leader of the delegation?
A Yes. I took the plenipotentiary papers with me to Berlin and these papers had been signed by Grossadmiral Doenitz in his capacity as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the armed forces and contained, in a few words, that he gave me the power and the order to conduct negotiations and to fulfill the capitulation
Q Were these papers examined by the Allies and conformed? arently examined the documents and Several hours later the papers were returned to me by a high officer of the Red Army with the words that I had to show them again at the occasion of the signing.
Q Did you show it again? place and I added it to the documents. BY PROFESSOR DR. JAHRREISS (Counsel for the defendant Jodl): organization of the OKW. This organization was formed by a decree of the Fuehrer and Chancellor on the 4th of February, 1936. In that decree the Supreme Command of the armed forces was designated as the military Staff of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. In that light you were the Chief of Staff.
Now, the prosecution has repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that right? the High Command of the Armed Forces, as I have already stated.
Q That is to say, the Chief of several coordinated offices? on the 12th of February, 1938, at Obersalzberg. You remember that. The Court has been shown a note by Jodl in his diary referring to this conversation.
as Jodl present at this conversation? I described here between him and Canaris about the information as to Certain military preparations during the days after the conference with Schuschnigg, that is to say, it is an impression which General Jodl had gained as a result of the explanation given to him.
the Sudeten question, and incident which was allegedly to be construed played a great role. Did you ever give an order to the department under Canaris to bring about such an incident at the Czechoslovakian border? artment of National Defense, the defendant Jodl, left this position and he was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?
A Jodl was transferred to the Front. He became an artillery chief with the division invenna and his Success was Warlimont, at that time Colonel Warlimont.
Q That is to say his successor? leave but he was transferred out of his office? troop officer with a division and Warlimont was not the deputy but successor to Jodl in the same position. ference of the 23rd of May, 1938 -- no, 1939, Mr. Warlimont was present or allegedly was present as a later successor of Jodl or deputy of Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference? Vienna and he had nothing to do with it.
Q Why did you designate Jodl Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff?
A. That was in consequence of our work from 1935 to '38 which we had together, and I thought that I could not find a better man for that position.
Q. How did Jodl picture his military career after the assumption of his career in Vienna or in Bruenn?
A. I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.
Q. Well, would there have been any chance to get such a command?
A. Yes, I have tried to use my influence with the Supreme Command of the Army, and I remember that during the summer, 1939, I wrote him that his desire to become the commander of a mountain division in Reichenhall -- I don't remember the name -- will come true. I was glad to be able to give him that information.
Q. Were you the one to make the decision?
A. No, I asked the Supreme Command of the Army and he decided.
Q. If I understand correctly, you, yourself, notified Jodl?
A. Yes. I wrote him a letter because I knew that he would be very happy about it.
Q. Yes. May I ask, Fieldmarshal, have you been in regular correspondence with Jodl?
A. No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him during that year.
Q. I ask that for a very definite reason. Jodl was excluded from the OKW. He knows that there was an eventuality of being chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff later; that is to say, an important position. He goes to the front, I should say, and one should think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you but would be kept informed by you regularly.
A. That was certainly not done from my side, and, according to my personal opinion, every general staff officer who comes to the front is very happy if he is not bothered with such things any more.
Q. Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which makes us happy. It could be possible that officially, for instance, one would have to give an order to somebody and inform this gentleman, instruct him.
A. No, I have not done that. I don't believe that was done, but I don't know for sure whether somebody might not have informed him.
Q. During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Bruenn, that is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order to got information?
A. I have not seen him and he did not come to see me. I believe it very unlikely because he would have come to see me.
Q. Then I have to understand first that shortly before the beginning of the war, upon a telegram, he came to Berlin and he had to be informed as to what was going on?
A. Yes, that was the first contact between him and myself.
Q. You informed him?
A. Yes
Q. Another thing, Fieldmarshal, you remember, perhaps the somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellory after the Simowitsch Putsch; that was the 27th of March 1941?
A. Yes, yes, Yugoslavia.
Q. If we look back and think of the political and war history of the last two hundred years in Europe, they we ask ourselves:
"Was there nobody during that conference in the Reich Chancellory who could have said, or who had said, 'Instead of attacking a state, whose attitude was not quite clear, right away, shouldn't we deploy our troops along the border and then by diplomatic negotiations find the solution?'"
