Nobody in such a situation could have the possibility or could have found the energy to say anything. To use just one word for it, and I certainly do not exaggerate, it was the issuing of an order but not a conference. been a member of the Reich Government. What do you have to say about that?
A I never belonged to the Reich Government. I was never a member of the cabinet and I have to state that I never became a minister but as it is expressed in the decree of 1938 -- he had the rank of Reichsminister. He is not a Minister. The expression "Minister" is, of course, simply intended to mean with the rank of Minister. There was a good reason for that. that I had the rank of a Minister, I have to clarify that by saying that I put the question when the decree was issued with whom I had to deal, with the State Secretary or with the Minister and Hitler said: "If you deal on my orders with other departments of the Reich then, of course, you can only do that with the rank of a Minister." That is the explanation for that expression in the decree -- he has the rank of a Reichsminister.
such as Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Speer and Sauckel, did you have any conferences with them? following a certain plan and very seldom lead to the simultaneous presence of several of them. Generally, it was so devised that everyone was coming at a certain time. I was informed, of course, generally, that the Foreign Minister was there, or Mr. Speer, or the Plenipotentiary for Manpower Sauckel, but only in case of purely military questions I was called for conferences which the Fuehrer had with these gentlemen alone and I could name examples for that, but as it has been mentioned during the interrogation of State Secretary Steengracht, it would be wrong to believe that these gentlemen who came to headquarters would have formed a sort of small cabinet. Hitler dealt with and spoke to actually everyone of these officials alone, gave him his orders, and sent him away with these orders, and it certainly happened that on the way home, these gentlemen may have paid a visit to me, mostly with small questions and asking small favors which I could do for them, or with the order to forward a decision to those military officers who had to know about it. expression, which is included in the indictment, "intimate", whether that is correct in describing the relations between you and Hitler, privately or officially?
A I have found the "intimate" in the Indictment and I asked myself what made anybody think so and if I shall be quite frank, I can only answer that question by saying that nobody ever heard from a single word about the actual conditions and the difficulties that I have had. I kept quiet about them. "Intimate", -- we call these relations -- I don't know if the English translation "intimate" expresses the same thing which we call "intim" -that is to say, a relation of confidence, of frank statements. That did not exist. I have characterized it before already, that it was not in keeping with Hitler's mentality to stand on an "intimate" footing with his older generals, amongst whom I was the eldest, independent of the formal relations which had formerly been, sometimes for weeks and months, just the form that was kept.
The relation has never gotten to where one could classify it as that of a close advisor or a close assistant and such as I had known it from my many positions on staffs. I must say that with which I am then concerned, I have been faithful and loyal and I always considered it my duty in my position and I have also to say that a sincere relation based upon personal understanding and confidence never existed. It was always a correct relation but it was military, official, and never went beyond that. was established. According to the content of that decree, you are supposed to have been a member of that Cabinet Council. In order to save time, I only want to ask you: Do you confirm the statement made by Reichsmarshal Goering, from your own knowledge, that the establishment of that Secret Cabinet Council was only for reasons of prestige and that Cabinet Council was never constituted and that it never had a session?
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I should like to take the opportunity -- here is the English translation. I come now to the questions of the Reich Defense Council --"Reichsverteidigungsrat." In the session of the 23rd of November, the prosecutor has submitted in evidence as proof for the rearmament and the active participation of the Wehrmacht, of the Armed Forces, in the planning of wars of aggression. Submitted, among others, is the document EC-177, which was designated as "Meeting of the Reich Defense Council of the 22nd of May 1933." I have to say that I have taken the translation from the transcript and I am not sure whether the expression "Reichsverteidigungsrat" -- Reich Defense Council -- was translated correctly. It says in the transcript that it was a meeting of the committee, the working committee. For your orientation, may I say that the "Reichsverteidigungsrat" was supposed to be a sort of ministerial forum and that inside of it there existed a working committee. organization on the 7th of March 1934; and a third document 2261-PS dealing with the appointment of Dr. Schacht as Plenipotentiary for the Economy. BY DR. NELTE:
witness, and these documents are also used, submitted against you as evidence.
I ask you, therefore, to state your position as to whether these meetings in which you participated and which you have conducted, were concerned with the preparations for war and rearmament.
