the 15th of March, 1939, had been laid to a change of attitude on the part of Britain. The former Prime Minister, Chamberlain, under pressure from the Opposition, had had consultations with various European statesmen. As evidence of this fact, I am referring to exhibit, von Ribbentrop 159, which is page 317 of the Document Book. This is a conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berlin on March 26, 1939. May I quote its beginning, which is as follows:
"On the 21st March the British Governmentproposed first of all in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and Moscow, that a formal declaration by the British, French, Russian and Polish Governments shall be made." 7 from the bottom:
"The Polish Government which ordered partial mobilization on the 23rd March was in no way satisfied with this British proposal for negotiations but demanded a more concrete commitment on behalf of England regarding Poland. Therefore, on the 23rd of March Foreign Minister Beck instructed the Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczinski, to submit to the British Government the following proposals of an Anglo-Polish union, referring to the English proposal. It says: I request you to ask Lord Halifax if (1) in view of the difficulties and the unavoidable complications and ensuing loss of time"-
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I see no reason -- if I may say so with a great deal of respect -- for reading any part of these documents. They are all in evidence, or will be, and it seems that all that need be done now is to give them numbers. I know we read and commented from documents earlier in the trial, when we put in the Prosecution's case, but the compelling reasons for that system are not present now and cannot apply as far as these Defendants are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to know what the compelling reasons are that you were referring to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I shall be glad to. At that time it was physically impossible for the Prosecution to have its material all translated in the four languages, or the three languages in addition to the ones in which the original was written. Now the Defendants do have those facilities. Had we been able to have our papers all translated, we would have submitted them and would not have commented; but the necessity for comment was real at that time, because we had to get everything into the record, over the sound system, and if we read a lot of disjointed excerpts from documents we could not have related a chain of evidence before this Tribunal. But I say that now the Defense can do so -- submit the whole document, and later on, as I understand the rules and the Charter also, we will have an opportunity to argue and comment about it as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: But you will remember that this matter was argued a week or so ago. And if I remember rightly, Dr. Dix argued in favor of the Defendants' Counsel being still entitled to reac such passages as they wanted, and with short connecting remarks, and we adhered to that rule.
MR. DODD: I didn't understand that your Honors had already ruled. I remember that Dr. Dix's principal reason was that he wanted an opportunity to make this information available to the press or the public. If that is still the reason, they are all available; the press can have them without having them read over this microphone. However, I won't press the matter if the Court has already ruled.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I would like to say a few words on the subject of Mr. Dodd's proposal. I fully supported -
THE PRESIDENT:A General Rudenko, I have just pointed out to Mr. Dodd that we have made a specific ruling upon this subject and in the opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has been performing his task with great discretion.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I still would like to be permitted to make a few remarks in regard to Mr. Dodd's proposal. questioning of the Defendant Keitel the Defense gave full documentation for Keitel, and the Tribunal looked into the matter of what document was to be accepted and what was to be declined -
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you are repeating the very words I used to Dr. Horn when he began, and as I say, in the opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has met the views of the Tribunal and has made his reading of these documents reasonably short.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to remark that the Soviet Prosecution considers, that Dr. Horn's comments are superfluous at the present time.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I am sure you will continue to use every possible means of cutting it short as much as you can.
DR. HORN: I hope, Mr. President, that I have convinced the Tribunal that I am trying to be as brief as possible and that I assure you that I small read only as much as is necessary to make it understandable and why I am presenting the document at all.
THE PRESIDENT: It is half-past three. Shall we adjourn now?
(A recess was taken)
DR. HORN: I had last quotes from Ribbentrop Exhibit 159, page 317 of the Document Book. I had quoted some passages, and I wish to briefly summarize what this document is. to England regarding consultations which should take place and led to a concrete agreement. That agreement was in fact made between March 21st and March 26th, and between England and Poland. on the part of England which is proved by the documents, 182 to 18 , pages 370 of the Document Book No.5. This and points which arise from 182 concerning the following states -- and I am quoting from Document 182, page 6:
"The following countries are to be included and have been invited to participate in the question of guarantees -- Russia, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It is said to be definitely established that Hungary was not approached and that it was up to Poland to approach Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The same applies to Turkey with regard to Greece." page 372 of the document book. This is a telegram from the German charge d'affaires in London to the Foreign Office, and I should like to briefly quote:
"The existing news proved clearly that the plan for a declaration on the part of Britain can be divided into two parts. The first part deals with the guarantee of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland; the second part aims to protect the Eastern countries against aggression. The British Cabinet is supposed to be informed by a military spokesman that Roumania, because of her oi-wells, will definitely have to be protected against German Military seizures."
