Q. Did you know that the occupation of the Rhineland -- that is, of the demilitarized zone -- and the reestablishing of the Wehrhoheit and conscription, the establishment of an air force and the increasing of the number of soldiers, was a violation of the Versailles Treaty?
A. So far as the verbatim language of the Versailles Treaty is concerned, as long as we acknowledged the existence of the Treaty, the terms of the Treaty, of course, did not permit any of those things. A study of the Treaty of Versailles, I can say, was made very intensively in order to find loopholes through which we could, without violating the Treaty, take measures which would not find us guilty of breaking the Treaty. That was in connection with the Reichsverteidigungst Ausschuss (Reich Defense Committee). We were concerned with that. Blomberg, I must state frankly that I had no misgivings as to whether the question rested with us in any way as to whether it was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, because the things which did take place happened openly. It had been declared by us that we would raise 36 divisions. Discussions had taken place, and I could not see anything which in any was would be considered as a violation of the Treaty, or which could be considered as such by our soldiers. to be free of the territorial and military chains of the Treaty of Versailles. And I must say frankly that any soldier or officer who did not have similar feelings towards his country would be very worthless, in my estimation.
Q. In these proceedings, an order, C-124, was shown, or a command, which hears your signature. We are concerned with aerial reconnaisance and movements of U-boats at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland. Participation on your part, so far as the occupation of the Rhineland was concerned, was mentioned. In what capacity did you sign this order or decree?
A. Von Blomberg had decreed this. It was a mission which General von Blomberg had given me, and I transmitted this decree to the Commander-inchief of the Navy and of the Air Force. I recall that we were concerned with supervisory measures which were to be established during those days in which the three battalions were marching into the demilitarized zone.
himself or through other channels, have knowledge of those things for which there were plans in existence which, contrary to expressed peaceful assurances by Hitler, were to be put into effect only through war?
A I cannot remember. In this period of time until the first practical measures were taken in the case of Austria I heard about a program or a programmatic establishment of a plan which was to go into years. I must say also that we were so occupied and so busy with the reorganization of the small army of seven divisions into an expanded unit--to have them expanded twice and three times--and the creation of an air force, which was nonexistent, that in these years one would have to be in your office to know that we were concerned completely and wholly with organizational problems. can draw the conclusion that it is absolutely clear that we never heard about these things. connection with Hitler? Fuehrer three times. He did not say one word to me and he did not know me. If he knew anything at all about me it could only have been through von Blomberg. Any contact either with the Fuehrer himself or through other ways, perhaps through prominent personages--I had no contacts with him. My first conversation with him was in the last days of January before I was called into office.
Q Did you know about the meeting with Hitler in November of 1937? Didn't you hear about that conference? There was a conference in which Hitler, as it is alleged, made public his last will and testament. I did not know about this, and that I for the first time saw the minutes or a record of this meeting. I believe it is the Hoszbach document. And I do not in any way remember that von Blomberg after this conference gave me any directions that I was to take any preparatory measures. That is definitely not the case.
Q Did you know of the territorial demands on the part of Hitler?
A Yes. I must affirm that. I had received word, and I knew from public political discussions, that a series of territorial problems, as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, was an aim--to have these territorial matters settled in one way or another sooner or later; that is correct. solution of these territorial problems at that time? military problems. I can say only in 1935, when I left my troops, none of these 24 divisions which were to be established existed. I considered all of this, not from the point of view of political aims, but with the sober consideration that we could not do anything through military means if we had no military means at our disposal. rearmament, and in 1935 the end-term for the navy was 1945. Therefore, we had ten years in which to raise a concentrated wehrmacht. not consider them acute, for I considered it impossible to realize these plans in ways other than were at hand. preparation for mobilization? and was in line with cur traditional general staff tendency which had been in existence even before the First World War -- that something like that must, as a matter of basic principle, be prepared for. But as far as political planning on the part of Hitler was concerned, it had nothing to do with any planning of that sort, for at that time I was already the chief of staff with Blomberg and Jodl was at that time concerned with landesverteidigung (land defense). Perhaps it is a bit presumptuous for me to say that we were very much satisfied that at last we were beginning to tell the Wehrmacht every year with what it was to concern itself spiritually and theoretically. In the old education in line with the general staff tradition which I received, it was the chief aim of the directive of this sort that travels were to be stopped. This was the way in old officialdom. But I cannot say whether Blomberg had thoughts of belligerent complications or whether he was respon sible for such thoughts or in what way he may have been influenced by Hitler, but I am surethat Hitler never saw this document.
