(c) Murder and terrorism. Nazi conspirators provided the Henleinists, and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which to provoke incidents and maintain a state of permanent unrest. Gendarms, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked. A boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and tradesmen. Gestapo crossed into the border districts to carry Czechoslovak citizens across the border into Germany. In several cases, political foes of the Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents murdered Professor Theodor Lessing in 1933 and Ing. Formis in 1935. Both men were anti-Nazi who had escaped from Germany after Hitler came to power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia. deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank statement of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence Document No. 2863-PS, an excerpt from a lecture by Conrad Henlein quoted, in the book "Four Fighting Years", a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I quote from page 29. This book has been marked for identification Exhibit U.S.A.-92, but without offering it in evidence, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
I shall read from page 29. This lecture was delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941 in the auditorium of the University of Vienna, under the auspices of the wiener Verwantungs Akademie. During a thorough search of libraries in Vienae and elsewhere, we have been unable to find a copy of the German text. This text, this volume that I have here, is an English version. The Vienna newspapers the following day carried only summaries of the lecture. This English version, however, is an official publication of the Czech Government and is, under the circumstances, the best evidence that we can produce of the Henlein speech.
In this lecture on "The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens" Henlein said:
"National Socialism seen swept over us Sudeten Germans. Our struggle was of a different character from that in Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil, too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true followers of our Fuehrer, whatever their outward appearance. Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in its final struggle. When ... in autumn, 1933, the leaders of the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve, Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-preservation of the Sudeten Germans and in order to prepare their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second alternative seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than doubtful whether by this means we could have fulfilled the political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the allegiance against the German Reich."
presented to the Tribunal is the outline of this conspiracy as it had been pieced together by the Czechoslovak Government early this summer. Since then, captured documents and other information made available to us since the defeat of Germany have clearly and conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the agitation in the Sudetenland.
I offer in evidence Document No. 3060-PS, Exhibit USA-93. This is the original, hand-written draft of a telegram sent from the German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Minister in Berlin. It is presumably written by the German Minister Eisenlohr. It proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was an instrument, a puppet of the Nazi conspirators. The Henlein party, it appears from this document, was directed from Berlin and from the German legation in Prague. It could have no policy of its own. Even the speeches of its leaders had to be coordinated with the German authorities.
I will read this telegram:
"Prague, 16 March 1938 "Foreign (Office), Berlin Cipher Cable (Secret Proced.)
No. 57 of 16 Mar. With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.
"Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out matters with Henlein, who recently had shunned me, and with Frank separately and received following promises:
"1. The line of German Foreign Policy as transmitted by the German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be complied with implicitly.
"2. Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial staff of 'Zeit' (Time) is to be improved.
"3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which in the end might lead to political complications and adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests.
The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action. Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze) and 'territorial autonomy' are no longer to be stressed.
"4. If consultations with Berlin agencies are required or desired before Henlein issues important statements on his program, they are to be applied for and prepared through the Mission.
"5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.
"6. Henlein wall establish contact with me every week, and will come to Prague at any time if requested.
"I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming developments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) and request them to support this uniformdirection of the Sudeten German Party." desired effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to von Ribbentrop, asking an early personal conversation.
I offer in evidence Document No. 2789-PS, as Exhibit USA-94. This is the letter from Conrad Henlein to von Ribbentrop, captured in the German Foreign Office files, dated 17 March 1938. "Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:
"In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our Fuehrer.
"I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith.
"We shall show our appreciation to the Fuehrer by doubled efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.
"The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the opportunity for a very early personal talk.
"In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have postponed the Nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled for 26th and 27th of March, 1938, for four weeks.
"I would appreciate if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and two of my closest associates would be allowed to participate in the requested talks.
"Heil Hitler.
"Loyally yours, "/s/ Konrad Henlein."
Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy towards Czechoslovakia. You will also note that he was already in close enough contact with Ribbentrop and the German Minister in Prague to feel free to suggest early personal talks.
Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein's suggestion. The conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office in Berlin on 29 March 1938. The previous day Henlein had conferred with Hitler himself.
I offer in evidence Document No. 2788-PS as Exhibit USA-95, captured German Foreign Office notes of the conference on 29 March.
I read the first two paragraphs:
"In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed list participated.
"The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret; he then explained, in view of the directives which the Fuehrer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally yesterday afternoon that there were two questions which were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of the Sudeten German Party;" and resume the minutes of this meeting in the middle of the last paragraph of the first page of the English translation, with the sentence beginning, "The aim of the negotiations."
"The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German party with the Czechoslovakian Government is finally this: to avoid entry into the Government by the extension and gradual specification of the demands to bemade. It must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that theSudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich cabinet. The Reich cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the Government in prag or toward London and Paris as the advocate or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending discussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten Germans would be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, would maintain quiet and discipline, and would avoid indiscretions. The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this connection were satisfactory.
"Following these general explanations of theReichminister, the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czechoslovak Government, as contained in the enclosure, were discussed and approved in principle. For further cooperation, Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible touch with the Reichminister and the head of the Central Office for Racial Germans, as well as the German Minister in Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister.
The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to support the demand of the Sudeten German Party as reasonable, not officially, but in more private talks with the Czechoslovak politicians, without exerting any direct influence on the extent of the demands of the party.
"In conclusion, there was a discussion whether it would be useful if the Sudeten German Party would cooperate with other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slovaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the party should have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minority groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might appear appropriate. Berlin, 29 March, 1938, 'R' for Ribbentrop." list of those who attended: Konrad Henlein; his principal deputy, Karl Hermann Frank, and two others represented the Sudeten German Party. Professor Haushofer, the geopolitician, and SS Obergruppenfuhrer Lorenz represented the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the Central Office for Racial Germans.
The Foreign Office was represented by a delegation of eight. These eight included von Ribbentrop, who presided at the meeting and did most of the talking; von Mackensen; Weissaecker; and Minister Eisenlohr from the German Legation at Prague. Nazi conspirators. At this time, the plans for Case Green, for the attack on the Czechs, were already on paper, and it may be assumed that Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the summer months.
I again quote from General Jodl's diary, Document 1780-PS, the entry for 22 May, 1938: "Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure)."
The enclosure unfortunately is missing from Jodl's diary. had admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi Conspirators in the fall of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten Germans. The documents I have just read show conclusively the nature of Henlein's mission. They demonstrate that Henlein's policy, his propaganda, even his speeches, were controlled by Berlin. Party was secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. I offer in evidence Document 3059-PS, as Exhibit USA 96, another secret document captured in the German Foreign Office file. August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein party for additional funds. I read from that document:
"The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the Foreign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, consisting of a monthly payment of 15000 Marks; 12000 Marks of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disbursement and 3000 Marks are paid out to the Berlin representation of the party (Bureau Buerger). In the course of the last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Buerger have increased considerably due to the current negotiations with the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propaganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense accounts have increased especially because due to the necessity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to Prague, London and Paris (including the financing of travels of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown considerably heavier.
Under these conditions the Bureau Buerger is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance of 3000 Marks to 5500 Marks monthly. In view of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the Bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of the Bureau in regard to the cooperation with the Foreign Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.
"Herewith submitted to the Dept: Pers(onnel) with a request for approval. It is requested to increase the payments with retroactive effect from 1 August." footnote: "Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Central Office for Racial Germans) will be informed by the Political Dept." -- handwritten marginal note. movement received from other agencies of the German Government. forward in the late summer and early fall, the Nazi command made good use of Henlein and his followers. About the first of August, the Air Attache in the German Legation in Prague, Major Merrecke, acting on instructions from Luftwaffe Headquarters in Berlin, visited the Sudeten German leader in Freudenthal. With his assistance and in the company of the local leader of the FS, the Henlein equivalent of the SS, he reconnoitered the surrounding countryside to select possible airfield sites for German use. The FS leader, a Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform of the Czech Army, a fact which, as the attache noted, served as excellent camouflage. offered in evidence earlier and which bears US Exhibit Number 83. I have already read the first four paragraphs of the enclosure.
"The manufacturer M. is head of the Sudeten German Glider Pilots in Fr. (Freudenthal) and said to be absolutely reliable by my trusted man.
My personal impression fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity was made to him, although I had the impression that M. knew who I was.
"At my request, with which he complied without any question, M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used M.'s private car for the trip.
"As M. did not know the country around Beneschau sufficiently well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage, I was entirely in agreement with this -- without actually saying so.
"As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photographed large open spaces out of the car, he said, 'Aha, so you're looking for airfields!' I answered that we supposed that in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications. I had the intention of looking over the country from that point of view."
In the latter part of the Air Attache's report, reference is made to the presence of reliable agents and informers, which he called V-Leute, or V-people, apparently dram from the ranks of the Henlein party in this area. It was indicated that these agents were in touch with the Abwehr Stelle, the Intelligence Office in Breslau. its height, the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on the Sudeten demands for autonomy. They attempted to use the Slovaks as well. On 19 September the Foreign Office in Berlin sent a telegram to the German Legation in Prague. I offer the document in evidence, Number 2858-PS, Exhibit USA 97, another captured German Foreign Office document:
"Please inform Deputy Kundt that Konrad Henlein requests to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start their demands for autonomy. (Signed) Altenburg."
