Then, in the next weeks, we began the theoretical considerations; this, however, without the participation of the departments of the Wehrmacht, because I was not authorized to consult thorn. military adjutants were asked innumerable questions regarding the strength of divisions, and so on.
Q. I believe we can shorten this. The decisive point could be reached if you would compare, in the document, the outline that you drew up on orders from Obersalzburg, and tell me what resulted from that outline of yours.
A Yes. About four weeks after I was given this job, I sent to Obersalzburg an outline of this project.
A. By way of answer I was informed that Hitler himself would come to Berlin and speak with the high commander in chief of the army. I came to Berlin at the end of May, and I was present at the conference with General von Brauchitsch. In this conference the basic plan was changed althogether. Now Hitler expressed the wish and intention as soon as possible to take military measures against Czechoslovakia. The reasons why he changed his mind were because -- I believe this was the 20th or 21st of May -- Czechoslovakia had ordered general mobilization, and Hitler declared that that could only be directed against us. Military preparations had not been taken by Germany. This was the reason for the complete turnabout of his intentions, which he communicated orally to the commander in chief of the army and ordered him to take steps immediately. This explains the changes in the basic plan -- that is to say, "It is my irrevocable decision to take military action against Czechoslovakia as soon as possible."
Q. War did not take place between Germany and Czechoslovakia because of the Munich agreement. How did you and the generals regard this Munich agreements?
A. We were extraordinarily happy that it had not reached the point of a military operation, because during the time of preparation we had never participated in the basic proposition that our boundary fortifications against Czechoslovakia were sufficient. That would have made necessary our piercing the Czechoslovakian boundary defenses, and we were not strong enough to do that. Moreover, for this reason we were particularly happy that a peaceful solution had been reached.
Q. That effect did this agreement have on the generals' opinion of Hitler?
A. I believe I may say that this raised Hitler greatly in the opinion of the generals. We recognized that although military preparations were not neglected a solution had been found which had not been expected and for which we were thankful.
Q. Is it not extraordinary that three weeks after this agreement that had been so welcomed by everyone, including the generals, Hitler made preparations for the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia?
A. I believe, as Marshal Goering stated in his testimony lately, my impression was this: As Hitler told me then, he did not believe that Czechoslovakia could stand the loss of the Sudeten territories with their strong fortifications; and, moreover, he was concerned over the close connections between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He regarded Czechoslovakia as a threat. That was the military impression I received.
Q. Was it pointed out to Hitler by anyone that there was great danger in a forceful settlement of the problem of Czechoslovakia -- danger from the side of the other great powers, England and others?
A. I did not know of the last talk in Munich between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer, but I always regarded this question it its further ramifications as a political one. Consequently, I did not give expression to my misgivings, all the more since the military preparations that had been made before Munich had been reduced. To discuss the political question was something that did not please the Fuehrer.
Q. In connection with this problem of Czechoslovakia I should like to bring up Colonel Koechling, who was mentioned by the Prosecution as the liaison man with Hitler. Was the Wehrmacht or the OKW a participant in this?
A. Koechling's job was unknown to me. Hitler asked me if an officer was available to carry out a special mission, and if so he should report to Hitler, After I sent Lieutenant Colonel Koechling from Berlin I never saw him again or spoke to him further. I do know, however that, as I found out later, he was with Henlein as military adviser.
Q. The Prosecution has brought up facts as follows: At both the visit of Tiso in March, 1939, as well as the visit of Hacha, you were present, and it was deduced from these facts that you took part in the political discussions that took place at those times. What role did you play on these occasions?
A. It is true that on the occasion of such visits from foreign statesmen I was present in the Reich Chancellory on every occasion -- at any rate, present when they were greeted. I did not take part in the discussions and never took part in concrete discussions of a political nature. I was present for the official greeting and felt that I should be present as a representative of the high office in the Wehrmacht.
But in each individual case that I can recall I withdrew and then waited in the antechamber to see whether I might be needed. I can consequently say that neither with Tiso nor with President Hacha did I say one single word nor take part in the direct discussions that Hitler was carrying out. Lot me add, however, that in the night of President Hacha's visit I was obliged to be present in the Reich Chancellory, because the high command of the army had to be given orders as to how the entry into Czechoslovakia that had been prepared was to be carried out.
