Q We come now to the question of Norway. Did you know that Apr-4-M-PM-5-1 Germany had made in October 1939, a declaration of neutrality to Denmark and Norway?
neutrality in this or other cases?
Q Were you informed of them?
A No, not that either. Those were foreign political discussions on which we soldiers were not informed. ing newspapers or some such things? you a question and should like, in order to save time, not to repeat this question; but it seems to me that the question that I asked, in order to get your opinion regarding aggressive war, would have to be asked again in this connection because an attack on a neutral country, a country to which a guarantee had been given, brings up particular scruples on the part of people who have to do with the waging of war. Therefore, I ask you again and ask for your explanation as to what your attitude and the attitude of the soldiers was?
A I must say we were already at war. There was a state of war between England and France, on the one hand, and Germany and England on the other, and it would be dishonest to say that I concerned myself with these things. I regarded than rather as political matters and, in the same wry, I, as a soldier, had the opinion that the preparations for a military action against Norway and Denmark were by no means the activation of an attack and that these preparations would have to last for months if one was really to undertake such an action. In the meantime, the prerequisites for such an attack could change, and it was these thoughts that decided me not to take any steps in this question of intervention in Norway and Denmark. I will say that I left these things to those who were concerned with political matters.
Q When were the proportions for this action begun?
Apr-4-M-PM-5-2
A The first discussions were in October of 1939. On the other hand, the first orders were issued for the first time in January; that is to say, several months later. Also, in connection with the discussions that took place in this connection, I remember that one day I was ordered to bring Raeder to the Fuehrer. He wanted to ask him questions about sea warfare in the Atlantic Ocean and the dangers that we would meet in waging war in this area. A special staff was created by Hitler, which was to occupy itself with these problems. I have seen documents on that subject here and I was to occupy myself with a study of these problems from the military point of view. This special staff was not under my personal direction. Hitler said that he, himself, would give orders to this staff. Thus, in the months at the end of 1939, beginning with 1940, these were the military considerations. had any conference with Quisling at this stage of developments? afterwards. I only saw him approximately two years later, after the conclusion of that campaign. There were no connections between us, even in the way of communication of information. I have already stated in an interrogation that I sent am officer, I believe Colonel Pieckenboeck, to Copenhagen to have conferences with the Norwegians, but I did not know Quisling. inent question of violation of neutrality, particularly in the case of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Do you know whether these three countries were given assurances that their neutrality would not be violated?
Q I don't want to ask the same questions that I asked in connection with Norway and Denmark, but in this context I should like to ask you: Did you consider these assurances on the part of Hitler as honestly meant?
A I must say that I did believe them to be honestly meant. There was no intention of bringing any other state into this war. I had no reason to assume the opposite or to believe that this was a deception on Hitler's part.
Apr-4-M-PM-5-3 there was a possibility of a localization or a conclusion of the war altogether
A Yes, I did believe that. I was reinforced in this conviction by the Reichstag speech after the Polish war, in which Hitler made hints that led no to believe that discussion of a political nature could be carried out with England on these matters and because Hitler had always told me, whenever I brought up this question, "The West is really not interested in these Eastern-German problems". This was the phrase that he always used to pacify people, that the Western powers were not interested in the East. we soldiers always counted on the intervention of the Western powers during the Polish campaign and were very surprised that, aside from certain skirmishes between the Siegfried and the Maginot Line, no such military action on the part of the Western Powers took place. The entire Western front from the Dutch border to Basel was covered by only five divisions, which was a very weak fortification of the Western wall. So, from a purely military point of view, attack on the part of the Western Powers during the Polish campaign would have met only a show of defense, which would certainly not be effective. Western powers really did not have any serious military intentions. The Western Powers, we thought had passed the favorable time for an attack, and, now that the Polish campaign was concluded, we did not believe that they would undertake a campaign. This was our opinion of what the further attitude on the part of the Western Powers would be.
Q What plans did Hitler have for the West? ported all available forces to the West, in consideration of the fact that at any time something might happen there. But, even during the last stage of the Polish campaign, he stated to me that he wanted to throw his forces as swiftly as possible from the East to the West and wanted to attack in the winter of 1939-1940. provided for?
A Not at first. At first, if we can express it militarily, the the attack in the west was to be a security measure.
