You said Rowil made flights from Budapest later?
Q Do you know that of your own knowledge or information? according to the diary, and because at that time I was present at Budapest, and I was asked, because I was there, to attend a Dedication
Q And why were these flights executed from Budapest?
A I said that already yesterday. The gentlemen of the Air Force have to give an answer to that, I do not know.
DR. DIX (Counsel for defendant Schacht): You probably do not know me. I am the attorney for the defendant Schacht. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. DIX:
Q Do you, witness, know Captain Staruenck from the Abwehr?
A I would like you to tell me something about the name. The name alone, I do not know what belongs to it. Give me a few points that will refresh my memory. do not know in what department, but I would say it was in the department of Pieckenbrock. However, if you do not know I will not ask you anything further.
A If he was with Pieckenbrock I do not know him. I knew a few. Is Staruenck still alive? Has he been executed?
DR. DIX: For the information of the Court, I only ask this question because I have asked Colonel Staruenck as a witness, and he has already been admitted.
Q (Continuing) However, if you do not know him I will not ask you anything further.
A Well, it is only what I have already said. As to the question whether he is still alive, something came back to me; that this man, in connection with others that I know very well, it might be he was killed, but I cannot put it any more precisely.
DR. FRITZ (Counsel for defendant Fritsche): I would like to ask a few questions of the witness. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITZ: 1942, was transferred to the Sixth Army as a soldier and at that time, for the first time, heard of an order for execution. The Oberkommander of the Sixth Army, Paulus, he recommended to him that this order be retracted. The leaflets were thrown all over Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask one question at a time? What you have just asked are three or four questions.
Q (Continuing) Well, after I have said this, is it known to you that Fritsche gave Paulus the advice to rescind the order?
A That was already given to his Army. Will you kindly give me this within a certain time? mostly in May 1942.
A No. In connection with the person Fritsche, this is not known to me. In connection with the name Reichenau, which was mentioned before, I do remember a conversation between Reichenau and Canaris. That for me was very impressive, and Reichenau's conception and judgment of things in this conversation, in this circle, where there were several other gentlemen present.
It was shown to me entirely different from how it was generally expected, and as I also thought of it. But furthermore, I do not know anything concrete, anything in connection with the question you directed to me. really rescinded the order for the jurisdiction of his Army? I also said yesterday that several Army Commanders, whose names are no longer in my memory today, all those names that have been recorded, I have already informed you about. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. KAUFFMANN (Counsel for defendant Kaltenbrunner):
Q Do you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?
A Kaltenbrunner? I met Kaltenbrunner once in my life. I have seen Kaltenbrunner once in my life on a date that will always be in my memory, I heard him there. It was also the first meeting between Canaris and Kaltenbrunner. It took place in Munich in the Regina Hotel, and it was on that day when the two young people, a student and his sister, were arrested and executed. They distributed leaflets from the auditorium of the University. I read the contents of the leaflets, I remember, and I also remember, among other things, that there was an appeal to the Wehrmacht on this day.
I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time that I saw Kaltenbrunner, whose name has been known to me. Of course, Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, and witnesses were there, and everybody was under the terrible impression of what had happened, and Kaltenbrunner spoke about that to Canaris in a manner of which cynicism would be a very mild description. This is the only thing that I can say to this question. himself, and he had only Information Service. Is this in accord with the conversation that you just mentioned? the matter Kaltenbrunner and Himmler, the power politics which took place, to this very plain description of an event. I can give you the names and they were very impressive.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. BOEHM: (Counsel for SA): of Soviet prisoners of war was known to the leaders of the SA and other organizations, and your answer was that these orders must have been known and I would now like to ask you who these leaders were at the time and what were their names? I have also stated explicitly yesterday why I said so. They should have been known to you and a large circle, because from everything that became obvious from these orders and what, of course, was in a very natural way, was known by the return of wounded people. fact based on your information?
A It was not. I have never spoken to any SA leader about it. I never had anything to do with them, and I do not think any one of them knows me closely.
Q. Could you make a statement on this, that is, that the orders which were named yesterday were given to the formations of the SA, emphasizing SA?
A. Would you kindly formulate that question again?
Q. Could you make another statement, whether it was known to you whether the contents of these orders, which were talked about yesterday, were sent to formations of the SA through channels?
