COLONEL AMEN: I don't know how that happened, your Lordship.
(Whereupon, at 13.40 hours, the Hearing of the Tribunal adjourned.)
in the matter of: The United States of America, the
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States.
MR. ALDERMAN : May it please the Tribunal, it occurs to me that perhaps the Tribunal might be interested in a very brief outline of what might be expected to occur within the next week or two weeks in this trial. present the story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I perhaps shall not be able to conclude that today. that he be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening statement on Count 2, and I shall be glad to yield for that purpose, with the understanding that we shall resume on Czechoslovakia after that. aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and England into the war. Thereupon the British Prosecutor will proceed with the expansion aggressive war in Europe, the aggression against Norway and Denmark, against Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia and Greece. And in connection with those aggressions the British Prosecutor will present to the Tribunal the various treaties involved and the various breaches of treaties involved in those aggressions. Count 2; and that will probably take the rest of this week. to come back to Count 1 to cover certain portions which have not been covered, specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration camps, spoliation in occupied territories, the High Command and other alleged criminal organizations, particular evidence dealing with individual responsibility of individual defendants.
following week, two weeks. However, that is a very rough estimate. statement and will present the evidence as to crimes against humanity and war crimes under Count 3 and 4 as to Western occupied countries. opening statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Eastern countries. presentation of the aggressive war case, aggression against Czechoslovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV, (F), appearing at pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text of the Indictment.
This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts:
(a) The 1936-1938 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the assault both on Austria and Czechoslovakia.
(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria; November 1937 to March 1938.
(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, April 1938 to March 1939. on the execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents are gathered together in a document book, which was handed to the Tribunal at the beginning of the Austrian presentation. have been gathered in a separate document book, which I now submit to the Tribunal and which is marked "Document Book O".
had initiated a program of rearmament designed to give the Third Reich military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations. You will recall also that beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked upon a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last until March 1939. This was intended to shorten their frontier, to increase their industrial and food reserve, and to place them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of aggression. began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia, they had reached approximately the half-way point in this preliminary program. 5 November, 1937, covered by the Hoszbach minutes, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to follow. Those Hoszbach minutes, you will recall, are contained in document 386-PS, US Exhibit No. 25, which I read to the Tribunal in my introductory statement a week ago today.
"The question for Germany", the Fuehrer had informed his military commanders at that meeting, "is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost." following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a re-definition of German intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. A little more than a month later two of the conspirators, Hitler and Keitel, met to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State. my introduction a week ago, to establish the corpus of the crime of aggressive war, was the account of this meeting on 21 May, 1938. This account is item 2 in our document number 388-PS, U.S..Exhibit No. 26. which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an excuse for war.
In the alternative--and this alternative they found to be preferable--they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an incident of their own creation. proved--was given to the assassination of the German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. lovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli and forestalling outside intervention. Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical planning. of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be viewed against that background. Although they had, in the fall of 1937, determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German Government were bound by a treaty of arbitration, and assurances freely given, to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. TC-14, which will be introduced by the British Prosecutor--Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice matters of dispute. I quote, they would so refer "all disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective right, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy."
And the preamble to this treaty stated:
"The President of the German Empire and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic equally resolve to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by sharing the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries, declaring their respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the Law of Nations obligatory for international peace, agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent, and considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which might become the cause of division between states, have decided to embody in a treaty their common intention in this respect." Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On 11 and 12 March, 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time the defendant Goering assured Monsieur Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government, that German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the development in Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions towards Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity, Defendant Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement: "Iche gebe Ihnen mein ehrenwort." "I give you my word of honor." German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop's stay in London, assured Monsieur Masaryk, on behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that Germany still considered herself bound by the arbitration convention of 1925.
a series of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal by the British Prosecutor under Count 2 of the Indictment. proceeded with their military and political plan for aggression. Ever since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German policy was the elimination both of Austria and of Czechoslovakia. In both countries the conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist by propaganda and by fifth column activities, while the actual military preparations were being developed. and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March of 1938. Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to "Fall Gruen", Case Green, the designation given to the proposed operation against Czechoslovakia. form as early as June 1937. The OKW top secret directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war--signed by von Blomberg on 24 June, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning 1 July, 1937--included, as a probable war-like eventuality for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, "War on two fronts, with the main struggle in the Southeast". in evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon copy, signed in ink by von Blomberg. The original section of this directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakiait was later revised--opens with this supposition. I read from the bottom of page 3 of the English translation of this directive; I am reading from page 3 of the English copy, at the bottom of the page, following the heading II, and subparagraph (1) headed "Suppositions":"The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition.
