"The reply suggested by us to be made to Hitler draws a distinction between the method of reaching an agreement on German-Polish differences and the nature of the solution which should be achieved. As far as the method is concerned, we wish to express clearly that in our view direct discussion between the parties on equal terms appears to us to be the proper means." events which followed. it states as follows:
"As the Polish Government, in their reply to President Roosevelt, appear to accept the idea of direct negotiations, His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the Polish Government, in the light of the considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraph, will authorize them to inform the German Government that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct negotiations with Germany."
same page, you will find a telegram from Sir Neville Henderson to Lord Halifax, which was dispatched on August 29, 1939. Great Britain's role is once more clarified. It says under number 3 of this document:
"Note observes that German proposals have never had for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests and declares that German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary. The German Government adds the note:
"Count on the arrival of such a plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, the 30th of August. I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress the urgency of the moment, when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face." another exhibit, had the following reaction in Great Britain. I am reading from page 453 of Ribbentrop's document book. It is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Neville Henderson of August 30, 1939. It says:
"We shall give careful consideration to German Government's reply, but it is of course unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and German Government must not expect this." Henderson didn't consider that a success of Britain's action could be possible. This is contained in the same document on page 454. This is a telegram from Sir Neville Henderson to Lord Halifax. I am merely reading a short quotation from point 3 of the telegram:
"While I still recommend that the Polish Government should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifices for preservation of peace." direct negotiations. This can be seen from the same document on page 454, from which I am only reading the first three lines. It is a telegram from the British Ambassador to Warsaw to Lord Halifax, and it states:
"I am convinced that it would be impossible to get the Polish Government to send Mr. Beck or any other representative to Berlin immediately." 4. I quote:
"I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler's reply until I receive instructions, which I trust will be without delay."
Through the failure to pass on the German Government's proposals, direct negotiations were made impossible. As evidence for the fact that the Polish Governments too, had no intention of entering into such direct negotiations, I am referring to page 465 of the same document, which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw. Once more he is asking the Ambassador to invite the Polish Government to enter into direct negotiations. I am not quoting from this document, but I am quoting from the next document, page 466, which is an extract from the British Blue Book and which refers to the Polish reaction. It is a telegram from Sir Kennard to Lord Halifax, August 31, 1939. I am going to read the first three paragraphs of this document. From these paragraphs it becomes clear what the Polish attitude was regarding the possibility of direct negotiations. I quote:
"Mr. Beck has just communicated the Polish reply to my effort of 1st night in writing."
The second paragraph states:
"I asked Mr. Beck what steps he proposed to take in order to establish contact with the German Government. He replied that he would instruct Mr. Lipski to seek an interview with the minister for foreign affairs or state secretary in order to state that Poland had accepted British proposals. I urged him to do this without any delay. I then asked him what attitude Polish Ambassador would adopt if Herr von Ribbentrop or whomever he saw handed him the German proposals. He said that Sir Lipski would not be authorized to accept such a document, asin view of past experience it might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum."
This extract from the British Blue Book proves that asfar as Poland's part was concerned any possibilities of clarifying the question of Danzig or the minorities was refused.
ment or British Governmant to discuss this question with Poland any further. As evidence for further efforts I am submitting to the Tribunal the Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 209 on page 494, of which I am asking the The next document is Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 213, which is on page 504b of my document book.