It was to take place at Apr-4-M-PM-5-4 the unfortified fort at the border from Aachen to the Dutch frontier.
At the end of September and the beginning of October, a transportation of the army from the East to the West did take place without, however, any fixed center of gravity.
Q What did the German intelligence know about Belgium and Holland's attitude and preparations? or in the autum of 1939. I can only speak for myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter. I was of the opinion that Belgium wanted to remain out of the war under any circumstances and would do anything it could to preserve its neutrality. On the other hand, we received, through close cconnections between the Belgium and Italian royal houses, a number of reports that sounded threatening to us. whether or not they were true, I had not way of finding out. However these reports state I that Belgium was submitted to strong pressure to give up its neutrality. staff relations between it and England. But then, in the months of October to May, 1940, the matters took various forms, became more or less serious. Purely militarily, we know one tiling; to wit, that the French had taken all their motorized and swift units and had put them on the Belgian border and, from a military point of view, we interpreted this measure as meaning that at least preparations were being made for crossing through Belgium, at any rate, for an attack on the Ruhr district.
further development and are of a purely military nature. with reference to the attack in the West through this neutral territory? the whole ar, namely, the opinions of a number of Generals, including the Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch, and his Chief of General Staff, and I also personnaly belonged to that group -- who wanted to attempt to prevent an attach in the West, which Hitler already intended in the winter of 1939.
There were various reasons for this: The difficulty of transporting the Eastern Army to the West; then another fact -- and this I must state -- the fact that we believed at that time that if we did not attack the possibility of a peaceful solution would not yet have been completely obviated. In other words, we considered it possible that until the spring many political changes could take place. Secondly, as soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter war, particularly in view of the long nights and short days which are always a military disadvantage. strong forces, could take place. However, we answered that we were involved in a war of movement, that we believe that we were superior. to a very serious crisis, since these were my opinion and Hitler turned them down vigorously. He accused me in our talks in the sharpest manner, of conspiring against him with the Generals and strengthening them in their opposition to his views. I must state that I immediately offered to resign, because I consi dered that the conficence between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed. I may add that relations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army alos suffered greatly in this matter. But my resignation was not permitted. As this has already been discussed here, I need to go into it.
But this break in confidence was never healed. In the case of Norway there was already a similar conflict. Jodl's diary refers to it as a "serious crisis" I shall not go into this in detail, either.
Q What was Hitler's incentive to the speech on the 31st of November 1939, in the Reichschancellery?
just discussed. He wanted to explain the reasons for this difference of opinion between himself and the Generals, and we know it was his intention to bring about a change in attitude on the part of the General Staff. In the notes on this speech we see that individual persons were directly attacked, namely, those who had spoken against this attack in the West. carry out this aggressive action in the West, because this -- in his view -was the only strategic possibility, as every moment's delay was to the enemy's advantage. In other words, he was counting at that time on no other solution to than resort to force of arms. and Holland? ready been taken but the decision, whether such a violation of the neutrality of these countries was actually to be carried out, this decision Hitler withheld until the spring of 1940, for all sorts of political reasons, and perhaps also with the thoughts that the problem would automatically be solved if the enemy invaded Belgium or Holland or some such things as that. I can state that the decision for the carrying out of this plan was withhold until the very last moment and the order was given immediately before it was to be executed. ready mentioned, the relations between the royal houses of Italy and Belgium Since Hitler always surrounded his decisions in secrecy, he was afraid that this would come to light through this relationship.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal will be glad if when you refer to Czechoslovakia or any other state you will refer to it by its proper name--you and the defendants and other witnesses.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the Defendant Keitel wishes to rectify a statement which he made earlier upon my question regarding the occupation in the West during the Polish campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. were five divisions. I must rectify that statement. I had that mixed up with the year 1938. In 1939 there were approximately twenty divisions, including the reserves in the Rhineland and behind the West Wall. Therefore, the statement I made was made in error.
