army sectors which were affected?
A No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly to increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against Russia and, secondly, certain investigations regarding the possibilities of transferring troops from the west, from France, as quickly as possible to the southeast areas, Prussia, respectively. Certain return transports of troops had occurred, certainly, at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions or directives were given at that time.
Q What was the line of demarcation? frontier incidents, trooping, and particularly about frequent crossings of that line by aircraft of the Soviet Union, which led to corresponding notes being exchanged. But at any rate there was a continuous small frontier fight, particularly in the south, and we received information through our frontier troops that at internals or currently new Russian troop units appeared opposite them, and I think that was all. the time?
A During the western campaign there were -- I don't think I am wrong this time -- seven divisions; seven divisions from East Prussia to the Carpathians, inclusive, two of which, during the western campaign, had even been transported to the west but were later on transported back again.
Q The prosecution stated that at the end of July 1940 Col. Gen. Jodl had given general instructions at Reichenhall to certain officers of the Army Leadership Staff instructing them to occupy themselves with the Russian problem, and particularly to examine the railway transport problem. Since you said a little earlier that not until August did you hear for the first time from Hitler what the situation was, I am now asking you what you know about this conference and whether you were informed about it.
A No. I didn't hear about it until I came here that such a conference took place. This was connected with the fact that I was absent from Berchtesgaden from the end of July or beginning of August, and I didn't know of this conference, and I think General Jodl probably forgot to tell me about it at the time.
which after all did arise after that conference with Hitler? serious thoughts involved I was most surprised, and I considered it most unfortunate, I seriously considered what could be done to use military considerations for influencing Hitler. At that time, as has been briefly discussed by the Foreign Minister, I wrote a personal memorandum containing my thoughts. I should like to say, independently from the experts working in the General Staff and the Army Leadership Staff, I was proposing to submit that memorandum to Hitler. I decided on that method because it was typical that one would never get past the second sentence during such a discussion. When he would begin speaking one would be deprived of the opportunity of saying what one wanted to say, so I wanted to give it to him in writing. And in that connection I should like to say right now that I was considering that. And I think that was the first and only time that I visited the Foreign Minister personally, because I wanted to tell him to ask him to support me from the political angle regarding that question. That is the visit which has been discussed here to Fuschl which the Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop confirmed during his examination the other day. is no need for me to repeat it? memorandum with me. It had been made in handwriting, since I didn't want anybody else to get hold of it. And I left Fuschl conscious of the fact that he was trying to influence Hitler in the same way or at least he wanted to try and influence him. He had agreed to do that.
Q Did you give that memorandum to Hitler?
A Yes. A little later, after a report at the Berghof, I had handed him that memorandum when we were alone. I think he told me then that he was going to study it, took it, and didn't give me another chance to explain. considering the importance of it?
A Yes. To start with nothing at all happened. After some time, therefore, I reminded him of it.
I asked him to talk to me about that problem. That actually occurred and the matter was settled pretty briefly by saying that whatever was contained therein from the military point of view was in no way convincing. He, Hitler, would have to consider those thoughts erroneous, and turned, them down. In that connection I should like to tell you very briefly that this touched me, offended me deeply once more, and there was yet another crisis when I asked to be relieved of my post and to place another man in my position. That once more led to a keen controversy which as is known has been stated by the Reich Marshal who mentioned the thoughts he had upon that subject, namely, that Hitler said that ha resented the fact that a general, whose views he did not agree to, was asking for his resignation thereupon. I think he said that it was his right to turn down such suggestions and thoughts if he considered them wrong, but that it was not my right to draw any consequences from that.
Q Did he return that memorandum to you?
A No, I don't think I got it back. So far I have always thought that was found among the captured Schmundt files. Apparently it hasn't. I didn't get it back; he retained it. any further. I should like to leave it to you whether you can repeat the contents of that memorandum. So far as I am concerned, what is important in this connection is not so much the military representations which one can imagine, but the question, did you refer to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 in that memorandum? devoted to military considerations; military considerations regarding the balance of forces, the need for forces, and the splitting of forces which were suffering from at the time -- France, Norway, the air force in Italy, and being tied down in the west. But I did in that memorandum most certainly refer to the fact that that Non-Aggression Pact existed. But the rest were entirely military considerations.
