if General Giraud set foot in the occupied territory he would take the necessary security measures through the French secret state police and perhaps a conflict might ensue. But it was well known that the general was a very doughty soldier, and at the age of sixty he had lowered himself by a rope over a precipice That is how his escape was effected.
Fifth phase: According to Lahousen, the giving over of the task to the Secret State Police, the chiefs of the divisions had done this because I again asked "How are matters with Giraud?" He wanted to be rid of such troublesome problems. Canaris came to me and asked me whether he should transmit this mission to the police or the RSHA and I said "Yes"; for the Fuehrer had told me repeatedly that he wanted to transmit this mission to Himmler.
The next phase: Some period of time later Himmler came to see me and confirmed to me that he had had the order from Hitler to supervise and guard Giraud and his fam ily unobtrusively and said I should stop Canaris concerning himself with this case. He had reports that Canaris was trying to carry on matters along parallel lines. I agreed. about "Gustav". I wanted to direct Canaris immediately to stop all of his activity in this mission, for the Hitler decree had come out. other things, that things were looked at in a mystic way, as he describes it-this is more the creation of fantasy rather that reality, I had Canaris summonsed to me, for he was at Paris rather than Berlin. In the beginning he had done nothing, and he considered himself in a very uncomfortable position as far as I was concerned, for he had lied to me. When he came I said, "Do nothing more in this matter; keep yourself entirely away from it.
Then the next phase: The escape which took place without any trouble-- the escape of the General to North Africa by plane-- this was reported before the invasion of North Africa by the Anglo-American troops, That concluded the case. did I even use the words "To do away with the General." Never did I use such language. true nevertheless. The general, in 1944--perhaps in February or Larch--took a plane or had a plane sent from North Africa to the region of Lyon in France, with a liaison man who reported to the Ausland Abwehr and asked whether the General could return to France and what was to happen to him on his landing in France.
The question was turned over to me. Colonel-General Jodl is my witness that these things actually did take place. The chief of the counter intelligence was with me, and the answer was that he was to have the same treatment as General Weygand who was already in Germany. Nothing actually did happen, and I have no further knowledge as to what took place later on; but these events actually did take place.
French Prosecution has mentioned that later, in a later phase, the family of General Giraud had inconveniences or disadvantages of a rather serious nature. In this connection with the investigation of Giraud, you remember at this time he was in occupied France, did you cause them any trouble? Did you give them any directives which would limit the family in any way?
A No. It was an unobtrusive supervising of the residence of the family so that a visit whichhe might have had planned -- so that we would know about it. But no measure of any kind was taken at the time. There was nothing like that. anything having taken place?
Q General Giraud is still alive and I again ask you. Can you confirm or assert -- did you give an order or a directive which might be interpreted that General Giraud was to be milled?
A No. I never gave an order of that kind. That would have been silly, The sentence "To have to have him back, dead or alive," it did not have anything to do in that connection. I never gave any order of this kind.
DR. NELTE: I have concluded my direct examination of the Defendant Keitel. I will ask that you permit me the affidavit -- the last one -in document book number 2, Affidavit No. 6. I would like to submit that affidavit in evidence. It is on page 51 following and ........
THE PRESIDENT: Didn't you put that in as EK-12 yesterday?
DR. NELTE: K-13, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: I have K-12.
DR. NELTE: Today I submit it as K-13.
THE PRESIDENT: This affidavit that you want to submit now, where is it and what's the date of it?
DR. NELTE: It's page 51, following, and it is dated 9 March 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
DR. NELTE: This affidavit has-also been attested to by Colonel General Jodl and I ask that when he is called on the witness stand that I may ask him about this affidavit and submit it to him for his confirmation at that time?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: If the court please, we have looked into the matter of the so-called interrogation of General Von Falkenhorst referred to yesterday and Dr. Nelte, insofar as we can determine, this paper was never offered in evidence by any members of the Prosecution. It was referred to by M. Dubost, I mean, it was not referred to b him but it was included in his brief. I did not refer to it and I did not offer it in evidence. That is how it came into the hands of Dr. Nelte, but not in evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte want to offer it in evidence now?
DR. NELTE: I ask to submit it as K-14, as exhibit No. K-14.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number or another number?