Without that I propose to read from it, and I also ask that document number 183 be taken judicial notice of, which is on page 375 of the document book and which, once more, so as to save time, I do not propose to read.
Based on this policy of coalition on Britain's part whichwas directed against Germany, the alliance between Germany and Italy was concluded on 22 Hay 1939. I am submitting it as an exhibit, Ribbentrop 187. It is on page 376 of the Document Book Ribbentrop. I am submitting it to the Tribunal forjudicial notice, without wanting to read it. was that Ambassador Lipsky on 26 March 1939, on the occasion of a conference with the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, declared--and I am here referring to Exhibit Ribbentrop 162 and quoting from the third paragraph:
"Lipsky replied that it was his unpleasant duty to point out that any further pursuance of these German plans, particularly regarding a return of Danzig to theReich, would mean a war with Poland."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The same applies to the previous document, Ribbentrop 160 on page 320 of the document book, which refers to the consultation between Britain and the governments previously mentioned. namely, that further pursuance of an attempt to alter the status quo regarding the Corridor and Danzig would mean war--the Reich Foreign Ministe stated on 27 March 1939 to the Polish Ambassador--and I now quote from Ribbentrop Exhibit 163 on page 335 of the document book-that this attitude could not be the basis for a settling of these questions so far as Germany was concerned. The corresponding passage is the last but one paragraph on page two of the document where it says:
"In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked that he no longer knew what to make of the attitude of the Polish Government. They had given a negative answer to the generous proposals which Germany had made to Poland. The Foreign Minister could not possibly regard the proposal, submitted yesterday by the Polish Ambassador, as a basis for the settlement of existing problems.
The relations between the two countries were therefore becoming more and more critical." So as to prove that the Anglo-Polish guarantee pact was clearly aimed against Germany, I am submitting to the Tribunal under Exhibit number Ribbentrop 164, which is on page 338 of the document book, and I am quoting the last two lines, where it says that the pact was only to cover an attack on Germany's part. The Polish Government is confirming this as correct. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document. been submitted by the Prosecution as Number 72 but which appears on Page 337 of my document book, was the termination of the Polish-German agreement of January 26, 1934, since Germany was now convinced that the AngloPolish guarantee was contrary to the spirit of this agreement. minorities in Poland. The documents referring to this are contained in my document book under numbers 165 to 181. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents and so, to save time, I shall limit myself to very short quotations. occurred in Njevo and Bromberg. document book, which states that during recent days there had been a public appeal in Warsaw which was an invitation to boycott German trade and handicraft. Ribbentrop 180, which is on page 368 of the document book Ribbentrop. May I read this brief report, which I quote as follows:
"During the last few months the German Foreign Office has continuously received reports from the German Consulate in Poland about the cruel treatment to which members of the German minority are subjected by the Poles, who have been more and more lashed into fury and have abandoned themselves to unbridled fanaticism. In the Appendix 38 especially grave cases have been collected."
clashes did, in fact, take place with the knowledge and under the protection of Polish statesmen and high officials. As evidence for this, I am referring to Document 181, but for purposes of saving time, I am not going to read from it, but am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. an acute crisis. As evidence for this, I am presenting Exhibit Ribbentrop Number 188, on page 381 of my document book. The cause was actually a small one. There was an argument regarding the functions of the customs officials on the Danzig frontier. Because of this argument, the diplomatic representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig made a protest to the president of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig,and that is contained in Exhibit Ribbentrop 188.
