DR. DIX: But, in my opinion, I should have to touch upon the seriousness and intensity of the activities of these conspirators, and I should substantiate them in detail. I don't really think it is enough that some one had such plans.
THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon then since 10 o'clock this morning.
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now using the technique of letting the witness tell the political developments.
THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you would be half hour longer. Do you remember saying that? Perhaps it was a mis-translation.
DR. DIX: Oh no, that is a terrible misunderstanding. I said that if I wer to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, then that would take a half hour; that is, the Fritsch crisis alone.
Gentlemen of the Tribunal, this is the situation. We are now hearing the work and the history of the political opposition, in which Schacht played a lea ding role. If the defendant Goering and others had time to tell the story of th events from their point of view, for days, then I think it would be a matter of justice that those men too, who are represented in this court room by the defendant Schacht who fought against that system under the most terrible conditions of terror, should also be given a chance to tell the story of their opposition. fluous things now -- to give me permission so that the witness may complete his story of the measures taken by the conspirator's group, Schacht, Canaris, and others. I consider that of the greatesr importance. And I assume, Your Lordship that if it is not done now, then the prosecution will very probably do so during cross-examination; and since it is now being told coherently, it will probably occupy less time than if we had to wait for the cross-examination by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you how you are to prove your case, but they hope that you will deal with it as shortly as possibl and without unnecessary details.
DR. DIX: Please, gentlemen, be convinced of that.
BY DR. DIX: and you were just going to talk about the motives which some of you had when you called upon foreign countries for support of your movement. Will you talk about that briefly? that very moment there were considerable and substantial discussions with foreign countries so as to try absolutely everything to prevent the outbreak, or at least the spreading, of that war. However, as long as I am not in a position to bring up the motives of such an extremely tricky matter, where at least in Germany we had been accused of high treason -- as long as that is the case, I shall not say more than just the fact that these conversations had taken place. producing your motives. Therefore, you may state them. who are now dead, that I should state here that in those matters which I have described we suffered from tremendous pressure upon our consciences. We knew that we would be accused of conspiring with countries abroad.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these matters were not conducted without danger, but we are not really here for the purpose of conside ring people who have, unfortunately, lost their lives. We are considering the case of the Defendant Schacht at the moment.
DR. DIX: I think the witness' intentions have been misunderstood.
He was not going to talk about those men who had lost their lives, and he does not want to talk about the dangers. He wants to talk about the conflicts of their consciences, which was suffered by those who inaugurated those steps and who undertook them. I think that privilege should be granted the witness if he is to talk about this very delicate matter in public here.
I should, therefore, beg you to allow it. Otherwise, the witness will confine himself to general hints which do not help my defendant, and I am sure that the prosecution, perhaps, would ask him that question anyway.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the point? We, of course, can't tell what he wants to talk about. We can only tell about what he does talk about. BY DR. DIX: those who took up these connections, and I think you ought to refer to the actual connections you made.
A Mr. President, it wasn't a question of conscience. I was concerned with the fact that dependents are still alive who may be subject to unjust accusations, and that is why I had to say, with reference to those conferences abroad which I shall describe, that our more intimate friends too were not aware of, or had not decided upon the measures which were admissible. One went further, while another considered himself more limited. mistakes which had been made in the reports of the press should be rectified, that he had turned around to conspire with foreign countries. And I must oppose the fact that anything I might say now should be applied to men whom I had mentioned earlier. That is the reason why I wanted to make that statement. did that sort of thing refused to be accused of high treason, because we felt that these attempts were our humane duty.
Q Well, then, what happened?
A What happened was this. Immediately after Hitler announced his intention to bring war to Czechoslovakia, friends currently attempted to inform the British Government of the first intention, until the last decision.
The chain of these attempts began with the journey of Goerdeler in the spring of 1938 to London, where he talked about the existence of such an opposition group, saying that they were resolved to take the last step. In the name of that group the British Government was continuously being informed about what was beginning to happen, and that it was absolutely essential that the German people should be clearly told, and so should the generals, that every step across the Czech border, as far as the Western Powers were concerned, would be a reason for a war. completed to the last detail, we took a step which was unusual because of its form and context: we had the British Government informed that during the pending diplomatic negotiations there would not, as Hitler stated, be the question of the Sudeten countries discussed only, but that Hitler had decided to bring war to the entire Czechoslovakian State; and that if the British Government were to remain firm, we in turn could give the assurance that the war would not happen. tance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation of a revolution. the Munich Conference. What were the activities of your conspirator's group at that time? convince Halder that he should cause that revolution at once. When Halder didn't seem to be quite clear about the facts and the actions, Witzleben prepared everything in great detail. I shall only describe the last two dramatic days. was going out to the lastin order to make the German people interested in a war. He ordered a raid of the armies in Berlin, and Witzleben had to carry it through. The effect the raid had was exactly the opposite. The population, being under the impression that these groups were going to war, showed openly that they were not pleased, and the troops did not receive enthusiasm, but, instead, clenched fists.