Q. In conclusion of this point I wish to ascertain simply this, because I believe it has otherwise been cleared up by Goering's testimony: You never spoke to President Hacha of a possible bombarding of Prague in the event that he should refuse to sign what he was asked to sign?
A. No.
Q. We come now to Poland. Here too the Prosecution accuses you or having participated in the planning of the military action against Poland. Would you like to state your basic attitude towards this eastern problem in brief?
A. The questions connected with Danzig and the Corridor were known to me. I also knew that political discussions and negotiations were connected with these questions. The plan for the attack on Poland -- I had, of course, some connection with these problems. Since I did not concern myself with political matters, I personally was of the opinion that, as in the case of Munich and before, military preparation or -- if I may so call it -- military pressure would play the same sort of role as in my opinion it had played at Munich. I did not believe that without any such military preparation things would develop.
Q Could not this question have been solved by direct negotiations.
question discussions took place several times, as in the case of the question of the Corridor. I recall an expression of an opinion that impressed me at the time, when Hitler said he regretted Marshal Pilsudski's death because he believed that he might have reached some agreement or arrangement with this statesman. This statement was made in my presence then to me. has busied himself with the question of war against Poland. Did you participate in this?
A No. That I cannot recall. I believe I have notes that can demonstrate that this was not the case. I accompanied Hitler on a thorough tour of inspection of the eastern fortifications. At that time we covered the entire Front from Pommerania to Breslau in order to look at the frontier fortifications against Poland. The matter of the fortifications in the east was an important serious question at that time and can only imagine that these were considerations in Autumn of 1938, that stood in some connection with the Danzig and Corridor question and he simply wanted to convince himself that it had been necessary to strengthen these eastern fortifications if the Danzig and Corridor questions should lead to war.
Q Then were the preparations made for the occupation of Danzig?
A I believe that was in the late Autumn of 1938. Orders were issued from East Prussia that Danzig should be occupied at the proper moment in the form of a coup d'etat. More, I don't know.
Q Was the possibility of war discussed in this connection?
A Yes. That is connected with the inspection of the fortifications, and so on, that I just described, but that a specific preparation of some sort for anything more than a coup d'etat was to take place from East Prussia I do not know, and it actually did not take place. these questions, that Danzig should only be occupied if no war with Poland would arise from that.
A Yes, that is so. That remark was made several times, that this occupation of Danzig would only be carried out if it were certain that a war would not result from it.
Q When did this view change?
A I believe that Poland's refusal to negotiate the question of Danzig was apparently the reason for further considerations and steps on the part of Germany. after Munich had been reached by him in connection with the eastern problems, I recall in this connection, that the Czechoslovakian problem was solved without a shot. Perhaps the other German problems in the east could also be solved in that way and I also believe that I remember Hitler saying that he did not believe that the Western powers, particularly England, would concern themselves with these eastern problems of Germany.
Q That is document C-102, the "Case White" question. Then on the 3rd of April 1939, an order was issued. the regular annual instructions regarding the possibility of a mobilization,-a further working over of these matters which were brought up annually and which we knew already from the years 1937 and 1938, but concretely, this was the situation: Hitler, in my presence, gave the commander in chief of the army at this time the order to make preparations of a military and strategic nature for a war against Poland and at this time, Iissued these first reflections, to be seen in this document. It is stated here that the Fuehrer has already ordered this, that it should be carried out by the 1st of October 1939, and the OKW should draw up a schedule for carrying out of these measures.
Q What was your and the other general's attitude towards this war? Czeschoslovakia, both the high command of the army and the generals and also I, myself, disapproved of the motion of waging a war against Poland. We wanted no war in that sense, but, of course, we carried out the orders we had received, -- at least, formally. Our reasons for this were that, according to our knowledge of the military means that we had at our disposal, that is to say, the divisions, their armaments and their inadequate supply of munitions must not be ignored--we recognized as soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war against Poland.
Q. You want, thereby, witness, to state that in your consideration of this matter, only military matters influenced your attitude?
A Yes. I must admit that I did not concern myself with the political consideration. I was only concerned with "can we, or can we not?"