Q Now we come to the Balkan wars. The Prosecution, with reference to the war against Greece and Jugoslavia, has accused you of having cooperated in the preparation, planning and carrying out of those wars. What have you to state on that? surprise, a total surprise. We were dragged into it without having made any plans. First of all, Greece. I accompanied Hitler during his journey to France for the meeting with Marshal Petain and Franco on the Spanish border, and during that journey we had our first news regarding the intention of Italy to attack Greece. The journey to Florence was immediately decided upon, and upon arrival there at Florence, we received Mussolini's statement, which has been mentioned by Marshal Goering; namely, that the attack against Greece had already begun. disgusted with this development and the dragging of the Balkans into the war and that only the fact that Italy was an ally prevented a complete break with Mussolini. Any intention to wage war against Graced never did become known to me.
Q Was there any necessity for Germany to enter into that war? How did that come about? months--October, November--of that campaign of the Italians, it became clear that the Italian position in this war had become extremely precarious.
Therefore, probably as early as November or December, there were calls for assistance on the part of Mussolini, calls to assist him in some form or other. course that for the entire military position in the war, a defeat of Italy in the Balkans would have had considerable consequences. Therefore, by means of improvisation, assistance was rendered. I think a mountain division was to be tried, but it was technically impossible since there were no unloading facilities, and other types of assistance were given by means of air transport and so on and so forth. by the Prosecution and called "Marita". When was that? of standardization because of the influence of winter. During that time, considerations arose that, in order to avoid a catastrophe fir Italy, certain formations were to be used for a relieving attack against Greece, and they were to be used from the North. That would, of course, have to take several months, and it did. even the suggestion to place units at the disposal by marching them through Jugoslavia were turned down by Hitler, although the army particularly considered that possibility as the most suitable way of getting troops up and suggested it. said about the marching through Bulgaria, which had been prepared and discussed diplomatically with the Bulgarian government.
Q I would like to ask just one more question on that subject. The Prosecution has stated that before the fall of the Jugoslav government -that is to say, at the end of March 1911-- negotiations were conducted with Hungary for the eventuality of an attack on Jugoslavia. Were you or the OKW informed of this, or did you participate?
A No. I do not in any way or any form remember any military discussior on the part of the OKW with Hungary regarding the eventuality of a military action against Jugoslavia.
That is completely unknown to me. To the contrary, everything that happened later on--I shall have to say a few words about Jugoslavia later--was completely now to us. Nothing had been prepared, at any rate, not within the knowledge of the OKW. Hungary had taken place during that period? I assume that you merely want to say that they did not refer to Jugoslavia.
A Yes, of course. It was known to me that discussions had taken place with the Hungarian military staff. Jugoslavia, Reichmarshal Goering has made statements upon that subject. Can you add anything new? I will not have any further questions on that subject otherwise. proceed against Jugoslavia with military means meant a complete overthrowing of all military steps and preparations, deployment, etc. which had been made, which had to be completely gone over, just as new forces had to be brought through Hungary from the North, and all that was complete improvisation.
Q I am now turning to the case of "Barbarossa". The Soviet Russian Delegation, particularly, have stressed that the Supreme Command of the armed forces, and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer of 1940 had occupied themselves with the plan of attack against the Soviet Union. When did Hitler for the first time talk to you about the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union? 1940 on the occasion of a discussion at Berchtesgaden, or, specifically, at his house, the Berghof. That was the first time that the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union was discussed. could possibly lead to a war? According to our conception, there were considerable troop concentrations in Bessarabia and Bukowina. The Foreign Minister, too, has mentioned figures and there was the anxiety which had been repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time that something further might arise on the strength of that in the Roumanian theatre which would lead to a threat to the fuel supply for our armed forces.
army sectors which were affected?
A No. As far as I can recollect this was confined firstly to increased activities of the intelligence or espionage service against Russia and, secondly, certain investigations regarding the possibilities of transferring troops from the west, from France, as quickly as possible to the southeast areas, Prussia, respectively. Certain return transports of troops had occurred, certainly, at the end of July. Apart from that no instructions or directives were given at that time.
Q What was the line of demarcation? frontier incidents, trooping, and particularly about frequent crossings of that line by aircraft of the Soviet Union, which led to corresponding notes being exchanged. But at any rate there was a continuous small frontier fight, particularly in the south, and we received information through our frontier troops that at internals or currently new Russian troop units appeared opposite them, and I think that was all. the time?
A During the western campaign there were -- I don't think I am wrong this time -- seven divisions; seven divisions from East Prussia to the Carpathians, inclusive, two of which, during the western campaign, had even been transported to the west but were later on transported back again.
