A In the Reich Defense Law of 1938, in order to limit matters, a general plenipotentiary for administration was established.
The Reich Minister of the Interior was to have this office, and, furthermore, as far as sub-section V was concerned,--sub-section IV for Postal and Railroad Matters, the High Command of the Army was to have special preference for in the case of a mobilization, they took care of transport and communications, and this applied in all countries. The Three Men College is a concept which I have never heard until just now. It probably refers to the general plenipotentiary for administration and economy and the chief of the OKW. These three were meant, and there is no doubt about that, and for that reason and since, in line with the Reich Defense Law, they issued, a number of decrees which were to be publicized and announced when this law was made public, and each one concerned had to make the necessary preparations in his own sphere, and this concept of the Three Men College arose. 2852 that you were a member of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. Did you become a minister through this appointment? Council. When the Ministerial Council was created, all the laws of the Reich Defense Council and the Reich Defense Committee disappeared. Therefore, they were never published and never took effect, and the Minister Council for Reich Defense, which originated in the first week of September 1939 absorbed the Reich Defense Council and Committe, and the Ministerial Council was now a small war council. Now a new basis was created, and the decrees which were necessary were put into effect through the Ministerial Council for Reich defense after it had been created and officially confirmed.
I was called into this Ministerial Council. I received a chair in this group, but I prefer not to cite the reasons. They were entirely personal. I was never active in this Ministerial Council for Reich Defense, but I was a member, and it was not necessary since in the purely military sector-that is, things with which the Wehrmacht was concerned -- the Fuehrer, without the Ministerial Council, issued through his own signature decrees, and they had the force of law, and a circumvention by way of the Ministerial Council through Berlin was not necessary, and to the question of whether I actually became a minister or received the functions of a minister through this appointment, I must say, in my opinion; No; I must deny this.
I had no right to exercise the functions of a minister. I was only the deputy of the armed forces of the Wehrmacht in this Ministerial Council. laws which were issued; that you signed these laws. How can you explain the signing of these laws? Ministerial Council Secretariat. That is through the chief of the Reich Chancellory, Minister Lammers. They were given to me with the request to sign these decrees also.
As to the question of the necessity of my doing that, I received a formal answer from Lammers -- so that the other Reich departments could see that the Wehrmacht was not excluded from these laws and decrees, and that is the reason why I signed these decrees. That was the reason -- that the Wehrmacht was to be included and was to obey these laws and decrees. I had no misgivings of any kind in signing my name.
Q. The Prosecution further accuses you of being a political general. Undoubtedly you appeared on special occasions. What can you say to clarify this concept, this accusation, and can you tell us how it came about?
A. I can readily understand that the functions of a ministerial nature which brought me in contact with Reich ministers -- and this was necessarily so because everything in the final analysis touched upon the Wehrmacht -might seem to indicate that I had exercised a political function in these matters. Similarly, ether reasons might be found. That is whether, through my presence, as is shown in many documents, at visits of state that I was present there in such a way and that through that I exercised a political function or had political connections. as far as foreign political matters are concerned, but many things had to be regulated and settled. In almost all decrees which the civilian ministries issued, the Wehrmacht had to be heard in some way and this channel of business took place in Berlin, where I was with the Fuehrer at headquarters, and it also meant that in my many positions in OKW -- that is, in an easing up of the situation there -- I had to work with the various Reich departments and its experts, and in that way it came about that decrees of that sort originated, to which my position and view and the agreement of the Fuehrer had to be received through me, and in that connection I was the person who knew of the view of the High Commanders of the Wehrmacht and I had to unify all of these spheres and aspects in my person. Through my main activities, I was drawn int the general picture, into the general framework, but I do not believe that this would justify that the military chief of staff of the Fuehrer should be termed a political general.