A. No, not through channels, no, but in the way I have previously indicated; in other words, that members of the SA who were also in the Wehrmacht would see outside actually what happened, and when they came back or came in contact with them, that they talked about the Jews as anyone else would. It was only in this connection-
Q. Is it known to you whether members of the SA had anything to do, at all, with the management of the prisoners of war?
A. Within the frame of the employment of SA in the Wehrmacht, yes.
Q. Have you any personal information on that?
A. No, I never said that. I said I had already talked about the SA.
Q. I have asked you what leaders of the SA formations have known about it and you yourself answered that they should have known it.
A. I said the leaders of these organizations, in this way, have known about it.
Q. And today I ask you whether the specific formations of the SA had received these orders.
A. I can only repeat what I said yesterday, and I think I was very clear on the subject, in other words, how these orders, that I did not read myself, but I knew the effects anyway
Q. I can imagine myself how this happened, but I have asked you whether you know anything about having these orders actually given to the SA?
A. No.
Q. You do not know? Is anything known to you that members of the SA were employed for the supervision of prisoners of war, according to your personal information?
A. Yes, because I, myself, on a trip to the Army Group North, I once got hold of an SA man, who kicked a Russian prisoner of war and I told him off, accordingly. Surely somewhere I have this in my records, and also an Arbeitsdienst Mann.
Q. Have you reported any of these incidents to any superior officers?
A. I have reported it to my superior officers, also my reports about these trips, either orally or in written shape, I have reported this, and on many of these occasions discussions had taken place.
Q. Have you got anything in your records?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you kindly present these?
(Discussion between Counsel and witness in German, not translated).
A. I am looking it up. This is about the Arbeitsdienst Mann, this document.
Q. It is not about the SA?
A. I do not have it here. I would have to look it up.
Q. Is there any possibility that you might find some records?
A. I would, have to have the possibility of having the entire material which the American authorities have, and I would have to look through it thoroughly for this one possibility.
DR. GEORG BOEHM (Counsel for S.A.): I will ask the Court to have it made possible at some time. BY DR. BOEHM:
Q. I would also like to ask you if you have any other information that SA members, who you previously said were employed in supervisory capacities, were made to execute these orders according to statements about Russian prisoners of war.
A. No, not personally.
Q. Thank you.
DR. STAHMER: (Counsel for Goering): I would like to ask the Court for a fundamental ruling, whether the defendant also has the right to personally ask the witness questions. According to the German Charter, Paragraph 16, I believe this is permissible without a doubt.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the point you have raised and will let you know later.
JUSTICE JACKSON: The U.S. prosecution would desire to be heard, I am sure, if there was any probability of that view being taken by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear you now then, Mr. Justice Jackson.
JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think it is very clear that these provisions are mutually exclusive. Each has the right to conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of counsel. Certainly this would become a performance rather than a trial if we go into that sort of thing. In framing this Charter, we anticipated the possibility that some of these defendants, being lawyers themselves, might conduct their own defenses. If they do so, of course they have all the privileges of counsel. If they avail themselves of the privilege of counsel, they are not, we submit, entitled to be heard in person.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out once more that Paragraph 16-A, according to my opinion, speaks very clearly for my point of view, and says that the defendant has the right, either personally or through his attorney, to present evidence, and according to the German text it is clear that the defendant has the right to cross examine each witness called by the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel, defendant's counsel, wish to cross-examine the prisoner?
DR. SERVATIUS (counsel for Sauckel): I would only like to point out that in the written forms that have been given to us by the Court, the defendant as well as his lawyer can make amotion. There is room for two signatures on the questionnaire. I request, therefore, that the defendant himself have the right to speak on the floor.
THE PRESIDENT: What I asked was whether any other defendants' counsel wished to cross examine the witness.
(Dr. Boehm approached the bench)
THE PRESIDENT: What is it? Would you put the earphones on, please, unless you understand English.
What is it you want to ask now? You have already corss examined the witness.
DR. BOEHM: Yes, I have cross examined him, but I have heard from him that he has written statements, that he mas made a report, according to something he has witnessed. I cannot dismiss the witness as yet. witness from the prosecution to look through all the reports and all the records, and we will have the possibility to go through all the materials.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must conclude your cross examination now.
DR. BOEHM: Surely.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court thinks it would be better if you want to make any further application with reference to this witness, that you should make it in writing later.
DR. BOEHM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, as no other defendant's Counsel wishes to cross-examine the witness, the Tribunal will now retire for the purpose of considering the question raised by Dr. Stahmer as to whether a defendant was the right to cross-examine as well as his own Counsel.
(Whereupon at 1.10 p.m. a short recess was takes.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered the question raised by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants who are represented by Counsel have not the right to cross-examine) witnesses. They have the right to be called as witness is themselves and to make a statement at the end of the trial. in re-examination?