Chancellery, had an attack of fury. He stepped back from his window and said, "With such a people I cannot run a war." Witzleben, in turn, discussed it and said that he would have liked to have had troops, with bayonets, outside of the Reich Chancellery. Chancellery? And where do you derive your knowledge from regarding Hitler's remarks when he stepped back from the balcony?
the opportunity had come to start The revolt. On that morning too it had become known to us that Hitler had received the last offer from The British Prime Minister Chamberlain and had turned it down, and that an intermediary Wilson, had taken back a negative answer.
Witzleben received that letter and took it to Halder. He believed that now the proof for Hitler's will for a war had been established, and Halder agreed. Halder in turn visited von Brauchitsch while Witzleben was waiting in Halder's room. After a few moments Halder came back and said that now Brauchitsch too had realized that one would have to act and that he was merely going over to the Reich Chancellory to make quite sure whether Witzleben and Halder's description was correct. him over the telephone that everything was prepared. That is that midday of the 28th of September, when suddenly and against our expectation Mussolini's intervention took place in the Reich Chancellory and when Hitler, under the impression of Mussolini's stop, agreed to go to Munich. So that in fact in the last hour The action was made impossible.
Q You mean through Munich, don't you?
Q And now Munich was over. What were things like in your group of conspirators?
A We were extremely depressed. We were convinced that now Hitler would take his last stop, and quite soon. We did not doubt that Munich was the signal for the world war. Some of our friends were wondering whether they would emigrate, but Goerdeler and Schacht, with whom it was discussed, reacted differently. Goerdeler, under this consideration, wrote a letter to a political friend in America in which to him he put that question expressedly--whether the opposition people should now emigrate. Goerdeler said, "There is only one other possibility, and that is that by other methods we will be able to continue our political work in Germany."
We decided to hang on, and things hurried along past the Jewish pogroms to the occupation of Prague. Jewish pogrom in November, 1938, I take it. Do you know or can you recollect how Schacht acted on the occasion of those events? a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank.
Q I shall submit that speech later as evidence. And then how did things go on from there? We have come to the end of 1938. Were there now political events coming over the horizon which were stimulating to you conspirators? the directorate of the Reichsbank, and Schacht's wish that the cabinet would consult did not come true. Ourhopes to cause a cabinet crisis did not fulfil themselves. Thus our opposition group had no starting point, and we had to wait to see how things would develop. On the occasion of the conquering of Prague-
Q I am going to mention Schacht's resignation or dismissal from his position as president of the Reichsbank. Do you know anything about these events and the accompanying circumstances and the affect these things had on Schacht? in the Reichsbank, which became less and less strongly worded. I was there when the dismissal came. A few minutes after the letter of dismissal had arrived from Hitler Schacht read it to me, and he was disgusted about the contends. He repeated to me that passage in which Hitler is praising him because of his participation in the German rearmament program, and Schacht said, "And now he is even trying to pin me down to his policy of war."
Q But then Schacht remained as minister without portfolio. The problem whether to do so or not, or whether he could have acted differently, was that ever discussed between you and Schacht at the time?
which happened whenever he wanted to resign. He talked to Lammers, and I assume that Lammers gave him the customary reply. he was forced to remain? spook about Prague. Will you please describe the affects upon your group of conspirators, as far as Schacht was included? attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically called the "March Uproar." Since it was quite openly discussed in Berlin, we were hoping that news of this action would roach the American and British embassies. be were firmly convinced that this time there would not be a successful surprise. But Halder had already adopted a different view. He thought that Hitler had been given a free road to Prague by the western powers, and he refused to have preliminary conferences and wanted to wait. Whether this Prague action could be achieved without a fight, that of course happened. British and American embassy.
A Oh, no, I haven't.
