"I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points." are the notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. There follows Jodl's initials once more. the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be found as Item 18 at pages 39 and 40 of the Document 388-PS. I shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes: "Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to 'exercise areas' for 'Gruen'. Field units to be transferred on 28 September.
From here will then be ready for action.
When X day becomes known "Fuehrer Has objection. Troops assemble field units.
A 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere."
"OKH must know when X day is by 1200 noon, 27 September."
would be transferred to the proper areas for "case Green" on 28 September and would then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when X day is by 12 noon on 27 September."
strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote, "of drawing in the Henlein people." The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence from page 40 of the English transcript:
"The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarebrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action." assurance that the OKH would be informed five days in advance about the impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the coordination of ground, and air operation at the start of the action. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl's diary, page 5 of the English translation of Document 1780-PS.
"General Stuelpnagel OKI, asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent, only for two days in advance and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment, that is D day minus 2", or as the German puts it, "X minus 2 tage".
"General Stuelpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved."
Now, this is Jodl talking:
"I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 November '37, 7 December '37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us.
We must pass this test of nerves but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.
"1800 hours to 2100 hours: conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force. (Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuher, Sternburg and myself.) We agree about the promulgation of the D day order, (X-Befhel) (X-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D day minus 1 (X minus 1 day) 7 o'clock). The "Y" time has yet to be examined. Some formations of an approach flight of one hour." defendant Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt's minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt file, at pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS. of the German armies being committed to the attack, the Second, the Tenth, Twelfth and Fourteenth German Armies. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations, which should be taken into account as the attack developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs, beginning with the summary of General von Brauchitsch's remarks, on the bottom of page 42.
"General Oberst von Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized divisions were based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs." -- that is for divisions -- "(ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September, if X day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.
The Fuehrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day.
Also the railroad cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.
"General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands in the west. Trains must be assembled.
"Von Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be drafted. 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in the East.) 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West." intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On 11 September defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of international law and of exploiting those of the Czechoslovakians. I read the 11 September entry in the Jodl diary at page 5 of the English translation of Document 1780-PS:
"In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke, from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks. These joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important." that is Jodl's section of the OKW.
I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit U.S.A. 90, which is a carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of this document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and distributed on the 1 October 1938, to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe and the Foreign Office. in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the Propaganda Agencies. It is a highly interesting Top Secret document and, at a glance at the original, you can see the careful form in which the study of anticipated violations of international law and propagandistic refutations thereof were set out. instances of violation of international law are listed in the left hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be taken toward these incidents, in violation of international law and in violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth. reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. I first quote from the covering letter:
"Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the violations of international law which may be expected on the part of fighting troops.
"Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, columns C-1, and C-2 had to be filled in directly here for the time being.
"The branches of the armed forces are requested to send in an opinion here so that a final version may be drawn up.
"The same is requested of the Foreign Office.
"The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"By order (signed) Burkner." this document. I shall confine myself to reading the first ten hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found from the second column, Column B of the Table.
"First: in an air rad on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed.
"Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are killed or injured.
"Third: the Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.
"Fourth: on account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
"Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder, are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot).
"Sixth: captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.
"Seven: for military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.
"Eight: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.
"Nine: churches are used for military accommodations.
"Ten: in the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft." the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the German Labor Service, under the OKW. This Top Secret order -
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT : Would you read the classification with reference to gas?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4.
MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident on account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered. Under the paragraph "Attitude of International Law Group" it says:
"According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances is expressly forbidden.
Quite a number of states made the reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas warfare."
Then, under the column headed "Justification by the Laws of War" it says:
"If the assertion, that the opponent -- in this case the Czechs -- used a prohibited gas in warfare, it is to be believed by the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the firing of gas projectiles is justified and it must be given out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly important to furnish the proof. If the assertion is unfounded or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the same way did the Italians in the Abyssinian War. In this case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must be proved." ing the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the German Labor Service, under the OKW -
THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems to be material.
MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole document.
THE PRESIDENT: The classification of number 10.
MR. ALDERMAN: Number 10 was "in the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft."
Under the heading "Attitude of the International Law Group:
"According to Article 1 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is not to be violated. A deliberate violation by flying over this territory is a breach of international law if the neutral powers have declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of international law, provided that this action is not expressly permitted."
Now, under the heading "Justification by the Laws of War", is this :
"An attempt at the denial should first be made if this is unsuccessful, a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds of miscalculation of position to the Polish government and compensation for damage guarantee)."
THE PRESIDENT: Will you go to a quarter to one?
MR. ALDERMAN: Whatever the Court wishes, yes sir, I shall go on. defendant Keitel issued detailed instructions. No, I am sorry, I had referred to an order issued by Hitler on 10 September from Nurnberg, bringing the German Labor Service under the OKW. This Top Secret order, of which 25 copies were made, is Item 20 in the Schmundt file, page 44. I will read that order:
"1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.