Q. And what was the foreign political situation and the foreign political meetings?
A. As far as foreign politics and policies are concerned, I would like to say only and emphasize what the former Foreign Minister has already said in connection with collaboration of the leadership of the Wehrmacht. If two commanders were to go their separate ways, then it was on one side the Wehrmacht and on the other side foreign politics and especially under the influence of the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer was against collaboration or the exchange of thoughts. He kept us in separate camps, so to speak, and wished to work with each separately and alone. I wish to emphasize that most emphatically, and this applies to all other departments and the representatives who came to head. quarters were received alone; they deliberated with the Fuehrer alone, and left alone. that in regard to keeping in touch with the Foreign Office -- as Steengracht has already touched upon in a small way -- all of these connections were on the basis of international law -- as far as prisoners of war were concerned, dealings with protective powers, and the sphere which appeared to Steengracht when he said that reports of military attaches came through the Foreign Office. During the war, these reports, of course, were of special interest, and they brought about certain contacts. We had to complain that we received these reports too late from the Foreign Office or that we wanted our reports direct, rather than having them circumvented, but as far as the rest is concerned, I would like to emphasize that there was no collaboration of any kind or nay community of work between the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht.
Apr-3-A-RT-19-1 This document has the heading, "Thoughts of the Fuehrer about the Waffen SS" dated 6-8-1940. In this document there is a passage--the document of the OKW- in which the following is set forth: thoughts of the Fuehrer about the Waffen SS can only be desired."
Do you know this document?
A Yes, I saw the document at the time when it was submitted. I read it and I recall it. The origin of this document I believe, I have to clarify. after the war in France Hitler wanted an independant status of the SS, and the Waffen SS were to be converted into special units. Up until that time they had been annexed to various army groups. Now these Groups were to be made into divisions and they were to be independant formations or units from now on in. Then this created unrest in the army, it brought about depression among the Generals, and it was said that this was a rivalry of the army. And then sentence that there was only one group who could bear arms, and that was the Wehrmacht, and this promise had been broken, what would it lead to. Then the Commanderin-chief of the army spoke to the adjutant of Hitler about this rather exasperating affair. And General Schmundt then returned the passage, which is mentioned in this document, with the approval of Hitler. I personally was with the Fuehrer and told the Fuehrer that this was an affront to the army. He decided that this matter should be handled by his adjutant, for the Wehrmacht was not concerned with it. The publication for the calming of dicontent was distributed by the army itself, and the announcement from me that in this case dissemination should be taken care of. And it was satisfactory. Brauchitsch asked that he might distribute even to the smallest unit this announcement so that this might have a calming and quieting influence on the army; that these would be police troops which could not be used in war if they were not recognized at home. Therefore I believe this is the background, and if I am asked what my position is at present on this matter I would like to say that at that time I was active in saying that matters should have their limits; I believe ten percent is mentioned. Then it developes that after 1942 this formation lost the character which it originally had had, the character of elite troops, Apr-3-A-RT-19-2 and it was not to be confused.
And I was afraid that someday this instrument of the Waffen SS, which was more than twenty divisions strong, that it would one day be an army with a different ideology. And I had the greatest misgivings about this matter, especially now, as the things which had come into being did not have a selective character any more. As far as officers and men were concerned there was a transfer of personnel; it was not a selection of volunteers. I do not believe that I need to content further on this point.
Q The prosecution has submitted document L-211 to me. It has the heading "The Carrying Out of the War as a Problem of Organization." It contains the position taken by the OKW to the memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army regarding the organization of the leadership of the Wehrmacht. This document was submitted in order to show that the OKW and you as its chief had aggressive tendencies and had put them down in this study. I assume that you remember this study, and what you can say about the accusation which is based on this study? its existence, of course. In this connection I must mention the antecedents and the background. It is not exaggerated that in the first years of-- in 1920 that is shortly after the completion of the First World War. I believe that in all countries which had participated there was extensive literature about the question, "What is the most expedient way for the leadership of the Wehrmacht?" I wrote this, and I know people in the United States and England and in France who were afterward concerned with the problem of Kriegssnitzengliederung" (Organization of highest army echelon) about which Blomberg said that his position was solution number eight, that seven had been disposed of already.
And in this connection there was rather a struggle between the OKH and the General Staff against the idea of a comprehensive leadership of the Wehrmacht, and with the demand of a large General Staff as in the past to have the leadership potential fixed that way. After OKH was established and Blomberg had faded from the scene the army considered it opportune to bring this matter once more under discussion. Therefore, this memorandum was the result, and that which we see now as a stury is the answer. we were the only men who worked on this. And I can establish that at that time there was no concrete problem, or there was nothing in the nature of preparatory work in case of a war. We were not concerned with that problem at all; we were concerned only because there had been some investigation and some memoranda that we set forth the solutions which to us seemed the right ones.