Q Were you going to talk about it? Do you have something to say? hoping that the news would reach the embassies. went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group, is that correct? We were of the opinion that Prague would have incredible psychological effects upon the Germans. As far as foreign countries were concerned, Prague was the signal that there was no peace one could make with Hitler. But inside Germany we had to notice unfortunately that now the generals and the people were convinced that this Hitler can do whatever he wants to do; nobody will stop him: he is protected by Providence. This, of course, alarmed us. On one side we saw that the western powers were now no longer allowing these things to happen. On the other side we saw that within Germany the illusion grew that the western powers would not go as far as a war.
We could see that a war could only be prevented if the western powers would clearly not only tell the foreign minister and not only Hitler, but with all means of propaganda tell the German nation that now any further step towards the eat would mean war. That appeared to us to be the only possibility to warn the generals and to get them to revolt. In the conversation which Schacht, Goerdeler, and I were having outside, in Switzerland, immediately after Prague, that is what we were aiming at, governments. This man reported very exactly, at least to the French government. That is so nothing to which I can testify, because I have seen a copy of his report later after Paris was occupied. It was found among the secret papers of Daladier.
This man was informed in great detail, and we told him that, at the latest, in the autumn the fight for Danzig would start.
We told him that we as good Germans were without doubt of the opinion that Danzig was a German city and that one day that point would have to be discussed peacefully; but we also warned him that these conferences regarding Danzig were now being conducted in their particular way because Hitler didn't only want the whole of Poland; and because he didn't only want the whole of Poland but the Ukraine; and that was the reason why the foreign propaganda machine should become effective in Germany and make it abundantly clear that the limit had now been reached and that the Western powers would intervene. We said that only that would give us the possibility for a revolution.
Q And did that confidence man report at that stage as you had said?
A Yes, he had; and I must say that quite true public statements on the part of the British, partly through the radio and partly through the press, made in the House of Commons began to remove these doubts on the part of the German generals and the German people. Beginning at that time everything had been done by the British that could be done to alarm the German generals. at that time and did he talk with him in the same sense? Do you know? Were you there?
A Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to talk to a great friend of Prime Minister Chamberlain should not be allowed to pass, and Schacht had a very detailed discussion with Montague-Norman, so that he, too, would understand thepsychological atmosphere in Germany after Prague, and because he wanted to persuade him that the British Government should now carry out the necessary clarifying steps.
Q Wasn't the word predominant? You must say the Nazis were up against it in Germany at that time/
A Yes, it was the sense of all our discussions. We wanted it made clear to the German people that the Western powers weren't against Germany but only against those Nazis and their policy of suprise and their methods of terror, both in the country as well as outside.
Q And now, having come back from Switzerland, what happened next, particularly with reference to Schacht?
the crisis of August and that the generals could not be deterred from the view that Hitler was only bluffing and that there would only be another Munich or another Prague. And now all those desperate efforts began, which we made in order to influence the loading generals, and, in particular, Keitel, hoping that the final order to march against Poland would not be given.
Q But let's come back to Schacht's return from the Swiss journey in spring of '39. You know that Schacht left Germany and made a journey to India? possible; then to go to China. But on the way the order reached him, coming from Hitler, that he was prohibited from touching upon Chinese soil and that he had to return. He came Back a few days before theoutbreak of war.
Q Did Schacht have sympathies for Chiang-Kai-Chek against Japan?
A Yes, he did. He sympathized to quite an extent with the Chinese Government, just as we all did. We all have quite a number of good and dear Chinese friends with whom we attempt to keep in touch because of the Japanese agreement pact.
Q When did Schacht come back, roughly, from India?
A I think it was the beginning of August; I'm not certain.
Q Now, the first turning towards war. Did Schacht, before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent the outbreak of war? individually since that would create the impression that only Schacht was taking these steps, whereas, in fact, the situation was that a large number of people were now fighting and that everybody took just those steps which were most obvious to him and everybody informed the other regarding what he had done and if the other considered that suitable. It is for that reason that I am afraid that it would be a completely erroneous picture if I described individually only those steps taken by Schacht personally, leaving out all the other desperate efforts made in August '39 until the attack on Holland and Belgium.
Schacht was doing something, but, after all, we are talking about Schacht's case and I should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to the description of Schacht's efforts. knew of all these matters and were in fact fellow perpetrators. As far as he is concerned, I can only say at this particular moment that Schacht was a fellow author of the Thomas memorandum, addressed to General Keitel, or in fact the two memoranda, in which Schacht, together with our group, pointed out the dangers of war to Keitel. And, further, I can say that afterwards Schacht, through Thomas and Cararis, was taking steps to intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder. But I must emphasize that all the steps taken by Beck and Goerdeler were taken with full knowledge of Schacht and all his participants. This is a very large action.
