I don't think it necessary to read the answers. They are detailed answers giving information in response to these questions posed by Hitler.
Question 2: "How many battalions, etc., are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?"
Question 3: "Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?"
Question 4: "Frontier protection in the West." initialled by Colonel Zeizler of General Jodl's staff. Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier in Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at page 12 of the Big Schmundt file, a telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, and I quote from this telegram. It is, as I say, Item 8 of the Schmundt file, page 12 of document 388-PS:
"Inform Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and General Keitel". And then, skipping a paragraph:
"The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification work in the West." his political And military advisors resulted in the issuance of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack on Czechoslovakia. It was decided that preparations for X-Day, the day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1 October. I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to the more important of these conferences and directives. At this meeting he gave the necessary instructions to his fellow conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. This fact Hitler later publicly admitted. I nowrefer and invite the notice of the Tribunal to document 2360a copy of the Voelkischer Beobachter for 13 January 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag the preceding day, reported in this newspaper, reading now from document 2360-PS, Hitler spoke as follows.
"On account of this intolerable provocation which had beenaggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there, I resolved to solve once and for all, and this time radically, the Sudeten German question.
On May 28 I ordered (1) that preparations should be made for military action against this state by October 2; I ordered (2) the immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the West." military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item 11 in the Big Schmundt file, document 388-PS. It is entitled, "Two front war, with main effort in the Southeast", and this directive replaced the corresponding section, Fart 2, Section II, of the previous quote, "Directive for unified preparation for war," which had been promulgated by Von Blomberg on 26 June 1937, which I have already introduced in evidence as our document C-175, US Exhibit No.69. This revised directive represented a further Development of the ideas for political and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference on 21 April. It is an expansion of a rough draft submitted by the Defendant Keitel to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as Item 5 in the Schmundt file. It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Defendant Keitel to General Von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Defendant Raeder for the Navy, and to Defendant Goering for the Luftwaffe.
In his covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured, I quote, "As from 1 October 1938 at the latest." I now read from this document, which is the basic directive under which the Wehrmacht carried out its planning for Case Green, a rather lengthy quotation:
"1. Political Prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision. . ."
THE PRESIDENT (interposing) Which page is this?
MR. ALDERMAN: From the first page of Item 11. It is page 16.
"It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.
"An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.
"The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.
"2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action.
"The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:
a. suitable obvious cause and, with it b. sufficient political justification, c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him "From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.
"But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part, which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent, before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.
"3. Conclusions for the preparation of 'Fall Gruen.'
"For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, all ready in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates to hostile nations eager to intervene the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy - fears, or at least hestitates, to unleash an European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, an European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.
"b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance; on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.
"4. Tasks of the Armed Forces.
"Armed Forces preparations are to be made on the following basis:
"a. The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.
"b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.
"c. The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization." (In a footnote: "For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.") "5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.
"a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail?
MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before you pass from the document you ought to read the document on page 15, which introduces it and which gives the date of it.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated Berlin, 30 May 1938, Copy of the 4th Copy. "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. S. O. Only. Access only through Officer. Written by an Officer. Signed, Keitel. Distributed to C-in-C Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob.d.W.)", with some symbols, including "Chefsache", or top secret; "Two Front War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Gruen', is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 1938 at the latest. Alterations in other parts of the directives must be expected during the next few weeks.
"By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"Signed, Keitel.
"Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General Staff."
omit the detailed instructions which are set out for action by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph of the directive, which will be found on Page 19 of the English version:
"In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made possible through increased supplies. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war - economic strength - - by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations -- insofar as military operations permit -- can be of decisive importance to us." date of their planned attack, were looking forward to the contribution which the Czechoslovakian plan would make to further Nazi war efforts and economy.
Then the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page 19:
"All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.
"Signed Adolf Hitler, Certified copy.
"Signed Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General Staff." was prepared and initialed by the defendant Keitel. This is Item 14 at Pages 27 to 32 of the large Schmundt file. It did not supersede the 30 fey directive. I shall read the third and fifth paragraphs on Page 28 of the English translation, and the last paragraph on Page 29.
"The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim."
Then skipping a paragraph:
"However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene."
And then skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page:
"The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time." directions for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of the possibility that during the execution of Fall Gruen or Case Green France or England, might declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute Item 15 in the Schmundt file, give a time table of specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated action. in General Jodl's diary, our Document Number 1780-PS, and US Exhibit Number 72, from which I quoted portions during the Austrian presentation. I now quote from three entries in this diary written in the spring of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated it appears to have been written several months after the annexation of Austria, and here I read under the heading on Page 3 of the English translation, "Later undated entry:"
"After annexation of Austria the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically.