The necessary conditions justify such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand." action, the directive continues as follows:
"(2) The task of the German armed forces"--and that much is underscored--"is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear cover for this attack.
"The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German armed forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and, the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia." principles the following statement--and I now read from page 1 of the English translation, that is, the third paragraph following figure 1:
"Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German armed forces."
And then (a): "To counter attacks at any time."
(b): "To make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should the occur." without public announcement, I quote: "In order to put the armed forces in a position to be able to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise, both as regards strength and time of attack," This directive is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it give it a significance that it would not have in another setting.
the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-33. On the political level, this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5 November 1937, reported in the Hoszbach minutes, to which I have frequently heretofore referred. defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel were concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1933, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for Keitel's confidential information the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an interchange of views. This document 2786-.PS, a photostat of the original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA 81. I his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as wall would be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you world notify me briefly whether any committments were made here in any respect. With best regards and Heil Hitler."
At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning, document 388-PS, Item 0, specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time.
This meeting was followed, in the late Spring and Summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green (Fall Gruen). Those notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler's headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the Fuehrer's military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzburg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is preserved intact, bears our number 388-PS, and is US Exhibit No.26, and which we affectionately refer to as Big Schmundt -- a large file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators' plan to launch an unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovakian armament. With the leave of the Tribunal I shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeizler, in General Jodl's office of the OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler's headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman ?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them?
MR. ALDERMAN : I hadn't intended to read them in full, unless that my be necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish to refer to the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed "Short Survey of Armament of the Czechoslovakian Army," dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and initialled "Z" for Zeizler, and Item 13, "Questions of the Fuehrer", dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and classified Most Secret. I should like to read four of the questions which Hitler wanted authoritative information about, as shown by that document, and I read indicated questions on pages 23, 24, 25. and 26 of Item 13 of Document 388-PS. Question 1: Hitler asked about armament of the Czechoslovakian army.
I don't think it necessary to read the answers. They are detailed answers giving information in response to these questions posed by Hitler.
Question 2: "How many battalions, etc., are employed in the West for the construction of emplacements?"
Question 3: "Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occupied in unreduced strength?"
Question 4: "Frontier protection in the West." initialled by Colonel Zeizler of General Jodl's staff. Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western frontier in Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at page 12 of the Big Schmundt file, a telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berchtesgaden to Berlin, and I quote from this telegram. It is, as I say, Item 8 of the Schmundt file, page 12 of document 388-PS:
"Inform Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and General Keitel". And then, skipping a paragraph:
"The Fuehrer repeatedly emphasized the necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification work in the West." his political And military advisors resulted in the issuance of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack on Czechoslovakia. It was decided that preparations for X-Day, the day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1 October. I now invite the attention of the Tribunal to the more important of these conferences and directives. At this meeting he gave the necessary instructions to his fellow conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. This fact Hitler later publicly admitted. I nowrefer and invite the notice of the Tribunal to document 2360a copy of the Voelkischer Beobachter for 13 January 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag the preceding day, reported in this newspaper, reading now from document 2360-PS, Hitler spoke as follows.
"On account of this intolerable provocation which had beenaggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization of our Germans there, I resolved to solve once and for all, and this time radically, the Sudeten German question.
On May 28 I ordered (1) that preparations should be made for military action against this state by October 2; I ordered (2) the immense and accelerated expansion of our defensive front in the West." military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item 11 in the Big Schmundt file, document 388-PS. It is entitled, "Two front war, with main effort in the Southeast", and this directive replaced the corresponding section, Fart 2, Section II, of the previous quote, "Directive for unified preparation for war," which had been promulgated by Von Blomberg on 26 June 1937, which I have already introduced in evidence as our document C-175, US Exhibit No.69. This revised directive represented a further Development of the ideas for political and military action discussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference on 21 April. It is an expansion of a rough draft submitted by the Defendant Keitel to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as Item 5 in the Schmundt file. It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were made. Three copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Defendant Keitel to General Von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Defendant Raeder for the Navy, and to Defendant Goering for the Luftwaffe.
In his covering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured, I quote, "As from 1 October 1938 at the latest." I now read from this document, which is the basic directive under which the Wehrmacht carried out its planning for Case Green, a rather lengthy quotation:
"1. Political Prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision. . ."
THE PRESIDENT (interposing) Which page is this?
MR. ALDERMAN: From the first page of Item 11. It is page 16.
"It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the politically and militarily suitable moment.
"An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia or other political events in Europe creating a surprisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never come again may cause me to take early action.
"The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly the preparations are to be made at once.
"2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action.