Q But doesn't an attempt of Schacht's play a special part that at the very last moment, at the end of August, Canaris was used to approach Brauchitsch?
A Yes. After the attempt of Thomashad failed, after these two memoranda had failed, and after Thomas had talked to Keitel and asked him to see Goerdeler, Schacht had failed. Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that purpose Halder paid frequent visits to General Halder and it was typical that during those critical days he could not get past the anteroom of Halder's office and that he could not get past General von Stuelpnagel. Halder denied his presence and had only a message delivered that he didn't want to see Schacht. Subsequently, on the dramatic 25th of August, we took yet another step; that is the day when Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the news of that reached us, the news that Hitler had given the order to march to Halder, Schacht attempted, together with me, first of all, to get in touch with Thomas and then, together with Thomas, we went to see Admiral Canaris, so that both Thomas and Canaris should accompany Schacht when he without previous announcement would go to the headquarters to the Fuehrer, so as to put Brauchitsch and Halder before the accomplished fact of his being present there.
accordance with the existing constitution, before the outbreak of a war, the Reich Cabinet should be heard. Brauchitsch and Halder would commit perjury if they, without knowledge of the political influences concerned, would give an order for a war. That generally or in principle was what Schacht intended to say so as to give a motive for that step of his. straight to Canaris.
DR. DIX: It was the OKW, My Lord, situated on Bendlerstrasse. He meant the OKW or the OKH, rather.
A (Continuing) When we arrived, the OKW were waiting at a corner downstairs at the street. Canaris was sending Oster down to us. And that was the moment when Hitler suddenly, between six and seven in the evening, withdraw his marching order to Halder. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, impressed by the renewed intervention on Mussolini's part, quite suddenly withdrew the marching order which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal of an order to march was an unheard of loss of prestige for Hitler. Oster thought that it was unparalleled in the history of war that a supreme commander had withdrawn such an important order in the cause of a nervous breakdown. And Canaris said, "Now the peace in Europe is saved for fifty years, because now Hitler haslost all reputation before the generals." And, unfortunately, because of this psychological change, we all became victims of the impression that we could look forward to the following days peacefully. decisive order to march, this was a surprise, a total surprise for our group as well. Oster called me to the OKW. Schacht accompanied me. And when we asked Canaris whether he couldn't arrange a renewed conference with Brauchitsch and Halder, Canaris said, "It is too late now."
He had tears in his eyes, and he said, "That is the end of Germany."
DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that we perhaps better deal with the war after lunch.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
BY DR. DIX:
Q Dr. Gisevius, before the morning recess we had just arrived at the discussion of the outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be understood, I have to ask you first what use you were put to during the war. called in by General Oster. Since it was a regulation that all officers or other members of the Abwehr had to be checked by the Gestapo, and since I would never have received permission to be a member of the Abwehr, they just used the means of giving me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Canaris without doing any direct service. constituency you have already mentioned? Who participated in this group, and what was done? head of all oppositional movements, all oppositional movements which were active in Germany with the exception of the Communists with whom we were not in touch at that time. We were of the opinion that only a General could have the position of leadership during the war, and Beck was so far above the purely military that he was the man to unify all groups from the left to the right. Dr. Goerdeler was called in as his first assistant. and Goerdeler?
A Oh, no. I must add something. On the contrary, now all oppositional groups who had just had vague connections with each other, now they were unified, and especially the left oppositional movement, which had been decimated in the first years since their leaders had been interned.
like to mention Leuschler and Dr. Karl Muehlendorf, but I must also recall Dr. Habermann, Dr. Kaiser, the Christian and Catholic circles, the leaders of the other religious movements, and the political men like Ambassador von Hassel, State Secretary Plank, Minister Popitz, and many, many others. the question of a Putsch or of a forceful doing away with Hitler or a plot on him? Did they have the same thought that perhaps a plot of an assassination, which later took place, might come through? strongly, that the Dolchstoss legend had done much damage, and the leftist circles believed that they did not want to expose themselves to the danger that it could be said later on that Hitler or the German Army had not been conquered at the front. The leftist wing had been of the opinion for years that now it must be proved to the German people at all costs that militarism had murdered itself in Germany. letter which you, Doctor, wrote approximately at this time--that is, about the end of 1939--which you smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht. It is a letter to the former president of the International Bank at Basel, and then president of the First National Bank of New York. This is a man of influence, and who probably had access to President Roosevelt. the admissibility of evidence I submitted the most essential points, and since Justice Jackson does not have the document book before him and remarked just a little while age that he did not like it especially if I were to start using documents, I will dispense with carrying through my original intention.
