Colonel Lindeiner is said to have stated, that military officers stood behind these measures and had been informed of them?
A I don't believe I expressed myself just that way. Could you please repeat that? military officers stood behind this measure and hadbeen informed of it ahead of time. made such an assertion? this matter. I have no more reasons to believe so.
DR. NELTE: No further questions.
DR. STAHMER: Dr. Stahmer, for the defendant Goering. BY DR. STAHMER: Commissar Absalom, even before your departure for Berlin, had informed you that he had heard in Camp Sagan that shootings were to take place?
Q Another question. During the discussion that you had with General Nebe in Berlin, General Nebe said to you that the military officers were informed. Did he state more precisely what military officers were here concerned?
A No, that was not said. Moreover, I do not know whether this was intended or whether it already turned into fact because this whole matter was to be regarded as top secret and was to be kept secret.
Q In your testimony here, you mentioned Reichsmarshal Goering. Do you have any documentation that Goering knew of these shootings or is that merely conjecture on your part? that question entirely open. I have no particular reason to make specific statements in this matter but since he was the high officer in the Luftwaffe, I could only assume that the Reichsmarshal could have been informed on this matter.
Q In other words, it was only a conjecture on your part? the matter at all.
DR. STAHMER: That is all.
BY DR. KAUFMANN (Counsel for defendant Kaltenbrunner):
brunner and Mueller. Now, I ask you was this order in the form of a telegraph or a telegraphic communication or did you see the original of it, or what? communication.
Q Do you know for sure it was not an original?
A Yes, I know that for sure. In fact I felt indeed doubts about this later because I thought about it hundreds of times and it occurred to me to wonder whether or not this might not possibly have been signed by Himmler but from the organizational point of view it would have been Kaltenbrunner who signed it. even state definitely that the thing was really signed by Kaltenbrunner but that rather you simply assume that it was because of your knowledge of how things were organized? the importance of it I was so impressed that I paid little attention to the mechanical matters involved in the transmission of this order so that I cannot make a statement with definite certainty as to who signed it.
MR. ROBERTS: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire, Dr. Nelte, does that close the case for the defendant Keitel?
DR. NELTE: So far as witnesses are concerned that closes the case for Keitel, yes. I have a few further remarks to make.
The Tribunal has seen an affidavit by Dr. Krieger and has approved it by its ruling of the 6th of April, 1945. I ask the Tribunal to permit me to put this affidavit in evidence as Document K-15. I have the German original here and I should like to read only that part of the affidavit that describes the relations between Hitler and Keitel. This involves three short paragraphs.
"The relations between Hitler and the previous Field Marshal Keitel were officially correct and on Hitler's part, in general, he had confidence and was full of respect for a faithful servant and Keitel on his part was upright and honest.
There was, however, no further friendly or confidential note between them, aside from official occasions, receptions and so forth.
"So far as could be ascertained Keitel hardly took part with Hitler in anything which was not obligatory nor shared any meals with him. If Keitel was called to conferences with Hitler outside the official conferences at which there were no stenographers present these were not observed to have taken place. In preparing decisions or in formulating orders Keitel gave expression to his opinions if they happened to differ in an objective, capable manner as befits a soldier. He apparently knew, from many years of collaboration with Hitler, the possible limits of influencing his opinions or decisions or of changing his mind. For that reason he generally accepted Hitler's decisions as orders in a soldierly attitude. However, in individual cases he succeeded by emphatic reasoning in changing decisions or at least in delaying them in order to have them further examined.
"Hitler, at times, did not seem to trust Keitel completely which can be gathered from one of his remarks, made to his most intimate circles."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it appears to the Tribunal it is not really necessary to read this. Keitel has already said it, it is cumulative to him and the document itself is in evidence and so we can read it ourselves.
DR. NELTE: It is not necessary but it simply corroborates what has been testified to here.
THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient that you tell us that.
DR. NELTE: I have further the answer to several interrogatories that I sent out that were permitted by the Tribunal. Mr. Rommilly. I can put in evidence this interrogatory and in that form submit it to the Tribunal and can thus forego any reading of it. The same is true of the answers to the interrogatory submitted to the witness Rotrautroemer, as to the question of the marking of Russian prisoners of war.
The Naville and Scarpini interrogatories are not yet at hand.
I shall submit them as soon as they arrive.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution had these documents?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you given numbers to these? You have given the number K-15 to the last affidavit. You ought to number the others.
