the Second, Eigth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Fourtennth, was set forth. That is Item 26 in the Schmundt file at page 50 of the English translation. Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the West to protect the German rear during "Case Green", and I refer to Item 31 in the Schmundt file at page 13. I beg your pardon, it is page 55, I had a misprint. I might refer to that. It is a "Most Secret" order, Berlin 27, 9, 1938, 1920 hours, 45 copies of which this is the 16th.
"The Fuehrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular West divisions (26, 34, 36, 32 and 35), The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the Todt organization.
"It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshaling areas behind the Western fortifications. (Signed) Keitel."
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to adjourn. Before the Tribunal adjourns, the Tribunal would be very grateful if the officers in charge of the Court could reduce the heat.
We will meet again at 2 o'clock. (Whereupon at 1245 the Tribunal recessed until 1400 of the same day.)
Tribunal, in the matter of: The United States of at Nurnberg, Germany,' on 3 December, 1945,
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. that I misread a signature on one of the documents to which I adverted this morning. It is item 31 of the Schmundt Minutes. I read the name "Jodl" as being the signature on that item. I should have read Keitel. being offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a moment, and recall the setting in which these facts took place. The World will never forget the Munich Pact, and the international crisis which lead to it. As this crisis was developing in August and September of 1938, a final effort was being made by statesmen of the World to preserve the peace of the World. Little did they know of the evil plans or designs in the hearts and the minds of these conspirators, so what is being presented to the Tribunal today is an inside story in that year underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now able to spread upon the pages of history the truth concerning the fraud and deceit practised by the Nazi conspirators. In the achieving of their own end, the Pact of Munich as a stepping stone towards further aggression, one can not think back without living again through the dread of war, or the threat to the world, or still of the war threat that was sought by these living persons. The hope of peace which came with the Munich Pact was the renouncing of the snare, and deceit and the trap course set by the defendants on trial. in this scheme for aggression and war is demonstrated by their own documents. Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe as to the time of day at which the attack should be limited.
Notes between the defendant Jodl dated 27 September reveal that in the translation of document 388-PS. These notes in Item 54, at page ninety in these Minutes of the trial. I shall read these first three paragraphs as follows : The heading is "MOST SECRET Berlin 27.
9.38.
Time of attack "Grun"?
(Z z A Grun) "As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X day, wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 100 due to low coiling in Bavaria."
Then I'll skip to the last two paragraphs on page 91: "Thus it is Proposed:
"Attack by the Army-independent of the attack by the air forceat the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
"The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them."
The initial at the end of that order is "J" meaning I think clearly "Jodl".
most secret memorandum to the defendant Hess, and the Reichs Fuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of the Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is item 32 in the Schmundt files at page 56 of the English translation. I read the first four paragraphs of this message.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the item?
MR. ALDERMAN: It is item 32 in the Schmundt's files at page 56, which here is the English version:
"As a result of the political situation the Fuhrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order, or corresponding code words.
"Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.
"The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.
"OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan."
Then I'll skip to the last paragraph as follows:
"The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organizations, or Police units, as a result of the political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.
KEITEL" To these two entries there the defendant Jodl's files reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their preparations for an attack; even during the period of negotiations which culminated in the Munich agreement.
I quote the answers in the Jodl Diary for the 26 and 27 September from page 7 of the translation of document 1780-PS. The 26 September --
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the entry on the visit of Mr. Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement?
Perhaps you can give it later on.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: The acting on the agreement of the Munich Pact was September 29th, and this answer then was three days before the Pact, the 26 September as follows: "Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
"In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.
"Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of Armed Forces High Command: yes.
"1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
"It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.
"A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army can not be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.
"The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.
"The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
"2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast."
Then the entry on the 27 September: 1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.." Schmundt, which appears with item 33 at page 57 of the file. I'll read it in its entirety. This order had brought the Nazi Army to a jumping off point for the unremittable and fertile aggression.
"28.9.38. MOST SECRET. MEMORANDUM : At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping off points.
"The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions) must be ready to begin the action against "Grun" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.