It was an internal problem of the Wehrmacht.
Q But in it you find a reference to "Fall Otto" (Case Otto), and you knew that that was the affair with Austria.
A Yes, I remember of course, the Case Otto; and, as is plain to see from the name, Otto von Hapsburg is meant. Certainly there were certain reports about an attempted restoration, and with this condition perhaps an armed intervention was to take place; but the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, wished to oppose that. He did not wish a restoration of the monarchy in Austria. Later on there was a connection in the case of the Anschluss, but I do not, I believe, need to mention that. Perhaps I may refer to this later. by the army a preparation was at hand which would bring about the Case Otto. crete orders were not given to the effect that the Case Otto-
A You mean annexation? I can say only that which I experienced when I was sent by Hitler to General Beck. I went into the study and said that the Fuehrer demanded that you report to him immediately and report to him above the preparation which already existed for an eventual invasion of Austria, and the then General Beck said, "We have prepared nothing; nothing at all." of Austria was put into effect in March of 1938. I have a directive regarding the Case Otto--C 102. Can you state that the whole matter was improvised, so to speak?
A. I remember that this order was issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and to the other commanders-in-chief. It was given out that everything was improvised and this was to be the recording of facts, facts which had become and had been put into practice, or the commands and orders had been given orally and in detail as to how things were to take place and how they actually did take place on the 12th of March, the day of the invasion of Austria.
Q I would like to refer to the antecedents of the Case Austria. You know that in the diary of Jodl's it is stated that Schuschnigg is signing only under the greatest pressure politically and militarily. In what way did you take part in this conference on the Obersalzburg, which took place with Schuschnigg?
A. May I complete my previous answer by saying that from this we can say the invasion took place in the morning, that the issuing of the order which was received, actually took place in the evening, for there could have been no practical effect between 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning, and things cannot be started rolling in that short period of time. 11th of February, I would like to say the following in that respect:
It was the first official action in which I participated. In the evening of the 4th Hitler left Berlin and asked me to be at Obersalzburg on the 10th. There, on that day -- the day which has been mentioned frequently here -- the visit of the Federal Chancellor, Schuschnigg, took place. Shortly after I arrived, -- I had no idea as to why I had been summoned -- I met General von Reichenau who had come from Munich and General of the Air Force Sperrle; so that we three Generals were present when perhaps about 10:30 Mr. Schuschnigg arrived with Mr. von Papen. nature, I did not know just what I was to do, and I must tell you this frankl -- otherwise you will not understand what I have to say from now on: In the course of the day I could see that with three representatives of the Wehrmach it was to be a military demonstration, and I may call it such.
questioned just as to what that meant, that in the afternoon suddenly my name was called and I was to visit the Fuehrer. I went into the room to see the Fuehrer -- and it may perhaps sound strange if I say that when I entered the room I thought that he would give me a directive, but used the words, "Please sit down." He told me that Schuschnigg wanted to conduct a short conference with foreign minister, Mr. Schmidt; and beyond that I have nothing to say. I can only assure you that not one word about this political action, which was so imminent, was told me -- only from the fact that Mr. Schuschnigg left only in the evening and further conferences took Place. directive to rather reports, as is known through a document, about mobilization and then I saw that this day had served, with the bringing in of military representatives, to bring the discussions to a conclusion, and the pressure-as it is called -- was to be maintained through this. Canaris, we discussed just what reports were to be brought in. Canaris was at Munich and in order to conclude this matter it is not without interest that the Chief of Intelligence who had been present, Lahousen, told Jodl and me when later on he went into the service of the Wehrmacht that we did not fall for this bluff. And indubitably I gave Jodl the motive and the reason for his entry in the diary, even, though it is a little drastically stated, for that was my first sharp impression.
Q. How can you judge the measures against Austria? That is your position?
A. As far as further developments are concerned, I do not need to say, a it is already set forth -- on the day of the invasion by the troops I accompanied Hitler; we flew to the front. We crossed highways to Braunau, spent the night there, and then proceeded to Vienna. And soberly speaking, it is true that in every village and every twon that we passed we were received most enthusiastically and the Austrian Army marched step by step with us, the German Army. Not a shot was heard. On the other side, on the other hand, the was only one formation that had military significance; it traveled from Passau to Vienna and arrived in Vienna.