DR. NELTE: No, Mr. President, it has no other number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. Now, do any of the other Defense Counsels want to ask questions?
DR. STAHMER (Counsel forDefendant Goering): Dr. Stahmer -- for Defendant Goering. question of your counsel with certainty saying that Reichsmarshall Goering was not present at the conference in which Hitler gave directives about the fliers which had fled from the Camp Sagan and after that you further said that a briefing conference with Gearing in Berlin did not take place. I only have the following question. Several weeks after that escape, were you informed by the General Staff of the Air Force in a letter -- were you informed that the Luftwaffe wanted to relinquish these prison camps? sent it to him.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
DR. SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Frank): Dr. Seidl -- Counsel for Defendant Dr. Frank. The defenda,t Dr. Frank, was, at the beginning of the war, a Lieutenant in the Regimental 9th Army, is that correct?
a letter from the then General Governor Dr. Frank concerning the fact that he wanted to rejoin the Wehrmacht? The purpose of that letter was to be relieved of his office. to the Fuehrer who, by a typical Hitler gesture -- it was a simple gesture rejected the matter. Through the officer who at the time was with Frank I let him know about that decision.
DR. DIX: (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Sir, it is three minutes to one and it won't take me very long, but it might take me beyond 1:00 o'clock, so that if we could adjourn now I could put my question to the witness after it is over.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn until 2:00 o'clock.
(The tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)
DR. DIX (Counsel for defendant Schacht): May it please the Court, this witness is competent and has full knowledge in order to give the Tribunal definite figures about the expense for armaments undergone by the Reich but the witness is certainly not in a position to have these figures ready at all times. My colleague, Professor Kraus, therefore, during my absence, was kind enough to mark these figures down in cooperation with the assistance of the witness and this written statement at that time, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, was signed by the witness. In order to assist his memory or recollection concerning these figures, I ask now to be permitted to have submitted to the witness this statement which he had signed. Of this document, I have had translations made into three languages in question and I now submit to the Tribunal eight copies. I also have four copies for the four delegations of the prosecution, and in German I have copies for the defendants' counsel, of Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Doenitz, and the OKW. May I ask for just one moment so that the witness can read it? BY DR. DIX:
has the title "Total Expenditures," the second and third column, which sub-divide these sums and show that they have been raised by the Reichsbank on the onehand and on the other side those are figures which I should like to have certified during the interrogation of Schacht himself, because those were the results of calculations of Schacht, and the witness here cannot give any information about these, but may I ask you concerning these armament expenditures of the Reich from 1935; that is, the fiscal year from the 31st of April to the 21st of March. May I ask you whether the figures which we have here, of 5 billions for 1935, 7 billions for 1936, 9 billions for 1937, 11 billions for 1938, and 20.
5 for 1939, are those figures correct?
AAccording to my conviction these figures are correct. May I also add that I had an opportunity during the beginning of my period of captivity to speak to the Reich Finance Minister about these figures and we found coordination of our opinions. on the 1st of April 1938. Is it correct to say that at that time there existed 24 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, no motorized division, 1 mountain division, and 1 cavalry division, and that there were in the process of being established, 10 infantry divisions and 1 armored division, and if I may limit it further, that of the three reserve divisions on the 1st of April 1938, none had been completed and only 7 to 8 were in the process of being established, which was expected to be done by the 1st of October 1938.
this affidavit.
DR. DIX: That is as far as this documents goes. I would like to put two more questions tot the witness which have not been discussed with him and concerning which I do not know whether he is prepared to give us the figures in question. BY. DR. DIX: portion between the Reich, on the one hand, and Czechoslovakia on the other hand that is the relation of strength at the time of the march of Hitler into Czechoslovakia; that is the relation of strength (a) concerning the armed forces and (b) the civilian population.
A I could not give accurate figures about that at present. In a previous interrogation I have been questioned about it and I believe that I gave quite correct figures, saying that in the fall of 1938-
Q You said 1938?
Q I mean now the time when Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia. That was in 1939. as figures are concerned, there were less divisions in Germany than Czechoslovakia could dispose of. In the fall of 1938 they may have been equally strong as far as divisions are concerned. In the spring of 1939, when we marched in, the proportion of strength which was used then was lessthan what had been prepared in the fall of 1938. Accurate figures, if they are important to this Tribunal, you could rather get from General Jodl. in March 1939, could you tell us anything about that?