Q Were any military instructions given during that period?
A No, nothing was ordered at that time with the exception, I think, of improvements of lines of communications from the west to the east so that there could be faster troop transports, particularly to the southeastern sphere; in other words, the Carpathians and the East Prussian theatre.
Apart from that no orders were given at that time; no orders of any kind. at that time?
A No. To the contrary at that time in October considerations regarding a discussion with some Russians were still pending. Hitler told me that at the time, and he always emphasized in that connection that before such a discussion had taken place he would not give any orders, since it had been proved to him by General Jodl that it was technically impossible in any case to transfer strong troop units into the threatened theatres, which I have mentioned, in the east. Nothing happened therefore, and that visit or discussion with the Russian delegation was prepared, in which connection I would like to say that I made the suggestion at that time that Hitler should talk personally to him, Stalin. That was the only thing I suggested.
Q. During that conference were military matters discussed?
A. I did'nt at all take part during the discussions with Mr. Molotov, although in that case too I was present during the reception and certain official functions. I remember that on two occasions I was the neighbour of M. Kelanosov at the table, but I didn't experience or attend any political conferences, now did I have any political discussions with my neighbor at the table.
Q. What did Hitler say after these discussions had come to an end?
A. After he departed he really only informed us very briefly, and he said approximately that he had been disappointed. I think he mentioned briefly that problems existed regarding the Eastern Sea and the Black Sea and that they had been discussed, and that he had not been able to get any positive or definite reaction, but he didn't go into detail at all. I asked him about military things which had a certain significance at the time -- the strong forces, for instance, in the Bessarabian theatre. I think Hitler avoided an answer and said that was obviously connected with all these matters and that he had not gone into it too deeply. I can't remember exactly, but at any rate, there was nothing now in it for us and nothing final.
Q. After that conference were any military orders given?
A. I think not even then. Hitler told us at the time that he wished the reaction to these discussions when the delegation had returned to Russia. Certain orders had been given to the ambassador, too, in that respect. In other words, immediately after the departure there were no orders, no.
Q. May I ask you to state the date when the first definite instructions were given?
A. I can only reconstruct it on the strength of the instruction Barbarossa, which has been shown to me here and which appeared in November. In other words, it must have been during the first half of December that the corresponding orders were issued, that well-known order Barbarossa. To be precise, these orders were given at the beginning of September, namely, the orders to work out the strategic plan.
Q. Did you know about the conferences which took place at Zossen in December and which have been mentioned by the Prosecution here?
Perhaps I may remind you that General Heinrichs was present.
A. No. Of that conference at Zossen I did know nothing, and according to the testimony of General Buschenhagen, I did not know anything about the participation of General Heinrichs. It was here for the first time that I heard about it. The only way I can explain that to myself is that the General Staff of the army wanted to get certain documentary details and that they had that discussion at that time with the persons concerned. I did not meet General Heinrichs until May 1941, and at that time General Jodl and I had a discussion with him at Salzburg. But before that I had never seen him and I had never talked to him.
Q. Is there significance in the fact that in Directive No. 21 it says that Hitler eight weeks before the operational plan would become effective would order the carrying out of the final march, the final troop dispositions?
A. Yes, there was considerable significance attached to that. I have been interrogated about that by a Soviet Union delegation here. The reason was that in accordance with the estimate of the army it would take about eight weeks to get these troops into position, looking at it from the railway transport point of view. That is to say, if troops from Reich territory were to be placed in position on an operative start line, Hitler emphasized at the time during the repeated investigation of the plan that he wanted to have complete control of those dispositions. In other words, troop movements without his approval were not permissible. That was the purpose of that instruction.