It had an ultimatum, which becomes clear from paragraph 3 of the document. city of Danzig replied, as appears in Exhibit Ribbentrop 189. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also. behalf of the Reich Government, forewarning Poland not to state any ultimatum. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well, as I do not propose to read from it. page 385 of the document book. This is a document from the Under-Secretary of State at the Polish Foreign Ministry to the German Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw, and it isdated August 10, 1939. It appears, from the list two lines of the document, that Poland was refusing any intervention of the German Government and would consider that an aggressive act. Polish relations. The Reich Government and its departments attempted to avoid a final conflict. As evidence for this, I am submitted Exhibit Ribbentrop 193, which is on page 404 of the document book, and I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
This is a memorandum of the State Secretary in the Foreign Office. It is in document number 6, by the way, and on page 404 of the document book. This is a memorandum regarding a visit of the French Ambassador to the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Weizsaecker. During that conversation the former Secretary of State, Weizsaecker, emphasized that Germany had no more urgent wish than an agreement regarding the question of Danzig. The French Ambassador assured that his government would cooperate in those attempts. Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 193, and the next document, number 194, on page 406 of the document book, the last document which is concerned with the discussion between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, during which the German Secretary of State pointed out the seriousness of the situation.
the following sentence which characterizes the situation: "Danzig was only protecting itself against its protector." regarding Danzig had now reached extreme tension.
The next document I am referring to is Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 195, on pages 408 to 415. This document refers to a conference between Hitler and Ambassador Henderson on the 23rd of August, 1939. A report of this conference is contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit 199, on page 422 of the document book Ribbentrop. I am also asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, and, so as to clarify the content of that conference, I am going to quote from page 4 of the document, where it says that he, Hitler, "once more drew attention to the Danzig and Polish question in connection with which it was England's attitude that this war might be something to Germany's advantage."
The second paragraph from that states that "the Fuehrer said that the fact that England was against Germany regarding the Danzig problem was deeply shaking the German people.
"Henderson then stated that one was merely defending oneself against the principle of force, whereupon the Fuehrer answered whether England was in any way trying to find a solution by negotiation of the idiocies of Versailles.
"The Ambassador had no reply to this, and the Fuehrer then stated that according to a German slogan, there should always have to be two to make a friendship." the late Prime Minister Chamberlain to Hitler direct.
This letter is Exhibit Ribbentrop 200, on page 426 of the document book. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. contains Hitler's reply to the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain. Hitler and Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson. That meeting is contained in Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 202, which is on page 431 of the document book Ribbentrop. May I refer to paragraph 5, where Hitler emphasized once more that the problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved.
On the following page, in paragraph 3 on page 2, it says: "The Fuehrer would be prepared to make an offer to England regarding the solution of this problem." detail in document 202. which is Exhibit 195, on page 415, and he is referring to this last-mentioned meeting of August the 25th, 1939.
"My interview with Hitler", says Henderson, "at which Herr von Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt were also present on this occasion, lasted over an hour. The Chancellor spoke with calm and obvious sincerity. He described his proposals as a last conscientious effort to secure good relations with Great Britain, and suggested that I ought to fly to London with them myself."
Under number 8, on the same page, 415, Henderson continues to say: "Whatever may have been the underlying motive of this final offer on the part of the Chancellor, it was one which could not be ignored." up to the outbreak of war, is Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 208, on page 451 of the document book. notice of the entire document. Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw, states the following, and I am quoting:
"The reply suggested by us to be made to Hitler draws a distinction between the method of reaching an agreement on German-Polish differences and the nature of the solution which should be achieved. As far as the method is concerned, we wish to express clearly that in our view direct discussion between the parties on equal terms appears to us to be the proper means." events which followed. it states as follows:
"As the Polish Government, in their reply to President Roosevelt, appear to accept the idea of direct negotiations, His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the Polish Government, in the light of the considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraph, will authorize them to inform the German Government that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct negotiations with Germany."
same page, you will find a telegram from Sir Neville Henderson to Lord Halifax, which was dispatched on August 29, 1939. Great Britain's role is once more clarified. It says under number 3 of this document:
"Note observes that German proposals have never had for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests and declares that German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary. The German Government adds the note:
"Count on the arrival of such a plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, the 30th of August. I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress the urgency of the moment, when the two fully mobilized armies were standing face to face." another exhibit, had the following reaction in Great Britain. I am reading from page 453 of Ribbentrop's document book. It is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Neville Henderson of August 30, 1939. It says:
"We shall give careful consideration to German Government's reply, but it is of course unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and German Government must not expect this." Henderson didn't consider that a success of Britain's action could be possible. This is contained in the same document on page 454. This is a telegram from Sir Neville Henderson to Lord Halifax. I am merely reading a short quotation from point 3 of the telegram:
"While I still recommend that the Polish Government should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifices for preservation of peace." direct negotiations. This can be seen from the same document on page 454, from which I am only reading the first three lines. It is a telegram from the British Ambassador to Warsaw to Lord Halifax, and it states:
"I am convinced that it would be impossible to get the Polish Government to send Mr. Beck or any other representative to Berlin immediately." 4. I quote:
"I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler's reply until I receive instructions, which I trust will be without delay."