Q That is what I wanted to ascertain. Now, on the 23rd of May, 1939, there was a meeting at which Hitler delivered a speech to the generals. You know of this speech?
Q What was the cause, the reason, and the contents of this speech? and that reminded me of the situation at that time. The tendencies expressed in this speech -- This speech was simply delivered to the generals in order to inform the generals that they had no reason to feel perturbed and to point out that the prerequisites were not yet present and that political negotiations in this matter could still change the situation and still might. This speech was delivered simply by way of encouragement.
point of war? that a solution by way of negotiation would take place as it had before. Our military considerations always were kept in the foreground. We generals believed that France and to a lesser extent England, in view of ots pact of mutual assistance with Poland, would attack and that we did not have the defensive means to combat such an attack. For this reason I personally was always convinced that war would not take place because we could not wage a war both against Poland and against France. August, 1939? salzberg who had been in change of the troops in the East and at that time also Hitler, toward the end of this speech, declared that a pact had been concluded with Soviet Union. I was completely convinced that it would not reach the point of wan because I believed that on these conditions a basis for negotiation was available and that Poland would not be recalcitrant and that there was a satisfactory basis for negotiation, although Hitler said in this speech, which again I read here for the first time, that the preparations should be carried out to the utmost and that it was intended to put them into execution.
Q Did you know that England actually attempted to mediate?
A No, I knew nothing of these matters. It was very surprising to me as it was on the 24th or 25th, only a few days before the conference at Obersalzberg, ] was called to Hitler at the Reichehancellory and he ordered me to stop everything at once, to call Brauchitsch. "I need time for negotiations" he said, I believe that with these few words I was dismissed.
Q What followed thereupon? called to the Fuehrer. Everything was stopped and all decisions regarding a possible military decision were posponed. I believe there was a pause which took place in the military preparations which lasted about five days.
Q Did you know of the so-called minimum demands on Poland?
A I believe that I saw them in the Reichschancellory. I believe Hitler showed them to me personally; that is to say that I knew of them.
Q Since you saw them did you hold these demands to be serious? minutes and as a soldier I naturally believed that these were meant perfectly seriously.
Q Was there talk at that time of border incidents?
A No. This question of border incidents was discussed with me here in my interrogations. During this situation when there were discussions and negotiations at the Reichschancellory there was no mention of border incidents.
Q I now show you document 795-PS. It is a copy -
(witness handed the document) which was then on the first of September was again postponed for twenty-four hours. For this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called to the Reichschancellory and as I recall it the reason for this postponement was that a Polish plenipotentiary was expected and preparations were to wait twenty-four hours until he arrived. Then no further changes were made in the military plans. of illegal military undertakings has been shown me and I know it. There is a subsequent copy made by Canaris of a talk that I had with him. He told me at that time that he was to make available a few Polish uniforms. This had been communicated to him from the Fuehrer through an adjutant. We both agreed that this was intended for some illegal action. If I recall correctly I told. him at that time that I did not see much future in such actions and that he should keep his hands away from such things. We then had a short discussion as to a coup d'etat that was to be undertaken with which the Wehrmacht had been commisioned. I did not know any more that that at that time. I believe I told Canaris that he could evade this whole issue by saying that he had no Polish uniforms and that would settle the matter. on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Did you know this event at all?
testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was commissioned to carry out such things and until I heard testimony here before this Tribunal I knew nothing of this attack on the radio station at Gleitwitz. I also do not recall that I found out at that time that the event had taken place.
Q Did you know of America's and Italy's efforts after the 1st of September 1939; to and the war in one way or another? last few days from the 24th August up to the 1st of September, 1939. I knew nothing of a visit by Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London's intervention. I remember only one thing, that I met Hitler very briefly once in the Reichschancellory and he said to me:
"Do not bother me now, I am writing a letter to Deladier."
It must have been in the first days of September. Of the matters that I found out here and of the steps that were taken after the 1st of September I nor any of the other generals knew anything about that at that time.