I will read this letter later on when I cite my documents, but in order to refresh the witness' memory about this letter, I will give you the quintessence of the contents of the letter, that Schacht made the suggestion to Frazier that now the moment had come-
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from Schacht to leon Frazier as one banker writing to another. If you want to claim that Mr. Frazier was influential with President Roosevelt, I should want you to prove it, but I have no objection to the letter.
DR. DIX: The letter is dated the 14th of January 1946. I will not read it in its entirety, for there are six long pages.
THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?
DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16th of October 1939. It will be Exhibit Number 31 in my document book.
"It is said that now would be the proper moment so that President Roosvelt could give peace to the world."
THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?
DR. DIX: Yes, written by Schacht to Frazier.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?
DR. DIX: If the High Tribunal would prefer it that way, then Schacht can use that letter, Then in that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he smuggled this letter into Switzerland. May I do that? BY DR. DIX:
A Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.
Q Very well. That happened in the sense of the bringing about of peace, or against the expansion of war. As far as your group is concerned, that is, your oppositional or conspiracy group, did you carry through other foreign political activities? means at our disposal, and the expansion of the war could be done through Holland, Belguim or Norway. We knew and saw clearly that if a step was taken in this direction, tremendous consequences, not only for Germany, but for all of Europe would result. Therefore, with all the means at our disposal we wanted to prevent the spread of the war in the West.
troops from the East to the West, and to bring about the attack on Holland and Belgium and to violate their neutrality. during the coming winter months we would gain so much time so that the individual Generals at the top, such as Brauchitsch and Halder and the leaders of the army groups, could be convinced by us that they should at least oppose the expansion of the war. Brauchitsch and Halder evaded and said it was too late now, that the opposition would fight Germany to the end and destroy her; but we did not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still possible, and what I mean by honor is that we of course would eliminate the Nazi domination until the very end.
The purpose of showing and proving to the generals that the foreign countries did not wish to destroy the German people but wanted to protect themselves only against the Nazi terrors for that proof we undertook allpossible steps abroad and a small fragment in the attempt was the letter written by Schacht to Frazier (?), which was confirmed with hintings and showing that certain domestic political developments were imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, after we had lived through the winter, we could interest the generals in a putsch, in a revolution.
DR. DIX: May I interrupt you for a moment. I would like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that the witness is referring to a hint contained in the letter. This letter is in English. I have no German translation and I must therefore read this sentence. It is that "the earlier discussions would be opened, the easier it will be to influence the development of existing conditions." BY DR. DIX:
Q Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean with the words "certain existing conditions are to be influenced," did he mean your efforts and aims?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic language, but I don't think that this witness can interpret what Schacht meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now appears. I don't want to be overtechnical about this, but it does seem to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr. Schacht himself.
DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is correct but the witness said the letter was sent to Switzerland and I assume he discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and would therefore be in a position to explain the cryptic words.
THE PRESIDENT: He didn't say he had; he hasn't said he ever saw the letter except the outside of it. He hasn't said he ever saw the letter. BY DR. DIX:
contents? clearly. I helped in working out the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and when it was written.
DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. BY DR. DIX: words? certain developments and now that the expected and encouraging word from the other side -- but I do not want any misunderstandings to arise here. In this letter it is also shown very clearly that President Roosevelt had been disappointed on many scores to the German side, so that we had to ask him and beg him to take up steps. President Roosevelt had taken various steps.
Q Now, if I may give you the clue word, Vatican action? we tried to get a declaration from the British Government, and we were interested in it and again it was out attempt -
THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this only given from memory?
DR. DIX: The original document, yes, that is a letter signed by Schacht. That is here and that was kept during the war in Switzerland and now brought back for statements by this witness. BY DR. DIX:
A We tried at all cost to prove to General Halder and Obeis ? that this theory was wrong, that there could be no more dealings with a decent German government. We believed that we would have to follow a certain way and a sure way. The Holy Father was trying himself to bring about some sort of solution in this matter, for the British Government had become unsure, and rightly so, whether the trustworthy group was existing in Germany, a group with which it could actually talk and I remember that shortly thereafter the Venlo incident took place at which, under the excuse of a German oppositional group, people who were under the English Secret Service had been kidnapped at the Dutch Border.