"This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt (pencil note by Schmundt)." body of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a moment to examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The military preparation for action against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out in vacuo. They had been proceeding by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to promote several disobediences in Czechoslovakia state. Using the tactics they did develop in underhand authority, their intentions of the Nazi conspirators of that period of year used many methods of propaganda and force to put in the mind of Czechoslovakians the program of the Nazi force, forcing their intentions of the present German decision on those living in Sudetanland, and the areas bounded thereto on the northwest and the south. I invite attention to the verbatim report in document 998-PS and offer it in evidence as Exhibit No. USA 91. This exhibit is entitled, "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia," and "Czechoslovak Official Report for the Prosecution and Trial of the German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal established according to the agreement of the Four Great Powers of August 8th, 1945." Article 21, or Charter, and the document of which the Court will take judicial notice.
Article 21 provides:
"The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and documents of the committees set up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United Nations. this governmental report by the Czech Government, I shall, with the leave of the Tribunal, merely summarize pages 9 to 12 of this report to show the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue within Czechoslovakia. NSDAP of the Nazi party. In the years following the First World War, a German National Socialist Workers Party, DNSAP, which maintained close contact with Hitler's NSDAP, was activated in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of the Sudeten Volksport, an organization corresponding to the Nazi S. A. or Sturmabteilung, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a greater Germany. Soon thereafter, they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic.
stalled. its dissolution by voluntary liquidation and several of its chiefs escaped across the border into Germany, For a year thereafter, Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground. conspirators, an instructor of gymnastics, Konrad Henlein, established the German Home Front or Deutsche Heimatfront, which, the following spring became the Sudentendeutsche Partei, SDP, Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism and professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to honest democracy and to the Czech State. His party, nonetheless, was built on the basis of the Nazi Fuehrerprinzip, and he became its fuehrer.
By 1937, when the powers of Hitler's Germany had become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note, demanding, without defining "complete Sudenten autonomy". The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would have created a state within a state. Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activities. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press.
The campaign against Bolshevism was intensified. Terrorism in the Henlein dominated communities increased. A Storm Troop organization, patterned and trained on the principals of the Nazi SS was established, known as the FS, Freiwilliger Schutz or Voluntary Vigilantes. Henlein came into the open with what he called his Karlsbad Programme. In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess German political philosophy, which it was clear meant National Socialism. of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in pages 12 to 16 of the Czech Government official report, these techniques included:
(a) Espionage, Military espionage was conducted by the SDP the FS and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped and information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the German authorities.
(b) Nazification of German organizations in Czechoslovakia. The Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social cultural centers regularly underwent Gleichschaltung, that is, purification, by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sports societies, rowing clubs, associations of exservicemeh, and choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating as many business institution as possible, and bring over to their side the directors of banks, the owners of directors of factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or direction, they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and technical staffs of the institutions.
(c) German direction and leadership. The Henleinists maintained permament contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany, at which Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity, were camouflaged by being held in conjunction with Singer Feste or choral festivals, gymnastic shows, and assemblies, and commercial gatherings such as the Leibzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed incidents for their war of nervs, it was the duty of the Henleinists to supply them.
(d) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a nest of Bolshevism and spread the false report of Russian troops and airplanes centered in Prague. Under direction from the Reich, the Henleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the Sudetenland which contributed to the mounting tension and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German population in the Sudetenland.
(c) Murder and terrorism. Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke incidents and maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarms, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. Gestapo crossed into the border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens across the border into Germany. In several cases, political foes of the Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor Theodor Lessing in 1933 and Ing. Formis in 1935. Both men were anti-Nazi who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence Document No. 2863-PS, an excerpt from a lecture by Conrad Henlein quoted, in the book "Four Fighting Years", a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I quote from page 29. This book has been marked for identification Exhibit U.S.A.-92, but without offering it in evidence, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
I shall read from page 29. This lecture was delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the auditorium of the University of Vienna, under the auspices of the wiener Verwantungs Akademie. During a thorough search of libraries in Vienae and elsewhere, we have been unable to find a copy of the German text. This text, this volume that I have here, is an English version. The Vienna newspapers the following day carried only summaries of the lecture. This English version, however, is an official publication of the Czech Government and is, under the circumstances, the best evidence that we can produce of the Henlein speech.
In this lecture on "The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens" Henlein said:
"National Socialism seen swept over us Sudeten Germans. Our struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in its final struggle. When ... in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve, Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten Germans and in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the allegiance against the German Reich."
presented to the Tribunal is the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak Government early this summer. Since then, captured documents and other information made available to us since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the agitation in the Sudetenland.