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you will actually offer this document in evidence when the defendant Schacht gives evidence. Isthat what youintend to do?
DR.DIX: I am going to submit it and it will be included, in my book of documents.
Therefore, it is not necessary now that you keep it. You will find it again in the document book at the time when the Schacht case comes up. But I would like to suggest that the copy which I have given to the witness should become a part of the record because my questions have referred to this document. Therefore, it may be necessary to make this copy a part of the record.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to make it a part of the record it had better be given a number now. It had better be S-1 had it not?
DR. DIX: Yes. Your Lordship, may I suggest SCH-1?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: Dr Stahmer, for Dr Servatius for the defendant Sauckel, BY DR. STAHMER: manpower.
Q Were you present? that the demand could not be fulfilled?
Q What reasons did he give? which he was supposed to recruit manpower, the strong activity of partisan bands, the difficulty in obtaining sufficient police forces at his disposal and similar reasons. I do not know any more details about that. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for defendant Doenitz): the capitulation with which the war in Europe was terminated?
Q When and where did that take place? 9th of May, 1945.
leader of the delegation?
A Yes. I took the plenipotentiary papers with me to Berlin and these papers had been signed by Grossadmiral Doenitz in his capacity as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the armed forces and contained, in a few words, that he gave me the power and the order to conduct negotiations and to fulfill the capitulation
Q Were these papers examined by the Allies and conformed? arently examined the documents and Several hours later the papers were returned to me by a high officer of the Red Army with the words that I had to show them again at the occasion of the signing.
Q Did you show it again? place and I added it to the documents. BY PROFESSOR DR. JAHRREISS (Counsel for the defendant Jodl): organization of the OKW. This organization was formed by a decree of the Fuehrer and Chancellor on the 4th of February, 1936. In that decree the Supreme Command of the armed forces was designated as the military Staff of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. In that light you were the Chief of Staff.
Now, the prosecution has repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that right? the High Command of the Armed Forces, as I have already stated.
Q That is to say, the Chief of several coordinated offices? on the 12th of February, 1938, at Obersalzberg. You remember that. The Court has been shown a note by Jodl in his diary referring to this conversation.
as Jodl present at this conversation? I described here between him and Canaris about the information as to Certain military preparations during the days after the conference with Schuschnigg, that is to say, it is an impression which General Jodl had gained as a result of the explanation given to him.
the Sudeten question, and incident which was allegedly to be construed played a great role. Did you ever give an order to the department under Canaris to bring about such an incident at the Czechoslovakian border? artment of National Defense, the defendant Jodl, left this position and he was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?
A Jodl was transferred to the Front. He became an artillery chief with the division invenna and his Success was Warlimont, at that time Colonel Warlimont.
Q That is to say his successor? leave but he was transferred out of his office? troop officer with a division and Warlimont was not the deputy but successor to Jodl in the same position. ference of the 23rd of May, 1938 -- no, 1939, Mr. Warlimont was present or allegedly was present as a later successor of Jodl or deputy of Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference? Vienna and he had nothing to do with it.
Q Why did you designate Jodl Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff?
A. That was in consequence of our work from 1935 to '38 which we had together, and I thought that I could not find a better man for that position.
Q. How did Jodl picture his military career after the assumption of his career in Vienna or in Bruenn?
A. I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.
Q. Well, would there have been any chance to get such a command?
A. Yes, I have tried to use my influence with the Supreme Command of the Army, and I remember that during the summer, 1939, I wrote him that his desire to become the commander of a mountain division in Reichenhall -- I don't remember the name -- will come true. I was glad to be able to give him that information.
Q. Were you the one to make the decision?
A. No, I asked the Supreme Command of the Army and he decided.
Q. If I understand correctly, you, yourself, notified Jodl?
A. Yes. I wrote him a letter because I knew that he would be very happy about it.
Q. Yes. May I ask, Fieldmarshal, have you been in regular correspondence with Jodl?
A. No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him during that year.
Q. I ask that for a very definite reason. Jodl was excluded from the OKW. He knows that there was an eventuality of being chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff later; that is to say, an important position. He goes to the front, I should say, and one should think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you but would be kept informed by you regularly.