They will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparation, see Memorandum L-1-A of 19 April, reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.
"The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Germany's self-restraint the consequences led to a loss of prestige for the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on 30 May."
And then the entry, 23 May: "Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer for the conferences, which gradually revealed exact intentions of the Fuehrer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces and High Command, OKW on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, - see inclosures."
Then the entry of 30 May: "The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day - X-Tag--combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force.
"Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the Army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them." gaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further expansion of the Reich.
I now offer in evidence Document R-150, as USA Exhibit 82. This is a top secret document dated 2 June 1938, issued by Air Force Group Command 3, and entitled "Plan Study 1938, Instruction for Deployment and Combat, 'Case Red'."
"Case Red" is the code name for action against the Western Powers if need be. 28 copies of this document were made, of which this is Number 16. This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable progress by this date of the planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia. lation, referring to the various possibilities under which war with France may occur. You will note that they are all predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict.
"France will (a) either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of 'Case Green', or (b) start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia; (c) It is possible but not likely that France will begin the fight while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof."
And then, reading down lower on the page under "Intention": "Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of 'Case Green' or whether she makes the opening move of the war simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army, first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia. being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August at the direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff the German Air Attache in Prague reconnoitered the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia south of Upper Silesia for suitable landing ground. of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938. This was a top secret document for general officers only, of which only two copies were made.
the German attache in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. I quote the first four paragraphs of the enclosure:
"I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to reconnoitre the land in the region Freudenthal-Freihermersdorf -
THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
"...for possible landing possibilities.
"For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted men in Prague.
"I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about me to M, particularly about my official position.
" I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to Fr. taking precautions against being observed." compelled the issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence memorandum, entitled "Extended Case Green", in other words, an estimate of possible action by the Western powers during the attack on Czechoslovakia. USA 8*. This is a top secret memorandum of the Intelligence Section of the Luftwaffe, General Staff, dated Berlin, 25 August 1938. Based on the assumption that Great Britain and France would declare war on Germany during Case Creen, this stuey contains an estimate of the strategy and air strength of the Western Powers as of 1 October 1938, the target date for Case Green. I quote the first two sentences of the document. That is under the heading *---* Political Situation";
"1. The basic assumption is that Prance will declare war during Case Green. It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured." Czechoslovakia was not confined to a close circle of high officials of the Reich and the Nazi Party.
During the summer Germany's allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence Document 2800-PS as Exhibit USA 85. This is a captured document from the German Foreign Office files, a confidential memorandum of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July 1938. At the bottom is a handwritten note headed "For the Reichminister only," and the Reichminister was the defendant Ribbentrop. I now read this note. I read from the note the third and fourth paragraphs:
"Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to the Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia. He also knew the appointed time well enough so that he could take perhaps a two months' holiday now which he could not do later on.
"Giving an idea of the attitude of other Governments Attolico mentioned that the Roumanian Government had refused to grant application for leave to its Berlin Minister."
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off for ten minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.
(Whereupon at 11:20 a.m., a short recess was taken).
(A recess was taken from 1125-1140)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a month later Mussolini sent a message to Berlin requesting that he be told the date on which Case Green would take place. I offer in evidence Document No. 2791-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 86, a German Foreign Office note on a conference with Ambassador Attolico. This note is signed "R" for Ribbentrop, and dated 23 August 1938, and I now read two paragraphs from the memorandum:
"On the voyage of the "Patria" Ambassador Attolico explained to me that he had instructions to request the notification of a contemplated time for German action against Czechoslovakia from the German Government.
"In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow, in six months, or perhaps ina year. However, I could promise him that the German Government, in case of an increasing gravity of the situation or as soon as the Fuehrer made his decision, would notify the Italian Chief of Government as rapidly as possible. In any case, the Italian Government will be the first one who will receive such a notification."
THE PRESIDENT: You did not tell us what the initial was, did you?
MR. ALDERMAN: The initial "R" for Ribbentrop, and the date 23 August 1938.
"Four days later Attolico again requested to be notified of the date of the pending attack. I offer Document No. 2792-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 87, an other German Foreign memorandum, and from that document I read three paragraphs under the heading "R.M. 251."
"Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at twelve o'clock to communicate the following:
"He had received another Written instruction from Mussolini asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia Mussolini asked for such notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order 'to be able to take in due time the necessary measures on the French frontier.' Berlin, 27 August 1938, 'R' for Ribbentrop."