This last document is an official German memorandum regarding the negotiations and subject of negotiations during the time of the Polish-German crisis. Since Poland was unable to discuss these questions of Danzig or the Corridor with Germany, a war arose between those two countries. ation of this war I shall go into this in detail. What I want to state today is that the lack of any effective international institution for the alteration of the insufferable status quo was the final reason which led to the outbreak of war in 1939. ments which refer to the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany. These are the documents Exhibits Ribbentrop No 216a, on page 509 of the document book; 216b, and 217. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents, and as far as evidence and the actual events are concerned I am referring to the documents and statement which my colleague, Dr. Siemers, will be submitting to the Tribunal when he speaks on behalf of Raeder. occupation of Holland and Belgium. They are documents No. 218 and the following on page 518 of the document book. The documents are contained in book No. 7. Ribbentrop 218 of document book No. 7. I am going to quote the following brief passsages. Paragraph 2--I quote:
"As the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr. Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being a matter of course that those two countries, in the event of a war between Germany and England and France, would maintain the strictest neutrality. Belgium and The Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.
made to the evidence which was known to the German Government at the time and which I will submit in due course as evidence of the statement just made. It says, "Evidence at the disposal of the German government proves that there are preparations on the part of Britain and France which are taking place on Belgian and Netherlands territory. It is known that these preparations have progressed considerably. Consequently, for some time, all obstacles on the Belgian Border towards France, which might hinder the entry of the English and French invasion army, have been secretly removed. Air fields in Belgium and the Netherlands have been reconnoitered by English and French officers and extensions effected. Belgium has made transport facilities available at the frontier and recently, advance parties of staff personnel and units of the French and English army have arrived in various parts of Belgium and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish conclusive proof that the English and French attack against Germany is imminent and that this advance will be directed against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands." Ribbentrop 221, 229, which I am submitting to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They are the Anglo-French plans, aspreparation for violations of Holland's and Belgium's neutrality.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal has to adjourn at five o'clock into a closed session. They hope very much that you will conclude your examination of these documents by then.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. So as to save time, I shall only state briefly what these documents are. Exhibit Ribbentrop 221 is the proof for an intended intervention in Belgium. This is a report from the military attache to the French Embassy in London, General Lelong, addressed to the Chief of the French General Staff and of National Defense. I am going to quote a very brief passage From it, which says "Intervention in Belgium.
The British Delegation has recognized the following conditions which are necessary for an intervention in Belgium. It was proposed that we would have to prevent a battle in Belgium and that we would have to organize our defenses at least along the Scheldt or better still, along the Albert Canal. By request of the British Delegation, the following points have been considered:
"(1) The possibility of intervention along the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur, supposing that it were possible to organize such a position in good time.
"(2) The importance of holding Belgium and Dutch territory as a base for a resumption of the offensive against Germany." with this group. I am merely asking the Tribunal that document 2190, page 521 of the book, which is a memorandum of the German Government to the Luxembourg government, of May 9 1940. and Exhibit Ribbentrop 225, ahould be taken judicial notice of, so that I can refer to them when I present my case. Furthermore, I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the documents 230, 230-a 231,and 231-a. 232,233,234,235,236,237,239,240,241,242,243,244,and 245, which, again, are documents which originate from the French General Staff and are clear proof that, on the part of Britain and France, and before the 9th of May 1940, there were detailed plans for a military cooperation and that the British and American advance parties were already on Belgium and Dutch territory and had to cross the Frontiers. This is the end of this particular group. with reference to the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. These are documents 272, and the following page 604, and the following document book. Here again, we are concerned with documents which partly come from the files of the French General Staff. The first document of the Type is Exhibit Ribbentrop No.272, which is a note from the German Government to the Yugoslavia Government, dated 25th March 1941.
This document states that Germany and the Axis Powers did not intend during the war to put demands to Yugoslavia, particularly with reference to the march of troops yhrough Yugoslavian territory. Document 272, Exhibit 274, are the minutes of Yugoslavia's entry into thr Three Power Pact of March 25 1941 and connected with it are the Reich government and the Yugoslav government. from the Reich Government to the Greek government, which was handed to that government after Greek territory had been occupied by British troops. From page 3, I am quoting the follosing sentence : "During recent days Greece had become an operational territory for British forces." statement from the Reich government, dated April 6, 1941, which is addressed to both Yugoslavia and Greece. The reasons are states in this note, which after the Simowitsh Revolt, lead to military action on Germany's part in Yugoslavia. These reasons can be found on page 4 of this document. As evicende that the statements contained therein are true, I am referring to the so-called Charitait files which are the files of the French General Staff. Greece but I should like to add that once again I am relying on further evidence which will be submitted by my colleague, Dr. Siemers, for the defendant Reader, and which refer to the German action against Greece.