This division was on hand for the parade the next day. That was a very sober picture of that which I have seen.
Q. Now, we will come to the question of Czechoslovakia. When for the first time did Hitler discuss the question of Czechoslovakia and his designs and intentions in that regard?
A. I believe six to eight weeks after the invasion in Austria -- that would be the end of April. The other took place in the middle of March. And that took place in the following form:
I was one evening suddenly called to the Reich Chancellery. The Fuehrer then told me those matters and those reasons upon which the well-known directive in the Case Green resulted. The antecedents are well-known through the files of Schmundt, and I have made statements on this in preliminary interrogations. At that time he gave me the first directive, in more or less of a hurry. It was not possible for me to converse with him or discuss this matter with him, for he wished to leave Berlin immediately. And these were the reasons for the question under which conditions military or warlike, against Czechos lovakia could arise of would arise.
Q. Then you had the impression that Hitler wanted to attack Czechoslovak
A. The exposition which he made to me that evening was of such a nature that a preparation of a military action with all its preliminary works, which the General Staff had to do, was to be undertaken, and he used rather precise language when he said that the time was open, and at that time, as he said, he did not have the intention, he did not have the intention at present.
Q. Was there in this connection a differentiation between the Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia?
A. I believe that evening, at that short meeting, we did not have time to discuss this. The Fuehrer did not discuss the political aspects, only the militarily necessary measures, and he gave me these problems for deliberation, He did not say whether we would be content with the Sudetenland or whether one was to break through the Fortress of Czechoslovakia. That was not the problem at that time. In any case, if any of these ideas had to be settled through war and if preparation had to be made, there was to be a conflict with Czechoslovakia, we should be ready.
Q. You know that in the record about the conference Hitler and General Keitel, 21st of March, there has been two versions, that a lightning action in the case of an incident would be considered necessary, and in one, after the word "incident" there is, such as the assassination of a German Ambassador in a demonstration hostile to Germany, while in the second version after the word "incident" there is only "for example". Can you please clarify this, as to the notes of the incident?
A. I saw the notes as taken by Schmundt for the first time here. We did not receive any documents to work with. No record was made. It is a subsequent setting down of notes by an adjutant. As far as the accuracy is concerned, I do not wish to doubt it, for memory would not permit me to say what words were used. But this question is considered significant, that is, the assassination of the German Ambassador in Prague. I never had knowledge of a situation like that at that time, and just for the reason why anything like that was never said; it could have been said that the Ambassador might be assassinated or something like that, and said that if the Ambassador -- and if I recall, Hitler said the war of 1914 arose through the assassination at Sarajevo, and such incidents could happen. That the impression that a war would be created through a provocation on our side, I never had that impression in this situation at that time.
Q. And I would like something further about this record.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 4 April 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte. BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Yesterday we discussed the meeting on the 21st of April between you, Hitler, and Adjutant Schmundt. I show you again Document 388-PS, and ask you to answer me as to whether or not this was a conference in the sense as you defined it yesterday.
A. To a certain extent it is true that I was called and, to my entire surprise, had explained to me thoughts concerning war against Czechoslovakia. This took place in a very short period of time, before Hitler's departure for Berchtesgaden. I do not recall having said one word during this conference, which was very short. Questions were asked of me, and then, with these very surprising directives that I received, I went home.
Q. What happened then, so far as you were concerned?
A. My thoughts during the first hour thereafter were, in view of the military strength that we then possessed, that these measures could not be carried out, and I then calmed myself with the thought that this plan could not be put into execution in the near future. General Jodl. I received no minutes of this meeting, nor any official document regarding it. The talk ended with the decision to let things wait because the was plenty of time, and that this attack on Czechoslovakia was out of the question for military reasons. not my intention in the near future to undertake aggressive action against Czechoslovakia.
Then, in the next weeks, we began the theoretical considerations; this, however, without the participation of the departments of the Wehrmacht, because I was not authorized to consult thorn. military adjutants were asked innumerable questions regarding the strength of divisions, and so on.