Q. When did it become clear to you that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union?
A. As far as I can recollect, that was the beginning of March. There had been thoughts that the attack might be made approximately in the middle of May. Therefore in the middle of March the decision regarding the railway questions and problems had to be made. For that reason, during the first half of March a meeting of generals was called -- that is to say, an order group for generals with Hitler.
the generals that he had decided to carry out that campaign, but of course an order had not been given. He stated a number of thoughts at the time and produced certain instructions, referring to those matters which are contained in these directives here, Special Case Barbarossa. This is Document 447-PS, and these are the directives which were eventually signed by me. For those directives and thoughts contained therein he gave us directives at the time of that meeting, so that the generals were informed about the contents here, which in turn was the cause for me to confirm it in writing immediately. There was nothing new in that for any one who took part in that conference.
Q. But it appears new to me, what Hitler told the generals during that speech he made, and it also appears to me that you who are not changed with these matters, that is to say, the working out of these plans, must have become clear, and you had to become aware of the fact that now a completely abnormal method of warfare was about to begin, at least seen from your point of view as a soldier -- from your traditional point of view as a soldier?
A. That is correct. Here the thoughts were expressed regarding the administration and economic exploitation of the territories to be conquered and occupied, and there was the completely new thought to create Reichs Commissioners and vicil administrations, and there was the clear decision to give supreme command to the plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Flan in the economic sector; and what was the most decisive point for me and affected me most was the fact that apart from the rights for the military commanders to carry out the supreme orders as occupation forces, a new way was to be used here and expressed clearly, by which the Reichs Leader SS Himmler was to be given complete plenipotentiary powers with reference to the entire police actions which later on became known in these territories. I fought against that keenly, since it appeared impossinle to me that there should be two forces working side by side.
of the Army are not effected by this. That was a complete deception, and quite the opposition occured. As long as it was possible, considering my position, I fought against this. Jodl, who experienced it. Eventually, however, Hitler worked out those directives himself, more or less, personnaly. That is how these directives came about and were worked out. That I couldn't give the orders which are contained in these directives becomes apparent when you realize that it says that the Reichsmarshal receives this task, and the Reichsleader receives that task, and those were things which I could not order. event of an attack on the Soviet Union, one would have to take in the way of dramatic stops or declarations of war, that one would have to present an ultimatum? 1941, Whenever discussions regarding the strength of the Russion forces on the demaraction line took place -- and I an now talking about the months: DecemberJanuary -- I asked Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to clarify the situation. I can add right now that the first time he said nothing, and the second time he refused, stating that no purpose could be served and he would only receive the answer that this was an internal affair and that it was none of his business, or something like that. At any rate, he refused.
I tried again, at a later stage. That is to say, I distinctly voiced the request that an ultimatum should be presented before we took action, so that in some form the basis would be created for a preventive war, as we called it; in other words, an attack.
Q You say "preventive war". When the final and decisive decision were made, what was the military situation? here through a memorandum, which is document PS-872. According to that, at the end of January or the beginning of February, there was a report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler regarding the state of affairs of operative and strategic preparations.
In that document I found the realization, in that period, regarding the strength of the positions of the Red Army and all the other existing information which has become known. It was all contains in that document. OKW -- Admiral Canaris -- supplied little material which could be placed at the disposal of the Army, because of the very strong dividing line which exis0 ted between the Russian theater and our German positions. In other words, there were graps up to a point. Only the matters contained in that PS document were known. your decision?
A Yes. It was reported that there were approximately 150 divisions of the Soviet Union in their positions along that line of demarcation, and then there was certain aerial photography regarding a large number of airdromes. In other words, a degree of preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia existed, which could, at any time, lead to military action. And the actual battle later made it clear just how far the enemy had been prepared. I have to say, however that this was realization which was only brought about by the actual attack. made on the 14th of June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, were you not? May I ask you, without your committing any repetitions, to say briefly what Hitler said on that occasion, and how his statement affected the Generals?
THE PRESIDENT: Isn't there a document in connection with this? It must all be in the document. Isn't that so?
DR. NELTE: I merely wanted to ask one question on that subject and then submit the document; or, if the Tribunal so desires, I will not read the document in full but will merely quote the short summary which is contained at the end of the document. Will the Tribunal agree to that?
THE PRESIDENT: But what you did was to ask the defendant what was in the document.
DR. NELTE: In that document it states, if I may briefly indicate it to you, the development, and the continuously increasing influence which organizations outside of the armed forces exercised upon the conduct of the war It is the proof that the armed forces, during that war -- which must be called a distorted war -- tried, as far as possible, to remain within international law.