COLONEL AMEN: Just one question, your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness come back here.
COLONEL MAYS: He was taken away.
THE PRESIDENT: Taken away?
COLONEL MAYS: That's right. He was taken away by some Captain who brought him here for the trial. They have sent after him now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how far he has been taken away?
COLONEL MAYS: No, Sir, I do not. I will find out immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are the questions that you wish to ask of sufficient importance for the Tribunal to wait for this witness or for him to be recalled on Monday?
COLONEL AMEN: I don't believe so, your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well then. The Tribunal will adjourn, and it will be understood that in the future no witness will be removed whilst he is under examination from the precincts of this Court without the orders of the Tribunal.
COLONEL AMEN: I don't know how that happened, your Lordship.
(Whereupon, at 13.40 hours, the Hearing of the Tribunal adjourned.)
in the matter of: The United States of America, the
THE PRESIDENT: I call on the Prosecutor for the United States.
MR. ALDERMAN : May it please the Tribunal, it occurs to me that perhaps the Tribunal might be interested in a very brief outline of what might be expected to occur within the next week or two weeks in this trial. present the story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I perhaps shall not be able to conclude that today. that he be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening statement on Count 2, and I shall be glad to yield for that purpose, with the understanding that we shall resume on Czechoslovakia after that. aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and England into the war. Thereupon the British Prosecutor will proceed with the expansion aggressive war in Europe, the aggression against Norway and Denmark, against Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia and Greece. And in connection with those aggressions the British Prosecutor will present to the Tribunal the various treaties involved and the various breaches of treaties involved in those aggressions. Count 2; and that will probably take the rest of this week. to come back to Count 1 to cover certain portions which have not been covered, specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration camps, spoliation in occupied territories, the High Command and other alleged criminal organizations, particular evidence dealing with individual responsibility of individual defendants.
following week, two weeks. However, that is a very rough estimate. statement and will present the evidence as to crimes against humanity and war crimes under Count 3 and 4 as to Western occupied countries. opening statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Eastern countries. presentation of the aggressive war case, aggression against Czechoslovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV, (F), appearing at pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text of the Indictment.
This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts:
(a) The 1936-1938 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the assault both on Austria and Czechoslovakia.
(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria; November 1937 to March 1938.
(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, April 1938 to March 1939. on the execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents are gathered together in a document book, which was handed to the Tribunal at the beginning of the Austrian presentation. have been gathered in a separate document book, which I now submit to the Tribunal and which is marked "Document Book O".
had initiated a program of rearmament designed to give the Third Reich military strength and political bargaining power to be used against other nations. You will recall also that beginning in the year 1936 they had embarked upon a preliminary program of expansion which, as it turned out, was to last until March 1939. This was intended to shorten their frontier, to increase their industrial and food reserve, and to place them in a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they could launch a more ambitious and more devastating campaign of aggression. began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czechoslovakia, they had reached approximately the half-way point in this preliminary program. 5 November, 1937, covered by the Hoszbach minutes, Hitler had set forth the program which Germany was to follow. Those Hoszbach minutes, you will recall, are contained in document 386-PS, US Exhibit No. 25, which I read to the Tribunal in my introductory statement a week ago today.
"The question for Germany", the Fuehrer had informed his military commanders at that meeting, "is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at the lowest cost." following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time had come for a re-definition of German intentions regarding Czechoslovakia. A little more than a month later two of the conspirators, Hitler and Keitel, met to discuss plans for the envelopment and conquest of the Czechoslovak State. my introduction a week ago, to establish the corpus of the crime of aggressive war, was the account of this meeting on 21 May, 1938. This account is item 2 in our document number 388-PS, U.S..Exhibit No. 26. which Germany might develop to serve as an excuse for a sudden and overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead to an excuse for war.
In the alternative--and this alternative they found to be preferable--they planned to unleash a lightning attack as the result of an incident of their own creation. proved--was given to the assassination of the German Ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident. lovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized. Problems of transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli and forestalling outside intervention. Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical planning. of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be viewed against that background. Although they had, in the fall of 1937, determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of the German Government were bound by a treaty of arbitration, and assurances freely given, to observe the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. TC-14, which will be introduced by the British Prosecutor--Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain exceptions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice matters of dispute. I quote, they would so refer "all disputes of every kind between Germany and Czechoslovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective right, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy."