A One moment, please. From the very beginning, as long as we were concerned with these things, as long as it was a committee of experts from which everything else evolved, I have been active in these affairs and I may speak of myself as the founder of that committee of experts of the ministry for the purpose of coordination with the War Ministry. As Chief of the Department of the Organization of the Army, in the winter of 1929 and 1930, that is, three years before the time when Hitler came to power, I have formed that council, that committee after the Chancellor --- I believe it was Bruenig-and the Prussian and Reichsminister of the Interior Severing had consented to it, and there was always the Deputy of the Minister Severing present to make sure that nothing happened there which would have been in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. That work was very difficult because no minister and no chief of the department was obliged officially to carry out the demands of the War Ministry or the army and it was purely voluntary. Consequently, the work went along with great difficulties and very slowly. We dealt in this committee of experts, which convened perhaps twice or three times during the year; and if I may summarize it, we dealt with the problem, "what assistance can we get from the civilian departments in order to free the small army of one hundred thousand soldiers for purely military tasks?"
Of course, the question of the perfection of our borders, such as is stated in the Treaty of Versailles, I could still say from memory what we talked about, since, with the exception of the time from '33 to '35 I have conducted every cue of these meetings myself or at least was the chairman of the meetings, rot the chairman of the committee. I can point to the mobilization book for civilian authorities, which I will mention later again, which was the outcome of this work. for our borders, and, in order to be better understood, I may mention some of them. The armed forces should be relieved of the duty to safeguard the bridges; the customs organization should take care of customs; the connection of East Prussia should be improved. These were all defensive measure in order to free the soldiers for purely military functions. This was for the purpose of a purely military use, and I do not have to clarify any more how little could have been done with an army of 100,000 men. All the questions which could have gone beyond that scope were never dealt with in that committee, and the way in which we worked was this: departments and then to try by persuasion to assure that these departments took care of the various tasks so that we could say that we had nothing to do with it. The question of an operational strategic nature, armament questions, supply questions, as I can guarantee, were never discussed in this committee. There were only questions of an organizational nature, of taking over functions which generally should be the task of the soldiers, but which we wanted to transfer to civil authorities. several times already in the heading of the minutes, we can see, until now the Reich War Ministry, and now by duty the department heads, that is the ministers, who received the designation "defense counsel". I have to say that more clearly so that it should not be misunderstood. Each member of the committee represented one ministry, and the superior competent for this member, who was a Minister, formed with his colleagues, according to our usage of the term at that time, the Reich Defense Counsel. Therefore this remark "So far, the competent Reich War Minister, now the others, are obliged to carry cut" that and that.
Especially in paragraph 3 the plans were mentioned.
The plans, in other words, have preceded the mobilization book, which is the final stage while these plans were in the intermediary stage, I would say in the year 1933. have been emphasized here by the Prosecution concerning the secrecy, where I have said, "Such, as the minutes, include that nothing written should pile up on the desks of the ministries which could lead to objections at the disarmament conference at Geneva." That is true as I have said it, and I have said it because those exports told me that, with the exception of a small drawer in the desk which could not be locked, they did not possess any place where they could safeguard the documents, and because the then Reich War Minister von Blomberg, who had been in Geneva almost two years, at the disarmament conference, gave me the definite order before that meeting was held to emphasize these things because people in Geneva were surrounded with a large number of agents who were only waiting to be able to present proof that, in spite of the negotiations for disarment, things were going on which represented violations of the Versailles Treaty. It is document RS-1639. It has been submitted in order to prove that we are confronted here with the planning of aggressive wars. Would you please explain to us what the purpose of this book was? '32, '33. The various ministries had so-called working schedules which included some sort of check lists, and in the curse of years, of course, a number of new tasks have been added to those listed, and that led to this mobilization book for the civil administration, the study of which would certainly not produce anything which would have anything to do with strategic or operational prepartions for war. On the other hand, I am not in a position to prove that everything which was in this book would sever have been useful in military operations which may be called aggressive war because one could say that most of these measures would not show, in the cases of mobilization, whether it is a measure for the defense or a measure which is necessary for an aggressive action.
That could not be determined. But I believe I can say, because I, myself, personally have engaged in this work more than anybody else, that there was no reason at all to burden the civilian experts with strategic questions of military planning and I believe that doesn't even have to be proved.