"2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in connection with the Reich Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.
"3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned, (Signed) Adolf Hitler." detailed instructions for the employment of specific RAD units This order is Item 21 in the Schmundt file, at page 45 in the English translation. I do not think I need read the order. September, Item 24, at page 48 in the Schmundt file. I think I need only read the heading or title of that: "Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service" for maneuvers with Wehrmacht.
"1. Effective 15 September, the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army, the RAD forces of the light construction battalion."
Two further entries in the defendant Jodl's diary give further indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the anticipated X day. 5 and 6 of the English translation of the Jodl diary.
"In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.
"16 September: General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place, on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.
"With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.
"In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September." Jodl referred to appears as Item 22, at page 47 of the Schmundt file. In this order the defendant Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to continue to work on the Western front fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. I quote the first four pages of this order:
"The Reichsbahn (that is the railroads) must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.
"Therefore the trainloads for the limes -- job --" -- I understand the "lime job" to have reference to defense fortification in the West -- "will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.
"The Supreme Command of the Army (Fifth Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.
"However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible, even after 20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes."
The penultimate stage of the aggression begins on 18 September. From that date until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file and I shall not take the time of the Tribunal by attempting to read all of it.
the Second, Eigth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Fourtennth, was set forth. That is Item 26 in the Schmundt file at page 50 of the English translation. Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the West to protect the German rear during "Case Green", and I refer to Item 31 in the Schmundt file at page 13. I beg your pardon, it is page 55, I had a misprint. I might refer to that. It is a "Most Secret" order, Berlin 27, 9, 1938, 1920 hours, 45 copies of which this is the 16th.
"The Fuehrer has approved the mobilization without warning of the five regular West divisions (26, 34, 36, 32 and 35), The Fuehrer and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by workers of the Todt organization.
"It is left to the OKH -- to assemble as far as possible first of all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining sections of the divisions in marshaling areas behind the Western fortifications. (Signed) Keitel."
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to adjourn. Before the Tribunal adjourns, the Tribunal would be very grateful if the officers in charge of the Court could reduce the heat.
We will meet again at 2 o'clock. (Whereupon at 1245 the Tribunal recessed until 1400 of the same day.)
Tribunal, in the matter of: The United States of at Nurnberg, Germany,' on 3 December, 1945,
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal. that I misread a signature on one of the documents to which I adverted this morning. It is item 31 of the Schmundt Minutes. I read the name "Jodl" as being the signature on that item. I should have read Keitel. being offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a moment, and recall the setting in which these facts took place. The World will never forget the Munich Pact, and the international crisis which lead to it. As this crisis was developing in August and September of 1938, a final effort was being made by statesmen of the World to preserve the peace of the World. Little did they know of the evil plans or designs in the hearts and the minds of these conspirators, so what is being presented to the Tribunal today is an inside story in that year underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now able to spread upon the pages of history the truth concerning the fraud and deceit practised by the Nazi conspirators. In the achieving of their own end, the Pact of Munich as a stepping stone towards further aggression, one can not think back without living again through the dread of war, or the threat to the world, or still of the war threat that was sought by these living persons. The hope of peace which came with the Munich Pact was the renouncing of the snare, and deceit and the trap course set by the defendants on trial. in this scheme for aggression and war is demonstrated by their own documents. Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luftwaffe as to the time of day at which the attack should be limited.
Notes between the defendant Jodl dated 27 September reveal that in the translation of document 388-PS. These notes in Item 54, at page ninety in these Minutes of the trial. I shall read these first three paragraphs as follows : The heading is "MOST SECRET Berlin 27.
9.38.
Time of attack "Grun"?
(Z z A Grun) "As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X day, wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.
Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 100 due to low coiling in Bavaria."
Then I'll skip to the last two paragraphs on page 91: "Thus it is Proposed:
"Attack by the Army-independent of the attack by the air forceat the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before then, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.
"The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them."
The initial at the end of that order is "J" meaning I think clearly "Jodl".
most secret memorandum to the defendant Hess, and the Reichs Fuehrer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of the Nazi Party officials. This memorandum is item 32 in the Schmundt files at page 56 of the English translation. I read the first four paragraphs of this message.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the item?
MR. ALDERMAN: It is item 32 in the Schmundt's files at page 56, which here is the English version:
"As a result of the political situation the Fuhrer and Chancellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the mobilization (X) order, or corresponding code words.
"Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, the advance measures or special code names.
"The special situation makes it necessary that these demands be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued) immediately and without being referred to higher authorities.
"OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan."
Then I'll skip to the last paragraph as follows:
"The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which are undertaken by Party Organizations, or Police units, as a result of the political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in practice.
KEITEL" To these two entries there the defendant Jodl's files reveal the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their preparations for an attack; even during the period of negotiations which culminated in the Munich agreement.