And the preamble to this treaty stated:
"The President of the German Empire and the President of the Czechoslovak Republic equally resolve to maintain peace between Germany and Czechoslovakia by sharing the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries, declaring their respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the Law of Nations obligatory for international peace, agreeing to recognize that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent, and considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which might become the cause of division between states, have decided to embody in a treaty their common intention in this respect." Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as late as March 1938. On 11 and 12 March, 1938, at the time of the annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time the defendant Goering assured Monsieur Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on behalf of the German Government, that German-Czech relations were not adversely affected by the development in Austria and that Germany had no hostile intentions towards Czechoslovakia. As a token of his sincerity, Defendant Goering accompanied his assurance with the statement: "Iche gebe Ihnen mein ehrenwort." "I give you my word of honor." German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop's stay in London, assured Monsieur Masaryk, on behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that Germany still considered herself bound by the arbitration convention of 1925.
a series of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal by the British Prosecutor under Count 2 of the Indictment. proceeded with their military and political plan for aggression. Ever since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate aim of German policy was the elimination both of Austria and of Czechoslovakia. In both countries the conspirators planned to undermine the will to resist by propaganda and by fifth column activities, while the actual military preparations were being developed. and strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March of 1938. Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to "Fall Gruen", Case Green, the designation given to the proposed operation against Czechoslovakia. form as early as June 1937. The OKW top secret directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war--signed by von Blomberg on 24 June, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe for the year beginning 1 July, 1937--included, as a probable war-like eventuality for which a concentrated plan was to be drafted, Case Green, "War on two fronts, with the main struggle in the Southeast". in evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an original carbon copy, signed in ink by von Blomberg. The original section of this directive dealing with the probable war against Czechoslovakiait was later revised--opens with this supposition. I read from the bottom of page 3 of the English translation of this directive; I am reading from page 3 of the English copy, at the bottom of the page, following the heading II, and subparagraph (1) headed "Suppositions":"The war in the East can begin with a surprise German operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition.
The necessary conditions justify such an action politically, and in the eyes of international law must be created beforehand." action, the directive continues as follows:
"(2) The task of the German armed forces"--and that much is underscored--"is to make their preparations in such a way that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force while in the West the minimum strength is provided as rear cover for this attack.
"The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German armed forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by the defeat of the enemy armed forces and, the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia." principles the following statement--and I now read from page 1 of the English translation, that is, the third paragraph following figure 1:
"Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant preparedness for war on the part of the German armed forces."
And then (a): "To counter attacks at any time."
(b): "To make possible the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should the occur." without public announcement, I quote: "In order to put the armed forces in a position to be able to begin a war suddenly which will take the enemy by surprise, both as regards strength and time of attack," This directive is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature of the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments which resulted from it give it a significance that it would not have in another setting.
the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-33. On the political level, this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military commanders on 5 November 1937, reported in the Hoszbach minutes, to which I have frequently heretofore referred. defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel were concerned over the extent of the information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to Hungary. On 4 March 1933, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for Keitel's confidential information the minutes of a conference with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had suggested an interchange of views. This document 2786-.PS, a photostat of the original captured letter, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA 81. I his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as wall would be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you world notify me briefly whether any committments were made here in any respect. With best regards and Heil Hitler."
At the 21 April meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account of which I read last week and alluded to earlier this morning, document 388-PS, Item 0, specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia were discussed for the first time.
This meeting was followed, in the late Spring and Summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and telegrams advancing Case Green (Fall Gruen). Those notes and communications were carefully filed at Hitler's headquarters by the very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the Fuehrer's military adjutant, and were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzburg, near Berchtesgaden. This file, which is preserved intact, bears our number 388-PS, and is US Exhibit No.26, and which we affectionately refer to as Big Schmundt -- a large file. The individual items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the progress of the Nazi conspirators' plan to launch an unprovoked and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning Czechoslovakian armament. With the leave of the Tribunal I shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt file without reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item 4 of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeizler, in General Jodl's office of the OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler's headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman ?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them?
MR. ALDERMAN : I hadn't intended to read them in full, unless that my be necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish to refer to the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed "Short Survey of Armament of the Czechoslovakian Army," dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and initialled "Z" for Zeizler, and Item 13, "Questions of the Fuehrer", dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and classified Most Secret. I should like to read four of the questions which Hitler wanted authoritative information about, as shown by that document, and I read indicated questions on pages 23, 24, 25. and 26 of Item 13 of Document 388-PS. Question 1: Hitler asked about armament of the Czechoslovakian army.