And then: "N. N. I replied to ambassador Attolico, just as on his former demarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any decision. Berlin, 2 September 1938." first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green. You will recall that in early March 1938 Defendants Keitel and Ribbentrop had exchanged letters on the question of bringing Hungary into the Nazi plan. At that time the decision was in the negative, but by mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were attempting to persuade Hungary to join in the attack. Germany. Inevitably there were discussions of the Czechoslovakian question. I now offer Document 2796-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 88. This is a captured German Foreign Office account signed by von Weizsacker of the conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and aHungarian delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya aboard the S.S. Patria on 23 August 1938. In this conference Ribbentrop inquired about the Hungarian attitude in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, and suggested that such an attack would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary. Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant to commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop's statement and said, "Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well." I now quote from this document the first two paragraphs:
"While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Fuehrer and the Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion. The Hungarian Minister Imredy and Kanya were in conference with von Ribbentrop. Mr. von Weiszacker also attended the conference.
"Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1: Negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente; and 2: The Czechoslovakian problem."
Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph: "Mr. von Ribbentrop inquired as to what Hungary's attitude would be if the Fuehrer would carry out his decision to answer a new Czech provocation by force. The reply of the Hungarians presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality must be assured if Hungary marches towards the north and perhaps the east. Moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had only been started and one to two more years time for its development should be allowed.
"Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the Yugoslavs would not date to march while they were between the pincers of the Axis Powers. Rumania alone would therefore not move. England and France would also remain tranquil. England would not recklessly risk her empire. She knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, however, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could be predicted since it would depend on Czech provoation. Von Ribbentrop repeated that, 'Whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate'.
"The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon the question of Von Ribbentrop, what purpose the desired General Staff conferences were to have, not much more was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual inventory of military materiel and preparedness for the Czech conflict. The clear political basis for such a conflict - the time of Hungarian intervention - was not obtained.
"In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von Horthy in his talk with the Fuehrer. He wished not to hide his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished to put Hungary's intention to participate on record. The Hungarian ministers were and remained, even later, more skeptical since they felt more strongly about the immediate danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks.
"When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Fuehrer in the afternoon he was very relieved when the Fuehrer explained to him that in regard to the situation in question he demanded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish conferences of the General Staffs he would have no objections."
I think perhaps that sentence, "Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to participate in the cooking as well," is perhaps as cynical a statement as any statement has ever been guilty of. in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October.
I now offer in evidence Document 2797-PS as Exhibit U.S.A. 89, another captured German Foreign Office Memorandum of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. You will note that the English mimeographed translation bears the date 29 August. That is incorrect; it should read 25 August. I read the last paragraph from that document, or the last two.
"Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a GermanCzech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one to two years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary.
"During today's conversation, Von Kanya corrected this remark and said that Hungary's military situation was much better. His country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year. (signed an illegible signature)," which probably is that of Weizsacker. corroboration in General Jodl's diary, Document 1780-PS, from which I have already several times read. The entry in that diary for 21 to follows:
"Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied by the Minister von Raatz"--with a question mark in the original in "They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great State of Hungary can be re-established.
They leave with the under Czechoslovakia, even if it should be.
If they want to participate "Germany, however, will never play the role of an arbitrator between them and Poland.
The Hungarians agree; but they believe indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude."
conference on September 6th.
I quote again from Jodl's diary, the entry for 6 September, beginning at the end of that same page.
"Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of Staff Fischer. Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer, especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with CQI, General von Stuelpnagel." a briefing on such political matters. With a 1 October target date, set for "Case Green", there was a notable increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators was devoted to technical details, the timing of "X days", questions of mobilization, question of transports and supplies. entitled "Timing of the X Order and the Question of Advance Measures." This is item 17 at pages 37 and 38 of the English translation of the Schmundt file on "Case Green", our Number 388-PS. to this memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the complicity of the OKW and of the defendants Keitel and Jodl in the shameful fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals in bare outline the deceit, the barbarity, the completely criminal character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch.
I ask leave to read this document in full:
"Chief Section L Written by General Staff Officer S.O. Only Berlin, 24 August 1938 "TIMING OF THE X- ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES "The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.
"The army's efforts are turning in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1.
"To this the following must be said:
"Operation (aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.
"It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it (news of this prepared incident) to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.
"It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.
"On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.
"If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.
"For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.
"Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German, subjects before the incident.
"Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in PRAGUE is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)
"If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.
" In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident (X-Fall) "It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.