I have this mobilization book here and I went through it. I studied it. I do not wish to bore anybody by citing points which are of a defensive nature or the increase of the border supplies, measures against the interruptions of the railroad traffic, and similar things. One of the most important chapters, if I remember correctly, with which we occupied ourselves during four or five of these sessions, was the question of evacuation of territories close to the border, so that, in case of a war, we should not fall into the hands of the enemy. This problem of evacuation was one of the most difficult ones. To determine the border region which can be evacuated is one of the most difficult decisions. In supplementing the things which I have expressed before, until the year 1938, at no time has there been a meeting or a session of the Reich Defense Counsel. That is to say, the ministers who were superior to the committee never, not a single time -- I would have to know that -- although in the cabinet meeting, I believe already in the month of March, 1933, the resolution had been taken to give these ministers the responsibility of a Reich defense counsel and to oblige them to take over these tasks in the interest of the defense of the Reich, and, of course, also to finance them, -- that was the main purpose -- the Reich defense counsel never had a meeting. time from '33 to '38 are then meetings of committees, but you know that eight days ago minutes of meetings of the Reich defense counsel have been submitted; one meeting or assembly, supposedly, was in November, 1938, and the other one in March, 1939. Unfortunately, I have not received these documents, but I have looked at them and you have seen then also.
Can you explain to us how it came to these meetings and what they mean?
A. I only want to say a few words after the explanation which Reichsmarshal Goering has already given. In September, 1938, the Reich Defense Law, which existed until then, since 1935, and had not been published, had to be changed for the reason that the Reich Defense Law of '35 was based upon the function of the Reich War Minister and commander in chief of the armed forces, and that office did not exist any more. I was with the Reichsmarshal Goering to discuss with him. how to find a new basis for this law, which until then had existed without having been published. That law of the fall of 1938 had a number of supplementary points compared to the old one, and perhaps I will have a chance to mention the details later. Among other things, here, also, the Reichsmarshal Goering was the deputy of the Fuehrer, whereas before it had been the Reich War Minister, a function which I could not have. by the Reichsmarshal in order to present this non-published law and this law which was not supposed to be published, but to present it to a circle of about seventy or more people, to whom the Reichsmarshal explained the purpose and the essence of this law in the form of a speech. Discussions of any kind did not take place beyond that speech, and one cannot speak of it as a meeting, definitely, of the Reich defense counsel. Defense counsel the other day, Reichsverteidigungsrat, and also the minutes of that meeting of summer, 1939.
Q. No, March, 1939.
A. That was called here, and I believe it was also the second meeting of the Reich defense counsel. I can explain that.
Goering, and the schedule was presented to Goering and the names of the people who were to be invited. Reich Marshal Goering let me know that he would come himself and he would extend the circle to include a number of people who would be present. This discussion, therefore, was based on a definite agenda; concrete questions were brought up. It is, however, remarkable that according to the list of those present, the members of the Reich Defense Council were only representedby a very small number, although there were about forty or fifty people present. The Reich Defense Council itself was an organization of twelve people, and it needs no further explanation that according to the form in which these two discussions or meetings took place, one could not say that this was a plenary session of the Reich Defense Counsel based on a definite schedule; but there were two meetings, and to the extent which I have described.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal think that you might get on a little more quickly with the Defendant. The Tribunal recall that you asked a few days ago that you might submit an affidavit of the Defendant's evidence, and there is in your document book an affidavit. You have been over all those matters in the affidavit at very much greater length than you would have gone into them if you read the affidavit, and we hope that you will be able to deal more shortly with the evidence in future.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I believe I made every effort to be as brief and concise in my questions as possible, but the evaluation and judgment is, of course, always subjective. The Defendant is the one who is the most often quotedin this proceeding and he is the most often mentioned, and naturally he is interested in having those matters clarified which he considers vital, in order to present his picture clearly and decisively.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Nelte, I don't think it is necessary to discuss the matter further; but the Tribunal have expressed their wish.
DR. NELTE: As far as I am able, I shall comply with your request, Mr. President.
(The Defendant Keitel resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
BY DR. NELTE (Continued): how they differed. You must have a clear picture that we are not so much concerned and should not be concerned so much, whether decisions were made by the Reich Defense Counsel or its committee. We are concerned and interested in those things which actually did take place and whether the things that did take place and happen were in accordance with the assertion and contention of the Prosecution, and to that extent I request you to tell me those things which you deliberated on in your committee. Was it such as to justify the suspicion that you were considering aggressive war? whether it was the Council or its committee, but the committee was a group of small insignificant experts. And we are concerned with those things which actually did take place, what was done, and with the limitation that in the year 1934 and until the autumn of 1935 I was not present at these deliberations and discussions, and therefore cannot vouch for every word which was spoken at that time. I must state that any and all things which might be for the preparation of wars in an operational armament or strategical preparation, such matters were never discussed. and as a result of that you are supposed to have had certain obligations or certain commands as far as the German Reich Government was concerned. I am submitting Document 2194.-PS to you. In this document you will find regarding the Reich Defense Law of 1936, paragraph 5, sub-section 4, the source of the term which in itself, of course, is not official.