The next group of documents refer to Russia. They are the documents, Exhibit Ribbentrop 279 and the following, which can be found on page 619 of the document book. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of 279, 280, 282, 283 and 284. During the presentation of my argument, I shall refer to these documents further. accusation against the defendant Ribbentrop regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact and his policy in connection with Japan and the USSR.
the document book. This document contains the Anti-Comminters Pact. Ribbentrop 281 refers to the extension of the Anti-Commintern Three Power Pact of September 27, 1940. I am submitting these documents to the Tribunal as proof of the fact that Ribbentrop and the Reich Government were making efforts by means of this policy to keep the United States out of a war. In spide of this policy an active support of our opponents by the United States took place. As proof of this I refer to document Exhibit Ribbentrop 306 and Exhibit Ribbentrop 308 on page 703 of the document book. These documents are the last I am submitting to the Tribunal with reference to the policy of Germany during the years when the defendant von Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister. Finally I am briefly referring to Exhibit Ribbentrop 313. That is an affidavit from the Counsellor of the Legation Gotttfriedsen and this affidavit has nothing to do actually with the aggressive war but it refers to questions whcih have been brought up by the Prosecution in connection with the case of Ribbentrop and this affidavit contains statements regarding the real estate property of the defendant Ribbentrop and regarding his property of art and treasures. the affidavit that he handled financial affairs of the Foreign Office and particularly the financial affairs of the Foreign Minister. May I quote a brief passage from it in connection therewith from question number five.
Q What about von Ribbentrop's art possessions?
A (by Secretary of the Legation Gottfriedsen): Mr. von Ribbentrop was a wealthy man before he entered diplomatic life. During the time of my activities in the above mentioned department, he acquired some paintings for the most part on the art market in Germany itself. Everyone of these paintings were acquired properly and above all, at correct prices, and , of course, paid for out of private funds of the Reich Foreign Minister.
"During the time he was Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop acquired art objects abroad for purposes of furnishing the Foreign Office and were used accordingly. All these art objects were catalogued and carried in the books as inventory. No foreign art objects were acquired illegally, i.e. by pressure, etc.
Mr. von Ribbentrop's private art objects too were catalogued ant the objects themselves marked distinctly by me." says:
"During the war he did not acquire any art objects illegally from any of the territories accupied by German troops be it for his own private use or for the Foreign Office of the Reich." the private financial affairs of the defendant von Ribbentrop and had annually made a survey of them together with a chartered accountant for the purpose of taxes and his inventory. the Exhibit Number 317 and which is in the document book at page 749, and from which I propose to read.
This is an affidavit from Mrs. von Ribbentrop given before a notary in Nurnberg. It refers to accusations raised by the Prosecution in connection with the Russian policy pursued by Ribbentrop. I am quoting, as follows:
"In 1940 we had a very inadequate air-raid shelter in the Foreign Office(official residence). During air-raids we therefore, and on the orders of Adolf Hitler, we used the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery, since he was anxious to see that my husband, in his capacity as Reich Foreign Minister, and the documentsof the Foreign Office should be safe from air-raids. I was at that time expecting my youngest child, which was born on 19 December, 1940, and can therefore clearly remember an air-raid which took place shortly before this event, which caused us to go to the air-raid shelter of the Reich Chancellery. On this occasion Adolf Hitler was also present and came into our room in the shelter. He, my husband, and I sat at a table in this room. In the course of our stay my husband spoke at length of his efforts to induce Russia to join the Tri-partite Pact. He presented the possibilities of such diplomatic action and his process of thought, asto how he imagined the conclusion of such a pact. I remember clearly that Adolf Hitler closed the conversation with the words: 'Ribbentrop, why shouldn't we be able to manage that, when we have managed so many things?'