I offer in evidence Document No. 3060-PS, Exhibit USA-93. This is the original, hand-written draft of a telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Minister in Berlin. It is presumably written by the German Minister Eisenlohr. It proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument, a puppet of the Nazi conspirators. The Henlein party, it appears from this document, was directed from Berlin and from the German legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own. Even the speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German authorities.
I will read this telegram:
"Prague, 16 March 1938 "Foreign (Office), Berlin Cipher Cable (Secret Proced.)
No. 57 of 16 Mar. With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.
"Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises:
"1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.
"2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of 'Zeit' (Time) is to be improved.
"3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests.
The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and 'territorial autonomy' are no longer to be stressed.
"4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Henlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission.
"5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.
"6. Henlein wall establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested.
"I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniformdirection of the Sudeten German Party." desired effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to von Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation.
I offer in evidence Document No. 2789-PS, as Exhibit USA-94. This is the letter from Conrad Henlein to von Ribbentrop, captured in the German Foreign Office files, dated 17 March 1938. "Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:
"In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.
"I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith.
"We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.
"The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.
"In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for four weeks.
"I would appreciate if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.
"Heil Hitler.
"Loyally yours, "/s/ Konrad Henlein."
Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy towards Czechoslovakia. You will also note that he was already in close enough contact with Ribbentrop and the German Minister in Prague to feel free to suggest early personal talks.
Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein's suggestion. The conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred with Hitler himself.
I offer in evidence Document No. 2788-PS as Exhibit USA-95, captured German Foreign Office notes of the conference on 29 March.
I read the first two paragraphs:
"In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed list participated.
"The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party;" and resume the minutes of this meeting in the middle of the last paragraph of the first page of the English translation, with the sentence beginning, "The aim of the negotiations."
"The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and gradual specification of the demands to bemade. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that theSudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich cabinet. The Reich cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the Government in prag or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.
"Following these general explanations of theReichminister, the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government, as contained in the enclosure, were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichminister and the head of the Central Office for Racial Germans, as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister.
The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demand of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians, without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the party.
"In conclusion, there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate. Berlin, 29 March, 1938, 'R' for Ribbentrop." list of those who attended: Konrad Henlein; his principal deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor Haushofer, the geopolitician, and SS Obergruppenfuhrer Lorenz represented the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the Central Office for Racial Germans.
The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight. These eight included von Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and did most of the talking; von Mackensen; Weissaecker; and Minister Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague. Nazi conspirators. At this time, the plans for Case Green, for the attack on the Czechs, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months.
I again quote from General Jodl's diary, Document 1780-PS, the entry for 22 May, 1938: "Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure)."
The enclosure unfortunately is missing from Jodl's diary. had admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi Conspirators in the fall of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans. The documents I have just read show conclusively the nature of Henlein's mission. They demonstrate that Henlein's policy, his propaganda, even his speeches, were controlled by Berlin. Party was secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. I offer in evidence Document 3059-PS, as Exhibit USA 96, another secret document captured in the German Foreign Office file. August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein party for additional funds. I read from that document:
"The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15000 Marks; 12000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement and 3000 Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier.
Under these conditions the Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.
"Herewith submitted to the Dept: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August." footnote: "Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept." -- handwritten marginal note. movement received from other agencies of the German Government. forward in the late summer and early fall, the Nazi command made good use of Henlein and his followers. About the first of August, the Air Attache in the German Legation in Prague, Major Merrecke, acting on instructions from Luftwaffe Headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten German leader in Freudenthal. With his assistance and in the company of the local leader of the FS, the Henlein equivalent of the SS, he reconnoitered the surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform of the Czech Army, a fact which, as the attache noted, served as excellent camouflage. offered in evidence earlier and which bears US Exhibit Number 83. I have already read the first four paragraphs of the enclosure.
"The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in Fr. (Freudenthal) and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man.
My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
"At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.'s private car for the trip.
"As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage, I was entirely in agreement with this -- without actually saying so.
"As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said, 'Aha, so you're looking for airfields!' I answered that we supposed that in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view."
In the latter part of the Air Attache's report, reference is made to the presence of reliable agents and informers, which he called V-Leute, or V-people, apparently dram from the ranks of the Henlein party in this area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with the Abwehr Stelle, the Intelligence Office in Breslau. its height, the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On 19 September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent a telegram to the German Legation in Prague. I offer the document in evidence, Number 2858-PS, Exhibit USA 97, another captured German Foreign Office document: