Q Did you enter into the SS later on?
of 1933. Prosecution, you were a legal adviser of an SS unit?
A That statement requires clarification. In my immediate home country, Upper Austria, I have spoken at National Socialist meetings and in the first place or rather exclusively so as to serve the Anschluss movement. I was a legal adviser just as any other lawyer at that time who, because of economic difficulties, was prepared at the end of the day to help poor members of a Party, which in this case was the National Socialist Party, and to give them information without charging them. had you arrested and that you, together with other leading National Socialists, were sent to the detention camp near Kaisersteinbruch? What was the cause for that?
A That is correct. I think the political situation which existed in Austria at the time must be briefly described. men who had very little backing among the people. There were two different groups who did not participate in the government; in the first place those groups on the political left, the Social Democrats, that is the Austro-Marxist Party, and in the second place another, a very much smaller group, the National Socialists. The government at that time not only had the National Socialists but other parties too delivered into detention camps so that any political upheaval and meetings or demonstrations could be avoided. eighteen hundred Nazis I was to be found too. eventually subjected to a trial for conspiracy against the government and were you released from arrest in the end? Give that, if you will, in a few sentences, that is as to the cause of all this.
I should say first of all that in the meantime the attempt of the National Socialist revolt had taken place in Austria in May, 1934. That attempted revolt, which unfortunately caused the murder of Dollfuss, was defeated and severe measures were introduced against a large number of National Socialists as revenge. One particularly severe measure was that thousands of National Socialists lost their jobs by declaration and the necessity existed that there be an appeasement amongst the population and an alleviation of the government policy had to be brought about.
That was done by two men, Langot, the Deputy president of Upper Austria and a farmer and engineer by the name of Reinthaler.
invited to join that action. that is 1938. that is why I was invited to join in that appeasement action. Within that program it was demanded by the government itself that certain men take up connections with the party leaders and maintain that connection, that is to say the SA, SS and so on. With the knowledge and by the wish of the government and the police departments in question I took up a connection with the SS. with the SS and accused of high treason and arrested. I remained in custody for about six months and put before the military court martial on a charge of high treason. I was, however, acquitted since the government itself admitted that with their knowledge that task had been permitted and given me. There was left a sentence for legal secrecy which was, however, served by my custody. 1938 and what was the participation of the SS? ment action of Reinthaler I got in touch with circles first of all concerned with theAnshluss and secondly, with those circles who had set their aim so that a revolutionary movement and development should be achieved. Conditions in Austria were to be cleansed peacefully and at the same time the idea of the Anschluss was to be advanced and the government was to be brought over to that idea. personal contact with the later Minister Seyss-Inquart and I made his political train of thoughts my own.
Q Are you of the opinion that the plebiscite in Austria in April 1938 corresponded with the wish of the nation or not?
ance with the will of the Austrian population. The result of 99.7 per cent for Anschluss was perfectly genuine. made an SS brigadier and leader of an SS sector and promoted? Anschluss. The statement and opinion of the prosecution is completely incorrect when they think that national Socialism in Austria at that time could in any way be compared with the development which had taken place in Germany during the same period . The development of Austrian National Socialism was completely different over and above that therewas the Anschluss movement and its originator N ational Socialism and in that way through Anschluss to National Socialism. That was the line that was adopted by nearly all national Socialists and by no means the idealogy of the original Austrian Party program. that the Anschluss movement in Austria was backed by the people and that the plebiscite in the various districts, like the Tyrol and Salzburg, in 1925 or 1923 in more than ninety per cent of the votes being cast in favor of the Anschluss and that those facts have to be taken into consideration. Government had tried the resolution of the National Council which said that both these organizations had resolved to join the Reich and would not depart from that resolution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, I do not think you need go into these subjects as to reasons why they were in favor of the Anschluss in such detail.
Can't you hear?
Will you try to confine the witness to less detail and get on to the material period?
DR. KAUFFMANN: It is not coming through to me but I know what you mean. for his participation in the Austrian revolution and I did want him to say a few sentences about that before this Tribunal but I am willing and prepared to go over to another subject.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was giving us the figures in particular plebiscites long before the Anschluss and that seems to me to be quite unnecessary detail. BY DR. KAUFFMAN:
Q So then in September, 1938, you became SS Gruppenfuehrer; is that correct:
A Yes. After the Anschluss had been realized, I was appointed the leader of the General SS in Austria, which took the shape of the sector Upper Donau. At that time I had been promoted Brigade Leader without going through the lowest steps of SS leaders. They were great. And I think it was in December that I was appointed Gruppenfuehrer; so that my rank was coordinated with that of all the other Main SS Unit Leaders in the Reich.
Q Will you continue regarding your history and your development in the SS? Were you in 1941 appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria?
A In March, 1938, I became a member of the Austrian Government. I had the position of the Secretary of State for Security in Austria, which was part of the Ministry of the Interior. That Austrian Government was dissolved in 1941; that is to say, they handed their office activity over to the forms of administration which were prevalent in the Reich; so that the Secretary of State for Security was also dissolved. And so, as to put me on the budget and my salary could be paid, I was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader, I think, in July, 41. Police and the SD; that is, the so-called Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. How did that nomination arise? Did you have connections to Himmler; and what was said between you and Himmler on the occasion of your appointment?
A My activities between '41 and '43 will be briefly referred to be me so as to make it clear why I was called to Berlin. Austria, and in that respect the Prosecution's point is taken. centrally from Berlin and the jurisdiction of the minister concerned, Seyss-Inquart and his Secretary of State, Kaltenbrunner, had been completely taken away. My activities as Higher SS and Police Leader is different from the activities of the same men in the Reich, since in Austria we were limited to merely representative tasks.
In other words, my activities did not take up all my time. During these two years I have acted in accordance with my political intentions and from Austria I ran a rather large political intelligence service. for them the resources, economic and otherwise, of Austria, and, also, the Reich with incredible shortsightedness did not realize or fall back upon Austria's task in the direction of the eastern political sphere. Thus, my reports met with increased interest in Berlin. When Himmler continuously raised accusations against me that his intelligence service, which was run by Heydrich in the Reich, did, not produce the necessary political results, then Himmler, eight months after Heydrich's death, felt obliged to look for a man who could protect him against these accusations which were being made against him by Hitler.
Q And what did you discuss with Himmler? he was at the time because the headquarters were at Obersalzberg. He told me what accusations were made against him by Hitler and he demanded that I should create a central intelligence service in the Reich. We had a lengthy discussion about that with reference to my reports of the previous years. He was of the opinion that the best solution would be if I were to take over the Reich Security Main Office and make it the basis for the creation of such an intelligence department. That I refused and I stated as my reasons that my position in Austria had been that of an observer and a critic regarding, in particular, the inner political, developments in the Reich. I stated to Himmler in detail just why the Germans in Austria had been disappointed and what I considered the dangers to be in connection with a tiredness, a lustlessness of the Austrians towards the Reich, the same Austrians who four years ago had been enthusiastic about the Reich.
Q May I interrupt you for just one moment. It is correct, of course, that you were made the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. Are you trying to say that you did not take over the executive powers?
A I'm just coming to that. But, first of all, I must refer to that first conference with Himmler, and the second one took place two months later, and on that occasion I was given the order which you are referring to.
But I career through to the last day of the war--that, even on that first occasion, I stated to Himmler in which main joints I had differences with the National Socialists and the inner policy of the Reich, its foreign policy, its ideology, and the legal basis on which the German state existed. I stated emphatically that the administration in the Reich was too centralized; that Austria was criticizing that centralized system severely, particularly since some centralization had also been granted to other countries, such as Bavaria, for instance. in which it had been done, was wrong, and that German criminal law was casuistic, whereas the Austrian criminal law was based on a tradition of more than one hundred years and had proved itself best and had been recognized abroad. concentration camp was not approved in Austria, but that everyone in Austria strictly wanted his right to be pronounced through means of a law court. I explained to him that anti-Semitism in Austria was taking place in a completely different shape and form and had developed differently and was being handled differently. No one in Austria, I said, had ever thought of impeding the limits of anti-Semitism, as was laid down in the Party program. I also said that there was hardly any understanding for the fact in Austria that through the Nurnberg laws the limitations of the Party program in this respect had been impeded. towards immigration on the part of the Jews, and any personal or physical persecution of Jews was completely superfluous.
I'm referring to a document, which is in thehands of the Tribunal. It's a report from a President in Vienna, I think, dated December, 1939, which makes it abundantly clear. It is based on figures that between '34 and '39, I think, a total of 200,000 Jews had supplied more than 100,000 immigrants who had emigrated from abroad. Those were the problems which we discussed at the time.
Q And what did Himmler tell you?
A Himmler said that he knew best; that I had no police training at all, but that, in fact, all my previous activities had been that of political intelligence work. So that, therefore, by taking over the RSHA, I could not be given the task of executive work, such as the criminal police the state police; that I would not want to have anything to do with it, but that my task, for which he was appointing me, namely, the construction and extension of an intelligence service, would in fact be impeded by that. between Heydrich and myself. There were pertinent differences in that way. Heydrich was an expert in police matters, whereas I was not, and the policy with which he, Himmler, and Heydrich had already discredited the Reich up until that time could not be transferred to me since my honor and my family were too holy for me for that.
He quietened me down by saying, "You know that in June 42, Heydrich was assassinated and that I, myself, since his death"--and this was about six or sevel months after Heydrich's death--"was handling his entire office myself, and that's the way I propose things should be left; since I"--this means Himmler--"will retain the executive powers and exercise them personally. I have my well-trained experts, Mueller and Nebe, at my disposal for this purpose, and you will not have to concern yourself with it all. You take over the intelligence service, that is departments 5 and 6, and make them the basis for your intelligence service." an intelligence service, an intelligence service which until that time had been so narrow minded because of Heydrich's tendancies, and which had been forced more and more to become an executive organ for the supply of intelligence material, such as apparatus, from the beginning. An intelligence service, I said, would have to be smaller and, most of all, I had considered it lunacy that there should be a dividing line between military and political intelligence. No country in the whole world, except Germany and France, had divided their intelligence service into two parts. I had demanded, therefore, that to start with he would have to get a Fuehrer order on the strength of which the intelligence system of the armed forces, which rested in the Department OKW, counter intelligence, should he coordinated with the SD and should be given personnel, which would have to be found in the proper manner.
Q I am interrupting you. Can you tell me in one sentence whether that coordination which you just mentioned took place? of February, 1944.
Q Now, my next question to you. After what you have just explained, did Himmler relieve you of executive tasks and did this become effective within the RSHA, and was it made known to your department chiefs? Did this exclusion of executive powers become apparent to the outside world and, if so, how?
to leave, since I wasn't even prepared to accept the position in the RSHA under those conditions which he had offered to me, which were that the heads of the executive departments would retain that position. He was very angry with me--so angry that he didn't shake me by the hand and expressed his displeasure in various other ways which I felt during the subsequent weeks. received a telegram ordering me to report to head-quarters, which since then had been transferred to East Prussia. I assumed that in accordance with the wishes I had expressed to him he would now give me a full task. I went to headquarters with the view that I had at last achieved what my brothers or my other male relatives had been doing. But I was wrong. He told me that he had talked to the Fuehrer and that he had considered the centralization of the intelligence service appropriate, that he was going to enter into negotiations with the armed forces, and that I would be given the task of organizing and extending the intelligence service. The state would continue by which I continue the executive powers. outside world, then I have to answer that it was never announced, so that formally the Prosecution are right when they are accusing me. As far as the outside world is concerned, I have never introduced those limits. To that I can only say that I can refer to the words of my then superior, and I thought I could rely on them. He stated to me in the presence of Nebe and Mueller that he had given those two the corresponding orders, which were that there should be immediate contact with him as there had been since Heydrich's death and that they were to report to him directly and received their orders from him directly. to Heydrich--such as, for instance, the task of solution of the Jewish problem--were not only not known to me at the time but they were never given to me at all. Nominally I was the chief of the RSHA, and as such I dealt with the immediate tasks, as I said before, of creating this new intelligence service; and those I regarded army tasks. But Himmler's contact with the state police and the criminal police continued as it was, and it wasn't until much later that I could find that it was often carried out in the name of the chief of the RSHA, that is to say, my name, without that I knew of these orders when they were issued or that I had even seen them.
orders from Himmler, but they did so in the manner that they used my name as chief of the RSHA and signed with it. I shall probably have to state in detail later on that they continued habits which originated from Heydrich' time, who had the entire executive powers in his hand and who deputized corresponding powers to Mueller and Nebe. But I never had those powers from the beginning, and therefore I couldn't have deputized any powers to anybody else. Perhaps I ought to add, on the question of my responsibility, by saying that possibly I never have taken the necessary care to insure that the situation was clarified and to show that there would be no order of the criminal police with my name on it. The fact that I did not concern myself with that sufficiently is Himmler's fault, but partly probably my fault too. IV, Ohlendorf, on January 3, 1946, made before this Tribunal. I am putting it to you briefly, and will you please make your statement.
