the German attache in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. I quote the first four paragraphs of the enclosure:
"I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal-Freihermersdorf -
THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
"...for possible landing possibilities.
"For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.
"I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, particularly about my official position.
" I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to Fr. taking precautions against being observed." compelled the issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum, entitled "Extended Case Green", in other words, an estimate of possible action by the Western powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia. USA 8*. This is a top secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe, General Staff, dated Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the assumption that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany during Case Creen, this stuey contains an estimate of the strategy and air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date for Case Green. I quote the first two sentences of the document. That is under the heading *---* Political Situation";
"1. The basic assumption is that Prance will declare war during Case Green. It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured." Czechoslovakia was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich and the Nazi Party.
During the summer Germany's allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence Document 2800-PS as Exhibit USA 85. This is a captured document from the German Foreign Office files, a confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938. At the bottom is a handwritten note headed "For the Reichminister only," and the Reichminister was the defendant Ribbentrop. I now read this note. I read from the note the third and fourth paragraphs:
"Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take perhaps a two months' holiday now which he could not do later on.
"Giving an idea of the attitude of other Governments Attolico mentioned that the Roumanian Government had refused to grant application for leave to its Berlin Minister."
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off for ten minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
(Whereupon at 11:20 a.m., a short recess was taken).
(A recess was taken from 1125-1140)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin requesting that he be told the date on which Case Green would take place. I offer in evidence Document No. 2791-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 86, a German Foreign Office note on a conference with Ambassador Attolico. This note is signed "R" for Ribbentrop, and dated 23 August 1938, and I now read two paragraphs from the memorandum:
"On the voyage of the "Patria" Ambassador Attolico explained to me that he had instructions to request the notification of a contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from the German Government.
"In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six months, or perhaps ina year. However, I could promise him that the German Government, in case of an increasing gravity of the situation or as soon as the Fuehrer made his decision, would notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible. In any case, the Italian Government will be the first one who will receive such a notification."
THE PRESIDENT: You did not tell us what the initial was, did you?
MR. ALDERMAN: The initial "R" for Ribbentrop, and the date 23 August 1938.
"Four days later Attolico again requested to be notified of the date of the pending attack. I offer Document No. 2792-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 87, an other German Foreign memorandum, and from that document I read three paragraphs under the heading "R.M. 251."
"Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at twelve o'clock to communicate the following:
"He had received another Written instruction from Mussolini asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia Mussolini asked for such notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order 'to be able to take in due time the necessary measures on the French frontier.' Berlin, 27 August 1938, 'R' for Ribbentrop."
And then: "N. N. I replied to ambassador Attolico, just as on his former demarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any decision. Berlin, 2 September 1938." first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. You will recall that in early March 1938 Defendants Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi plan. At that time the decision was in the negative, but by mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join in the attack. Germany. Inevitably there were discussions of the Czechoslovakian question. I now offer Document 2796-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 88. This is a captured German Foreign Office account signed by von Weizsacker of the conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and aHungarian delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S.S. Patria on 23 August 1938. In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, and suggested that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary. Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop's statement and said, "Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well." I now quote from this document the first two paragraphs:
"While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Fuehrer and the Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion. The Hungarian Minister Imredy and Kanya were in conference with von Ribbentrop. Mr. von Weiszacker also attended the conference.
"Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1: Negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente; and 2: The Czechoslovakian problem."
Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph: "Mr. von Ribbentrop inquired as to what Hungary's attitude would be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches towards the north and perhaps the east. Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and one to two more years time for its development should be allowed.
"Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the Yugoslavs would not date to march while they were between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted since it would depend on Czech provoation. Von Ribbentrop repeated that, 'Whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate'.
"The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the question of Von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of military materiel and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear political basis for such a conflict - the time of Hungarian intervention - was not obtained.
"In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put Hungary's intention to participate on record. The Hungarian ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since they felt more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks.
"When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon he was very relieved when the Fuehrer explained to him that in regard to the situation in question he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs he would have no objections."
I think perhaps that sentence, "Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well," is perhaps as cynical a statement as any statement has ever been guilty of. in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October.
I now offer in evidence Document 2797-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 89, another captured German Foreign Office Memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. You will note that the English mimeographed translation bears the date 29 August. That is incorrect; it should read 25 August. I read the last paragraph from that document, or the last two.
"Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a GermanCzech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one to two years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary.
"During today's conversation, Von Kanya corrected this remark and said that Hungary's military situation was much better. His country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year. (signed an illegible signature)," which probably is that of Weizsacker. corroboration in General Jodl's diary, Document 1780-PS, from which I have already several times read. The entry in that diary for 21 to follows:
"Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied by the Minister von Raatz"--with a question mark in the original in "They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great State of Hungary can be re-established.
They leave with the under Czechoslovakia, even if it should be.
If they want to participate "Germany, however, will never play the role of an arbitrator between them and Poland.
The Hungarians agree; but they believe indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude."
conference on September 6th.
I quote again from Jodl's diary, the entry for 6 September, beginning at the end of that same page.
"Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of Staff Fischer. Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with CQI, General von Stuelpnagel." a briefing on such political matters. With a 1 October target date, set for "Case Green", there was a notable increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical details, the timing of "X days", questions of mobilization, question of transports and supplies. entitled "Timing of the X Order and the Question of Advance Measures." This is item 17 at pages 37 and 38 of the English translation of the Schmundt file on "Case Green", our Number 388-PS. to this memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of the OKW and of the defendants Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit, the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch.
I ask leave to read this document in full:
"Chief Section L Written by General Staff Officer S.O. Only Berlin, 24 August 1938 "TIMING OF THE X- ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES "The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.
"The army's efforts are turning in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.
"To this the following must be said:
"Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.
"It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it (news of this prepared incident) to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.
"It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.
"On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.
"If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.
"For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.
"Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German, subjects before the incident.
"Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)
"If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.
" In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident (X-Fall) "It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.
"I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points." are the notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30; that Hitler agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so notified on 31 August. There follows Jodl's initials once more. the Berghof. Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These will be found as Item 18 at pages 39 and 40 of the Document 388-PS. I shall read the first three short paragraphs of these minutes: "Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to 'exercise areas' for 'Gruen'. Field units to be transferred on 28 September.
From here will then be ready for action.
When X day becomes known "Fuehrer Has objection. Troops assemble field units.
A 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere."
"OKH must know when X day is by 1200 noon, 27 September."
would be transferred to the proper areas for "case Green" on 28 September and would then be ready for action. You will also note that the OKH must know when X day is by 12 noon on 27 September."
strategy the German armies should employ and the strength of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the possibility, and I quote, "of drawing in the Henlein people." The situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt further noted, and here I read the final sentence from page 40 of the English transcript:
"The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the Western fortifications improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarebrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action." assurance that the OKH would be informed five days in advance about the impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred with Luftwaffe generals about the coordination of ground, and air operation at the start of the action. I now read the 8 September entry in General Jodl's diary, page 5 of the English translation of Document 1780-PS.
"General Stuelpnagel OKI, asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent, only for two days in advance and that therefore the plans may be changed up to this moment, that is D day minus 2", or as the German puts it, "X minus 2 tage".
"General Stuelpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision, even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy is reserved."
Now, this is Jodl talking:
"I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 November '37, 7 December '37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us.
We must pass this test of nerves but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.
"1800 hours to 2100 hours: conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force. (Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuher, Sternburg and myself.) We agree about the promulgation of the D day order, (X-Befhel) (X-1, 4 o'clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D day minus 1 (X minus 1 day) 7 o'clock). The "Y" time has yet to be examined. Some formations of an approach flight of one hour." defendant Keitel and Generals von Brauchitsch and Halder at Nurnberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later joined this conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until 3:30 the following morning. Schmundt's minutes on this conference are Item 19 in the large Schmundt file, at pages 41 to 43 of Document 388-PS. of the German armies being committed to the attack, the Second, the Tenth, Twelfth and Fourteenth German Armies. With his characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered a soliloquy on strategic considerations, which should be taken into account as the attack developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs, beginning with the summary of General von Brauchitsch's remarks, on the bottom of page 42.
"General Oberst von Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized divisions were based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs." -- that is for divisions -- "(ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September, if X day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.
The Fuehrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day.
Also the railroad cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.
"General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands in the west. Trains must be assembled.
"Von Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be drafted. 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in the East.) 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West." intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On 11 September defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German violations of international law and of exploiting those of the Czechoslovakians. I read the 11 September entry in the Jodl diary at page 5 of the English translation of Document 1780-PS:
"In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke, from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks. These joint preparations for refutation (wiederlegung) of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important." that is Jodl's section of the OKW.
