in office in any case, since it was necessary for the influence of Beck to boar on the generals that Schacht should remain a minister and remain in office. Respectfully, I must say here that my advice given to Schacht was wrong. The events which I shall come to describe later and will have confirmed this, how important it was for Oster and others that Schacht should remain in office.
Q That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht's conscience. You have put in evidence before this Tribunal, saying what your opinions were and what Oster's opinions were, but perhaps it may be assumed ---
THE PRESIDENT: Go on. BY DR. DIX:
Q But now, what pangs of conscience did Schacht suffer; what were the pro's and con's of his consideration and did he discuss them with you? Did he discuss his final decision?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don't object to the defendants trying their ease in their own way, but I do think we are passing beyond the limits of profitable inquiry here.
Schacht is present; he is the man who can tell us about his conscience, and I know of no way that another witness can do so, and I think it is not a question to which the answer would have probative value, and I object respectfully.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us as to what Schacht did, not tell us, but get from the witness what Schacht did.
DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is true, of course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his own reasons best and that the witness can't make statements on the subject, but in a question which is as tricky as this, and the justification of which is subject to argument -- even Justice Jackson seems to be inclined to consider Schacht's thoughts not justified at the time -- it appears to me that at least, based on our type of evidence, it is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye and car witness what considerations there were and whether they were in reality given at the time, so it may not be considered that Schacht, ex post facto, might give an explanation, which after all is a suspicion under which a defendant must always labor.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell us what Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought.
DR. DIX: Quite true, your Lordship, and he only meant to say what he, Schacht, told the witness about his opinions at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think we need have any further discussion about it. The witness has heard what I have said, and you can ask him what Schacht said or what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought. BY DR. DIX: his resignation? experienced there was no certainty that the generals would ever really revolt. For that reason, he as a politician considered it his duty to prepare himself for such possibilities which might bring about a change in conditions in Germany without a revolution. For that, he had a plan which he explained to me at the time. Schacht told me, "I have got Hitler by the throat." He meant by that, as he explained to me in great detail, that now the day was approaching where the debts which had been incurred by the Reich Bank, by the Reich Minister of Finance, and thereby the High Reich Cabinet, would have to be repaid.
Schacht doubted that the Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared to take ever the moral and legal duty of repaying the credits which had been given. resignation, with the direct threat of the Reich Bank, and he was hoping that in that situation the other ministers of the Reich, who in their majority were still civil at the time, would follow suit.
That is what he meant when he said to me, "I have still got one arrow which I can shoot, and this is the moment when von Neurath, Guertner and Seldte cannot refuse to become my followers." such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the steps which would betaken to dispose of him would be much mere commonplace. Schacht did not believe me, and he told me that he would achieve one thing, that these things would have to be discussed in the Cabinet, and then he would achieve a similarly alarming situation in Germany as had existed in February 1938 on the occasion of the Fritzsch crisis. He therefore expected a reformation of the cabinet in the radical sense, which Would enable the psychological interference on the part of the generals. on the generals to make a revolution. which generals was he referring to, and what did he mean? situation which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May to September 1938 when we drifted into the crisis of the war against Czechoslovakia, was that Beck, on the occasion of his resignation, had assured us -- and I mean Goerdeler, Schacht and other politicians -- that he would leave to us a successor who would be more energetic than he himself, and he was determined to cause a revolution if Hitler should decide on a war. As a matter of fact, General Halder, immediately after he came, took steps to get in touch with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our entire group, and toopen conversations of that type. A few days after he took over his office, he sent. for Oster and informed him that he considered that matters were drifting into a war, and that he would then carry out a revolutionary act.
He asked Oster what he, for his part, had done to include the civilians in the plot. and Schacht? since there were only a few, he replied that to the best of his knowledge he only know two civilians with whom Halder could have preliminary political conversations; one was Goerdeler, the other, Schacht. Goerdeler. He based that on the assumption that it was too dangerous for him then to receive a man whom he didn't even know. Whilst there were no official motives to have a conference with Sohacht, Halder asked Oster to act as intermediary for such a conference with Schacht. Through my agency, Oster addressed Schacht and Schacht was prepared. A meeting was to be arranged in a third place, and I warned Schacht and told him, "Have Halder come to your apartment to that you are sure of the facts." of 1938 in his apartment, and he informed him that matters had reached a stage where war was imminent, and that he, Halder, would then cause a revolution and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared to aid him politically.
Q That is what Schacht told you at the time? Oster, and Oster told it to me since I was the intermediary.
Schacht replied, immediately after this visit of Halder's, assuring me that he was prepared to do everything if the generals were to decide to remove Hitler.
The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him about the conversation, and he asked Oster whether everything had now been prepared for such a revolt as far as the police were concerned.