Q What did you say to Canaris and Hah Lahousen on the 14 of September. that is shortly before the attack on Warsaw with regard to political matters under the code term "Flurbereiningung" (House cleansing)? here. As I remember, that I had said many things which Hitler had ordered of me and I had passed on these orders to the Commander-in-chief of the army of Poland as to what to do regarding the Polish Police attacks on Germans. I can only say that I repeated what had been said in my presence between Hitler and Brauchitsch. I can make no statements regarding details. several times that as long as he had executive authority in the occupied territory he would tolerate no other officers or departements in that region. On his wish then, in October he was relieved of his responsibility for the government of Poland. I should like therefore to believe that the testimony was not quite correct or from what is set down in notes.
Q We come now to the question of Norway. Did you know that Apr-4-M-PM-5-1 Germany had made in October 1939, a declaration of neutrality to Denmark and Norway?
neutrality in this or other cases?
Q Were you informed of them?
A No, not that either. Those were foreign political discussions on which we soldiers were not informed. ing newspapers or some such things? you a question and should like, in order to save time, not to repeat this question; but it seems to me that the question that I asked, in order to get your opinion regarding aggressive war, would have to be asked again in this connection because an attack on a neutral country, a country to which a guarantee had been given, brings up particular scruples on the part of people who have to do with the waging of war. Therefore, I ask you again and ask for your explanation as to what your attitude and the attitude of the soldiers was?
A I must say we were already at war. There was a state of war between England and France, on the one hand, and Germany and England on the other, and it would be dishonest to say that I concerned myself with these things. I regarded than rather as political matters and, in the same wry, I, as a soldier, had the opinion that the preparations for a military action against Norway and Denmark were by no means the activation of an attack and that these preparations would have to last for months if one was really to undertake such an action. In the meantime, the prerequisites for such an attack could change, and it was these thoughts that decided me not to take any steps in this question of intervention in Norway and Denmark. I will say that I left these things to those who were concerned with political matters.
Q When were the proportions for this action begun?
Apr-4-M-PM-5-2
A The first discussions were in October of 1939. On the other hand, the first orders were issued for the first time in January; that is to say, several months later. Also, in connection with the discussions that took place in this connection, I remember that one day I was ordered to bring Raeder to the Fuehrer. He wanted to ask him questions about sea warfare in the Atlantic Ocean and the dangers that we would meet in waging war in this area. A special staff was created by Hitler, which was to occupy itself with these problems. I have seen documents on that subject here and I was to occupy myself with a study of these problems from the military point of view. This special staff was not under my personal direction. Hitler said that he, himself, would give orders to this staff. Thus, in the months at the end of 1939, beginning with 1940, these were the military considerations. had any conference with Quisling at this stage of developments? afterwards. I only saw him approximately two years later, after the conclusion of that campaign. There were no connections between us, even in the way of communication of information. I have already stated in an interrogation that I sent am officer, I believe Colonel Pieckenboeck, to Copenhagen to have conferences with the Norwegians, but I did not know Quisling. inent question of violation of neutrality, particularly in the case of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Do you know whether these three countries were given assurances that their neutrality would not be violated?
Q I don't want to ask the same questions that I asked in connection with Norway and Denmark, but in this context I should like to ask you: Did you consider these assurances on the part of Hitler as honestly meant?
A I must say that I did believe them to be honestly meant. There was no intention of bringing any other state into this war. I had no reason to assume the opposite or to believe that this was a deception on Hitler's part.
Apr-4-M-PM-5-3 there was a possibility of a localization or a conclusion of the war altogether
A Yes, I did believe that. I was reinforced in this conviction by the Reichstag speech after the Polish war, in which Hitler made hints that led no to believe that discussion of a political nature could be carried out with England on these matters and because Hitler had always told me, whenever I brought up this question, "The West is really not interested in these Eastern-German problems". This was the phrase that he always used to pacify people, that the Western powers were not interested in the East. we soldiers always counted on the intervention of the Western powers during the Polish campaign and were very surprised that, aside from certain skirmishes between the Siegfried and the Maginot Line, no such military action on the part of the Western Powers took place. The entire Western front from the Dutch border to Basel was covered by only five divisions, which was a very weak fortification of the Western wall. So, from a purely military point of view, attack on the part of the Western Powers during the Polish campaign would have met only a show of defense, which would certainly not be effective. Western powers really did not have any serious military intentions. The Western Powers, we thought had passed the favorable time for an attack, and, now that the Polish campaign was concluded, we did not believe that they would undertake a campaign. This was our opinion of what the further attitude on the part of the Western Powers would be.
