THE PRESIDENT: We think you should read it now.
MR. DODD: Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I just say One thing about that. This is the first time that I near that the prosecution has also put questions to the same witness, which he has also answered. I think this is the first case of this kind which has been put before the Tribunal.
Wouldn't it have been a suitable solution that his answers would have been communicated to me, since I submitted my affidavit to the Prosecution a very long time ago?
THE PRESIDENT: They certainly should be. The Tribunal thinks they certainly should have been communicated to you at the same time that they were received.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Is the answer to be read nevertheless? I would rather like to raise formal objection to that and ask the Tribunal for a decision.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, why were these not submitted to Dr. Kauffmann?
MR. DODD: This cross-affidavit and interrogatory was only taken yesterday, and the material just wasn't ready until this morning. We regret that, and had it been ready it would, of course, have been turned over to him. If he would like to have some time to look it over, we, of course, would not object.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, in the circumstances we will postpone the reading of these cross-interrogatories in order that you may consider then, and, if you think it right, you may object to any of the questions or answers and we will then consider that matter.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
"I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, make the following affidavit in answer to the questions put by attorney Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International Military Tribunal."
THE PRESIDENT: Can you give a number to this document?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, KR No. 2.
"The first question:
"Give exact details of yourself. What was your official position in the SD? Where did you know Dr. Kaltenbrunner?
"Answer:
"I was born on the 19th of March, 1915, in Vienna; by profession a historian. My occupation up to the time of the German collapse was that of Consultant to Amt VI--Intelligence Service Abroad--of the RSHA. After the Anschluss with Austria in 1938 I voluntarily joined the SD. Coming from the National Catholic Youth Movement, I set myself theaim of steering a moderate political course for my country.
"I made the acquaintance of Kaltenbrunner in 1938; he knew that the above was my aim.
"In 1941, on the personal orders of Heydrich, I was called before the SA and the SS and Police Court for being under religious influence and for being unreliable from the political and ideological point of view, and had to join the ranks as an ordinary private. After Heydrich's death I was pardoned and, at the beginning of 1943; drafted by the Chief of Ant VI of the RSHA, Schellenberg, into his office.
Here I was in charge of the Vatican Referat Department, as well as of some State Referats in the Balkans.
"When Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA at the beginning of 1943, I was continually in touch with him at work, particularly since he was endeavoring to draw the group of Austrians in the RSHA nearer to him.
"The second question:
"Give an estimate of the numbers involved at the Head office of the RSHA in Berlin.
"Answer:
"At the Head Office in Berlin, Department 4, the Gestapo, had approximately 1500 members; Department 5, Criminal Police, 1200; Departments 3 and 6, Intelligence Service at Home and Abroad, three to four hundred each.
"The third question:
"What is understood by SD and what were its tasks?
"Answer:
"Heydrich organized the so-called Sicherheitsdienst--Security Service, known as the SD--- in 1932. Its task was to give the highest German authorities and the individual Reich offices information on all happenings at home and abroad.
"The SD was purely an information service and had no sort of executive authority. Only individual persons belonging to the SD were drafted to the so-called special units, Einsatzkommando, in the East. They thereby assumed executive positions, and they resigned from the SD during that period. There were Special Purpose Groups and Special purpose Units of the Security Police and the SD up to the last, also in Africa, even in 1944, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
"These Kommando units had nothing to do with executions. Their tasks had generally become similar to those of the Security Police in the meantime. As far as I know, executions were only carried out in Russia, and these on the strength of the so-called Commissar Order by Hitler.
Whether these units ceased their activity after Kaltenbrunner was named Chief of the RSHA, or whether they continued, I do not know.
"Fourth question:
"Do you know about the Eichmann operation to exterminate the Jews?
"Answer: end of August 1944. At that time Eichmann himself gave me detailed information. Eichmann explained, among other things, that the whole action was a special Reich secret and was known to only very few people. The number of members of this unit, in my opinion, could hardly have been more than a total of 100 people.
"Fifth question:
"What do you know about the official relationship between Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner?
"Answer:
"I know nothing about the official relations between the two. Eichmann may well have had no direct official contact with Kaltenbrunner. He often asked me to arrange a meeting with Kaltenbrunner for him. Kaltenbrunner always refused.
"Sixth question:
"What was the relationship between Kaltenbrunner and the Chief of the Secret State Police, Mueller?