A In the Reich Defense Law of 1938, in order to limit matters, a general plenipotentiary for administration was established.
The Reich Minister of the Interior was to have this office, and, furthermore, as far as sub-section V was concerned,--sub-section IV for Postal and Railroad Matters, the High Command of the Army was to have special preference for in the case of a mobilization, they took care of transport and communications, and this applied in all countries. The Three Men College is a concept which I have never heard until just now. It probably refers to the general plenipotentiary for administration and economy and the chief of the OKW. These three were meant, and there is no doubt about that, and for that reason and since, in line with the Reich Defense Law, they issued, a number of decrees which were to be publicized and announced when this law was made public, and each one concerned had to make the necessary preparations in his own sphere, and this concept of the Three Men College arose. 2852 that you were a member of the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. Did you become a minister through this appointment? Council. When the Ministerial Council was created, all the laws of the Reich Defense Council and the Reich Defense Committee disappeared. Therefore, they were never published and never took effect, and the Minister Council for Reich Defense, which originated in the first week of September 1939 absorbed the Reich Defense Council and Committe, and the Ministerial Council was now a small war council. Now a new basis was created, and the decrees which were necessary were put into effect through the Ministerial Council for Reich defense after it had been created and officially confirmed.
I was called into this Ministerial Council. I received a chair in this group, but I prefer not to cite the reasons. They were entirely personal. I was never active in this Ministerial Council for Reich Defense, but I was a member, and it was not necessary since in the purely military sector-that is, things with which the Wehrmacht was concerned -- the Fuehrer, without the Ministerial Council, issued through his own signature decrees, and they had the force of law, and a circumvention by way of the Ministerial Council through Berlin was not necessary, and to the question of whether I actually became a minister or received the functions of a minister through this appointment, I must say, in my opinion; No; I must deny this.
I had no right to exercise the functions of a minister. I was only the deputy of the armed forces of the Wehrmacht in this Ministerial Council. laws which were issued; that you signed these laws. How can you explain the signing of these laws? Ministerial Council Secretariat. That is through the chief of the Reich Chancellory, Minister Lammers. They were given to me with the request to sign these decrees also.
As to the question of the necessity of my doing that, I received a formal answer from Lammers -- so that the other Reich departments could see that the Wehrmacht was not excluded from these laws and decrees, and that is the reason why I signed these decrees. That was the reason -- that the Wehrmacht was to be included and was to obey these laws and decrees. I had no misgivings of any kind in signing my name.
Q. The Prosecution further accuses you of being a political general. Undoubtedly you appeared on special occasions. What can you say to clarify this concept, this accusation, and can you tell us how it came about?
A. I can readily understand that the functions of a ministerial nature which brought me in contact with Reich ministers -- and this was necessarily so because everything in the final analysis touched upon the Wehrmacht -might seem to indicate that I had exercised a political function in these matters. Similarly, ether reasons might be found. That is whether, through my presence, as is shown in many documents, at visits of state that I was present there in such a way and that through that I exercised a political function or had political connections. as far as foreign political matters are concerned, but many things had to be regulated and settled. In almost all decrees which the civilian ministries issued, the Wehrmacht had to be heard in some way and this channel of business took place in Berlin, where I was with the Fuehrer at headquarters, and it also meant that in my many positions in OKW -- that is, in an easing up of the situation there -- I had to work with the various Reich departments and its experts, and in that way it came about that decrees of that sort originated, to which my position and view and the agreement of the Fuehrer had to be received through me, and in that connection I was the person who knew of the view of the High Commanders of the Wehrmacht and I had to unify all of these spheres and aspects in my person. Through my main activities, I was drawn int the general picture, into the general framework, but I do not believe that this would justify that the military chief of staff of the Fuehrer should be termed a political general.