Q What plans did Hitler have for the West? ported all available forces to the West, in consideration of the fact that at any time something might happen there. But, even during the last stage of the Polish campaign, he stated to me that he wanted to throw his forces as swiftly as possible from the East to the West and wanted to attack in the winter of 1939-1940. provided for?
A Not at first. At first, if we can express it militarily, the the attack in the west was to be a security measure.
It was to take place at Apr-4-M-PM-5-4 the unfortified fort at the border from Aachen to the Dutch frontier.
At the end of September and the beginning of October, a transportation of the army from the East to the West did take place without, however, any fixed center of gravity.
Q What did the German intelligence know about Belgium and Holland's attitude and preparations? or in the autum of 1939. I can only speak for myself, and there may be other opinions on this matter. I was of the opinion that Belgium wanted to remain out of the war under any circumstances and would do anything it could to preserve its neutrality. On the other hand, we received, through close cconnections between the Belgium and Italian royal houses, a number of reports that sounded threatening to us. whether or not they were true, I had not way of finding out. However these reports state I that Belgium was submitted to strong pressure to give up its neutrality. staff relations between it and England. But then, in the months of October to May, 1940, the matters took various forms, became more or less serious. Purely militarily, we know one tiling; to wit, that the French had taken all their motorized and swift units and had put them on the Belgian border and, from a military point of view, we interpreted this measure as meaning that at least preparations were being made for crossing through Belgium, at any rate, for an attack on the Ruhr district.
further development and are of a purely military nature. with reference to the attack in the West through this neutral territory? the whole ar, namely, the opinions of a number of Generals, including the Commander-in-Chief, von Brauchitsch, and his Chief of General Staff, and I also personnaly belonged to that group -- who wanted to attempt to prevent an attach in the West, which Hitler already intended in the winter of 1939.
There were various reasons for this: The difficulty of transporting the Eastern Army to the West; then another fact -- and this I must state -- the fact that we believed at that time that if we did not attack the possibility of a peaceful solution would not yet have been completely obviated. In other words, we considered it possible that until the spring many political changes could take place. Secondly, as soldiers, we were decidedly against the waging of a winter war, particularly in view of the long nights and short days which are always a military disadvantage. strong forces, could take place. However, we answered that we were involved in a war of movement, that we believe that we were superior. to a very serious crisis, since these were my opinion and Hitler turned them down vigorously. He accused me in our talks in the sharpest manner, of conspiring against him with the Generals and strengthening them in their opposition to his views. I must state that I immediately offered to resign, because I consi dered that the conficence between Hitler and myself had been completely destroyed. I may add that relations with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army alos suffered greatly in this matter. But my resignation was not permitted. As this has already been discussed here, I need to go into it.
But this break in confidence was never healed. In the case of Norway there was already a similar conflict. Jodl's diary refers to it as a "serious crisis" I shall not go into this in detail, either.
Q What was Hitler's incentive to the speech on the 31st of November 1939, in the Reichschancellery?
just discussed. He wanted to explain the reasons for this difference of opinion between himself and the Generals, and we know it was his intention to bring about a change in attitude on the part of the General Staff. In the notes on this speech we see that individual persons were directly attacked, namely, those who had spoken against this attack in the West. carry out this aggressive action in the West, because this -- in his view -was the only strategic possibility, as every moment's delay was to the enemy's advantage. In other words, he was counting at that time on no other solution to than resort to force of arms. and Holland? ready been taken but the decision, whether such a violation of the neutrality of these countries was actually to be carried out, this decision Hitler withheld until the spring of 1940, for all sorts of political reasons, and perhaps also with the thoughts that the problem would automatically be solved if the enemy invaded Belgium or Holland or some such things as that. I can state that the decision for the carrying out of this plan was withhold until the very last moment and the order was given immediately before it was to be executed. ready mentioned, the relations between the royal houses of Italy and Belgium Since Hitler always surrounded his decisions in secrecy, he was afraid that this would come to light through this relationship.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal will be glad if when you refer to Czechoslovakia or any other state you will refer to it by its proper name--you and the defendants and other witnesses.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, the Defendant Keitel wishes to rectify a statement which he made earlier upon my question regarding the occupation in the West during the Polish campaign.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. were five divisions. I must rectify that statement. I had that mixed up with the year 1938. In 1939 there were approximately twenty divisions, including the reserves in the Rhineland and behind the West Wall. Therefore, the statement I made was made in error.