DR. NELTE: Rommilly is K-16 and Roemer is K-17. Blomberg. As ruled by the Tribunal on the 26th of February, it was allowed that he be interrogated. I have shown the original to the Prosecution and I ask to be allowed to put it in evidence, the sworn statement of von Blomberg. It is in document book one and is known both to the Tribunal and to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Nelte?
DR. NELTE: That concludes my case.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, you are lodging these original documents that are numbered K-16, 17 and 13 with the General Secretary?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they been translated?
DR. NELTE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, we have not seen a translation of K-16, but you are sure that it has been translated, are you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I have seen an English translation of it.
THE PRESIDENT: You have?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: It was shown to me when it came in. I remember reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the General Secretary's Department will see that we are furnished copies of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Y es, I think that is the one. That is K-16.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Certainly, I think Rommel is K-16. I have seen it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Dr. Horn, do you remember that we read these document at the time that we approved their admissibility?
DR. HORN: (Counsel for defendant Ribbentrop): Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: So it would not take you long to introduce them in evidence?
DR. HORN: I shall limit myself to an absolute minimum.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. HORN: I should like to ask the Tribunal first to contemplate Document R-75, contained in Volume 3, on page 191 of Ribbentrop's documents. It is a question here of an agreement between the Allied and other powers and Poland of the year 1919. This agreement defines the rights of the German minorities in Poland. In Article 12 of this Treaty, which is on page 3 of this document, it is said that Poland is agreeable to agree to the principles set down and to respect racial and linguistic minorities. The correct Treatment of such minorities will be put under the supervision of the League of Nations. In the subsequent years Poland repeatedly infringed on this Treaty. That can be see from the document No. 82, on page 208 of document book No. 4.
This is a testimonial on the part of the permanent court.
It is of the 10th of September, 1932. In order to save time I might just read the conclusion, where it is said,"The Court is of the opinion that the attitude defined under Points 'A' and 'B' do not here stand in accordance with Poland's international obligations." I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also, as well as the next document No. 84, which is on page 212 and 212-A of the fourth Ribbentrop document book. This, too, is a statement on the part of a judicial committee of the League of Nations on minority questions. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this report. by Hitler's men, it was attempted to establish good relationship with Poland. As evidence for this, I am referring to Ribbentrop Exhibit N o. 85, which is on page 213 of the document book. I am reading from page 2 of that document.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is that document book 4?
DR. HORN: Y es, 4, page 213. I am reading front page 214 of that, center of first paragraph:
"H e, the Chancellor, only wished that the outstanding political questions existing between Germany and Poland could be examined by the statesmen of both countries and examined without passion. H e was convinced that some way out of the present untenable position could be found. Germany desired peace. The forceful capture of British territory was not his intention, but he was reserving himself those rights to which he was entitled according to the pact, and he would refer to them at any time and when he thought fit."
There are two official communiques. They were issued by a request of the P olish Ambassador, and this is Ribbentrop Exhibit No, 86. This is the German communique, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it, and also the next document, No. 87, on page 26 of the document book, which is the Polish communique.
So as to save time, I do not propose to read these communiques.
German-Polish pact regarding anti-Silesia were enforced which should have been made in Geneva in 1942, but they expired. The necessity arose, therefore, to create a new pact between the two countries, particularly since additional difficulties arose due to the question of minorities and the treatment of German minorities. As evidence for this, I refer to document, Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 117, on page 254 of the document book, and I should like to read the second paragraph where it says:
"The minister has pointed out to the Polish Ambassador that the rigorous Polish point of view regarding the expulsion could not be accepted by us."
THE PRESIDENT: I could not see that on page 254.
DR. HORN: Page 257, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see it.
DR. HORN: The success of those conferences between the Poles and the Germans arose in the Ribbentrop Exhibit 123; it is a pact which appears on page 263 of the document book.
This is a coordinated declaration origination from the Polish and German Government regarding the protection of their respective minorities, It was published on November the 5th, 1937. Sa as to save time, I can point out that the German minorities were given those rights which were in existence between civilized states in similar cases. May I also point out that this agreement does not contain anything which can be considered the sanctioning of any wrong previously committed in this respect, a point of view which was recently represented by the Prosecution. rify the economic difficulties, on the 5th of august 1933, an agreemenr was reached, which is Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 127, and which is on page 270 of the document book. May I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. existed as well as the problemsof the Free State of Danzig and cuased continuous difficulties between the two states, Hitler gave the order to the defendant Ribbentrop that after the solution of the Sudeten-German question in October 1938, to commence negotiations regarding the Danzig and Corridor questions as well as the question of minorities. For this reason, the then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, was invited to come to Berchtesgaden. The discussion which took place on that occasion between Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister are contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit No- 149, on page 301 of the document book No. 5. May I quote from page 2 of the document to explain what the rain features of this conference were? On page 6, it says:
"On the part of Germany, apart from the problem of Memel, which would probably be solved in Germany since there was the appearance that the Lithuanians would cooperate in a reasonable solution, there were problems which in the opinion of Germany were extremely difficult reffering to Danzig and the corridor, and which would have to be solved."