A. No, under those turbulent conditions during that morning session, as much as I know, Jodl himself, personally, mentioned that in the course of the discussion. I think the suggestion was to deploy our troop along the border and try to find a solution.
Q. If I am correctly informed, in October '41, for the purposes of inspection or a visit to the army group, you were in the cast; is that correct?
A. Yes, in the fall of '41 I was frequently with army groups in order to get information for the Fuehrer.
Q. Was Fieldmarshal Leb the commander of that Harresgruppen?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Did von Leb tell you about particular worries which he had at that time?
A. Yes, I think that was the next to the last visit to Leb where the question of a surrender -- that is to say, the question of the population of Leningrad -- played an important role, and it worried him very much at that time because there were definite signs already of the population streaming out of the city. I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the Fuehrer, wince he could not take over millions of civilian people and feed them within his army group, that a sort of opening should be left that the copulation could be evacuated in the direction of the Russian side.
Q. Did the population come into your direction?
A. Into the forests of the south at that time, according to the explanation of Leb, there was a certain amount of pressure to get through the German lines and that was recognizable.
Q. And that would have impeded your operations?
A. Yes.
Q. Fieldmarshal, you are aware, I believe, because it has been mentioned before, of the order of the Fuehrer and Supreme Command about the Commandos of the 18th of October '42, PS-498, which has been submitted here?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that before an order of that kind would be issued, it would be announced publicly?
A. Yes; that was announced by a daily armed forces report.
Q. We are dealing with the armed forces report of September, 1942, and, after the usual report about what happened, it is stated:
"The High Command of the Armed Froces is obliged, therefore, to issue the following regulations:" the following sentence:
"In the future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their allies who do not behave like soldiers, but rather like bandits, will be considered and treated by the German troops as such and they will be killed in the struggle wherever they appear without any consideration."
Fieldmarshal, who has written these words?
A. The Fuehrer personally. I was present when he dictated and corrected it. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):
Q. Witness, I should like to continue with the point which was the last one that Dr. Jahrreiss mentioned. It dealt with the Commando Order No.498-PS In that Commando Order under No. 6, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be responsible under court martial if they would not carry out this order. Do you know about the conditions which led Hitler to formulate the order like that?
A. Yes, they are quite clear, I should think; that is to say, based on the demand that this order should definitely be carried out, the general and those who should carry it out would consider it as a very severe one. He wished to put more pressure on that regulation by threatening punishment and to force them to carry it out.
Q. Now, I should like to put several questions to you concerning the character of the so-called group of the General Staff and the OKW. Witness, what do you understand by the German General Staff?
A. The General Staff means to me those officers who by special training are able to be assistants to the higher leadership.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long time in explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as criminal, and, therefore, I do not see what relevance any further evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking him now about what he understands by the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. After this question I wanted to put another one and, by the answer to the second question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, one has accused a group under a wrong name.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what he understands by the General Staff. Will you nut your second question. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Witness, if the higher military leaders can be designated in a group as General Stuff and OKW, do you consider this name correct or misleading?
A. According to our German military concept, this designation is misleading because for us the General Staff always meant an assistant, a machinery of assistans, whereas the commanders-in-chief of army groups were the commanding generals of the Leadership Corps, the Fuehrer Corps.
Q. The military hierarchy has sufficiently been explained in this trial. I only want to know the following from you: military relation of command or beyond that among these groups; was there a further organization which reached beyond the military duties?
A. No, the General Staff -- that is to say, the General Staff officers could be recognized by their uniforms as assistants to the leader. The leaders or the commanders had no horizontal connections in their positions. There was no organization that would have provided horizontal connections between the top commanders.
Q Yesterday the affidavit was shown to you which Colonel General Halder made.
I would now like to mention the last sentence of that affidavit; I shall read it to you:
"That was the actual General Staff in the highest leadership of the Armed Forces."
Is the statement in that sentence correct or incorrect? few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who took part in the main work of the General Staff of the Army, while the rest, in large number -- far beyond one hundred General Staff officers in the OKH -were not connected with it. That is what I think he wanted to say -- a small group that was concerned with these major problems. sulted a military leader in a political matter? with Hitler, at least most of the time. Could you tell me anything about objections which any commander -- supreme commanders -- who had come from the front lines may have made with or without success? listeners at these briefing discussions and then any such commander could make a report about his area to Hitler and there was an opportunity to discuss the things personally and to utter opinions. But otherwise nobody had any opportunity of saying anything. made to Hitler?
A In the briefing discussions?
Q No, I mean generally. Whatever the occasions may have been. have had with Supreme Commanders of Armies, but I don't know of any such incidents. These cases which were important in this war were the objections of the Generals before the beginning of the war in the West. That, I believe, I have sufficiently explained. And I understand your question now to mean beyond that, whether beyond that, I knew of any case. I have to point out, then, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of anything which he could do as an officer.
Army?
A It was not a good one. One may describe it best by saying that he had a sort of suspicion, a mistrust, and he considered the General Staff arrogant, He had an innate prejudice against it. I believe that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: We have hear all this once, if not more than once.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I don't believe that this witness has been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has not been asked about these points.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal unfortunately thinks it has.
DR. LATERNSER: And I was very careful about this point. I would not have put the question if one of my colleagues had put it before. by one or more front commanders -
THE PRESIDENT: Nearly ever, officer who has come and given evidence to this Court has spoken upon that subject, certainly many of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that with regard to the question I have now put ?
THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this Court have told as it was impossible to resign. That is what you are asking, isn t it?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will forego that question, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts that it is true, which I want to prove.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept its truth or not, it is a different question.
DR. LATERNSER: In this connection, also I would like to say something. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative, because it has already been put by my colleague, Dr. Dix. The question to two different witnesses makes a different situation, because the subjective answer of the individual witness is desired. But I will forego that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions. the Hauptquartier -- secure against raids? from the Army, and also I believe from a company of the Waffen SS -- and very thorough measures in the way of guards, barriers and similar things. It was very well secured against raids.
Q Were there several zones? which were limited individually. groups and Armies in the East, outside of their theatre of operations, did not have any competence or jurisdiction. Was there a tendency to keep that area as small as possible, or as largo as possible? tions as large as possible, in order to assure the possibility of movement in the rear area. Only later did the Fuehrer, by energetic means, see fit to limit these zones, to make them as small as possible
Q Yes, for what reason? matters andto limit them to small, areas. SS, which were tactically for combat, were subordinated to the Army. I would like to clarify thatparticularly, because in my opinion there is still one point not quite clear -- the Einsatzgruppe of the S.D., did they have anything to do with the units of the Waffen SS which were subordinated to Army units for the purpose of tactical tasks? incorporated into the Army units and had nothing to do with anything else. They were purely combat troops. any offense? tated; but aside from that, jurisdiction was with the top, that is, the Reichsfuehrer, Himmler, and not the Supreme Commander of the particular Army or army group.
Q Did the various functionaries of the Einsatzgruppc SD, have to report to the Supreme Commanders of the armies upon what they did on orders of Himmler?
Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connection which existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppe commando units. I did not take part in them, and I had no hand in them.
Q That is not what I wants to hear from you, Field Marshal. I wanted to know whether the agents or the Einsatzgruppe of the SD, according to your knowledge of regulation, were obliged to report to the army commanders in the rear of whose areas they had to work?
A I do not believe so, but I do not know the orders concerned. I have not seen them. knew about the intention of Hitler or Himmler to exterminate the Jews? ally was not informed. war complex. It became known during the war that there were regrettable circumstances concerning the supplying of Soviet Russian prisoners of war during the beginning of the East campaign. What was the reason for these conditions in the beginning? has reported during the briefing conferences. As I recall, he has repeatedly reported that it was a problem of large masses, that extraordinary efforts of organization were required in order to supply and house and guard them. period of time. I am thinking of a particular reason which may have existed, and in order to refresh your memory, I would like to mention the following: prisoners of war, because it was thought in the beginning that these prisoners would be transferred to the homeland. In spite of thes preparat ions, however, I have been told, there came a sudden decree by Hitler who prohibited the transfer of these Soviet Russian prisoners into the homeland.
a certain time, until September, all transportation of Soviet Russian prisoners of war into the homeland, the Reich area, was not permitted and only after that there was a possibility to transfer them into the home camps, for reasons of manpower. with the means at the disposal of the troops?
AApparently not. I am not informed about that because only the Supreme Commander of that army could know it. That was their responsibility. Deputy Chief of the armed forces leadership staff, the Wehrmacht Fuehrung Stab. When was that position created?
Q In 1942? What was the rank connected with that position?
Q I mean, was it like a position of a division commander? a department head.
Q How many chiefs of department were there in the OKW?
A I could not say from memory. I would not like to give you a wrong figure.
Q What do you estimate?
A Eight chiefs, each one two, three, four departments. About 30 to 35 chiefs of department there may have been there. 30 heads of deparments?
A No, I would not like to say that. We had subordinate to these offices department chiefs. We had apartment group chiefs. That is, they were over several sections.
Q What were the official tasks connected with that position?
Wehrmacht Fuehrung Stab witht the Fuehrer headquarters, to supervise that work according to the directives of the Chief of the armed forces Leadership Staff, Jodl.
That was the task. in a particular measure responsible for strategic planning, as is asserted by the Prosecution?
A Responsible? He was, of course, not according to his position, but as a matter of fact, he belonged to a small group of qualified general staff officers which were concerned with those things, as Haldar has pointed out.
Q Now, I have one last question. That is the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff was therefore not as significant as the other positions which are included in that group of the general staff and OKW? Leadership Staff and assistant in the group, in the small group of those who had to deal with strategic questions, but subordinate to General Jodl and the departmrny chief in the staff. it was not answered. I have asked you whether the significance, the importance of that position was the same as that of the others which are mentioned in that group of the general staff of the OKW. OKW, there were the supreme commanders and the chiefs of the general staff, He did not belong to these.
BY DR. BABEL (Counsel for the SS): beginning of the war became the front line fighters for a policy of power and conquest. In order to exclude an y misunderstandings, I should like to clarify the following:
What did you mean by SS? of a much longer affidavit. If you read that, you would find the answer to your question In a more precise form in which I shall state it, I dealt with the Reichsfuehrung SS under Himmler and underthose functions within his competence. police SS, which in the occupied territories appeared and were active. The conceptof the so-called general SS had nothing to do with that. I hopethat clears it. BY DR. BERGOLD (Counsel for Bormann): Bormann in connection with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. In that connection, I would like to put a few questions. 1944, have an offensive purpose of a defensive purpose? ation, any cooperation and coordination of the Volkssturm and the military office Volkssturm? bit of manpower to defend their own homesteads. in it? Volkssturm in their areas either incorporated them or sent them home. ion, the Volkssturm, was a brainchild of Bormann or did that come from Hitler?
A I do not know that. Maybe from both.
Q Hitler did not tell you about it either? officials had nothing to do with it. peculiar thing of the Volkssturm?
that what I have heard and assum that it originated from Bormann. I do not know it for sure. BY DR. HORN: (Counsel for defendant Ribbentrop): Moscow in August 1939, on account of the changed foreign political situation-the guarantee pact between England and Poland had been ratified--advised the Fuehrer to start certain military measures? were based upon a conversation between him and his foreign Minister. I was not present at that conversation. the most part never informed about the strategic plans? the Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff, that we werenot authorized to do it, and we never did it.
If the Reich Foreign Minister was at any time informed about such questions, that information couldhave come onlyfrom Hitler and I doubt if he made an exception there.
Q. The Prosecution has submitted a letter of 3 April 1939 concerning an impending occupa tion of Denmark and Norway which you sent to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter you informed the Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation and requested him to take the necessary foreignpolitical stops.before that date. Did you instruct von Ribbentrop about the intended occupation of Norway and Denmark?
A. No, I could not possibly have done that. According to the way in which the Fuehrer worked with us, that letter was a somewhat unusual way to inform the Reich Foreign Minister upon orders by Hitler. Otherwise he would not have known about it, and I was charged to write it.
Q. In connection with the testimony by General Lahousen, I want to ask you one question. Atthe time of the Polish campaign, was there a directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate the Jews in the Polish Ukraine?
A. I can not recall any such thing. I only know that even during the occupation of Poland, after the initial occupation, the problem of the Polish Jews played an important role, and in that connection I once put a question to Hitler, which I believe he answered by saying that that area was well designed to settle the Jews there. Other things I do not remember or do not recollect.
a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the back of the Poles? said here by Lahousen.