This statement of Ohlendorf's refers to the question of the executive power, and Ohlendorf said, upon being asked a question: "If you put the question whether Kaltenbrunner could have caused executive functions to be carried out, then I must answer that with yes. But if, on the other hand, you refer to Mueller and Himmler, excluding Kaltenbrunner in this connection, then I must draw your attention to the fact that in accordance with the construction of the system of the RSHA Mueller was Kaltenbrunner's subordinate; and therefore orders from Himmler to Mueller would be orders to Kaltenbrunner also. So therefore it was Mueller's duty to keep Kaltenbrunner informed."
And then he goes on to say, "I can say that it is definitely known to me that one expression was often used, 'to the last washerwoman' Himmler would reserve himself a final decision personally, and that whether Kaltenbrunner had no powers in that connection I cannot say."
A This requires an explanation. He is right in as far as according to the organization of the RSHA nothing had changed since Heydrich's time. So that as far a as official channels were concerned he could certainly say "Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, Mueller." But during the conferences, and when Himmler gave orders, it was cleanly excluded. And to the remark regarding that Himmler reserved himself the decision as far as the last washerwoman, that proves that the condition which arose was that, contrary to the time of Heydrich, the medium between Himmler and Mueller was no longer active. That intermediary was I. So that in fact the immediate orders from Himmler went immediately to Mueller. Prosecution. I now submit to you a document and ask for your statement. It is the document L-38, USA Exhibit No. 517.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean 033-PS?
DR. KAUFMANN:L-38, USA 517. May I ask whether the Tribunal have that document?
THE PRESIDENT: It came through before as 038. You mean L-38, do you?
DR. KAUFMANN: Yes, L-38. I am calling it Kr-3. This is concerned with the accusation raised during-
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kaufmann, has this already got an exhibit number? You don't want to give it another exhibit number.
DR. KAUFMANN: Very well. If it isn't necessary then I won't BY DR. KAUFMANN: orders bore your name either in facsimile or in typewritten form; and question two is whether you have given such protective custody arrest orders, whether original orders therefore are available; and, lastly, wheter if this is not applicable you knew of them. Please, will you make a statement in connection with this document? I ever sign or oven see a single protective custody arrest order. During interrogations before the trial a number of protective custody arrest orders were put before me in connection with certain questions which were put to me.
Everyone of thos orders was signed with my name, either with typewritten letters or in teleprint letters, and I think in one case there was a facsimile signature.
Q You will admit that as such this statement of yours isn't very credible. It is an incredible story that such orders were signed with his name. How do you explain that? How do you explain that fact, a fact which can be proved on the strength of the documents which have your signature?
A I hadn't finished my statement. I had stated that this signature "Kaltenbrunner" in protective custody arrest orders could only have arisen in that way--that the chief of the department, Mueller, continued to do what he did under Heydrich, at which time he was allowed to do so, which was that the name of the chief of the RSHA was put on these orders and that he authorized his subordinates to do so. Quite obviously he continued to do so during my time, because otherwise those orders couldn't have been put before me here.
to do this. To the contrary, this was altogether impossible and also superfluous, because he was immediately under Himmler and he had Himmler's authority so that he might just as well have written "Himmler" or "By order of Himmler", or "By authority of Himmler". I admit that this remains as a fact before this Tribunal, which the Tribunal night not believe me or couldn't believe me, but this is the true state of affairs and Himmler never gave me a cause to definite my attitude in this connection, since he told me that I would not be given these executive tasks. used, that it was misused? all and that it was admissible and that has been carried out very often? Himmler and myself as early as 1942 but I think even before that, on two occasions -- I talked on one occasion to him and another occasion to Thierack. We had correspondence about this conception. I consider protective custody, as it was handled in the German Reich, only in the smallest number of cases, as being a necessity in the interests of the State, or to put it best or make more accurately, that I consider that only then can it be considered a measure justified by the war. Apart from that, my views were against this conception and against protective custody altogether and I often spoke against it, using legal arguments and turned against it. On several occasions, I have talked to Himmler and even Hitler about this. I spoke about a meeting of public prosecutors, I think, in 1944, and I publicly voiced my views which were against this. Since old times, it was my viewpoint that a man's liberty must be counted amongst his highest privileges and that only a proper court based on the constitution can pass judgment, which would deprive him of that liberty. protective custody arrests. As one of the reasons for protective custody, it is stated that the man was responsible for activities hostile to the State or the spreading of untrue rumors or as a result, refusal to work, religious propaganda Please, will you express your views on the reasons for those protective custody arrests.