THE PRESIDENT: Doesn't the document speak for itself? He says he collaborated in it, but that he wasn't concerned with it at all, so that is all that needs to be said. The document speaks for itself then.
DR. NELTE: Perhaps the defendant might be able to clarify some of the thoughts contained in this document, You Honor, and in addition, Mr. President I, so far as document book two is concerned, do submit the affidavit regarding the OKW and the General Staff signed by Keitel and Jodl. It is number two of document book two. I think you should have that before you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that the affidavit of the 28th of March?
DR. NELTE: The 29th of March, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The first one in the book, or where is it?
DR. NELTE: In the second part.
THE PRESIDENT: But what page?
DR. NELTE: There is no consecutive pagination; it is just a table of contents, and under that you will find it as number two.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you quoting then from L-211 now? Are you finished with that?
DR. NELTE: This affidavit belongs to L-211.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought the witness said he had collaborated in the study, which is L-211, and that it wasn't concerned with war. You might leave it at that.
DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, we are concerned in this proceeding with hearing what the defendants have to say to those documents with which we are charged and which accuse them. That which the defendant washes to say to document L-211 in clarification is put down in the affidavit, which is found in document book number two.
THE PRESIDENT: If what he wishes to say was put down in the affidavit then he shouldn't have been asked about it; the affidavit should have been read.
DR. NELTE: The difference between what he will say here and what is in the affidavit is considered substantial. He said very briefly that what he wished to say in a summary. The affidavit is longer, and therefore I believe that I might dispense with reading the affidavit if he could tell us briefly the chief points with which we are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: You and I have a different idea of the word summary.
DR. NELTE: May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Now, I will turn to the complex questions which concern rearmament, and the case of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and so forth. I would like to ask you about the accusation of the prosecution that you participated in the preparation of aggressive wars. correctly, it must be clear just what is meant by aggressive war. Can you tell me your views on that subject?
A. As a soldier, I must ssy that the concept "aggressive war" does not mean very much to me in that sense, as such. We did know about aggressive action, or defensive actions, actions of retreat and how to carry them out, but, according to my own personal and soldierly feeling, the concept "aggressive war" is a purely political concept and not a military, soldierly one. I mean by that, that the Wehrmacht, or the soldier, is a tool of politics, but he is not called upon to decide or to judge whether we are concerned with aggressive war or not, so far as military actions are concerned. officers were not the decisive ones and should not have been such, and that decisions were not the mission of the soldier, but of the statesman.
Q. Then you mean to say that -- and I rather imagine this applies to all commanders-in-chief and offices connected therewith -- as far as the question of whether a war would be an aggressive war or would be conducted for the defense of a country, in the final analysis, whether a war is a just war or not, that does not fall into the sphere of your professional deliberations?
A. No; that is what I wish to express.
Q. Then that is an explanation which you are giving. However, you are not only a soldier, you are a personality as well, a personality who has a life of his own, an inner life. In that respect, didn't you have thoughts about an action which had been planned, that some of these things might be unjust?
A. I believe that I can say to that, only as far as my military career and development is concerned, that I grew up with traditional thoughts, and we were not concerned with these questions.
Naturally, one has an opinion of one's own and one has a life of one's own, but as far as professional functions as a soldier and officer are concerned, when you are a soldier and officer you have given away your personal and private life, and your life as a soldier is first. concerned, that I thought about these purely political questions, and that I was of the opinion that a soldier can demand that he can have the confidence of the state leadership; and, therefore, he is called upon to do his duty and to obey.
Q. Perhaps we can take up the questions one by one.
Did you know Hitler's plans for rearmament, and the, later, plans for aggression, as the prosecution contend. I am concerned chiefly with February 1933 to, let us say, 1938.
A. It was clear to me that with the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor, undoubtedly we soldiers would have a different leadership and would have a different position in the Reich, and that the military factor would find new and different considerations than had been the case before. Therefore we ahiled, frankly and openly, that at the head of the Reich Government there was a man who had decided to bring about an era which was to lead us away from conditions as they had obtained. armament were concerned, so far as I was able to judge them, I hailed these thoughts. my activities at the War Ministry and spent two years at the front. I returned at a period of time when the Wehrhoheit -- that is, military independence -- had been reestablished; rearmament had been declared and it was carried on openly. In the time of my absence I did not follow these matters. with Blomberg, I, of course, saw and experienced everything which took place in connection with rearmament and what was done on the part of the War Ministry in this respect.