Q The prosecution stated that at the end of July 1940 Col. Gen. Jodl had given general instructions at Reichenhall to certain officers of the Army Leadership Staff instructing them to occupy themselves with the Russian problem, and particularly to examine the railway transport problem. Since you said a little earlier that not until August did you hear for the first time from Hitler what the situation was, I am now asking you what you know about this conference and whether you were informed about it.
A No. I didn't hear about it until I came here that such a conference took place. This was connected with the fact that I was absent from Berchtesgaden from the end of July or beginning of August, and I didn't know of this conference, and I think General Jodl probably forgot to tell me about it at the time.
which after all did arise after that conference with Hitler? serious thoughts involved I was most surprised, and I considered it most unfortunate, I seriously considered what could be done to use military considerations for influencing Hitler. At that time, as has been briefly discussed by the Foreign Minister, I wrote a personal memorandum containing my thoughts. I should like to say, independently from the experts working in the General Staff and the Army Leadership Staff, I was proposing to submit that memorandum to Hitler. I decided on that method because it was typical that one would never get past the second sentence during such a discussion. When he would begin speaking one would be deprived of the opportunity of saying what one wanted to say, so I wanted to give it to him in writing. And in that connection I should like to say right now that I was considering that. And I think that was the first and only time that I visited the Foreign Minister personally, because I wanted to tell him to ask him to support me from the political angle regarding that question. That is the visit which has been discussed here to Fuschl which the Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop confirmed during his examination the other day. is no need for me to repeat it? memorandum with me. It had been made in handwriting, since I didn't want anybody else to get hold of it. And I left Fuschl conscious of the fact that he was trying to influence Hitler in the same way or at least he wanted to try and influence him. He had agreed to do that.
Q Did you give that memorandum to Hitler?
A Yes. A little later, after a report at the Berghof, I had handed him that memorandum when we were alone. I think he told me then that he was going to study it, took it, and didn't give me another chance to explain. considering the importance of it?
A Yes. To start with nothing at all happened. After some time, therefore, I reminded him of it.
I asked him to talk to me about that problem. That actually occurred and the matter was settled pretty briefly by saying that whatever was contained therein from the military point of view was in no way convincing. He, Hitler, would have to consider those thoughts erroneous, and turned, them down. In that connection I should like to tell you very briefly that this touched me, offended me deeply once more, and there was yet another crisis when I asked to be relieved of my post and to place another man in my position. That once more led to a keen controversy which as is known has been stated by the Reich Marshal who mentioned the thoughts he had upon that subject, namely, that Hitler said that ha resented the fact that a general, whose views he did not agree to, was asking for his resignation thereupon. I think he said that it was his right to turn down such suggestions and thoughts if he considered them wrong, but that it was not my right to draw any consequences from that.
Q Did he return that memorandum to you?
A No, I don't think I got it back. So far I have always thought that was found among the captured Schmundt files. Apparently it hasn't. I didn't get it back; he retained it. any further. I should like to leave it to you whether you can repeat the contents of that memorandum. So far as I am concerned, what is important in this connection is not so much the military representations which one can imagine, but the question, did you refer to the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 in that memorandum? devoted to military considerations; military considerations regarding the balance of forces, the need for forces, and the splitting of forces which were suffering from at the time -- France, Norway, the air force in Italy, and being tied down in the west. But I did in that memorandum most certainly refer to the fact that that Non-Aggression Pact existed. But the rest were entirely military considerations.
Q Were any military instructions given during that period?
A No, nothing was ordered at that time with the exception, I think, of improvements of lines of communications from the west to the east so that there could be faster troop transports, particularly to the southeastern sphere; in other words, the Carpathians and the East Prussian theatre.
Apart from that no orders were given at that time; no orders of any kind. at that time?
A No. To the contrary at that time in October considerations regarding a discussion with some Russians were still pending. Hitler told me that at the time, and he always emphasized in that connection that before such a discussion had taken place he would not give any orders, since it had been proved to him by General Jodl that it was technically impossible in any case to transfer strong troop units into the threatened theatres, which I have mentioned, in the east. Nothing happened therefore, and that visit or discussion with the Russian delegation was prepared, in which connection I would like to say that I made the suggestion at that time that Hitler should talk personally to him, Stalin. That was the only thing I suggested.