Were these to be approved of?
A No. I consider those reasons for protective custody to be wrong and I think I had better explain in detail. At any rate, my attitude is due to the fact that all the perpetrations, which have been mentioned here, might just as well have been dealt with by a proper law court and might have been prosecuted by the state. For that reason, I consider protective custody as such, with those reasons, as being wrong. by saying that you want to say that you had no knowledge of protective custody arrest orders; that you had given no authority for them and that you haven't signed them, but since those arrest orders were issued within the setup of this department, you consider that you ought to have had knowledge of them. Is this a correct summary or is it incorrect? tion. The prosecution called you the intellectual perpetrator and said that you as the Chief of the Security Police and the SD were responsible for the murdering and illtreatment of civilian persons through the so-called Einsatzgruppen (Action Commandos). I am going to quote a few sentences from the statement made by the witness Ohlendorf here in this courtroom on January 7, 1946, and, of course, the statement made by Ohlendorf implicates you and therefore I am asking you to make your statement. Ohlendorf says with reference to the Einsatzgruppen (Action Commandos) that after you entered, you would have had to occupy yourself with that problem. "He, Kaltenbrunner," says Ohlendorf "would therefore know the documents," referring to these Einsatzgruppen, "because they came under one of his departments." He goes on to say with reference to the valuables taken away from the executed persons, that these had been sent to the Reich Ministry of Finance or to the RSHA, and he finally states that officers for these Action Commandos were recruited from amongst the leading officials of the State Police and only a small percentage were drawn from, out of the SD. What is your view on it, your statement on the question of whether you knew of the existence of these action groups and whether you knew of that significance?
unknown to me. I heard later that they had existed, but many months later. In this connection, I want to say the following. It is known to the Tribunal, from, Ohlendorf's statement and from decrees which have been discussed here, originating from Himmler and Hitler, that orders for the killing of people had been given. These action groups or action commandos, during the time that I was in office, were never formed. Those groups which had been active up to the same time that I came into office, were also formed before I took over the RSHA, or rather, they had been dissolved or had come under a new superior. I don't know whether the witness Ohlendorf has stated here just when ha returned from his Action Commandos.
A That is before I came into office. The action groups must later on have come under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leaders in the occupied territories, and this is even more probable, they were under the jurisdiction of the chief of the anti-bandit units. I cannot answer your questiondifferently, since my possibilities of investigating the whole complex were not at my disposal.
I think you also asked me whether it is known to me that valuables, which had been taken away from executed persons, had been sent to the SD or the Ministry of Finance. I know nothing of such but I do know that Himmler had given a order to all police authorities, not only the security police but also other organizations in the occupied territories, be it the Order Police or be it the antibandit units,or be it those sections of the armed forces which were later on under his command, saying that all such property would have to be surrendered to the Ministry of Finance. result of an order originating from the RSHA? icance of these action groups. When, as far as the time is concerned, did you get that knowledge? may have been the following day when I reported to Himmler in November 1943.
Q 1943? and what they signified, then the question arises what your attitude about them was, and, if you should have been against them just what did you do to terminate their existence? Did you have a possibility to do something or not? of an action group. Their existence, or their previous activities, became known to me late in 1943. I knew that I would be against such a misuse of men under the RSHA and that I would have to defend myself against it. I think on the 13th of September, 1943, I called on Hitler, on the occasion of a visit of the just-liberated Mussolini. I saw him, but an attempt to talk to him failed, because of this state visit. my activities, and on that occasion I talked to the Fuehrer about the fact that the Einsatz Commandos had become known to me. However, it wasnot only about that. It was on that occasion that I approached him for the first time about the entire Jewish problem, and about the fact which had also just become clear to me, namely, that Himmler was giving orders directed against the Jews. through that problem in these details. However, I would like to supplement my statement now and say that action groups no longer came into the picture so far as I was concerned, because the entire personnel was transferred to the Anti-Partisan Units on the identical day when I joined the office in Berlin. I think I can remember distinctly that von dem Bach-Zelewski, who was the Chief of the Anti-Partisan Units, was appointed in January of 1943, and this may be the reason for the fact that I received no reports regarding the activities of these action groups. This is an extremely grave document, to which I want you to make a statement.