Q. Did you know that the occupation of the Rhineland -- that is, of the demilitarized zone -- and the reestablishing of the Wehrhoheit and conscription, the establishment of an air force and the increasing of the number of soldiers, was a violation of the Versailles Treaty?
A. So far as the verbatim language of the Versailles Treaty is concerned, as long as we acknowledged the existence of the Treaty, the terms of the Treaty, of course, did not permit any of those things. A study of the Treaty of Versailles, I can say, was made very intensively in order to find loopholes through which we could, without violating the Treaty, take measures which would not find us guilty of breaking the Treaty. That was in connection with the Reichsverteidigungst Ausschuss (Reich Defense Committee). We were concerned with that. Blomberg, I must state frankly that I had no misgivings as to whether the question rested with us in any way as to whether it was a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, because the things which did take place happened openly. It had been declared by us that we would raise 36 divisions. Discussions had taken place, and I could not see anything which in any was would be considered as a violation of the Treaty, or which could be considered as such by our soldiers. to be free of the territorial and military chains of the Treaty of Versailles. And I must say frankly that any soldier or officer who did not have similar feelings towards his country would be very worthless, in my estimation.
Q. In these proceedings, an order, C-124, was shown, or a command, which hears your signature. We are concerned with aerial reconnaisance and movements of U-boats at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland. Participation on your part, so far as the occupation of the Rhineland was concerned, was mentioned. In what capacity did you sign this order or decree?
A. Von Blomberg had decreed this. It was a mission which General von Blomberg had given me, and I transmitted this decree to the Commander-inchief of the Navy and of the Air Force. I recall that we were concerned with supervisory measures which were to be established during those days in which the three battalions were marching into the demilitarized zone.
himself or through other channels, have knowledge of those things for which there were plans in existence which, contrary to expressed peaceful assurances by Hitler, were to be put into effect only through war?
A I cannot remember. In this period of time until the first practical measures were taken in the case of Austria I heard about a program or a programmatic establishment of a plan which was to go into years. I must say also that we were so occupied and so busy with the reorganization of the small army of seven divisions into an expanded unit--to have them expanded twice and three times--and the creation of an air force, which was nonexistent, that in these years one would have to be in your office to know that we were concerned completely and wholly with organizational problems. can draw the conclusion that it is absolutely clear that we never heard about these things. connection with Hitler? Fuehrer three times. He did not say one word to me and he did not know me. If he knew anything at all about me it could only have been through von Blomberg. Any contact either with the Fuehrer himself or through other ways, perhaps through prominent personages--I had no contacts with him. My first conversation with him was in the last days of January before I was called into office.
Q Did you know about the meeting with Hitler in November of 1937? Didn't you hear about that conference? There was a conference in which Hitler, as it is alleged, made public his last will and testament. I did not know about this, and that I for the first time saw the minutes or a record of this meeting. I believe it is the Hoszbach document. And I do not in any way remember that von Blomberg after this conference gave me any directions that I was to take any preparatory measures. That is definitely not the case.
Q Did you know of the territorial demands on the part of Hitler?
A Yes. I must affirm that. I had received word, and I knew from public political discussions, that a series of territorial problems, as a result of the Treaty of Versailles, was an aim--to have these territorial matters settled in one way or another sooner or later; that is correct. solution of these territorial problems at that time? military problems. I can say only in 1935, when I left my troops, none of these 24 divisions which were to be established existed. I considered all of this, not from the point of view of political aims, but with the sober consideration that we could not do anything through military means if we had no military means at our disposal. rearmament, and in 1935 the end-term for the navy was 1945. Therefore, we had ten years in which to raise a concentrated wehrmacht. not consider them acute, for I considered it impossible to realize these plans in ways other than were at hand. preparation for mobilization? and was in line with cur traditional general staff tendency which had been in existence even before the First World War -- that something like that must, as a matter of basic principle, be prepared for. But as far as political planning on the part of Hitler was concerned, it had nothing to do with any planning of that sort, for at that time I was already the chief of staff with Blomberg and Jodl was at that time concerned with landesverteidigung (land defense). Perhaps it is a bit presumptuous for me to say that we were very much satisfied that at last we were beginning to tell the Wehrmacht every year with what it was to concern itself spiritually and theoretically. In the old education in line with the general staff tradition which I received, it was the chief aim of the directive of this sort that travels were to be stopped. This was the way in old officialdom. But I cannot say whether Blomberg had thoughts of belligerent complications or whether he was respon sible for such thoughts or in what way he may have been influenced by Hitler, but I am surethat Hitler never saw this document.