"My husband presented his ideas with great elan and with great impressiveness. After he had finished I noticed that Adolf Hitler, who had received my husband's statements without pertinent remarks, seemed to be a little absent-minded so that I had the impression that my husband's statements had not made any convincing impression." Ribbentrop was still anxious to avoid a conflict with Russia. von Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, could you inform us how far you have been able to get with Dr. Thoma in connection with his documents, that is the Rosenberg documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: My Lord, the American delegation and the French are dealing with Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Mr. Dodd can tell us.
MR. DODD: Captain Krieger of our staff, your Honor, has been in consultation with Dr. Thoma and will continue to be in an effort to follow the procedures laid out by the Court. that we have concluded our conversations with Dr. Dix and we are, I guess it is fair to say, at some differences and I think it would be necessary to have a hearing by the Court on these matters that we do not agree on. However, we have agreed to a considerable number of Schacht items.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to insure is that there shall be no delay at the end of Kaltenbrunner's case.
With reference to Rosenberg's case I understand the documents in the Rosenberg case which have been suggested we might have to consider are very numerous and the sooner the Tribunal gets to them the better.
MR. DODD: We shall be available at all times to talk with Dr. Thoma and move right along, in the evening if he cares to do so.
THE PRESIDENT: It might be possibly desirable, it seems to me, to have the documents which have been translated presented to the Tribunal before the others, I mean to say not have them all together because there are no doubt various volumes.
MR. DODD: There are three so far, I understand there will be mere. But we will press it and continue to talk with Dr. Thoma and just as soon as possible on the first book we will be prepared to come before the Court for a hearing.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma wouldn't the best thing be for you to submit the volumes which have been translated to the court so that they can consider them beforehead as we did with Dr. Horn's Books?
DR. THOMA: Yes, My Lord, that is possible with the documents which have already been processed. With reference to my books numbers two and three, I have discussed them with Captain Kriegar in room 216 and we came to an agreement.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you could specify that agreement in the books. I suppose You could show which documents you were prepared to withdraw.
DR. THOMA: Yes, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, as soon as possible you will let the General Secretary have those books, showing the agreement which you have made with Captain Kreiger, is that right?
DR. THOMA: But I do want to point out that I have only come to an agreement with Captain Kreiger in room 216 with reference to books two and three and that only refers to the Action Group (Einsatzstab). Rosenberg but I shall do that in due course.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Is that in book one?
DR. THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you are unable to come to an agreement you can specify that and we will consider those matters. Possibly you could take some time tomorrow with Captain Kreiger, take off from Court, in order to come to an agreement with reference to book one and with reference to the other books.
How many more books have you get?
DR. THOMA: All together four.
THE PRESIDENT: Four more?
DR. THOMA: All together four document books.
THE PRESIDENT: So there is only one more to be translated.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene on Thursday, April 11, 1946 at 1000 hours.)
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, Dr. Sauter for the defendant Funk. On Saturday last, when sickness prevented me from attending the session, the question came up in which sequence the defense for the defendants Funk and Dr. Schacht should be handled, and the President has expressed the wish to hear my statement on the subject as soon as possible. I have discussed the matter with my client and the defense counsel for Dr. Schacht and I am willing to agree and I suggest that the defense for the defendant Schacht come first and that the case of the defendant Funk, for reasons of suitability, should then come after the case for the defendant Schacht has been completed. I wanted to inform you of that, Mr. President, so that the Tribunal is up to date.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MR. DODD: If your Honors please, I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that with respect to the documents for the defendant Rosenberg, we have finished our conversations with Dr. Thoma on a number and there are a number of matters which will require a hearing before the Tribunal. We were not able to agree on a number of them and, as I said yesterday, we are prepared to be heard on the applications of Dr. Schacht.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will arrange a time for that. Now, Dr. Kauffmann.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Dr. Kauffmann, counsel for Kaltenbrunner. Mr. President, I am now beginning the defense in the case of the accused Kaltenbrunner. considering the extraordinarily severe accusations which have been raised. The way I am picturing the case for the defense is that with the permission of the Tribunal, I would quote from the short document book, quote two short documents first and that after that, with permission of the Tribunal, I would propose to put the defendant into the witness stand and that after that, I would examine one or two witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that that course would be appropriate but I wanted to draw your attention --
Dr. Kauffmann, there were four witnesses who were called for the prosecution, Ohlendorf, Hoellriegel, and Wisliceny --
THE PRESIDENT: You asked for leave at an earlier stage to that they must be called before your witnesses.