Q. I believe we can shorten this. The decisive point could be reached if you would compare, in the document, the outline that you drew up on orders from Obersalzburg, and tell me what resulted from that outline of yours.
A Yes. About four weeks after I was given this job, I sent to Obersalzburg an outline of this project.
A. By way of answer I was informed that Hitler himself would come to Berlin and speak with the high commander in chief of the army. I came to Berlin at the end of May, and I was present at the conference with General von Brauchitsch. In this conference the basic plan was changed althogether. Now Hitler expressed the wish and intention as soon as possible to take military measures against Czechoslovakia. The reasons why he changed his mind were because -- I believe this was the 20th or 21st of May -- Czechoslovakia had ordered general mobilization, and Hitler declared that that could only be directed against us. Military preparations had not been taken by Germany. This was the reason for the complete turnabout of his intentions, which he communicated orally to the commander in chief of the army and ordered him to take steps immediately. This explains the changes in the basic plan -- that is to say, "It is my irrevocable decision to take military action against Czechoslovakia as soon as possible."
Q. War did not take place between Germany and Czechoslovakia because of the Munich agreement. How did you and the generals regard this Munich agreements?
A. We were extraordinarily happy that it had not reached the point of a military operation, because during the time of preparation we had never participated in the basic proposition that our boundary fortifications against Czechoslovakia were sufficient. That would have made necessary our piercing the Czechoslovakian boundary defenses, and we were not strong enough to do that. Moreover, for this reason we were particularly happy that a peaceful solution had been reached.
Q. That effect did this agreement have on the generals' opinion of Hitler?
A. I believe I may say that this raised Hitler greatly in the opinion of the generals. We recognized that although military preparations were not neglected a solution had been found which had not been expected and for which we were thankful.
Q. Is it not extraordinary that three weeks after this agreement that had been so welcomed by everyone, including the generals, Hitler made preparations for the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia?
A. I believe, as Marshal Goering stated in his testimony lately, my impression was this: As Hitler told me then, he did not believe that Czechoslovakia could stand the loss of the Sudeten territories with their strong fortifications; and, moreover, he was concerned over the close connections between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He regarded Czechoslovakia as a threat. That was the military impression I received.
Q. Was it pointed out to Hitler by anyone that there was great danger in a forceful settlement of the problem of Czechoslovakia -- danger from the side of the other great powers, England and others?
A. I did not know of the last talk in Munich between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer, but I always regarded this question it its further ramifications as a political one. Consequently, I did not give expression to my misgivings, all the more since the military preparations that had been made before Munich had been reduced. To discuss the political question was something that did not please the Fuehrer.
Q. In connection with this problem of Czechoslovakia I should like to bring up Colonel Koechling, who was mentioned by the Prosecution as the liaison man with Hitler. Was the Wehrmacht or the OKW a participant in this?
A. Koechling's job was unknown to me. Hitler asked me if an officer was available to carry out a special mission, and if so he should report to Hitler, After I sent Lieutenant Colonel Koechling from Berlin I never saw him again or spoke to him further. I do know, however that, as I found out later, he was with Henlein as military adviser.
Q. The Prosecution has brought up facts as follows: At both the visit of Tiso in March, 1939, as well as the visit of Hacha, you were present, and it was deduced from these facts that you took part in the political discussions that took place at those times. What role did you play on these occasions?
A. It is true that on the occasion of such visits from foreign statesmen I was present in the Reich Chancellory on every occasion -- at any rate, present when they were greeted. I did not take part in the discussions and never took part in concrete discussions of a political nature. I was present for the official greeting and felt that I should be present as a representative of the high office in the Wehrmacht.
But in each individual case that I can recall I withdrew and then waited in the antechamber to see whether I might be needed. I can consequently say that neither with Tiso nor with President Hacha did I say one single word nor take part in the direct discussions that Hitler was carrying out. Lot me add, however, that in the night of President Hacha's visit I was obliged to be present in the Reich Chancellory, because the high command of the army had to be given orders as to how the entry into Czechoslovakia that had been prepared was to be carried out.
Q. In conclusion of this point I wish to ascertain simply this, because I believe it has otherwise been cleared up by Goering's testimony: You never spoke to President Hacha of a possible bombarding of Prague in the event that he should refuse to sign what he was asked to sign?