Q. And what was the foreign political situation and the foreign political meetings?
A. As far as foreign politics and policies are concerned, I would like to say only and emphasize what the former Foreign Minister has already said in connection with collaboration of the leadership of the Wehrmacht. If two commanders were to go their separate ways, then it was on one side the Wehrmacht and on the other side foreign politics and especially under the influence of the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer was against collaboration or the exchange of thoughts. He kept us in separate camps, so to speak, and wished to work with each separately and alone. I wish to emphasize that most emphatically, and this applies to all other departments and the representatives who came to head. quarters were received alone; they deliberated with the Fuehrer alone, and left alone. that in regard to keeping in touch with the Foreign Office -- as Steengracht has already touched upon in a small way -- all of these connections were on the basis of international law -- as far as prisoners of war were concerned, dealings with protective powers, and the sphere which appeared to Steengracht when he said that reports of military attaches came through the Foreign Office. During the war, these reports, of course, were of special interest, and they brought about certain contacts. We had to complain that we received these reports too late from the Foreign Office or that we wanted our reports direct, rather than having them circumvented, but as far as the rest is concerned, I would like to emphasize that there was no collaboration of any kind or nay community of work between the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht.
Apr-3-A-RT-19-1 This document has the heading, "Thoughts of the Fuehrer about the Waffen SS" dated 6-8-1940. In this document there is a passage--the document of the OKW- in which the following is set forth: thoughts of the Fuehrer about the Waffen SS can only be desired."
Do you know this document?
A Yes, I saw the document at the time when it was submitted. I read it and I recall it. The origin of this document I believe, I have to clarify. after the war in France Hitler wanted an independant status of the SS, and the Waffen SS were to be converted into special units. Up until that time they had been annexed to various army groups. Now these Groups were to be made into divisions and they were to be independant formations or units from now on in. Then this created unrest in the army, it brought about depression among the Generals, and it was said that this was a rivalry of the army. And then sentence that there was only one group who could bear arms, and that was the Wehrmacht, and this promise had been broken, what would it lead to. Then the Commanderin-chief of the army spoke to the adjutant of Hitler about this rather exasperating affair. And General Schmundt then returned the passage, which is mentioned in this document, with the approval of Hitler. I personally was with the Fuehrer and told the Fuehrer that this was an affront to the army. He decided that this matter should be handled by his adjutant, for the Wehrmacht was not concerned with it. The publication for the calming of dicontent was distributed by the army itself, and the announcement from me that in this case dissemination should be taken care of. And it was satisfactory. Brauchitsch asked that he might distribute even to the smallest unit this announcement so that this might have a calming and quieting influence on the army; that these would be police troops which could not be used in war if they were not recognized at home. Therefore I believe this is the background, and if I am asked what my position is at present on this matter I would like to say that at that time I was active in saying that matters should have their limits; I believe ten percent is mentioned. Then it developes that after 1942 this formation lost the character which it originally had had, the character of elite troops, Apr-3-A-RT-19-2 and it was not to be confused.
And I was afraid that someday this instrument of the Waffen SS, which was more than twenty divisions strong, that it would one day be an army with a different ideology. And I had the greatest misgivings about this matter, especially now, as the things which had come into being did not have a selective character any more. As far as officers and men were concerned there was a transfer of personnel; it was not a selection of volunteers. I do not believe that I need to content further on this point.
Q The prosecution has submitted document L-211 to me. It has the heading "The Carrying Out of the War as a Problem of Organization." It contains the position taken by the OKW to the memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army regarding the organization of the leadership of the Wehrmacht. This document was submitted in order to show that the OKW and you as its chief had aggressive tendencies and had put them down in this study. I assume that you remember this study, and what you can say about the accusation which is based on this study? its existence, of course. In this connection I must mention the antecedents and the background. It is not exaggerated that in the first years of-- in 1920 that is shortly after the completion of the First World War. I believe that in all countries which had participated there was extensive literature about the question, "What is the most expedient way for the leadership of the Wehrmacht?" I wrote this, and I know people in the United States and England and in France who were afterward concerned with the problem of Kriegssnitzengliederung" (Organization of highest army echelon) about which Blomberg said that his position was solution number eight, that seven had been disposed of already.
And in this connection there was rather a struggle between the OKH and the General Staff against the idea of a comprehensive leadership of the Wehrmacht, and with the demand of a large General Staff as in the past to have the leadership potential fixed that way. After OKH was established and Blomberg had faded from the scene the army considered it opportune to bring this matter once more under discussion. Therefore, this memorandum was the result, and that which we see now as a stury is the answer. we were the only men who worked on this. And I can establish that at that time there was no concrete problem, or there was nothing in the nature of preparatory work in case of a war. We were not concerned with that problem at all; we were concerned only because there had been some investigation and some memoranda that we set forth the solutions which to us seemed the right ones.