Q. During that conference were military matters discussed?
A. I did'nt at all take part during the discussions with Mr. Molotov, although in that case too I was present during the reception and certain official functions. I remember that on two occasions I was the neighbour of M. Kelanosov at the table, but I didn't experience or attend any political conferences, now did I have any political discussions with my neighbor at the table.
Q. What did Hitler say after these discussions had come to an end?
A. After he departed he really only informed us very briefly, and he said approximately that he had been disappointed. I think he mentioned briefly that problems existed regarding the Eastern Sea and the Black Sea and that they had been discussed, and that he had not been able to get any positive or definite reaction, but he didn't go into detail at all. I asked him about military things which had a certain significance at the time -- the strong forces, for instance, in the Bessarabian theatre. I think Hitler avoided an answer and said that was obviously connected with all these matters and that he had not gone into it too deeply. I can't remember exactly, but at any rate, there was nothing now in it for us and nothing final.
Q. After that conference were any military orders given?
A. I think not even then. Hitler told us at the time that he wished the reaction to these discussions when the delegation had returned to Russia. Certain orders had been given to the ambassador, too, in that respect. In other words, immediately after the departure there were no orders, no.
Q. May I ask you to state the date when the first definite instructions were given?
A. I can only reconstruct it on the strength of the instruction Barbarossa, which has been shown to me here and which appeared in November. In other words, it must have been during the first half of December that the corresponding orders were issued, that well-known order Barbarossa. To be precise, these orders were given at the beginning of September, namely, the orders to work out the strategic plan.
Q. Did you know about the conferences which took place at Zossen in December and which have been mentioned by the Prosecution here?
Perhaps I may remind you that General Heinrichs was present.
A. No. Of that conference at Zossen I did know nothing, and according to the testimony of General Buschenhagen, I did not know anything about the participation of General Heinrichs. It was here for the first time that I heard about it. The only way I can explain that to myself is that the General Staff of the army wanted to get certain documentary details and that they had that discussion at that time with the persons concerned. I did not meet General Heinrichs until May 1941, and at that time General Jodl and I had a discussion with him at Salzburg. But before that I had never seen him and I had never talked to him.
Q. Is there significance in the fact that in Directive No. 21 it says that Hitler eight weeks before the operational plan would become effective would order the carrying out of the final march, the final troop dispositions?
A. Yes, there was considerable significance attached to that. I have been interrogated about that by a Soviet Union delegation here. The reason was that in accordance with the estimate of the army it would take about eight weeks to get these troops into position, looking at it from the railway transport point of view. That is to say, if troops from Reich territory were to be placed in position on an operative start line, Hitler emphasized at the time during the repeated investigation of the plan that he wanted to have complete control of those dispositions. In other words, troop movements without his approval were not permissible. That was the purpose of that instruction.
Q. When did it become clear to you that Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union?
A. As far as I can recollect, that was the beginning of March. There had been thoughts that the attack might be made approximately in the middle of May. Therefore in the middle of March the decision regarding the railway questions and problems had to be made. For that reason, during the first half of March a meeting of generals was called -- that is to say, an order group for generals with Hitler.
the generals that he had decided to carry out that campaign, but of course an order had not been given. He stated a number of thoughts at the time and produced certain instructions, referring to those matters which are contained in these directives here, Special Case Barbarossa. This is Document 447-PS, and these are the directives which were eventually signed by me. For those directives and thoughts contained therein he gave us directives at the time of that meeting, so that the generals were informed about the contents here, which in turn was the cause for me to confirm it in writing immediately. There was nothing new in that for any one who took part in that conference.
Q. But it appears new to me, what Hitler told the generals during that speech he made, and it also appears to me that you who are not changed with these matters, that is to say, the working out of these plans, must have become clear, and you had to become aware of the fact that now a completely abnormal method of warfare was about to begin, at least seen from your point of view as a soldier -- from your traditional point of view as a soldier?
A. That is correct. Here the thoughts were expressed regarding the administration and economic exploitation of the territories to be conquered and occupied, and there was the completely new thought to create Reichs Commissioners and vicil administrations, and there was the clear decision to give supreme command to the plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Flan in the economic sector; and what was the most decisive point for me and affected me most was the fact that apart from the rights for the military commanders to carry out the supreme orders as occupation forces, a new way was to be used here and expressed clearly, by which the Reichs Leader SS Himmler was to be given complete plenipotentiary powers with reference to the entire police actions which later on became known in these territories. I fought against that keenly, since it appeared impossinle to me that there should be two forces working side by side.
of the Army are not effected by this. That was a complete deception, and quite the opposition occured. As long as it was possible, considering my position, I fought against this. Jodl, who experienced it. Eventually, however, Hitler worked out those directives himself, more or less, personnaly. That is how these directives came about and were worked out. That I couldn't give the orders which are contained in these directives becomes apparent when you realize that it says that the Reichsmarshal receives this task, and the Reichsleader receives that task, and those were things which I could not order. event of an attack on the Soviet Union, one would have to take in the way of dramatic stops or declarations of war, that one would have to present an ultimatum? 1941, Whenever discussions regarding the strength of the Russion forces on the demaraction line took place -- and I an now talking about the months: DecemberJanuary -- I asked Hitler to send a note to the Soviet Union so as to clarify the situation. I can add right now that the first time he said nothing, and the second time he refused, stating that no purpose could be served and he would only receive the answer that this was an internal affair and that it was none of his business, or something like that. At any rate, he refused.
I tried again, at a later stage. That is to say, I distinctly voiced the request that an ultimatum should be presented before we took action, so that in some form the basis would be created for a preventive war, as we called it; in other words, an attack.
Q You say "preventive war". When the final and decisive decision were made, what was the military situation? here through a memorandum, which is document PS-872. According to that, at the end of January or the beginning of February, there was a report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to Hitler regarding the state of affairs of operative and strategic preparations.
In that document I found the realization, in that period, regarding the strength of the positions of the Red Army and all the other existing information which has become known. It was all contains in that document. OKW -- Admiral Canaris -- supplied little material which could be placed at the disposal of the Army, because of the very strong dividing line which exis0 ted between the Russian theater and our German positions. In other words, there were graps up to a point. Only the matters contained in that PS document were known. your decision?
A Yes. It was reported that there were approximately 150 divisions of the Soviet Union in their positions along that line of demarcation, and then there was certain aerial photography regarding a large number of airdromes. In other words, a degree of preparedness on the part of Soviet Russia existed, which could, at any time, lead to military action. And the actual battle later made it clear just how far the enemy had been prepared. I have to say, however that this was realization which was only brought about by the actual attack. made on the 14th of June 1941, at the Reich Chancellery, were you not? May I ask you, without your committing any repetitions, to say briefly what Hitler said on that occasion, and how his statement affected the Generals?
THE PRESIDENT: Isn't there a document in connection with this? It must all be in the document. Isn't that so?
DR. NELTE: I merely wanted to ask one question on that subject and then submit the document; or, if the Tribunal so desires, I will not read the document in full but will merely quote the short summary which is contained at the end of the document. Will the Tribunal agree to that?
THE PRESIDENT: But what you did was to ask the defendant what was in the document.
DR. NELTE: In that document it states, if I may briefly indicate it to you, the development, and the continuously increasing influence which organizations outside of the armed forces exercised upon the conduct of the war It is the proof that the armed forces, during that war -- which must be called a distorted war -- tried, as far as possible, to remain within international law.
THE PRESIDENT: I only want to know what your question is, that is all.
DR. NELTE: My question was directed to Fieldmarshal Keitel, and I asked him to tell me about the speech on the 14th of June, 1941, to tell me what Hitler had ordered the Generals to do and what the effect on them was. I intended to end, with that, the preparation for the Russian campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: He can tell what the effect was upon himself, but I don't see how he can tell what the effect was upon the other Generals.
DR. NELTE: He can only assume, but of course he can say whether the others reacted in one way or another. You can talk, or you can make representations. I merely wanted to know whether that happened or not.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better ask him what happened at the conference; if you want to know what happened at the conference, why don't you ask him?
DR. NELTE: Very well. BY DR. NELTE:
Q Yes? commanders, there followed a summary speech which I must describe as purely political. The first argument raised was that this was the decisive battle between two well-known philosophical conceptions, and because of this fact, in this war, methods which were known to us soldiers and which we considered to be the only possible ones under international law, could not be applied, but that a completely different system would have to be employed.