A. No.
Q. We come now to Poland. Here too the Prosecution accuses you or having participated in the planning of the military action against Poland. Would you like to state your basic attitude towards this eastern problem in brief?
A. The questions connected with Danzig and the Corridor were known to me. I also knew that political discussions and negotiations were connected with these questions. The plan for the attack on Poland -- I had, of course, some connection with these problems. Since I did not concern myself with political matters, I personally was of the opinion that, as in the case of Munich and before, military preparation or -- if I may so call it -- military pressure would play the same sort of role as in my opinion it had played at Munich. I did not believe that without any such military preparation things would develop.
Q Could not this question have been solved by direct negotiations.
question discussions took place several times, as in the case of the question of the Corridor. I recall an expression of an opinion that impressed me at the time, when Hitler said he regretted Marshal Pilsudski's death because he believed that he might have reached some agreement or arrangement with this statesman. This statement was made in my presence then to me. has busied himself with the question of war against Poland. Did you participate in this?
A No. That I cannot recall. I believe I have notes that can demonstrate that this was not the case. I accompanied Hitler on a thorough tour of inspection of the eastern fortifications. At that time we covered the entire Front from Pommerania to Breslau in order to look at the frontier fortifications against Poland. The matter of the fortifications in the east was an important serious question at that time and can only imagine that these were considerations in Autumn of 1938, that stood in some connection with the Danzig and Corridor question and he simply wanted to convince himself that it had been necessary to strengthen these eastern fortifications if the Danzig and Corridor questions should lead to war.
Q Then were the preparations made for the occupation of Danzig?
A I believe that was in the late Autumn of 1938. Orders were issued from East Prussia that Danzig should be occupied at the proper moment in the form of a coup d'etat. More, I don't know.
Q Was the possibility of war discussed in this connection?
A Yes. That is connected with the inspection of the fortifications, and so on, that I just described, but that a specific preparation of some sort for anything more than a coup d'etat was to take place from East Prussia I do not know, and it actually did not take place. these questions, that Danzig should only be occupied if no war with Poland would arise from that.
A Yes, that is so. That remark was made several times, that this occupation of Danzig would only be carried out if it were certain that a war would not result from it.
Q When did this view change?
A I believe that Poland's refusal to negotiate the question of Danzig was apparently the reason for further considerations and steps on the part of Germany. after Munich had been reached by him in connection with the eastern problems, I recall in this connection, that the Czechoslovakian problem was solved without a shot. Perhaps the other German problems in the east could also be solved in that way and I also believe that I remember Hitler saying that he did not believe that the Western powers, particularly England, would concern themselves with these eastern problems of Germany.
Q That is document C-102, the "Case White" question. Then on the 3rd of April 1939, an order was issued. the regular annual instructions regarding the possibility of a mobilization,-a further working over of these matters which were brought up annually and which we knew already from the years 1937 and 1938, but concretely, this was the situation: Hitler, in my presence, gave the commander in chief of the army at this time the order to make preparations of a military and strategic nature for a war against Poland and at this time, Iissued these first reflections, to be seen in this document. It is stated here that the Fuehrer has already ordered this, that it should be carried out by the 1st of October 1939, and the OKW should draw up a schedule for carrying out of these measures.
Q What was your and the other general's attitude towards this war? Czeschoslovakia, both the high command of the army and the generals and also I, myself, disapproved of the motion of waging a war against Poland. We wanted no war in that sense, but, of course, we carried out the orders we had received, -- at least, formally. Our reasons for this were that, according to our knowledge of the military means that we had at our disposal, that is to say, the divisions, their armaments and their inadequate supply of munitions must not be ignored--we recognized as soldiers that we were not ready to wage a war against Poland.
Q. You want, thereby, witness, to state that in your consideration of this matter, only military matters influenced your attitude?
A Yes. I must admit that I did not concern myself with the political consideration. I was only concerned with "can we, or can we not?"
Q That is what I wanted to ascertain. Now, on the 23rd of May, 1939, there was a meeting at which Hitler delivered a speech to the generals. You know of this speech?