It was an internal problem of the Wehrmacht.
Q But in it you find a reference to "Fall Otto" (Case Otto), and you knew that that was the affair with Austria.
A Yes, I remember of course, the Case Otto; and, as is plain to see from the name, Otto von Hapsburg is meant. Certainly there were certain reports about an attempted restoration, and with this condition perhaps an armed intervention was to take place; but the Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, wished to oppose that. He did not wish a restoration of the monarchy in Austria. Later on there was a connection in the case of the Anschluss, but I do not, I believe, need to mention that. Perhaps I may refer to this later. by the army a preparation was at hand which would bring about the Case Otto. crete orders were not given to the effect that the Case Otto-
A You mean annexation? I can say only that which I experienced when I was sent by Hitler to General Beck. I went into the study and said that the Fuehrer demanded that you report to him immediately and report to him above the preparation which already existed for an eventual invasion of Austria, and the then General Beck said, "We have prepared nothing; nothing at all." of Austria was put into effect in March of 1938. I have a directive regarding the Case Otto--C 102. Can you state that the whole matter was improvised, so to speak?
A. I remember that this order was issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and to the other commanders-in-chief. It was given out that everything was improvised and this was to be the recording of facts, facts which had become and had been put into practice, or the commands and orders had been given orally and in detail as to how things were to take place and how they actually did take place on the 12th of March, the day of the invasion of Austria.
Q I would like to refer to the antecedents of the Case Austria. You know that in the diary of Jodl's it is stated that Schuschnigg is signing only under the greatest pressure politically and militarily. In what way did you take part in this conference on the Obersalzburg, which took place with Schuschnigg?
A. May I complete my previous answer by saying that from this we can say the invasion took place in the morning, that the issuing of the order which was received, actually took place in the evening, for there could have been no practical effect between 10 in the evening and 6 in the morning, and things cannot be started rolling in that short period of time. 11th of February, I would like to say the following in that respect:
It was the first official action in which I participated. In the evening of the 4th Hitler left Berlin and asked me to be at Obersalzburg on the 10th. There, on that day -- the day which has been mentioned frequently here -- the visit of the Federal Chancellor, Schuschnigg, took place. Shortly after I arrived, -- I had no idea as to why I had been summoned -- I met General von Reichenau who had come from Munich and General of the Air Force Sperrle; so that we three Generals were present when perhaps about 10:30 Mr. Schuschnigg arrived with Mr. von Papen. nature, I did not know just what I was to do, and I must tell you this frankl -- otherwise you will not understand what I have to say from now on: In the course of the day I could see that with three representatives of the Wehrmach it was to be a military demonstration, and I may call it such.
questioned just as to what that meant, that in the afternoon suddenly my name was called and I was to visit the Fuehrer. I went into the room to see the Fuehrer -- and it may perhaps sound strange if I say that when I entered the room I thought that he would give me a directive, but used the words, "Please sit down." He told me that Schuschnigg wanted to conduct a short conference with foreign minister, Mr. Schmidt; and beyond that I have nothing to say. I can only assure you that not one word about this political action, which was so imminent, was told me -- only from the fact that Mr. Schuschnigg left only in the evening and further conferences took Place. directive to rather reports, as is known through a document, about mobilization and then I saw that this day had served, with the bringing in of military representatives, to bring the discussions to a conclusion, and the pressure-as it is called -- was to be maintained through this. Canaris, we discussed just what reports were to be brought in. Canaris was at Munich and in order to conclude this matter it is not without interest that the Chief of Intelligence who had been present, Lahousen, told Jodl and me when later on he went into the service of the Wehrmacht that we did not fall for this bluff. And indubitably I gave Jodl the motive and the reason for his entry in the diary, even, though it is a little drastically stated, for that was my first sharp impression.