A. That was certainly not done from my side, and, according to my personal opinion, every general staff officer who comes to the front is very happy if he is not bothered with such things any more.
Q. Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which makes us happy. It could be possible that officially, for instance, one would have to give an order to somebody and inform this gentleman, instruct him.
A. No, I have not done that. I don't believe that was done, but I don't know for sure whether somebody might not have informed him.
Q. During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Bruenn, that is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order to got information?
A. I have not seen him and he did not come to see me. I believe it very unlikely because he would have come to see me.
Q. Then I have to understand first that shortly before the beginning of the war, upon a telegram, he came to Berlin and he had to be informed as to what was going on?
A. Yes, that was the first contact between him and myself.
Q. You informed him?
A. Yes
Q. Another thing, Fieldmarshal, you remember, perhaps the somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellory after the Simowitsch Putsch; that was the 27th of March 1941?
A. Yes, yes, Yugoslavia.
Q. If we look back and think of the political and war history of the last two hundred years in Europe, they we ask ourselves:
"Was there nobody during that conference in the Reich Chancellory who could have said, or who had said, 'Instead of attacking a state, whose attitude was not quite clear, right away, shouldn't we deploy our troops along the border and then by diplomatic negotiations find the solution?'"
A. No, under those turbulent conditions during that morning session, as much as I know, Jodl himself, personally, mentioned that in the course of the discussion. I think the suggestion was to deploy our troop along the border and try to find a solution.
Q. If I am correctly informed, in October '41, for the purposes of inspection or a visit to the army group, you were in the cast; is that correct?
A. Yes, in the fall of '41 I was frequently with army groups in order to get information for the Fuehrer.
Q. Was Fieldmarshal Leb the commander of that Harresgruppen?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Did von Leb tell you about particular worries which he had at that time?
A. Yes, I think that was the next to the last visit to Leb where the question of a surrender -- that is to say, the question of the population of Leningrad -- played an important role, and it worried him very much at that time because there were definite signs already of the population streaming out of the city. I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the Fuehrer, wince he could not take over millions of civilian people and feed them within his army group, that a sort of opening should be left that the copulation could be evacuated in the direction of the Russian side.
Q. Did the population come into your direction?
A. Into the forests of the south at that time, according to the explanation of Leb, there was a certain amount of pressure to get through the German lines and that was recognizable.
Q. And that would have impeded your operations?
A. Yes.
Q. Fieldmarshal, you are aware, I believe, because it has been mentioned before, of the order of the Fuehrer and Supreme Command about the Commandos of the 18th of October '42, PS-498, which has been submitted here?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that before an order of that kind would be issued, it would be announced publicly?
A. Yes; that was announced by a daily armed forces report.
Q. We are dealing with the armed forces report of September, 1942, and, after the usual report about what happened, it is stated:
"The High Command of the Armed Froces is obliged, therefore, to issue the following regulations:" the following sentence:
"In the future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their allies who do not behave like soldiers, but rather like bandits, will be considered and treated by the German troops as such and they will be killed in the struggle wherever they appear without any consideration."
Fieldmarshal, who has written these words?
A. The Fuehrer personally. I was present when he dictated and corrected it. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):
Q. Witness, I should like to continue with the point which was the last one that Dr. Jahrreiss mentioned. It dealt with the Commando Order No.498-PS In that Commando Order under No. 6, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be responsible under court martial if they would not carry out this order. Do you know about the conditions which led Hitler to formulate the order like that?
A. Yes, they are quite clear, I should think; that is to say, based on the demand that this order should definitely be carried out, the general and those who should carry it out would consider it as a very severe one. He wished to put more pressure on that regulation by threatening punishment and to force them to carry it out.
Q. Now, I should like to put several questions to you concerning the character of the so-called group of the General Staff and the OKW. Witness, what do you understand by the German General Staff?
A. The General Staff means to me those officers who by special training are able to be assistants to the higher leadership.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already spent a very long time in explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as criminal, and, therefore, I do not see what relevance any further evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking him now about what he understands by the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: This question was purely preparatory. After this question I wanted to put another one and, by the answer to the second question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, one has accused a group under a wrong name.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what he understands by the General Staff. Will you nut your second question. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Witness, if the higher military leaders can be designated in a group as General Stuff and OKW, do you consider this name correct or misleading?