Q What was the cause, the reason, and the contents of this speech? and that reminded me of the situation at that time. The tendencies expressed in this speech -- This speech was simply delivered to the generals in order to inform the generals that they had no reason to feel perturbed and to point out that the prerequisites were not yet present and that political negotiations in this matter could still change the situation and still might. This speech was delivered simply by way of encouragement.
point of war? that a solution by way of negotiation would take place as it had before. Our military considerations always were kept in the foreground. We generals believed that France and to a lesser extent England, in view of ots pact of mutual assistance with Poland, would attack and that we did not have the defensive means to combat such an attack. For this reason I personally was always convinced that war would not take place because we could not wage a war both against Poland and against France. August, 1939? salzberg who had been in change of the troops in the East and at that time also Hitler, toward the end of this speech, declared that a pact had been concluded with Soviet Union. I was completely convinced that it would not reach the point of wan because I believed that on these conditions a basis for negotiation was available and that Poland would not be recalcitrant and that there was a satisfactory basis for negotiation, although Hitler said in this speech, which again I read here for the first time, that the preparations should be carried out to the utmost and that it was intended to put them into execution.
Q Did you know that England actually attempted to mediate?
A No, I knew nothing of these matters. It was very surprising to me as it was on the 24th or 25th, only a few days before the conference at Obersalzberg, ] was called to Hitler at the Reichehancellory and he ordered me to stop everything at once, to call Brauchitsch. "I need time for negotiations" he said, I believe that with these few words I was dismissed.
Q What followed thereupon? called to the Fuehrer. Everything was stopped and all decisions regarding a possible military decision were posponed. I believe there was a pause which took place in the military preparations which lasted about five days.
Q Did you know of the so-called minimum demands on Poland?
A I believe that I saw them in the Reichschancellory. I believe Hitler showed them to me personally; that is to say that I knew of them.
Q Since you saw them did you hold these demands to be serious? minutes and as a soldier I naturally believed that these were meant perfectly seriously.
Q Was there talk at that time of border incidents?
A No. This question of border incidents was discussed with me here in my interrogations. During this situation when there were discussions and negotiations at the Reichschancellory there was no mention of border incidents.
Q I now show you document 795-PS. It is a copy -
(witness handed the document) which was then on the first of September was again postponed for twenty-four hours. For this reason Brauchitsch and I were again called to the Reichschancellory and as I recall it the reason for this postponement was that a Polish plenipotentiary was expected and preparations were to wait twenty-four hours until he arrived. Then no further changes were made in the military plans. of illegal military undertakings has been shown me and I know it. There is a subsequent copy made by Canaris of a talk that I had with him. He told me at that time that he was to make available a few Polish uniforms. This had been communicated to him from the Fuehrer through an adjutant. We both agreed that this was intended for some illegal action. If I recall correctly I told. him at that time that I did not see much future in such actions and that he should keep his hands away from such things. We then had a short discussion as to a coup d'etat that was to be undertaken with which the Wehrmacht had been commisioned. I did not know any more that that at that time. I believe I told Canaris that he could evade this whole issue by saying that he had no Polish uniforms and that would settle the matter. on the radio station at Gleiwitz. Did you know this event at all?
testimony of witnesses. I never found out who was commissioned to carry out such things and until I heard testimony here before this Tribunal I knew nothing of this attack on the radio station at Gleitwitz. I also do not recall that I found out at that time that the event had taken place.
Q Did you know of America's and Italy's efforts after the 1st of September 1939; to and the war in one way or another? last few days from the 24th August up to the 1st of September, 1939. I knew nothing of a visit by Dahlerus. I knew nothing of London's intervention. I remember only one thing, that I met Hitler very briefly once in the Reichschancellory and he said to me:
"Do not bother me now, I am writing a letter to Deladier."
It must have been in the first days of September. Of the matters that I found out here and of the steps that were taken after the 1st of September I nor any of the other generals knew anything about that at that time.
Q What did you say to Canaris and Hah Lahousen on the 14 of September. that is shortly before the attack on Warsaw with regard to political matters under the code term "Flurbereiningung" (House cleansing)? here. As I remember, that I had said many things which Hitler had ordered of me and I had passed on these orders to the Commander-in-chief of the army of Poland as to what to do regarding the Polish Police attacks on Germans. I can only say that I repeated what had been said in my presence between Hitler and Brauchitsch. I can make no statements regarding details. several times that as long as he had executive authority in the occupied territory he would tolerate no other officers or departements in that region. On his wish then, in October he was relieved of his responsibility for the government of Poland. I should like therefore to believe that the testimony was not quite correct or from what is set down in notes.