Oster suggested that Halder should talk to me personally about these matters. I had a long conference in the dark of the night with Halder about this revolt. Halder stated to me as his intention at that time. First of all Halder assured me that he had no doubt whatever, contrary to many other generals, that Hitler wanted war. Halder described Hitler to me as being bloodthirsty, a drinker of blood, and Halder referred to the blood bath of the 30th of June. Halder also told no that it was, unfortunately, terribly difficult to convince the generals, in particular the junior officers, just what Hitler's real intentions were, because outwardly the slogan with which the officers corps was being influenced was still that that was only a colossal bluff, that the army could be absolutely certain that Hitler would not start a war, and that he was only carrying out a diplomatic maneuver of blackmail of a great size and scale. necessary that even the last captain should be given the evidenc proving that Hitler was not Fluffing at all, but that in fact the order for war had been given. Halder, therefore, was decided a that time to have the German nation informed, and for the sake of the officers he would even tolerate the outbreak of war.
But even then Halder was afraid of the Hitler myth and so he suggested to me that the day after the outbreak of war one should remove Hitler by means of a bomb and to tell the German people, as far as possible, that Hitler had been killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Fuehrer's train. at any rate that I could not understand that at least not afterwards he would not want to tell the people, the German people, what the generals had been doin Then, for a few weeks there was no news from Halder.
The press campaign of hatred against Czechoslovakia took a more and more threatening character and we guessed that new it would be only a few weeks or perhaps months and the outbreak of war would come. once again and to remind him of his word. I thought it a good thing that a witness should bepresent during that conversation and for that reason I accompanied Schacht. I did not have the impression that Halder was too pleased about the presence of a witness. Halder once again confirmed that he was quite decided to cause a revolt but once again he wished to wait until the Germa nation had received proof of Hitler's final intentions to wage war by means of a final order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous danger of such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that it could not possibly be tolerated that a war should start only to prove to the German nation that the legend of Hitler was false and in a detailed and very excited conversation Halder now declared that he was prepared to start the revolt not after the official start of the war but at that very moment when Hitler had given the final order to march to the armed forces. situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him by a blitz. Halder replied literally:
"No, he cannot cheat me. I have designed my general staff plans in such a way that I shall know it forty-eight hours in advance." events when the period between the order to march and the actual march itself was shortened considerably.
armored division ready in Thuringia which was under the command of General von Hoeppner which could possibly deal with the life guard station in Munich and stop them from marching to Berlin. impression, after that conference, that there was something bitter attached to it. Halder had told Schacht that he, Schacht, appeared to push him, press him to cause this revolt prematurely and Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder might let us down at the last moment. We informed Oster immediately of the bad impression which we had had and we told Oster that something must be done so as to win another general over to us. Halder might not act at the last minute. Oster agreed and this is the preliminary history as to how General Field Marshal von Witzleben first turned to our circle of conspirators.
Q Who won Von Witzleben over?
Q Who did? Consequently Witzleben sent for me and I told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as commanding general of the Army Corps, stationed in Berlin, could dare to cause a revolt and Witzleben put the question to me which ever general was putting to us at that time, whether it was true that a diplomatic incident in the east could really lead to war or whether it was not true that Hitler and Ribbentrop had told the generals confidentially and confidentially again and again that there was a silent agreement with the western powers according to which Germany would be given a free hand in the east. Witzleben said in that case, if such an agreement really existed then he could, of course, not cause such a revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht could no doubt give him information based on his excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality.
A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben brought with him the Division General von Brockdorf, who was to carry out the Putsch in practice and he joined us during thatconference. Witzleben, Brockdorf and I, together, went to Schacht's country house to have a conference which lasted for hours.
The final result was that Witzleben felt himself convinced by Schacht that the western powers would not under any circumstances allow Germany to move into the eastern territories and that now had come the end of Hitler's policy of surprises. Witzleben made his decision that he, on his part and independentl from Halder, would make all preparations which were necessary if he wanted to act. so that I would be under his personal protection there and could make all the political and police preparations which might be necessary. He detailed General von Brockdorf and he and I visited all locations in Berlin which Brockdorf intended to occupy with his division from Potsdam. Von Struenk was at the wheel and we discussed the problems and made detailed investigations of what would bee necessary.
I owe you a brief explanation as to why Witzleben's cooperation was so utterly necessary. It was not so easy to find a general who had the actual power and authority to have his troops march. For instance, there were certain generals in the provinces who could not give their troops the order to march.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter in such detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in?
DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben should have joined are perhaps not essential for us and we can perhaps drop the subject. BY Dr. DIX:
Q Will you please, Dr. Gisevius, tell me did these military andpolice preparations which you have described come to Schacht's knowledge currently?
A Schacht was being currently informed about all these matters. We met in the evening in the apartment of von Witzleben and everything that I had done and put into writing I would show them. It was then discussed in great detail. mentioned, were political measures gone into?
A Yes, of course. We had to prepare in great detail what the German nation would be told in such a case just as there were certain preparations which had to be made regarding foreign countries.
Q Do you mean foreign politically?
Q Was the Foreign Office included or what do you mean "when you say "foreign politically."? foreign countries during war time or immediately before the war is a matter which can only be discussed under difficulties and we are touching upon a very difficult and tricky subject. If I am to talk about it then it is at least as important that the dates and the timing of what I say should be mentioned and what caused the people in question to get into touch with foreign countries.
Q I am quite sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do so. I think that the Tribunal will allow you to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going into too great detail over these matters.