THE PRESIDENT: Doesn't the document speak for itself? He says he collaborated in it, but that he wasn't concerned with it at all, so that is all that needs to be said. The document speaks for itself then.
DR. NELTE: Perhaps the defendant might be able to clarify some of the thoughts contained in this document, You Honor, and in addition, Mr. President I, so far as document book two is concerned, do submit the affidavit regarding the OKW and the General Staff signed by Keitel and Jodl. It is number two of document book two. I think you should have that before you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that the affidavit of the 28th of March?
DR. NELTE: The 29th of March, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: The first one in the book, or where is it?
DR. NELTE: In the second part.
THE PRESIDENT: But what page?
DR. NELTE: There is no consecutive pagination; it is just a table of contents, and under that you will find it as number two.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you quoting then from L-211 now? Are you finished with that?
DR. NELTE: This affidavit belongs to L-211.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought the witness said he had collaborated in the study, which is L-211, and that it wasn't concerned with war. You might leave it at that.
DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, we are concerned in this proceeding with hearing what the defendants have to say to those documents with which we are charged and which accuse them. That which the defendant washes to say to document L-211 in clarification is put down in the affidavit, which is found in document book number two.
THE PRESIDENT: If what he wishes to say was put down in the affidavit then he shouldn't have been asked about it; the affidavit should have been read.
DR. NELTE: The difference between what he will say here and what is in the affidavit is considered substantial. He said very briefly that what he wished to say in a summary. The affidavit is longer, and therefore I believe that I might dispense with reading the affidavit if he could tell us briefly the chief points with which we are concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: You and I have a different idea of the word summary.
DR. NELTE: May I continue, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Now, I will turn to the complex questions which concern rearmament, and the case of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and so forth. I would like to ask you about the accusation of the prosecution that you participated in the preparation of aggressive wars. correctly, it must be clear just what is meant by aggressive war. Can you tell me your views on that subject?
A. As a soldier, I must ssy that the concept "aggressive war" does not mean very much to me in that sense, as such. We did know about aggressive action, or defensive actions, actions of retreat and how to carry them out, but, according to my own personal and soldierly feeling, the concept "aggressive war" is a purely political concept and not a military, soldierly one. I mean by that, that the Wehrmacht, or the soldier, is a tool of politics, but he is not called upon to decide or to judge whether we are concerned with aggressive war or not, so far as military actions are concerned. officers were not the decisive ones and should not have been such, and that decisions were not the mission of the soldier, but of the statesman.
Q. Then you mean to say that -- and I rather imagine this applies to all commanders-in-chief and offices connected therewith -- as far as the question of whether a war would be an aggressive war or would be conducted for the defense of a country, in the final analysis, whether a war is a just war or not, that does not fall into the sphere of your professional deliberations?
A. No; that is what I wish to express.
Q. Then that is an explanation which you are giving. However, you are not only a soldier, you are a personality as well, a personality who has a life of his own, an inner life. In that respect, didn't you have thoughts about an action which had been planned, that some of these things might be unjust?
A. I believe that I can say to that, only as far as my military career and development is concerned, that I grew up with traditional thoughts, and we were not concerned with these questions.
Naturally, one has an opinion of one's own and one has a life of one's own, but as far as professional functions as a soldier and officer are concerned, when you are a soldier and officer you have given away your personal and private life, and your life as a soldier is first. concerned, that I thought about these purely political questions, and that I was of the opinion that a soldier can demand that he can have the confidence of the state leadership; and, therefore, he is called upon to do his duty and to obey.
Q. Perhaps we can take up the questions one by one.
Did you know Hitler's plans for rearmament, and the, later, plans for aggression, as the prosecution contend. I am concerned chiefly with February 1933 to, let us say, 1938.
A. It was clear to me that with the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor, undoubtedly we soldiers would have a different leadership and would have a different position in the Reich, and that the military factor would find new and different considerations than had been the case before. Therefore we ahiled, frankly and openly, that at the head of the Reich Government there was a man who had decided to bring about an era which was to lead us away from conditions as they had obtained. armament were concerned, so far as I was able to judge them, I hailed these thoughts. my activities at the War Ministry and spent two years at the front. I returned at a period of time when the Wehrhoheit -- that is, military independence -- had been reestablished; rearmament had been declared and it was carried on openly. In the time of my absence I did not follow these matters. with Blomberg, I, of course, saw and experienced everything which took place in connection with rearmament and what was done on the part of the War Ministry in this respect.