Q. How can you judge the measures against Austria? That is your position?
A. As far as further developments are concerned, I do not need to say, a it is already set forth -- on the day of the invasion by the troops I accompanied Hitler; we flew to the front. We crossed highways to Braunau, spent the night there, and then proceeded to Vienna. And soberly speaking, it is true that in every village and every twon that we passed we were received most enthusiastically and the Austrian Army marched step by step with us, the German Army. Not a shot was heard. On the other side, on the other hand, the was only one formation that had military significance; it traveled from Passau to Vienna and arrived in Vienna.
This division was on hand for the parade the next day. That was a very sober picture of that which I have seen.
Q. Now, we will come to the question of Czechoslovakia. When for the first time did Hitler discuss the question of Czechoslovakia and his designs and intentions in that regard?
A. I believe six to eight weeks after the invasion in Austria -- that would be the end of April. The other took place in the middle of March. And that took place in the following form:
I was one evening suddenly called to the Reich Chancellery. The Fuehrer then told me those matters and those reasons upon which the well-known directive in the Case Green resulted. The antecedents are well-known through the files of Schmundt, and I have made statements on this in preliminary interrogations. At that time he gave me the first directive, in more or less of a hurry. It was not possible for me to converse with him or discuss this matter with him, for he wished to leave Berlin immediately. And these were the reasons for the question under which conditions military or warlike, against Czechos lovakia could arise of would arise.
Q. Then you had the impression that Hitler wanted to attack Czechoslovak
A. The exposition which he made to me that evening was of such a nature that a preparation of a military action with all its preliminary works, which the General Staff had to do, was to be undertaken, and he used rather precise language when he said that the time was open, and at that time, as he said, he did not have the intention, he did not have the intention at present.
Q. Was there in this connection a differentiation between the Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia?
A. I believe that evening, at that short meeting, we did not have time to discuss this. The Fuehrer did not discuss the political aspects, only the militarily necessary measures, and he gave me these problems for deliberation, He did not say whether we would be content with the Sudetenland or whether one was to break through the Fortress of Czechoslovakia. That was not the problem at that time. In any case, if any of these ideas had to be settled through war and if preparation had to be made, there was to be a conflict with Czechoslovakia, we should be ready.
Q. You know that in the record about the conference Hitler and General Keitel, 21st of March, there has been two versions, that a lightning action in the case of an incident would be considered necessary, and in one, after the word "incident" there is, such as the assassination of a German Ambassador in a demonstration hostile to Germany, while in the second version after the word "incident" there is only "for example". Can you please clarify this, as to the notes of the incident?
A. I saw the notes as taken by Schmundt for the first time here. We did not receive any documents to work with. No record was made. It is a subsequent setting down of notes by an adjutant. As far as the accuracy is concerned, I do not wish to doubt it, for memory would not permit me to say what words were used. But this question is considered significant, that is, the assassination of the German Ambassador in Prague. I never had knowledge of a situation like that at that time, and just for the reason why anything like that was never said; it could have been said that the Ambassador might be assassinated or something like that, and said that if the Ambassador -- and if I recall, Hitler said the war of 1914 arose through the assassination at Sarajevo, and such incidents could happen. That the impression that a war would be created through a provocation on our side, I never had that impression in this situation at that time.
Q. And I would like something further about this record.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 4 April 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte. BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Yesterday we discussed the meeting on the 21st of April between you, Hitler, and Adjutant Schmundt. I show you again Document 388-PS, and ask you to answer me as to whether or not this was a conference in the sense as you defined it yesterday.
A. To a certain extent it is true that I was called and, to my entire surprise, had explained to me thoughts concerning war against Czechoslovakia. This took place in a very short period of time, before Hitler's departure for Berchtesgaden. I do not recall having said one word during this conference, which was very short. Questions were asked of me, and then, with these very surprising directives that I received, I went home.
Q. What happened then, so far as you were concerned?
A. My thoughts during the first hour thereafter were, in view of the military strength that we then possessed, that these measures could not be carried out, and I then calmed myself with the thought that this plan could not be put into execution in the near future. General Jodl. I received no minutes of this meeting, nor any official document regarding it. The talk ended with the decision to let things wait because the was plenty of time, and that this attack on Czechoslovakia was out of the question for military reasons. not my intention in the near future to undertake aggressive action against Czechoslovakia.