Therefore, the cross examination.
You do not?
DR. KAUFFMANN: No, Mr. President, neither Ohlendorf nor
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I now read those two documents I have mentioned?
To begin with there is the affidavit from the witness Dr. Mildner, which is contained in the document book.
I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
It is KR-1.
I am now reading:
"I, the undersigned, Dr. Mildner, at present in prison in put by attorney Dr. Kaufmann, for presentation to the Inter national Military Tribunal:
"First question: Give details of yourself.
"Answer: I was entrusted with certain tasks for the Gestapo for about ten years.
From 1938 to 1945 I came under office IV, the RSHA.
I was only in the RSHA Berlin itself for approximately three months, that is to say, from March to June 1944.
Apart "Second Question:
What can you say in regard to Kalten brunner's personality?
"Answer: From my own knowledge I can confirm the following:
I know the defendant Kaltenbrunner personally. His private life was beyond reproach.
In my opinion his appointment to chief of under him who could have endangered him in his position.
The Himmler.
Kaltenbrunner had no ambition to gain recognition for There was no question of a lust for power in his case.
It is wrong to call him 'the little Himmler.
' "Third Question:
What attitude did Kaltenbrunner adopt towards office IV, Amt IV (Gestapo)?"Answer:
I know of no specific limitation of the defendant Kaltenbrunner's competence with regard to the offices which came under the RSHA.
On the other hand, I can say that the chief of and the methods of his office, No. IV.
He had, after all, "Fourth Question:
Did you ever see any orders for executions by Kaltenbrunner?
"Answer: I have never seen an original order--that is to brunner.
I know quite well that orders for protective custody This was a custom which had grown in Heydrich's time.
"Fifth Question: Did orders for executions rest in Kalten brunner's or Himmler's hands?
Who was responsible for the setting up and running of concentration camps?
"Answer: I know that execution orders rested in Himmler's hands.
So far as I know no other sections of the RSHA could issue such orders without his permission.
I know, furthermore, that chief of which was Pohl.
The concentration camps had nothing to do with the RSHA.
This applies to the whole of the administra tion, food, treatment, camp regulations, etc.
The inspector of concentration camps was Gluecks.
The official channels were therefore:
Himmler, Pohl, Gluecks, Camp Commandant.
"Sixth Question: Did Kaltenbrunner order any of the con centration camps to be evacuated?
"Answer: Nothing is known to me that the defendant Kalten "Seventh Question:
Did Kaltenbrunner issue the order to them to the concentration camp at Theresienstadt?
"Answer: No. The reason why I can answer this question cerned with this matter in Denmark in September 1943.
The chief stadt.
I flew to Berlin to try and get this order canceled.
which the Jewish operation was to be carried out. Kaltenbrunner, therefore, did not issue the order.
I didn't speak to him even.
"Read and found correct.
"Nurnberg, 29 March 1946.
"Signed: Dr. Mildner."
The next affidavit copies from Dr. Hoettl.
MR. DODD: We are faced with a new problem. I do not think this question has arisen heretofore.
The Prosecution submitted a cross interrogation to this man Dr. Mildner, and we are not quite certain as to just how we should proceed.
Should we now offer our cross interrogation, or at a later stage?