it says:
"Foreign Minister Beck promised that he would willingly think about the problem. With that German considered that negotiations regarding this problem had begun." Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had a discussion with the polish Minister Beck during which the question of Minorities was once more touched on. That discussion is contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit No.150 on page 304. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document? there was a meeting between Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, who went to Warsaw. Once more the entire problem was discussed. organization in the East became necessary. The then Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop therefore asked the Polish Ambassador, on the 21st of March 1939, to come and visit him. The contents of that conference is contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 154, on page 310 of the document book. May I quote the third paragraph, page 3, which is the leading point regarding that conference?
"Generally, the settlement of the Corridor question was considered the worse burden, due to the Versailles Treaty, for Germany."
A few lines later, it says:
"The Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop explained that a prerequisite would be that Danzig would be returned to the Reich, and he suggested the creation of an extra-territorial read and railway connection between the Reich and East Prussia. He promised that Germany would in exchange guarantee the Corridor. Ambassador Lipsky promised to inform Mr. Beck accordingly and then to give no an answer."
May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well? cussions the question of the minorities and the question regarding Danzig and the Corridor would find some solution, these discussions had the opposit effect.
It appears from Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 155, on page 313, and Ribbentrop Exhi bit No. 156, on page 314 of the document book, that Poland at that time ordered partial mobilization. That partial mobilization could only be directed against Germany.
the 15th of March, 1939, had been laid to a change of attitude on the part of Britain. The former Prime Minister, Chamberlain, under pressure from the Opposition, had had consultations with various European statesmen. As evidence of this fact, I am referring to exhibit, von Ribbentrop 159, which is page 317 of the Document Book. This is a conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berlin on March 26, 1939. May I quote its beginning, which is as follows:
"On the 21st March the British Governmentproposed first of all in Warsaw, as well as in Paris and Moscow, that a formal declaration by the British, French, Russian and Polish Governments shall be made." 7 from the bottom:
"The Polish Government which ordered partial mobilization on the 23rd March was in no way satisfied with this British proposal for negotiations but demanded a more concrete commitment on behalf of England regarding Poland. Therefore, on the 23rd of March Foreign Minister Beck instructed the Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczinski, to submit to the British Government the following proposals of an Anglo-Polish union, referring to the English proposal. It says: I request you to ask Lord Halifax if (1) in view of the difficulties and the unavoidable complications and ensuing loss of time"-
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I see no reason -- if I may say so with a great deal of respect -- for reading any part of these documents. They are all in evidence, or will be, and it seems that all that need be done now is to give them numbers. I know we read and commented from documents earlier in the trial, when we put in the Prosecution's case, but the compelling reasons for that system are not present now and cannot apply as far as these Defendants are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to know what the compelling reasons are that you were referring to.
MR. DODD: Yes, I shall be glad to. At that time it was physically impossible for the Prosecution to have its material all translated in the four languages, or the three languages in addition to the ones in which the original was written. Now the Defendants do have those facilities. Had we been able to have our papers all translated, we would have submitted them and would not have commented; but the necessity for comment was real at that time, because we had to get everything into the record, over the sound system, and if we read a lot of disjointed excerpts from documents we could not have related a chain of evidence before this Tribunal. But I say that now the Defense can do so -- submit the whole document, and later on, as I understand the rules and the Charter also, we will have an opportunity to argue and comment about it as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: But you will remember that this matter was argued a week or so ago. And if I remember rightly, Dr. Dix argued in favor of the Defendants' Counsel being still entitled to reac such passages as they wanted, and with short connecting remarks, and we adhered to that rule.