DR. HORN: I thank you BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA): that is a prisoner of war system. Did you ever issue orders or have orders issued on the basis of which members of the SA or units of the SA were used to guard prisoners of war or prisoner of war camps, or should have been used that purpose? high command of the armed forces. I believe that certainly was not the case. ing of prisoners of war by SA over took place ? of the army in some particular places may have used SA men for the guarding. I don't know.
DR. BOEHM: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: perhaps we better adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. At 1230 it will take supplementary applications for witnesses and documents, and that at a quarter to one it will adjourn into a closed session. BY GENERAL RUDENKO: receive your first officer's commission?
Q What was the degree and extent of your military education? vanced through the various ranks to second lieutenant.
regimental adjutant. Then during the first World War, battery commander, and then after the spring of 1915, in the general staff.
Q Evidently, the translation was not correct. You finished the military academy or had you taken your military training in some other place; just what is it?
A I was never to a military academy. Twice I participated in so called general staff travels as regiment adjutant and in the summer of 1915, I was ordered to go to the general staff and returned to my regiment later.
Q Just what military training and military rank did Hitler possess? end of the first World War, he was a lieutenant in a Bavarian Infantry Regiment, Throughout the war, the first World War, he served as a soldier and possibly as a non-commissioned officer toward the end. training and experience in military matters, had a opportunity to influence Hitler considerably in his decisions of strategic and other military matters as well as all matters concerning the armed forces ? and for the professional officer, for reasons which are hard to understand, Hitler had studied tactics and strategy and he had a knowledge in military fields which was something surprising. May I give an example for that. The other other officers of the armed forces will confirm it, that concerning organization, armament, leadership, equipment, of all armies, and what is more remarkable, of all navies of the globe, he was so well-informed that it was impossible to prove any error on his part, and I have to add that also during the war, while I was at his headquarters and in his close proximity, that during the night Hitler studied all the big general staff books by Moltke, Schliefen and von Klausewitz and from there had a tremendous knowledge and therefore we had the impression that only a genius can do that.
training and experience you were Hitler's adviser in a number of important military matters? from him and about him; but yesterday when I was asked by my counsel I already pointed out that even in the simpler questions, every-day questions, concerning organization and equipment of the armed forces I have to admit openly I was the onewho was advised and not the adviser.
Q Since when did you begin to cooperate with Hitler militarily? of February 1938. the period when preparations for aggressive wars were made, is that not so?
A Yes. I have given all the necessary explanations as to how I entered the situation in the beginning of February and how things have developed and how surprisingly new situations arose. had the title of the Minister of the Reich? chief of the branches of the armed forces, and the supreme commander of the air force, Reichsmarshal Goering, was also Reichsminister of Aviation; and also I received only the rank but not the competence and not the position of the minister. decrees together with Hitler and the other Reich ministers? of the signatures of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor and the ministers, and then finally the chief of the Reichschancellory. In the military field that did not exist, but according to the traditions of the army and the armed forces the main personalities concerned signed--that is, the Chief of Staff or whoever had written the order with an initial on the margin. together with other Reichsministers.
reasons why I signed than, and that in doing so I was not a Reichsminister and did not have the function of a minister inoffice. function of the Minister of War? What was the government agency that fulfilled the function of the government of Minister of War? Reichsminister von Blomberg. Beginning with the 4th of February there was neither a war minister or a war ministry. on the function of the ministry of war, since there was no ministry of was following the period you mentioned. War Ministry continued the work such as I have described yesterday. That is, all rights and autonomies and competences were transferred to the commanders of the branches. It wasn't upon an order of myself but upon an order from Hitler. unifying supreme command was directly controlled and supervised by Hitler. Would that be a correct conclusion? nature? Specifically, I mean the plans for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Norway, Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union? the operational and strategic planning, after an order had been given by Hitler, were worked out by the commanders of the branches; that is to say, for the army by the High Command of the army and the General Staff of the army. They were reported to Hitler and then further decisions were made,
Q I would like to ask you with regard to Jugoslavia the following: Do you admit that a decree, or rather, a directive issued under your signature about the partition of Jugoslavia represents in itself a document of both political and international significance, since it practically decides on abolishing Jugoslavia as a sovereign state?