Q Now we come to the Balkan wars. The Prosecution, with reference to the war against Greece and Jugoslavia, has accused you of having cooperated in the preparation, planning and carrying out of those wars. What have you to state on that? surprise, a total surprise. We were dragged into it without having made any plans. First of all, Greece. I accompanied Hitler during his journey to France for the meeting with Marshal Petain and Franco on the Spanish border, and during that journey we had our first news regarding the intention of Italy to attack Greece. The journey to Florence was immediately decided upon, and upon arrival there at Florence, we received Mussolini's statement, which has been mentioned by Marshal Goering; namely, that the attack against Greece had already begun. disgusted with this development and the dragging of the Balkans into the war and that only the fact that Italy was an ally prevented a complete break with Mussolini. Any intention to wage war against Graced never did become known to me.
Q Was there any necessity for Germany to enter into that war? How did that come about? months--October, November--of that campaign of the Italians, it became clear that the Italian position in this war had become extremely precarious.
Therefore, probably as early as November or December, there were calls for assistance on the part of Mussolini, calls to assist him in some form or other. course that for the entire military position in the war, a defeat of Italy in the Balkans would have had considerable consequences. Therefore, by means of improvisation, assistance was rendered. I think a mountain division was to be tried, but it was technically impossible since there were no unloading facilities, and other types of assistance were given by means of air transport and so on and so forth. by the Prosecution and called "Marita". When was that? of standardization because of the influence of winter. During that time, considerations arose that, in order to avoid a catastrophe fir Italy, certain formations were to be used for a relieving attack against Greece, and they were to be used from the North. That would, of course, have to take several months, and it did. even the suggestion to place units at the disposal by marching them through Jugoslavia were turned down by Hitler, although the army particularly considered that possibility as the most suitable way of getting troops up and suggested it. said about the marching through Bulgaria, which had been prepared and discussed diplomatically with the Bulgarian government.
Q I would like to ask just one more question on that subject. The Prosecution has stated that before the fall of the Jugoslav government -that is to say, at the end of March 1911-- negotiations were conducted with Hungary for the eventuality of an attack on Jugoslavia. Were you or the OKW informed of this, or did you participate?
A No. I do not in any way or any form remember any military discussior on the part of the OKW with Hungary regarding the eventuality of a military action against Jugoslavia.
That is completely unknown to me. To the contrary, everything that happened later on--I shall have to say a few words about Jugoslavia later--was completely now to us. Nothing had been prepared, at any rate, not within the knowledge of the OKW. Hungary had taken place during that period? I assume that you merely want to say that they did not refer to Jugoslavia.
A Yes, of course. It was known to me that discussions had taken place with the Hungarian military staff. Jugoslavia, Reichmarshal Goering has made statements upon that subject. Can you add anything new? I will not have any further questions on that subject otherwise. proceed against Jugoslavia with military means meant a complete overthrowing of all military steps and preparations, deployment, etc. which had been made, which had to be completely gone over, just as new forces had to be brought through Hungary from the North, and all that was complete improvisation.
Q I am now turning to the case of "Barbarossa". The Soviet Russian Delegation, particularly, have stressed that the Supreme Command of the armed forces, and you as Chief of Staff, as early as the summer of 1940 had occupied themselves with the plan of attack against the Soviet Union. When did Hitler for the first time talk to you about the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union? 1940 on the occasion of a discussion at Berchtesgaden, or, specifically, at his house, the Berghof. That was the first time that the possibility of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union was discussed. could possibly lead to a war? According to our conception, there were considerable troop concentrations in Bessarabia and Bukowina. The Foreign Minister, too, has mentioned figures and there was the anxiety which had been repeatedly voiced by Hitler at that time that something further might arise on the strength of that in the Roumanian theatre which would lead to a threat to the fuel supply for our armed forces.