I quote the answers in the Jodl Diary for the 26 and 27 September from page 7 of the translation of document 1780-PS. The 26 September --
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the entry on the visit of Mr. Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement?
Perhaps you can give it later on.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: The acting on the agreement of the Munich Pact was September 29th, and this answer then was three days before the Pact, the 26 September as follows: "Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
"In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.
"Question by department "Foreign Countries" whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of Armed Forces High Command: yes.
"1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer's opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.
"It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.
"A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army can not be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.
"The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.
"The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.
"2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportpalast."
Then the entry on the 27 September: 1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.." Schmundt, which appears with item 33 at page 57 of the file. I'll read it in its entirety. This order had brought the Nazi Army to a jumping off point for the unremittable and fertile aggression.
"28.9.38. MOST SECRET. MEMORANDUM : At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping off points.
"The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 divisions) must be ready to begin the action against "Grun" on September 30, the decision having been made one day previously by 1200 noon.
"This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through Major Schmundt (pencil note by Schmundt)." body of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a moment to examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The military preparation for action against Czechoslovakia had not been carried out in vacuo. They had been proceeding by a skillfully conceived campaign designed to promote several disobediences in Czechoslovakia state. Using the tactics they did develop in underhand authority, their intentions of the Nazi conspirators of that period of year used many methods of propaganda and force to put in the mind of Czechoslovakians the program of the Nazi force, forcing their intentions of the present German decision on those living in Sudetanland, and the areas bounded thereto on the northwest and the south. I invite attention to the verbatim report in document 998-PS and offer it in evidence as Exhibit No. USA 91. This exhibit is entitled, "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia," and "Czechoslovak Official Report for the Prosecution and Trial of the German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal established according to the agreement of the Four Great Powers of August 8th, 1945." Article 21, or Charter, and the document of which the Court will take judicial notice.
Article 21 provides:
"The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and documents of the committees set up in the various allied countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United Nations. this governmental report by the Czech Government, I shall, with the leave of the Tribunal, merely summarize pages 9 to 12 of this report to show the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue within Czechoslovakia. NSDAP of the Nazi party. In the years following the First World War, a German National Socialist Workers Party, DNSAP, which maintained close contact with Hitler's NSDAP, was activated in the Sudetenland. In 1932, ring-leaders of the Sudeten Volksport, an organization corresponding to the Nazi S. A. or Sturmabteilung, openly endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's program, the first of which demanded the union of all Germans in a greater Germany. Soon thereafter, they were charged with planning armed rebellion on behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy against the Czech Republic.
stalled. its dissolution by voluntary liquidation and several of its chiefs escaped across the border into Germany, For a year thereafter, Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground. conspirators, an instructor of gymnastics, Konrad Henlein, established the German Home Front or Deutsche Heimatfront, which, the following spring became the Sudentendeutsche Partei, SDP, Profiting from the experience of the Czech National Socialist Party, Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis. He rejected pan-Germanism and professed his respect for individual liberties and his loyalty to honest democracy and to the Czech State. His party, nonetheless, was built on the basis of the Nazi Fuehrerprinzip, and he became its fuehrer.
By 1937, when the powers of Hitler's Germany had become manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive note, demanding, without defining "complete Sudenten autonomy". The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would have created a state within a state. Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model, intensified their activities. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda started in the Henlein press.
The campaign against Bolshevism was intensified. Terrorism in the Henlein dominated communities increased. A Storm Troop organization, patterned and trained on the principals of the Nazi SS was established, known as the FS, Freiwilliger Schutz or Voluntary Vigilantes. Henlein came into the open with what he called his Karlsbad Programme. In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance, Henlein asserted the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess German political philosophy, which it was clear meant National Socialism. of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in pages 12 to 16 of the Czech Government official report, these techniques included:
(a) Espionage, Military espionage was conducted by the SDP the FS and by other members of the German minority on behalf of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped and information on Czech troop movements was furnished to the German authorities.
(b) Nazification of German organizations in Czechoslovakia. The Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social cultural centers regularly underwent Gleichschaltung, that is, purification, by the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists were sports societies, rowing clubs, associations of exservicemeh, and choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested in penetrating as many business institution as possible, and bring over to their side the directors of banks, the owners of directors of factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case of Jewish ownership or direction, they attempted to secure the cooperation of the clerical and technical staffs of the institutions.
(c) German direction and leadership. The Henleinists maintained permament contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany, at which Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity, were camouflaged by being held in conjunction with Singer Feste or choral festivals, gymnastic shows, and assemblies, and commercial gatherings such as the Leibzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi conspirators needed incidents for their war of nervs, it was the duty of the Henleinists to supply them.
(d) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a nest of Bolshevism and spread the false report of Russian troops and airplanes centered in Prague. Under direction from the Reich, the Henleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the Sudetenland which contributed to the mounting tension and to the creation of incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein press more or less openly espoused Nazi ideology to the German population in the Sudetenland.