A. According to our German military concept, this designation is misleading because for us the General Staff always meant an assistant, a machinery of assistans, whereas the commanders-in-chief of army groups were the commanding generals of the Leadership Corps, the Fuehrer Corps.
Q. The military hierarchy has sufficiently been explained in this trial. I only want to know the following from you: military relation of command or beyond that among these groups; was there a further organization which reached beyond the military duties?
A. No, the General Staff -- that is to say, the General Staff officers could be recognized by their uniforms as assistants to the leader. The leaders or the commanders had no horizontal connections in their positions. There was no organization that would have provided horizontal connections between the top commanders.
Q Yesterday the affidavit was shown to you which Colonel General Halder made.
I would now like to mention the last sentence of that affidavit; I shall read it to you:
"That was the actual General Staff in the highest leadership of the Armed Forces."
Is the statement in that sentence correct or incorrect? few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who took part in the main work of the General Staff of the Army, while the rest, in large number -- far beyond one hundred General Staff officers in the OKH -were not connected with it. That is what I think he wanted to say -- a small group that was concerned with these major problems. sulted a military leader in a political matter? with Hitler, at least most of the time. Could you tell me anything about objections which any commander -- supreme commanders -- who had come from the front lines may have made with or without success? listeners at these briefing discussions and then any such commander could make a report about his area to Hitler and there was an opportunity to discuss the things personally and to utter opinions. But otherwise nobody had any opportunity of saying anything. made to Hitler?
A In the briefing discussions?
Q No, I mean generally. Whatever the occasions may have been. have had with Supreme Commanders of Armies, but I don't know of any such incidents. These cases which were important in this war were the objections of the Generals before the beginning of the war in the West. That, I believe, I have sufficiently explained. And I understand your question now to mean beyond that, whether beyond that, I knew of any case. I have to point out, then, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of anything which he could do as an officer.
Army?
A It was not a good one. One may describe it best by saying that he had a sort of suspicion, a mistrust, and he considered the General Staff arrogant, He had an innate prejudice against it. I believe that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT: We have hear all this once, if not more than once.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I don't believe that this witness has been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has not been asked about these points.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal unfortunately thinks it has.
DR. LATERNSER: And I was very careful about this point. I would not have put the question if one of my colleagues had put it before. by one or more front commanders -
THE PRESIDENT: Nearly ever, officer who has come and given evidence to this Court has spoken upon that subject, certainly many of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that with regard to the question I have now put ?
THE PRESIDENT: Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this Court have told as it was impossible to resign. That is what you are asking, isn t it?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will forego that question, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts that it is true, which I want to prove.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept its truth or not, it is a different question.
DR. LATERNSER: In this connection, also I would like to say something. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative, because it has already been put by my colleague, Dr. Dix. The question to two different witnesses makes a different situation, because the subjective answer of the individual witness is desired. But I will forego that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I have a few more questions. the Hauptquartier -- secure against raids? from the Army, and also I believe from a company of the Waffen SS -- and very thorough measures in the way of guards, barriers and similar things. It was very well secured against raids.
Q Were there several zones? which were limited individually. groups and Armies in the East, outside of their theatre of operations, did not have any competence or jurisdiction. Was there a tendency to keep that area as small as possible, or as largo as possible? tions as large as possible, in order to assure the possibility of movement in the rear area. Only later did the Fuehrer, by energetic means, see fit to limit these zones, to make them as small as possible
Q Yes, for what reason? matters andto limit them to small, areas. SS, which were tactically for combat, were subordinated to the Army. I would like to clarify thatparticularly, because in my opinion there is still one point not quite clear -- the Einsatzgruppe of the S.D., did they have anything to do with the units of the Waffen SS which were subordinated to Army units for the purpose of tactical tasks? incorporated into the Army units and had nothing to do with anything else. They were purely combat troops. any offense? tated; but aside from that, jurisdiction was with the top, that is, the Reichsfuehrer, Himmler, and not the Supreme Commander of the particular Army or army group.