THE PRESIDENT: I only want to know what your question is, that is all.
DR. NELTE: My question was directed to Fieldmarshal Keitel, and I asked him to tell me about the speech on the 14th of June, 1941, to tell me what Hitler had ordered the Generals to do and what the effect on them was. I intended to end, with that, the preparation for the Russian campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: He can tell what the effect was upon himself, but I don't see how he can tell what the effect was upon the other Generals.
DR. NELTE: He can only assume, but of course he can say whether the others reacted in one way or another. You can talk, or you can make representations. I merely wanted to know whether that happened or not.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better ask him what happened at the conference; if you want to know what happened at the conference, why don't you ask him?
DR. NELTE: Very well. BY DR. NELTE:
Q Yes? commanders, there followed a summary speech which I must describe as purely political. The first argument raised was that this was the decisive battle between two well-known philosophical conceptions, and because of this fact, in this war, methods which were known to us soldiers and which we considered to be the only possible ones under international law, could not be applied, but that a completely different system would have to be employed.
That is, with such means one could not conduct the war, that this was an entirely new war, based on completely different arguments and principles. of a legal system in certain territories, regarding the fact that any resistance should be combatted with brutal means, that is, any local resistance which was caused by the deep controversy which existed between the two philosophical conceptions.
These were completely new and very impressive but also extremely upsetting thoughts.
orders or statements, or did you raise any arguments?
A No, I personally did not. And, of course, also theresistence, which I had always made known, against all these matters before, but I have no knowledge regarding which generals, or if any generals, did address the Fuehrer. At any rate, it did not happen after that discussion or conference.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think that now the time has come to decide whether you will permit the documents contained in my Book No. 2 under the Numbers 3 and 5, whether that affidavit of the Defendant Keitel will be admitted in evidence although -- and I should like the Prosecution to find that also -- now we have merely discussed the history before the actual Russian Campaign and as far as the Defendant Keitel and the OKW is concerned, I should like to abbreviate the examination by submitting these two affidavits. This affidavit -- No. 3 -- is an account of the situations of the strength of orders in the East, considering the large territory and the numerousorganizations which led to extremely complicated channels for orders. So as to make it possible for you to ascertain whether the Defendant Keitel or the OKW, or whichever department may be concerned as responsible for these conditions of the power of command in the East, they have been discussed in detail and I believe that it would save a great deal of time if it would be possible for this document to be submitted to the Tribunal as evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, Sir Dodd and I have no objection to this procedure used by the Prosecution and we believe that it will probably help the Tribunal to have in front of them the printed accounts.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte intend to read or only summarize these affidavits?
DR. NELTE: I was hoping merely to submit it to you after I have asked the Defendant whether the contents of the affidavit have been written and signed by him.
THE PRESIDENT: And the Prosecution, of course, have had these affi davits for some time?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: Yes.
DR. NELTE: The same allies, if I understand Sir David correctly, to affidavit No. 5?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it would be convenient, I think, if you gave these affidavits numbers in the sequence of your exhibit numbers and give us also the dates of them so that we can identify them. Can you give us the dates of the affidavits?
DR. NELTE: May I be permitted to arrange the matter during the luncheon interval?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The first is dated the 8th of March, isn't it? The other is the 18th, is it? Dr. Nelte, you can do it at the recess and give them numbers. You can give them numbers at the recess.
It is nearly 1:00 o'clock now, and we are just going to adjourn. You can give them numbers then. Does that conclude your examination?
DR. NELTE: We are now coming to the individual cases which I am hoping to conclude in the court room this afternoon. I must refer to the Prisoner of war circumstance and other certain individual matters and I think I shall require this afternoon for that purpose. I believe that if I considered the interest of the Defendant Keitel alone, I would confine myself to very little.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to put your questions to him now or not?
DR. NELTE: Well, I think -- I don't know how the President feels, about an interval, but I think it would be suitable if we had one now so that in the meantime I could put the affidavits in their proper order.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours).
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, of the two documents mentioned this morning, the first document, No. 3 of the second document book, reads "The Command Relationships in the East".