MR. DODD: I didn't understand that your Honors had already ruled. I remember that Dr. Dix's principal reason was that he wanted an opportunity to make this information available to the press or the public. If that is still the reason, they are all available; the press can have them without having them read over this microphone. However, I won't press the matter if the Court has already ruled.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I would like to say a few words on the subject of Mr. Dodd's proposal. I fully supported -
THE PRESIDENT:A General Rudenko, I have just pointed out to Mr. Dodd that we have made a specific ruling upon this subject and in the opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has been performing his task with great discretion.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I still would like to be permitted to make a few remarks in regard to Mr. Dodd's proposal. questioning of the Defendant Keitel the Defense gave full documentation for Keitel, and the Tribunal looked into the matter of what document was to be accepted and what was to be declined -
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you are repeating the very words I used to Dr. Horn when he began, and as I say, in the opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has met the views of the Tribunal and has made his reading of these documents reasonably short.
GENERAL RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to remark that the Soviet Prosecution considers, that Dr. Horn's comments are superfluous at the present time.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I am sure you will continue to use every possible means of cutting it short as much as you can.
DR. HORN: I hope, Mr. President, that I have convinced the Tribunal that I am trying to be as brief as possible and that I assure you that I small read only as much as is necessary to make it understandable and why I am presenting the document at all.
THE PRESIDENT: It is half-past three. Shall we adjourn now?
(A recess was taken)
DR. HORN: I had last quotes from Ribbentrop Exhibit 159, page 317 of the Document Book. I had quoted some passages, and I wish to briefly summarize what this document is. to England regarding consultations which should take place and led to a concrete agreement. That agreement was in fact made between March 21st and March 26th, and between England and Poland. on the part of England which is proved by the documents, 182 to 18 , pages 370 of the Document Book No.5. This and points which arise from 182 concerning the following states -- and I am quoting from Document 182, page 6:
"The following countries are to be included and have been invited to participate in the question of guarantees -- Russia, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It is said to be definitely established that Hungary was not approached and that it was up to Poland to approach Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. The same applies to Turkey with regard to Greece." page 372 of the document book. This is a telegram from the German charge d'affaires in London to the Foreign Office, and I should like to briefly quote:
"The existing news proved clearly that the plan for a declaration on the part of Britain can be divided into two parts. The first part deals with the guarantee of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland; the second part aims to protect the Eastern countries against aggression. The British Cabinet is supposed to be informed by a military spokesman that Roumania, because of her oi-wells, will definitely have to be protected against German Military seizures."
Without that I propose to read from it, and I also ask that document number 183 be taken judicial notice of, which is on page 375 of the document book and which, once more, so as to save time, I do not propose to read.
Based on this policy of coalition on Britain's part whichwas directed against Germany, the alliance between Germany and Italy was concluded on 22 Hay 1939. I am submitting it as an exhibit, Ribbentrop 187. It is on page 376 of the Document Book Ribbentrop. I am submitting it to the Tribunal forjudicial notice, without wanting to read it. was that Ambassador Lipsky on 26 March 1939, on the occasion of a conference with the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, declared--and I am here referring to Exhibit Ribbentrop 162 and quoting from the third paragraph:
"Lipsky replied that it was his unpleasant duty to point out that any further pursuance of these German plans, particularly regarding a return of Danzig to theReich, would mean a war with Poland."
I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The same applies to the previous document, Ribbentrop 160 on page 320 of the document book, which refers to the consultation between Britain and the governments previously mentioned. namely, that further pursuance of an attempt to alter the status quo regarding the Corridor and Danzig would mean war--the Reich Foreign Ministe stated on 27 March 1939 to the Polish Ambassador--and I now quote from Ribbentrop Exhibit 163 on page 335 of the document book-that this attitude could not be the basis for a settling of these questions so far as Germany was concerned. The corresponding passage is the last but one paragraph on page two of the document where it says:
"In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked that he no longer knew what to make of the attitude of the Polish Government. They had given a negative answer to the generous proposals which Germany had made to Poland. The Foreign Minister could not possibly regard the proposal, submitted yesterday by the Polish Ambassador, as a basis for the settlement of existing problems.
The relations between the two countries were therefore becoming more and more critical." So as to prove that the Anglo-Polish guarantee pact was clearly aimed against Germany, I am submitting to the Tribunal under Exhibit number Ribbentrop 164, which is on page 338 of the document book, and I am quoting the last two lines, where it says that the pact was only to cover an attack on Germany's part. The Polish Government is confirming this as correct. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document. been submitted by the Prosecution as Number 72 but which appears on Page 337 of my document book, was the termination of the Polish-German agreement of January 26, 1934, since Germany was now convinced that the AngloPolish guarantee was contrary to the spirit of this agreement. minorities in Poland. The documents referring to this are contained in my document book under numbers 165 to 181. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these documents and so, to save time, I shall limit myself to very short quotations. occurred in Njevo and Bromberg. document book, which states that during recent days there had been a public appeal in Warsaw which was an invitation to boycott German trade and handicraft. Ribbentrop 180, which is on page 368 of the document book Ribbentrop. May I read this brief report, which I quote as follows:
"During the last few months the German Foreign Office has continuously received reports from the German Consulate in Poland about the cruel treatment to which members of the German minority are subjected by the Poles, who have been more and more lashed into fury and have abandoned themselves to unbridled fanaticism. In the Appendix 38 especially grave cases have been collected."