Through the failure to pass on the German Government's proposals, direct negotiations were made impossible. As evidence for the fact that the Polish Governments too, had no intention of entering into such direct negotiations, I am referring to page 465 of the same document, which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw. Once more he is asking the Ambassador to invite the Polish Government to enter into direct negotiations. I am not quoting from this document, but I am quoting from the next document, page 466, which is an extract from the British Blue Book and which refers to the Polish reaction. It is a telegram from Sir Kennard to Lord Halifax, August 31, 1939. I am going to read the first three paragraphs of this document. From these paragraphs it becomes clear what the Polish attitude was regarding the possibility of direct negotiations. I quote:
"Mr. Beck has just communicated the Polish reply to my effort of 1st night in writing."
The second paragraph states:
"I asked Mr. Beck what steps he proposed to take in order to establish contact with the German Government. He replied that he would instruct Mr. Lipski to seek an interview with the minister for foreign affairs or state secretary in order to state that Poland had accepted British proposals. I urged him to do this without any delay. I then asked him what attitude Polish Ambassador would adopt if Herr von Ribbentrop or whomever he saw handed him the German proposals. He said that Sir Lipski would not be authorized to accept such a document, asin view of past experience it might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum."
This extract from the British Blue Book proves that asfar as Poland's part was concerned any possibilities of clarifying the question of Danzig or the minorities was refused.
ment or British Governmant to discuss this question with Poland any further. As evidence for further efforts I am submitting to the Tribunal the Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 209 on page 494, of which I am asking the The next document is Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 213, which is on page 504b of my document book.
This last document is an official German memorandum regarding the negotiations and subject of negotiations during the time of the Polish-German crisis. Since Poland was unable to discuss these questions of Danzig or the Corridor with Germany, a war arose between those two countries. ation of this war I shall go into this in detail. What I want to state today is that the lack of any effective international institution for the alteration of the insufferable status quo was the final reason which led to the outbreak of war in 1939. ments which refer to the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany. These are the documents Exhibits Ribbentrop No 216a, on page 509 of the document book; 216b, and 217. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents, and as far as evidence and the actual events are concerned I am referring to the documents and statement which my colleague, Dr. Siemers, will be submitting to the Tribunal when he speaks on behalf of Raeder. occupation of Holland and Belgium. They are documents No. 218 and the following on page 518 of the document book. The documents are contained in book No. 7. Ribbentrop 218 of document book No. 7. I am going to quote the following brief passsages. Paragraph 2--I quote:
"As the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr. Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being a matter of course that those two countries, in the event of a war between Germany and England and France, would maintain the strictest neutrality. Belgium and The Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.
made to the evidence which was known to the German Government at the time and which I will submit in due course as evidence of the statement just made. It says, "Evidence at the disposal of the German government proves that there are preparations on the part of Britain and France which are taking place on Belgian and Netherlands territory. It is known that these preparations have progressed considerably. Consequently, for some time, all obstacles on the Belgian Border towards France, which might hinder the entry of the English and French invasion army, have been secretly removed. Air fields in Belgium and the Netherlands have been reconnoitered by English and French officers and extensions effected. Belgium has made transport facilities available at the frontier and recently, advance parties of staff personnel and units of the French and English army have arrived in various parts of Belgium and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish conclusive proof that the English and French attack against Germany is imminent and that this advance will be directed against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands." Ribbentrop 221, 229, which I am submitting to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They are the Anglo-French plans, aspreparation for violations of Holland's and Belgium's neutrality.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal has to adjourn at five o'clock into a closed session. They hope very much that you will conclude your examination of these documents by then.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. So as to save time, I shall only state briefly what these documents are. Exhibit Ribbentrop 221 is the proof for an intended intervention in Belgium. This is a report from the military attache to the French Embassy in London, General Lelong, addressed to the Chief of the French General Staff and of National Defense. I am going to quote a very brief passage From it, which says "Intervention in Belgium.
The British Delegation has recognized the following conditions which are necessary for an intervention in Belgium. It was proposed that we would have to prevent a battle in Belgium and that we would have to organize our defenses at least along the Scheldt or better still, along the Albert Canal. By request of the British Delegation, the following points have been considered:
"(1) The possibility of intervention along the line Antwerp-Brussels-Namur, supposing that it were possible to organize such a position in good time.