THE PRESIDENT: That is dated the 14th of March, 1946? The document that I have got is headed the 23rd of February, 1946, and at the end the 14th of March, 1946. Is that the one?
DR. NELTE: The document was first written down and later sworn to. There is, therefore, a difference in the two dates.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to identify which it is, that is all.
DR. NELTE: It is the document of the 14th of March.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: It was sworn to on the 14th.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are giving it what number?
DR. NELTE: I give it No. K-10. The second document is fifth in this document book and is dated the 18th of March, 1946, and is sworn to at the end by the Defendant as of the 29th of March. This document hasreceived the number K-12. Permit me to read a few points on pages 11 and 12 of the German copy. This, as it appears to me, is a very important point for this trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Of which document?
DR. NELTE: Document No. 12.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. I don't think the interpreters have found the document yet, have they? It comes just after a certificate by Catherine Bedford, and I think it is about halfway through the book, and although the pages are not numbered consecutively, it appears to have the figures 51 on it.
DR. NELTE: I shall begin where it says, "In summing up". Those are the last three pages of this document:
"In summing up there must be established:
"1. Alongside the Armed Forces as the legal protector of the Reich internally and externally, as in every nation" -- interpolating, in the SS organizations -- "a completely independent factor arose and was legalized which politically, biologically, and in police and administrational matters actually drew the powers of the State to itself.
"2. Even at the beginning of military complications and conpolicy of conquest and power.
"3. After commencement of the military campaigns the Reichsleader SS hit upon the plan by which, while concealed at first and very little to be seen outside, bur from time to time making suitable appearances, he could in reality build up his power under the guise of 'protecting' the annexed or occupied territories from political opponents.
"4. From the occupation of the Sudeten territory, beginning with the organization of political unrest, that is, of the so-called "freedom movements and incidents', the road leads straight through Poland and the Western areas in a steep curve into the Russian territory.
"5. With the 'Outlines' to the 'Barbarossa' plan for the administration and utilization of the conquered Eastern territories, theArmed Forces were against their intention and without knowledge of the basic assumptions drawn further and further into the subsequent developments and activities.
"6. I (Keitel) and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the effects of Himmler's full powers, and had no idea of the possible effectof these powers.
"I assume without further discussion that the same holds true for the OKH, which according to the order of the Fuehrer joined Himmler's units and gave orders to the subordinate army commanders.
"7. In reality, it was not the Commander in Chief of the Army who had the executive power assigned to him and the power to decree law and maintain law in the occupied territories, but Himmler and Heydrich themselves of their own authority decidedon the life or death of the people and prisoners, including PW's, in whose camps they represented the executive power.
"8. The traditional training and concept of duty of the German Officer with regard to absolute obedience, with responsibility borne by his superior, led to an attitude, regrettable in retrospect, which in spite of his recognition of their lawlessness and his inward rejection of them, still shrank from a rebellion against those orders and methods.
"9. The Fuehrer, Hitler, abused his authority and his fundamental No. 1 order in an irresponsible way with respect to us. This No. 1 Order read, more or less:
'1. No one shall know about secret matters which do not belong within '2. No one shall learn more than he needs to fulfil the tasks assigned '3. No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary '4. No one shall transmit orders which are to be kept to subordinate the achievement of the purpose.
' "10.
It is my conviction that if the entire consequences which arose from granting Himmler authority in the East had been known beforehand, in this case the leading generals would have been the first to raise an unequivocal protest against it. That is my conviction. As these atrocities developed one out of the other, step by step and without any recognition in advance of the consequences, destiny took its tragic course, with its fateful consequences." as I have just read it? Are you perfectly familiar with its contents and have you sworn to it?
DR. NELTE: I shall submit the document in the original. BY DR. NELTE: war area involved in the Plan Barbarossa. I don't know whether you want to take an attitude toward what has been read in the meantime or whether that is already superfluous? 884-PS, are the record of the directives that were given in that general staff meeting on the 15th of July, and not in the sense -- and as is usual in such cases, these orders were set down in writing and then sent to the appropriate officers.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give the date right? You said "the 15th of July." What was the date?
THE WITNESS: 14th of June. That was the date of the conference. BY DR. NELTE:
Q One more question regarding the war against America. The prosecution asserts that you influenced the Germans to wage war against America and accused you of participation in German efforts to involve America in the war. Would you like to make some statement regarding this? which contains directives for cooperation with Japan. Of course, I have participated in the drawing up of this order and signed it.
The other document 1881-PS. Regarding a conference between the Fuehrer and Matsuoka, I do not know and I did not know anything of it at the time. I can only say the following forus soldiers. In the course of all this time until Japanese entry into the war against America, there were two points of view that were our basic principles and those were the principles which Hitler emphasized to us. One was to prevent under any circumstances that America enter the war and consequently renounce military operations in the waters where Americans were present. Secondly, the thought that guided us soldiers was the hope that Japan would enter the war against Russia and I recall, that around November and the beginning of December 1941, when the advance of the German armies west of Moscow was halted, we, when we visited the front or accompanied Hitler, were asked several times by the generals, "When is Japan going to enter the war?" The reasons for so asking were that again and again Russian Far-Eastern divisions were being thrown into the fight around Moscow; that is to say, fresh troops coming from the Far East. That was 18 to 20 divisions but I wouldn't want to say for certain how many it was, but I was present at Matsuoka's visit at Berlin and I saw him also socially but I did not have any conversation with him, and all the combinations that can be associated with this document 75, and which I have heard in my previous interrogations, are without any foundation for us soldiers and there is no justification for anyone's believing that we were guided by thoughts of bringing about a war between Japan and America. In conclusion, I can only say that this order was necessary because the branches of the army have resisted the idea of giving Japan certain military secrets unless she were in the war.
Q. There was also a letter submitted by the Prosecution, a letter from Falkenstein to the Air Staff. Reichsmarshal Goering has already testified about this. Did you know of this letter or do you have anything to add to Reichsmarshal's Goering's testimony?
A. I have nothing to add, I never saw this letter by von Falkenstein. I head baout it during the testimony.
Q. We come now to the individual facts and things with which you are charged in the OKW by the Prosecution. Because of the vast number of points brought up by the Prosecution I can only treat the individual and those of the most important groups of such points in order to try to ascertain to what extent you were involved in these things and what your attitude was as to the effect of the measures that were taken. In most cases it is a question of orders of Hitler but in your statement you have admitted to a certain participation and knowledge of these things. One of the most important of these questions is the question of hostages.
I want to show you document C-128. These are orders for operations in the west. Let me ask you though, first of all, what is the reason as given to the ( Witness handed document)
A. These are the Secret Army Regulations, G-2 and it is headed -
DR. NELTE: I ask you, Mr. President, to turn in document book number one to number seven on page 65 of my document book. BY DR. NELTE:
Q. I ask you to ascertain whether this is a copy from the aforementioned Army Regulations, Section 9, which treats of the question of hostages. This is document K-7 and it reads as follows:
"Hostages may only be taken by order of a Regimental Commander, an independent Battalion Commander or a Commander of equal rank. With regard to accomodation and feeding, it is to be noted that, though they should be kept under strictest guard, they are not convicts. Furthermore, only senior office holding the position of at least a Divisional Commander can decide on the fate of hostages."
that is the operational order of the army in the west. It is headed "3A, Measures to Assure the Safety of the Population; sub-heading (a) Hostages.2
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you offering that as K-7?
DR. NELTE: I ask to have this put in evidence as K-7.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you kindly say that you are putting it in as each time because if you simply say seven it will lead to confusion. BY DR. NELTE: the occasion of the march into France? tude of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. It is a letter to the Reichsminister for Aviation and in this letter I assume there are contained the convictions held by the office you headed.
Q What do you say today in connection with this letter? represent today because it states here with reference to the above mentioned order the following paragraph, beginning with the words -- "Security against any misuse--" and so on. regarding the fate of hostages. made by someone at least of as high a rank as a divisional commander. drawn up by the High Command of the Wehrmacht Legal Department and was perused with regard to its implications with regard to international law? view was taken into consideration. capacity as head of the OKW?