"The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended invasion:
a. suitable obvious cause and, with it b. sufficient political justification, c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him "From a military as well as a political standpoint the most favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.
"But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, must terminate in sudden action on our part, which must have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent, before the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be surpassed.
"3. Conclusions for the preparation of 'Fall Gruen.'
"For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element as the most important factor contributing to success be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, all ready in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within the first four days which plainly demonstrates to hostile nations eager to intervene the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France - due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy - fears, or at least hestitates, to unleash an European war by intervening against Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations within the first few days, an European crisis will certainly result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided and bold action.
"b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance; on the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and determination of the date.
"4. Tasks of the Armed Forces.
"Armed Forces preparations are to be made on the following basis:
"a. The mass of all forces must be employed against Czechoslovakia.
"b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the Southern frontiers to be watched.
"c. The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the same time as the penetration by the Air Force before the enemy can become aware of our mobilization." (In a footnote: "For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.") "5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.
"a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns - the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time - must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail?
MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before you pass from the document you ought to read the document on page 15, which introduces it and which gives the date of it.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated Berlin, 30 May 1938, Copy of the 4th Copy. "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. S. O. Only. Access only through Officer. Written by an Officer. Signed, Keitel. Distributed to C-in-C Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob.d.W.)", with some symbols, including "Chefsache", or top secret; "Two Front War with main effort in the South-East - strategic concentration 'Gruen', is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 1938 at the latest. Alterations in other parts of the directives must be expected during the next few weeks.
"By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"Signed, Keitel.
"Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General Staff."
omit the detailed instructions which are set out for action by the Luftwaffe and by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph of the directive, which will be found on Page 19 of the English version:
"In war economy it is essential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum deployment of forces is made possible through increased supplies. In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total war - economic strength - - by rapidly reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations -- insofar as military operations permit -- can be of decisive importance to us." date of their planned attack, were looking forward to the contribution which the Czechoslovakian plan would make to further Nazi war efforts and economy.
Then the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page 19:
"All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air Force.
"Signed Adolf Hitler, Certified copy.
"Signed Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General Staff." was prepared and initialed by the defendant Keitel. This is Item 14 at Pages 27 to 32 of the large Schmundt file. It did not supersede the 30 fey directive. I shall read the third and fifth paragraphs on Page 28 of the English translation, and the last paragraph on Page 29.
"The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim."
Then skipping a paragraph:
"However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene."
And then skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page:
"The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself will be issued by me from time to time." directions for the deployment of troops and for precautionary measures in view of the possibility that during the execution of Fall Gruen or Case Green France or England, might declare war on Germany. Six pages of complicated schedules which follow this draft in the original have not been translated into English. These schedules, which constitute Item 15 in the Schmundt file, give a time table of specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the contemplated action. in General Jodl's diary, our Document Number 1780-PS, and US Exhibit Number 72, from which I quoted portions during the Austrian presentation. I now quote from three entries in this diary written in the spring of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated it appears to have been written several months after the annexation of Austria, and here I read under the heading on Page 3 of the English translation, "Later undated entry:"
"After annexation of Austria the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically.
They will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparation, see Memorandum L-1-A of 19 April, reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.
"The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Germany's self-restraint the consequences led to a loss of prestige for the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on 30 May."
And then the entry, 23 May: "Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer for the conferences, which gradually revealed exact intentions of the Fuehrer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces and High Command, OKW on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, - see inclosures."
Then the entry of 30 May: "The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day - X-Tag--combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force.
"Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the Army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer's intuition that we must do it this year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them." gaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green and the further expansion of the Reich.
I now offer in evidence Document R-150, as USA Exhibit 82. This is a top secret document dated 2 June 1938, issued by Air Force Group Command 3, and entitled "Plan Study 1938, Instruction for Deployment and Combat, 'Case Red'."
"Case Red" is the code name for action against the Western Powers if need be. 28 copies of this document were made, of which this is Number 16. This is another staff plan, this time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the event of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable progress by this date of the planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia. lation, referring to the various possibilities under which war with France may occur. You will note that they are all predicated on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict.
"France will (a) either interfere in the struggle between the Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of 'Case Green', or (b) start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia; (c) It is possible but not likely that France will begin the fight while Czechoslovakia still remains aloof."
And then, reading down lower on the page under "Intention": "Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of 'Case Green' or whether she makes the opening move of the war simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass of the German offensive formations will, in conjunction with the Army, first deliver the decisive blow against Czechoslovakia. being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August at the direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff the German Air Attache in Prague reconnoitered the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia south of Upper Silesia for suitable landing ground. of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated 12 August 1938. This was a top secret document for general officers only, of which only two copies were made.