"(2) The importance of holding Belgium and Dutch territory as a base for a resumption of the offensive against Germany." with this group. I am merely asking the Tribunal that document 2190, page 521 of the book, which is a memorandum of the German Government to the Luxembourg government, of May 9 1940. and Exhibit Ribbentrop 225, ahould be taken judicial notice of, so that I can refer to them when I present my case. Furthermore, I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the documents 230, 230-a 231,and 231-a. 232,233,234,235,236,237,239,240,241,242,243,244,and 245, which, again, are documents which originate from the French General Staff and are clear proof that, on the part of Britain and France, and before the 9th of May 1940, there were detailed plans for a military cooperation and that the British and American advance parties were already on Belgium and Dutch territory and had to cross the Frontiers. This is the end of this particular group. with reference to the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. These are documents 272, and the following page 604, and the following document book. Here again, we are concerned with documents which partly come from the files of the French General Staff. The first document of the Type is Exhibit Ribbentrop No.272, which is a note from the German Government to the Yugoslavia Government, dated 25th March 1941.
This document states that Germany and the Axis Powers did not intend during the war to put demands to Yugoslavia, particularly with reference to the march of troops yhrough Yugoslavian territory. Document 272, Exhibit 274, are the minutes of Yugoslavia's entry into thr Three Power Pact of March 25 1941 and connected with it are the Reich government and the Yugoslav government. from the Reich Government to the Greek government, which was handed to that government after Greek territory had been occupied by British troops. From page 3, I am quoting the follosing sentence : "During recent days Greece had become an operational territory for British forces." statement from the Reich government, dated April 6, 1941, which is addressed to both Yugoslavia and Greece. The reasons are states in this note, which after the Simowitsh Revolt, lead to military action on Germany's part in Yugoslavia. These reasons can be found on page 4 of this document. As evicende that the statements contained therein are true, I am referring to the so-called Charitait files which are the files of the French General Staff. Greece but I should like to add that once again I am relying on further evidence which will be submitted by my colleague, Dr. Siemers, for the defendant Reader, and which refer to the German action against Greece.
The next group of documents refer to Russia. They are the documents, Exhibit Ribbentrop 279 and the following, which can be found on page 619 of the document book. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of 279, 280, 282, 283 and 284. During the presentation of my argument, I shall refer to these documents further. accusation against the defendant Ribbentrop regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact and his policy in connection with Japan and the USSR.
the document book. This document contains the Anti-Comminters Pact. Ribbentrop 281 refers to the extension of the Anti-Commintern Three Power Pact of September 27, 1940. I am submitting these documents to the Tribunal as proof of the fact that Ribbentrop and the Reich Government were making efforts by means of this policy to keep the United States out of a war. In spide of this policy an active support of our opponents by the United States took place. As proof of this I refer to document Exhibit Ribbentrop 306 and Exhibit Ribbentrop 308 on page 703 of the document book. These documents are the last I am submitting to the Tribunal with reference to the policy of Germany during the years when the defendant von Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister. Finally I am briefly referring to Exhibit Ribbentrop 313. That is an affidavit from the Counsellor of the Legation Gotttfriedsen and this affidavit has nothing to do actually with the aggressive war but it refers to questions whcih have been brought up by the Prosecution in connection with the case of Ribbentrop and this affidavit contains statements regarding the real estate property of the defendant Ribbentrop and regarding his property of art and treasures. the affidavit that he handled financial affairs of the Foreign Office and particularly the financial affairs of the Foreign Minister. May I quote a brief passage from it in connection therewith from question number five.
Q What about von Ribbentrop's art possessions?
A (by Secretary of the Legation Gottfriedsen): Mr. von Ribbentrop was a wealthy man before he entered diplomatic life. During the time of my activities in the above mentioned department, he acquired some paintings for the most part on the art market in Germany itself. Everyone of these paintings were acquired properly and above all, at correct prices, and , of course, paid for out of private funds of the Reich Foreign Minister.
"During the time he was Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop acquired art objects abroad for purposes of furnishing the Foreign Office and were used accordingly. All these art objects were catalogued and carried in the books as inventory. No foreign art objects were acquired illegally, i.e. by pressure, etc.