I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit U.S.A. 90, which is a carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of this document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and distributed on the 1 October 1938, to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe and the Foreign Office. in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed and counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the Propaganda Agencies. It is a highly interesting Top Secret document and, at a glance at the original, you can see the careful form in which the study of anticipated violations of international law and propagandistic refutations thereof were set out. instances of violation of international law are listed in the left hand column. In the second column are given specific examples of the incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be taken toward these incidents, in violation of international law and in violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth. reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda Minister. I first quote from the covering letter:
"Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the violations of international law which may be expected on the part of fighting troops.
"Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation, columns C-1, and C-2 had to be filled in directly here for the time being.
"The branches of the armed forces are requested to send in an opinion here so that a final version may be drawn up.
"The same is requested of the Foreign Office.
"The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"By order (signed) Burkner." this document. I shall confine myself to reading the first ten hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found from the second column, Column B of the Table.
"First: in an air rad on Prague the British Embassy is destroyed.
"Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are killed or injured.
"Third: the Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.
"Fourth: on account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
"Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught in the act of sabotage (destruction of important bridges, destruction of foodstuffs and fodder, are discovered looting wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot).
"Sixth: captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed to do road work or to load munitions.
"Seven: for military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, foodstuffs and fodder from the Czech population. As a result the latter suffer from want.
"Eight: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily evacuated to the rear area.
"Nine: churches are used for military accommodations.
"Ten: in the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft." the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the German Labor Service, under the OKW. This Top Secret order -
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT : Would you read the classification with reference to gas?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4.
MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident on account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered. Under the paragraph "Attitude of International Law Group" it says:
"According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by 40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances is expressly forbidden.
Quite a number of states made the reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas warfare."
Then, under the column headed "Justification by the Laws of War" it says:
"If the assertion, that the opponent -- in this case the Czechs -- used a prohibited gas in warfare, it is to be believed by the world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the firing of gas projectiles is justified and it must be given out in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the first to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly important to furnish the proof. If the assertion is unfounded or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the same way did the Italians in the Abyssinian War. In this case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must be proved." ing the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the German Labor Service, under the OKW -
THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems to be material.
MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole document.
THE PRESIDENT: The classification of number 10.
MR. ALDERMAN: Number 10 was "in the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with Czech aircraft."
Under the heading "Attitude of the International Law Group:
"According to Article 1 of the Fifth Hague Convention of 18 October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is not to be violated. A deliberate violation by flying over this territory is a breach of international law if the neutral powers have declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of international law, provided that this action is not expressly permitted."
Now, under the heading "Justification by the Laws of War", is this :
"An attempt at the denial should first be made if this is unsuccessful, a request for pardon should be made (on the grounds of miscalculation of position to the Polish government and compensation for damage guarantee)."
THE PRESIDENT: Will you go to a quarter to one?
MR. ALDERMAN: Whatever the Court wishes, yes sir, I shall go on. defendant Keitel issued detailed instructions. No, I am sorry, I had referred to an order issued by Hitler on 10 September from Nurnberg, bringing the German Labor Service under the OKW. This Top Secret order, of which 25 copies were made, is Item 20 in the Schmundt file, page 44. I will read that order:
"1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.
"2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in connection with the Reich Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.
"3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned, (Signed) Adolf Hitler." detailed instructions for the employment of specific RAD units This order is Item 21 in the Schmundt file, at page 45 in the English translation. I do not think I need read the order. September, Item 24, at page 48 in the Schmundt file. I think I need only read the heading or title of that: "Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service" for maneuvers with Wehrmacht.
"1. Effective 15 September, the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army, the RAD forces of the light construction battalion."
Two further entries in the defendant Jodl's diary give further indications of the problems of the OKW in this period of mid-September, just two weeks before the anticipated X day. 5 and 6 of the English translation of the Jodl diary.
"In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.
"16 September: General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place, on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.
"With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.
"In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September." Jodl referred to appears as Item 22, at page 47 of the Schmundt file. In this order the defendant Keitel told the railroads to be ready by 28 September but to continue to work on the Western front fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage. I quote the first four pages of this order:
"The Reichsbahn (that is the railroads) must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.
"Therefore the trainloads for the limes -- job --" -- I understand the "lime job" to have reference to defense fortification in the West -- "will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.
"The Supreme Command of the Army (Fifth Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.
"However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible, even after 20 September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes."
The penultimate stage of the aggression begins on 18 September. From that date until the 28th a series of orders were issued advancing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the Schmundt file and I shall not take the time of the Tribunal by attempting to read all of it.