Kundt was Henlein's representative in Prague. Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threatening diplomatic tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension between the two countries. I offer in evidence documents 2855-PS, 2854-PS, 2853-PS and 2856-PS, as US Exhibits respectively 98, 99, 100, 101. Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Legation in Prague, despatched between the 16th and 24th of September, 1938. They are self-explanatory. The first is dated 16 September:
"Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest of Sudeten Germans since Fuehrer's speech of 12 September. I request you to ascertain the number of Sudeten Germans arrested since 12 September as extensively as possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated conservatively at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report."
A handwritten note follows: "Impossible for me to ascertain these fact as already communicated to the proper agent."
The second telegram is dated September 17:
"Most urgent.
"I. Request to inform the local government immediately of the following :
"The Reich Government has decided that:
"(a) immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent, Czech (b) if any Sudeten Germans should be executed pursuant to a death shot in Germany."
The third telegram was sent on 24 September. I read it:
"According to information received here Czechs have arrested 2 German frontier-policemen, seven customs-officials and 30 railway officials.
As countermeasure all the Czech staff in Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange the arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please approach Government there and wire result." last paragraph:
"Yielding of the Czech hostages arrested here for the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by military courts against Sudeten-Germans is, of course, out of question." followers wholeheartedly to the preparations for the coming German attack. About 15 September, after Hitler's provacative Nurnberg speech in which he accused Benes of torturing and planning the extermination of the Sudeten Germans. Henlein and Karl Frank, one of his principal deputies, fled to Germany to avoid arrest by the Czech Government. In Germany Henlein broadcast over the powerful Reichsender radio station his determination to lead the Germans home to the Reich and denounced what he called the Hussites, Bolshevist criminals of Prague. From his headquarters in a castle at Banndorf, outside Bayreuth, he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators, including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the border and began the organization of the Sudeten German Free Corps and auxiliary military organizations. You will find these events set forth in the Czechoslovak official government report, 998-PS, which has already been offered as Exhibit USA 91.
Henlein's activities were carried on with the advice and assistance of the German Nazi leaders. Lieutenant Colonel Koechling was assigned to Henlein in an advisory capacity to assist with the Sudeten German Free Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the night of September 17, Koechling received far-reaching military powers. the maintenance of disorder and clashes. I read from Item 25, a handwritten note labelled "Most Secret", at page 49 of the Schmundt file, Document 388-PS:
"Host Secret. Last night conference took place between Fuehrer and Oberstleutnant Koechling, Duration of conference 7 minutes. Lt. Col. Koechling remains directly responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received far-reaching military plenary powers from the Fuehrer. The Sudeten German Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein alone. Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten Germans and maintenance of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be established in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons. Activities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible."
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good place to break off for ten minutes?
(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, General Jodl's diary Corps.
At this time, the Free Corps was engaged in active skirmishing desired manner.
I quote from the entries in the Jodl diary, for the "19 September:
Order is given to the Army High Command to take "20 September:
England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown.
The activities of the Army.
(Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of the border.)
By checking with Lt.-Col. Keechling, I "Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives approval of the Corps HQ."
A report from Henlein's staff, which was filed in Hitler's I read the last two paragraphs :"Since 19 September - in more than 300 missions - the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack***" Now, that word "attack" was changed by superimposition to "defense."
"***And with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice.
The result of the first phase of its activities:
more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's***" which I suppose means machine guns "***and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by the enemy.
And there was superimposed in place of "enemy," "The Czech Terrorists."
OKW and with the SS and with the SA. The liaison officer between the SS and Henlein was Oberfuehrer Gottlieb Berger (SS).which is an affidavit executed by Gottlieb Berger; and in connection This man was a Nazi.
He was serving in this conspiracy. He had made this affidavit.
We think the affidavit has probative value and having probative value.
We think it would be unfair to require us is to us a member of this conspiracy, and it seems to us that the affidavit should be admitted with leave to the Defendants, if they wash, to call the author of the affidavit for examination.
I should have added that this man was a prominent member of the SS, which is charged before you as being a criminal organization, and we think the document is perfectly competent in evidence as an admission against the enemy by a prominent member of the SS organization.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, the Defense contradicts the use of this document. This document was made out only on the 22nd of November 1945. It was filed here in Nurnberg, and therefore, the witness, Berger, without any difficulty, could be produced as a witness, and we have to insist that the prosecution will need him and that the Defense will have the possibility to take the witness into cross-examination and in that way it will be able to see the objectivity of his statement that will be spoken.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection and will not hear this affidavit. It is open to either the prosecution or the defendants, of course, to call the man who made the affidavit. Did you hear? that is all I have to say. We have upheld your objection.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I had another affidavit by one Alfred Helmut Naujocks which, I take it, will be excluded under this same ruling, and which, therefore, I shall not offer.
THE PRESIDENT: If the circumstances are the same.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, I might merely refer to it for identification because it is in your document books.
TEE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is Document 3029-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That also will be rejected as evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Offensive operations along the Czechoslovakian Border were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the Free Corps. Two SS Totenkopf, SS Battalions, were operating across the border in Czech territory near Eich.
I quote now from Item 36 in the Schmundt file and OKW's most secret order, signed by Jodle, and dated 28 September 1938. This appears at page 61 of the Schmundt file.
"Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Berlin, September 28 1938, 45 copies, 16th copy.
"Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Battalions subordinate to the C in C Army.
"To: Reichsfuhrer SS and Chief of the German Police, (SS Central Office) (36 copies). MOST SECRET.
"By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the following Bn's of the SS Deaths Head organization will be under the command of the C in C Army with immediate effect.
"II and II Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia).
"I and II Bn, of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia at present in Radeboul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden.
"C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn's for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the Fuhrer's instructions.
"These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promontory I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the C in C Army only When they return to German Reich territory, or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier.
"It is requested that all further arrangements be made between C in C Army and Reichsfuhrer-SS. (SS Central Office).
"For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"Jodl".
According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl's diary, these SS-Totenkopf Battalions were operating in this area on direct orders from Hitler. As the correct day approached, the disposition of the Free Corps became a matter of dispute. Sudeten Germany Free Corps, directing that the Free Corps come under control of the Reichsfuehrer SS in the event of German invasion of Czechoslovakia. This document is Item 37 in the Schmundt file, at page 62.
German Army crosses the Czech border, the Free Corps will take orders from the OKH. In this most secret order of the OKW, Keitel discloses that Henlein's men are already operating in Czechoslovakian territory. three paragraphs of this most secret document.
"For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from the Fuhrer and that they carry out their operations only in conjunction with the competent general staff corps. The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the frontier.
"These units remaining forward of the frontier should - in their own interests - get into communication with the frontier guard as often as possible.
"As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later."
would result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland, the defendant Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Henlein in its present composition be placed under the command of Himmler.
I read from Item 38, at page 63, of the Schmundt File:
"1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps:
in agreement with the Reichsfuehrer SS." dates the Tribunal asked about before the recess. to Germany was 15 September 1938. Chamberlain flew to Munich and arrived at 12:30 o'clock; on September 15 he went by train from Munich to Berchtesgaden, arriving attachment of 1600 hours, and by car to Gerghof, arriving about at 1650, for three talks with Hitler. On 16 September Chamberlain returned by air to London.
The second visit was on September 22. Chamberlain met with Hitler at Bad Godesberg at 1700 hours for a three-hour discussion, and it was a deadlock. On September 23 discussions were resumed at 2230. On September 24 Chamberlain returned to London.
The third visit was on September 29. Chamberlain flew to Munich and the meeting of Chamberlain, Mussolini, Daladier and Hitler took place at the Brownhaus at 1330 and continued until 0230 hours on September 30, 1938, a Friday, when the Munich agreement was signed. Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators, and with war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom and France concluded the Munich pact with Germany and Italy at that early morning hour of September 30, 1938.
This treaty will be presented by the British Prosecutor. It is sufficient for me to say of it at this point that it provided for the cession of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce.
The Munich Pact will be No. TC-23 of the British documents. Sudetenland. During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehrmacht had been fully deployed for the attack, awaiting the word of Hitler to begin the assault. On 30 September the defendant Keitel promulgated Directive No. 1 on occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia. This is Item 39 at page 64 of the Schmundt File. This directive contained the timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the German armed forces.
I read now the fourth and fifth paragraphs of that document:
"2. The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be maintained completely, for the present also in the West, Order for the rescinding of measures taken is held over.
"The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be converted into operation 'Grun'." forces, and I quote from the list under the heading "A. Army: Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1 October." OKW directives giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudetenland. I think I need not read them, as they are not essential to the proof of our case. They merely indicate the scope of the preparations of the OKW. Directives specifying the occupational area of the army and units under its command, arranging for communication facilities, exchange facilities, supply, and propaganda, and giving instructions to the various departments of the government were issued over defendant Keitel's signature on 30 September.