"Answer:
"I cannot give any details about their official relations. It is a certainty, however, that Mueller always acted quite independently. He had gained great experience in Secret State Police matters over a period of many years. Himmler thought highly of him. Kaltenbrunner didn't think anything of him at all. Kaltenbrunner had neither technical experience in police questions nor any interest in them. The Intelligence Service took up the main part of his attention and all his interest, expecially in so far as it concerned foreign countries.
"Seventh question:
"Who wasin charge of the concentration camps?
"Answer:
"The SS Office of Economic Administration had sole charge of the concentration camps; that is, not the RSHA, and therefore not Kaltenbrunner. He, therefore, had no power to give orders and no competency in this sphere. Judging by my opinion of him as a man, Kaltenbrunner certainly did not approve of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps. I do not know whether he knew about them.
"Eighth question:
"Did Kaltenbrunner issue or transmit an order according to which enemy aviators who made forced landings were to be given no protection in the event of lynch justice being carried out by the population?
"Answer:
"No, I never heard about anything of the kind from Kaltenbrunner, although I was with him a great deal. As far as I can remember, however, Himmler issued an order of this kind.
"Ninth question:
"Did Kaltenbrunner issue orders that Jews were to be killed?
"Answer: No, he never issued such orders, and, in my opinion, he could not issue such orders on his own authority. In my opinion, he was opposed to Hitler and Himmler on this question; that is, the physical extermination of European Jewry.
"Tenth question:
"What church policy did Kaltenbrunner pursue?
"Answer:
"As a Vatican advisor, I often had the opportunity of speaking to him officially on this subject. He immediately supported my suggestion, made to Hitler in the spring of 1943, that a change in church policy should be effected so that the Vatican could be won over as a peace negotiator on this basis. Kaltenbrunner had no success with Hitler, as Himmler took up the strongest attitude against him. The German Ambassador, Baron von Weizsaecker, with whom I discussed the matter, had equally little success with the Pope. Bormann had an eye kept on him for this reason.
"Eleventh question:
"Did Kaltenbrunner intervene in foreign policy in the interest of peace?
"Answer:
"Yes. In the Hungarian question, for example, he was successful in March 1944, when the German troops occupied Hungary, in persuading Hitler to moderation and in preventing Roumanian and Slovak units from marching in as planned. Thanks to his support, I was able to prevent a planned National Socialist government from being formed in Hungary for another six months." defendant Kaltenbrunner to go to the witness stand.
THE PRESIDENT: There appears to be some difficulty with the No. 1 channel, and the Tribunal will, therefore, recess.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Kauffmann, are you going to call the defendant?
Dr. Kauffmann (Counsel for Dependant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I have committed a small error. I did not read page five of my document book. That is question 12 and 13 of the affidavit, which I failed to read. May I apologize an may I have your permission to read that now?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I continue on page five:
" Kaltenbrunner wanted the old Austro-Hugary to be re-established on a federative basis.
" Since 1943 I had favoured the view when talking so Kaltenbrunner that Germany must endeavour to end the war by peace at any price. I told him about m connection with an American office in Lisbon. I also told Kaltenbrunner that I had recently made a contact with an American office in a neutral country through the Austrian resistance movement. He said he was also prepared to travel to Switzerland with me and start the negotiations with an American representative i order to avoid further pointless bloodshed.
"12th Question: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner instructed the Commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to hand over the Camp to the approaching troops?
"Answer: It is correct that Kaltenbrunner did give such an order. He dictated it in my presence, to be forwarded to the Camp Commandant.
"13th Question: Can you say something briefly about Kaltenbrunner's personality?
"Answer: Kaltenbrunner was a completely different man from Hitler or Heydrich. He was therefore strongly and fundamentally opposed to both of them. He was appointed Chief of the RSHA, in my opinion, because Himmler did not want to run the risk of having a rival like Heydrich. It would be wrong to call him 'little Himmler'. In my opinion, he was never in complete control of the large office of RSHA and occupied himself very much more with the Intelligence Service and the influencing of policy as a whole, being very little interested in police and executive tasks. He regarded the former as his particular sphere."
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any more documents?
DR. KAUFFMANN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: How you wish to call the defendant
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name please?
Q Repeat this oath after me: I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing, so help me God.
(The witness repeated the oath.) BY DR. KAUFFMANN: of the security Police and the SD and the Chief of the so-called Main Security Office of the Reich, the RSHA. You are aware, of course, that you are particularly accused. The Prosecution is accusing you of having committed crimes against the peace, and you are accused of intellectual participation in connection with crimes against humanity and international law. Finally, the Prosecution is connecting your name with the terror of the Gestapo and the cruelties in the concentration camps. I now ask you, Do you assume responsibility within the framework of these considerable accusations, which are known to you? aware of the serious character of the accusations against me. I know the hatred of the whole world is directed against me, particularly since Mueller, Himmler and Pohl are no longer alive, which makes me the only man who is facing the world and the Tribunal to answer to them. I am aware that I shall have to tell the truth in this courtroom and that the Tribunal and the world must be put in a position wherein they can recogonize the events in Germany during this war, understand them and pass judgment on them. was called into an office. Regarding the details of that I shall make a state ment later, but right at the beginning, I would like to state that for everything that happened since my appointment to the Chief of RSHA, in that department, for every wrong that was committed there, as far as it happened under my actual control, which means that I knew about it and about events, for all that, I assume responsibility.
May I ask permission so that my defense counsel may put questions to me so as to direct *y memory.
a public figure, until you entered Austrian politics, that is 1934.
A I was born in 1903. My father and my grandfather were respectable solicitors. My mother comes from a simple family. She was adopted by the Belgian Ambassador to Rumania and lived there for twenty-five years. education by being placed in a good family and at the same time I was brought near to the Austrian character. I attended secondary school, I passed my matriculation examination and in 1923 I went to high school -- university in Graz. First of all I studied chemical technical sciences at the technical high school and later when my father returned from the war seriously ill and when the possibility arose that I might have to take over his law practice, I studied law. I completed my studies with a grade of Doctor of National and State Law in 1926.
I had to go through a difficult time. I had to earn my own living and the expenses for my studies and for two years I worked as a coal miner during the night shift. well as anybody. or eight years I became a solicitor's apprentice, which was necessary under Austrian law. Then I practiced at the courts of law for one year. Is it correct that in 1932 you became a member of the Party? longed to the Austrian H ome Protection Squad for several years.
Q Did you enter into the SS later on?
of 1933. Prosecution, you were a legal adviser of an SS unit?
A That statement requires clarification. In my immediate home country, Upper Austria, I have spoken at National Socialist meetings and in the first place or rather exclusively so as to serve the Anschluss movement. I was a legal adviser just as any other lawyer at that time who, because of economic difficulties, was prepared at the end of the day to help poor members of a Party, which in this case was the National Socialist Party, and to give them information without charging them. had you arrested and that you, together with other leading National Socialists, were sent to the detention camp near Kaisersteinbruch? What was the cause for that?
A That is correct. I think the political situation which existed in Austria at the time must be briefly described. men who had very little backing among the people. There were two different groups who did not participate in the government; in the first place those groups on the political left, the Social Democrats, that is the Austro-Marxist Party, and in the second place another, a very much smaller group, the National Socialists. The government at that time not only had the National Socialists but other parties too delivered into detention camps so that any political upheaval and meetings or demonstrations could be avoided. eighteen hundred Nazis I was to be found too. eventually subjected to a trial for conspiracy against the government and were you released from arrest in the end? Give that, if you will, in a few sentences, that is as to the cause of all this.
I should say first of all that in the meantime the attempt of the National Socialist revolt had taken place in Austria in May, 1934. That attempted revolt, which unfortunately caused the murder of Dollfuss, was defeated and severe measures were introduced against a large number of National Socialists as revenge. One particularly severe measure was that thousands of National Socialists lost their jobs by declaration and the necessity existed that there be an appeasement amongst the population and an alleviation of the government policy had to be brought about.
That was done by two men, Langot, the Deputy president of Upper Austria and a farmer and engineer by the name of Reinthaler.
invited to join that action. that is 1938. that is why I was invited to join in that appeasement action. Within that program it was demanded by the government itself that certain men take up connections with the party leaders and maintain that connection, that is to say the SA, SS and so on. With the knowledge and by the wish of the government and the police departments in question I took up a connection with the SS. with the SS and accused of high treason and arrested. I remained in custody for about six months and put before the military court martial on a charge of high treason. I was, however, acquitted since the government itself admitted that with their knowledge that task had been permitted and given me. There was left a sentence for legal secrecy which was, however, served by my custody. 1938 and what was the participation of the SS? ment action of Reinthaler I got in touch with circles first of all concerned with theAnshluss and secondly, with those circles who had set their aim so that a revolutionary movement and development should be achieved. Conditions in Austria were to be cleansed peacefully and at the same time the idea of the Anschluss was to be advanced and the government was to be brought over to that idea. personal contact with the later Minister Seyss-Inquart and I made his political train of thoughts my own.
Q Are you of the opinion that the plebiscite in Austria in April 1938 corresponded with the wish of the nation or not?
ance with the will of the Austrian population. The result of 99.7 per cent for Anschluss was perfectly genuine. made an SS brigadier and leader of an SS sector and promoted? Anschluss. The statement and opinion of the prosecution is completely incorrect when they think that national Socialism in Austria at that time could in any way be compared with the development which had taken place in Germany during the same period . The development of Austrian National Socialism was completely different over and above that therewas the Anschluss movement and its originator N ational Socialism and in that way through Anschluss to National Socialism. That was the line that was adopted by nearly all national Socialists and by no means the idealogy of the original Austrian Party program. that the Anschluss movement in Austria was backed by the people and that the plebiscite in the various districts, like the Tyrol and Salzburg, in 1925 or 1923 in more than ninety per cent of the votes being cast in favor of the Anschluss and that those facts have to be taken into consideration. Government had tried the resolution of the National Council which said that both these organizations had resolved to join the Reich and would not depart from that resolution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, I do not think you need go into these subjects as to reasons why they were in favor of the Anschluss in such detail.
Can't you hear?
Will you try to confine the witness to less detail and get on to the material period?
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is not coming through to me but I know what you mean. for his participation in the Austrian revolution and I did want him to say a few sentences about that before this Tribunal but I am willing and prepared to go over to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was giving us the figures in particular plebiscites long before the Anschluss and that seems to me to be quite unnecessary detail. BY DR. KAUFFMAN:
Q So then in September, 1938, you became SS Gruppenfuehrer; is that correct:
A Yes. After the Anschluss had been realized, I was appointed the leader of the General SS in Austria, which took the shape of the sector Upper Donau. At that time I had been promoted Brigade Leader without going through the lowest steps of SS leaders. They were great. And I think it was in December that I was appointed Gruppenfuehrer; so that my rank was coordinated with that of all the other Main SS Unit Leaders in the Reich.
Q Will you continue regarding your history and your development in the SS? Were you in 1941 appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria?
A In March, 1938, I became a member of the Austrian Government. I had the position of the Secretary of State for Security in Austria, which was part of the Ministry of the Interior. That Austrian Government was dissolved in 1941; that is to say, they handed their office activity over to the forms of administration which were prevalent in the Reich; so that the Secretary of State for Security was also dissolved. And so, as to put me on the budget and my salary could be paid, I was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader, I think, in July, 41. Police and the SD; that is, the so-called Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. How did that nomination arise? Did you have connections to Himmler; and what was said between you and Himmler on the occasion of your appointment?
A My activities between '41 and '43 will be briefly referred to be me so as to make it clear why I was called to Berlin. Austria, and in that respect the Prosecution's point is taken. centrally from Berlin and the jurisdiction of the minister concerned, Seyss-Inquart and his Secretary of State, Kaltenbrunner, had been completely taken away. My activities as Higher SS and Police Leader is different from the activities of the same men in the Reich, since in Austria we were limited to merely representative tasks.
In other words, my activities did not take up all my time. During these two years I have acted in accordance with my political intentions and from Austria I ran a rather large political intelligence service. for them the resources, economic and otherwise, of Austria, and, also, the Reich with incredible shortsightedness did not realize or fall back upon Austria's task in the direction of the eastern political sphere. Thus, my reports met with increased interest in Berlin. When Himmler continuously raised accusations against me that his intelligence service, which was run by Heydrich in the Reich, did, not produce the necessary political results, then Himmler, eight months after Heydrich's death, felt obliged to look for a man who could protect him against these accusations which were being made against him by Hitler.
Q And what did you discuss with Himmler? he was at the time because the headquarters were at Obersalzberg. He told me what accusations were made against him by Hitler and he demanded that I should create a central intelligence service in the Reich. We had a lengthy discussion about that with reference to my reports of the previous years. He was of the opinion that the best solution would be if I were to take over the Reich Security Main Office and make it the basis for the creation of such an intelligence department. That I refused and I stated as my reasons that my position in Austria had been that of an observer and a critic regarding, in particular, the inner political, developments in the Reich. I stated to Himmler in detail just why the Germans in Austria had been disappointed and what I considered the dangers to be in connection with a tiredness, a lustlessness of the Austrians towards the Reich, the same Austrians who four years ago had been enthusiastic about the Reich.
Q May I interrupt you for just one moment. It is correct, of course, that you were made the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. Are you trying to say that you did not take over the executive powers?
A I'm just coming to that. But, first of all, I must refer to that first conference with Himmler, and the second one took place two months later, and on that occasion I was given the order which you are referring to.
But I career through to the last day of the war--that, even on that first occasion, I stated to Himmler in which main joints I had differences with the National Socialists and the inner policy of the Reich, its foreign policy, its ideology, and the legal basis on which the German state existed. I stated emphatically that the administration in the Reich was too centralized; that Austria was criticizing that centralized system severely, particularly since some centralization had also been granted to other countries, such as Bavaria, for instance. in which it had been done, was wrong, and that German criminal law was casuistic, whereas the Austrian criminal law was based on a tradition of more than one hundred years and had proved itself best and had been recognized abroad. concentration camp was not approved in Austria, but that everyone in Austria strictly wanted his right to be pronounced through means of a law court. I explained to him that anti-Semitism in Austria was taking place in a completely different shape and form and had developed differently and was being handled differently. No one in Austria, I said, had ever thought of impeding the limits of anti-Semitism, as was laid down in the Party program. I also said that there was hardly any understanding for the fact in Austria that through the Nurnberg laws the limitations of the Party program in this respect had been impeded. towards immigration on the part of the Jews, and any personal or physical persecution of Jews was completely superfluous.
I'm referring to a document, which is in thehands of the Tribunal. It's a report from a President in Vienna, I think, dated December, 1939, which makes it abundantly clear. It is based on figures that between '34 and '39, I think, a total of 200,000 Jews had supplied more than 100,000 immigrants who had emigrated from abroad. Those were the problems which we discussed at the time.
Q And what did Himmler tell you?
A Himmler said that he knew best; that I had no police training at all, but that, in fact, all my previous activities had been that of political intelligence work. So that, therefore, by taking over the RSHA, I could not be given the task of executive work, such as the criminal police the state police; that I would not want to have anything to do with it, but that my task, for which he was appointing me, namely, the construction and extension of an intelligence service, would in fact be impeded by that. between Heydrich and myself. There were pertinent differences in that way. Heydrich was an expert in police matters, whereas I was not, and the policy with which he, Himmler, and Heydrich had already discredited the Reich up until that time could not be transferred to me since my honor and my family were too holy for me for that.
He quietened me down by saying, "You know that in June 42, Heydrich was assassinated and that I, myself, since his death"--and this was about six or sevel months after Heydrich's death--"was handling his entire office myself, and that's the way I propose things should be left; since I"--this means Himmler--"will retain the executive powers and exercise them personally. I have my well-trained experts, Mueller and Nebe, at my disposal for this purpose, and you will not have to concern yourself with it all. You take over the intelligence service, that is departments 5 and 6, and make them the basis for your intelligence service." an intelligence service, an intelligence service which until that time had been so narrow minded because of Heydrich's tendancies, and which had been forced more and more to become an executive organ for the supply of intelligence material, such as apparatus, from the beginning. An intelligence service, I said, would have to be smaller and, most of all, I had considered it lunacy that there should be a dividing line between military and political intelligence. No country in the whole world, except Germany and France, had divided their intelligence service into two parts. I had demanded, therefore, that to start with he would have to get a Fuehrer order on the strength of which the intelligence system of the armed forces, which rested in the Department OKW, counter intelligence, should he coordinated with the SD and should be given personnel, which would have to be found in the proper manner.
Q I am interrupting you. Can you tell me in one sentence whether that coordination which you just mentioned took place? of February, 1944.
Q Now, my next question to you. After what you have just explained, did Himmler relieve you of executive tasks and did this become effective within the RSHA, and was it made known to your department chiefs? Did this exclusion of executive powers become apparent to the outside world and, if so, how?