clashes did, in fact, take place with the knowledge and under the protection of Polish statesmen and high officials. As evidence for this, I am referring to Document 181, but for purposes of saving time, I am not going to read from it, but am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. an acute crisis. As evidence for this, I am presenting Exhibit Ribbentrop Number 188, on page 381 of my document book. The cause was actually a small one. There was an argument regarding the functions of the customs officials on the Danzig frontier. Because of this argument, the diplomatic representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig made a protest to the president of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig,and that is contained in Exhibit Ribbentrop 188.
It had an ultimatum, which becomes clear from paragraph 3 of the document. city of Danzig replied, as appears in Exhibit Ribbentrop 189. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also. behalf of the Reich Government, forewarning Poland not to state any ultimatum. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well, as I do not propose to read from it. page 385 of the document book. This is a document from the Under-Secretary of State at the Polish Foreign Ministry to the German Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw, and it isdated August 10, 1939. It appears, from the list two lines of the document, that Poland was refusing any intervention of the German Government and would consider that an aggressive act. Polish relations. The Reich Government and its departments attempted to avoid a final conflict. As evidence for this, I am submitted Exhibit Ribbentrop 193, which is on page 404 of the document book, and I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.
This is a memorandum of the State Secretary in the Foreign Office. It is in document number 6, by the way, and on page 404 of the document book. This is a memorandum regarding a visit of the French Ambassador to the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Weizsaecker. During that conversation the former Secretary of State, Weizsaecker, emphasized that Germany had no more urgent wish than an agreement regarding the question of Danzig. The French Ambassador assured that his government would cooperate in those attempts. Ribbentrop Exhibit No. 193, and the next document, number 194, on page 406 of the document book, the last document which is concerned with the discussion between the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, during which the German Secretary of State pointed out the seriousness of the situation.
the following sentence which characterizes the situation: "Danzig was only protecting itself against its protector." regarding Danzig had now reached extreme tension.
The next document I am referring to is Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 195, on pages 408 to 415. This document refers to a conference between Hitler and Ambassador Henderson on the 23rd of August, 1939. A report of this conference is contained in Ribbentrop Exhibit 199, on page 422 of the document book Ribbentrop. I am also asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, and, so as to clarify the content of that conference, I am going to quote from page 4 of the document, where it says that he, Hitler, "once more drew attention to the Danzig and Polish question in connection with which it was England's attitude that this war might be something to Germany's advantage."
The second paragraph from that states that "the Fuehrer said that the fact that England was against Germany regarding the Danzig problem was deeply shaking the German people.
"Henderson then stated that one was merely defending oneself against the principle of force, whereupon the Fuehrer answered whether England was in any way trying to find a solution by negotiation of the idiocies of Versailles.
"The Ambassador had no reply to this, and the Fuehrer then stated that according to a German slogan, there should always have to be two to make a friendship." the late Prime Minister Chamberlain to Hitler direct.
This letter is Exhibit Ribbentrop 200, on page 426 of the document book. I am asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. contains Hitler's reply to the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain. Hitler and Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson. That meeting is contained in Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 202, which is on page 431 of the document book Ribbentrop. May I refer to paragraph 5, where Hitler emphasized once more that the problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved.
On the following page, in paragraph 3 on page 2, it says: "The Fuehrer would be prepared to make an offer to England regarding the solution of this problem." detail in document 202. which is Exhibit 195, on page 415, and he is referring to this last-mentioned meeting of August the 25th, 1939.
"My interview with Hitler", says Henderson, "at which Herr von Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt were also present on this occasion, lasted over an hour. The Chancellor spoke with calm and obvious sincerity. He described his proposals as a last conscientious effort to secure good relations with Great Britain, and suggested that I ought to fly to London with them myself."
Under number 8, on the same page, 415, Henderson continues to say: "Whatever may have been the underlying motive of this final offer on the part of the Chancellor, it was one which could not be ignored." up to the outbreak of war, is Exhibit Ribbentrop No. 208, on page 451 of the document book. notice of the entire document. Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw, states the following, and I am quoting: