The following things happened at that time: all of that which in this connection had the authority to issue orders and who had authority of which the Fuehrer did not himself wish to take up personally or take over personally -that was, as far as decisions were concerned, given to the commanders-in-chief of the various parts of the Wehrmacht. amples, from memory, vital examples. For example: the personnel records of officers, the decision on complaints, matters of budget and administration, jurisdiction of the courts are some of the functions which the Minister of Jar had had and which went over to the supreme commanders. Questions of officials and concerning the rights of the officials -- these are some of the things I have mentioned. I could mention quite a few others, but I wanted to point out merely that where decisions had to be made, such as if the official was to be dismissed, not the Chief of the OKW could make that decision but the Commander in Chief. These powers were given to them, and certain reservations were made with the Fuehrer, those reservations which the Fuehrer wished to keep for himself. At the same time some of the other spheres of the command posts of the Wehrmacht were limited in subsequent and following years, limited in its tasks through the dissolution of the Wirtschaft and Ruestung, that is, the economic and armament department, and an armament minister was created through the dissolution of the counter intelligence department, so that only the defense troops was kept up. Everything else was deleted. My authority was such in a basic questions with which this ministerial sector was concerned that I was obligated in every case to find out the decision of Hitler. I was only free from doing this in current matters, and if between the people involved, that as far as an administrative question was concerned -- if between the various branches of the Wehrmacht my department, which was concerned with these matte had reached a complete agreement, then in a case like that a decision by Hitler was not necessary; and I must emphasize again, in summary, that the OKW had no jurisdiction of its own, no competence of its own, and that one can only expr it as follows: that Hitler indeed had the functions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, as well as the functions of War Minister, that he had these functions unified in his own person, so that an intermediary official was to be eliminated at all costs.
That is, there was to be no intermediary between him and the commanders-in-chief of the various Wehrmacht branches.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until two o'clock.
Apr-3-A-RT-12-1
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, although the Tribunal did say that they would hear Dr. Horn at 2 o'clock, they would not wish to interrupt the examination of the defendant Keitel if you wish to go on with that now. It is a matter for you to consider, whichever you like.
DR. NELTE: Dr. Horn agrees also, that I continue the interrogation of Keitel now.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: If it please the Tribunal, for the assistance of the Tribunal I have ascertained that the first Halder affidavit, referred to this morning by Dr. Nelte, was introduced as USA Exhibit 531, on January 4, by Colonel Taylor; and the second Halder affidavit referred to by Dr. Nelte was introduced as USA Exhibit 533, on January 5, by Colonel Taylor.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, Dr. Dodd was kind enough to give me a number of copies of the compilation of priciples of organization of the German Armed Forces, He has put these copies at my disposal, so that I am able to submit them to the Court which I now do. BY DR. NELTE:
Q You had last explained that on the 4th of February, 1938. one part of the former competence of the War Ministry was transferred to branches of the Armed Forces, and another part to the OKW, that is, the High Command of the Armed Forces, In the decree which has been mentioned it says, concerning these affairs: "The High Command of the Armed Forces, OKW, is taking care of the affairs of the Reich War Ministry. At the same time, the Chief of the OKW has, upon my orders, the functions which the Reich Minister of War had heretofore."
Apr-3-A-RT-12-2 already been sent to the Translating Division for the purpose of translation. However, I cannot say for sure whether it has already been translated and is in the hands of the Tribunal. OKW were executed by a number of offices. I shall name the most important now, indicating their functions. Forces Leadership Staff, which, as an office of the Armed Forces High Command, was coordinated with the other offices concerning channels of command, and which had a primary position compared to the other offices. As the name implies, the Armed Forces Leadership Staff was an organ of the High Command of the Fuehrer, with which the Furhrer was in personal contact primarily. There we find no functions or competence of a ministry. took care of ministerial and administrative questions.
One could call it a little war ministry. but also in part as an assistance in questions of leadership.
Then, the office for armament and economy. I have to point out that in the year 1940 this was dissolved and only a small wehr wirtschafts amt-economy office--was left over, which was mainly concerned with questions of supply in various fields which the armed forces needed--fuel, coal, gasoline, etc. called the Rekrutierung--a central office--which was more designed to take care of personnel questions within the OKW. it is not necessary to enumerate.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I think the Tribunal has followed the distinction whichthe Defendant has made between the General Staff for the High Command and the position of the OKW; but is it necessary for the Tribunal to go into all these details?
DR. NELTE: I had finished, as a matter of fact, with this section.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I want to put just one more -
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document that you have just put before the Tribunal--this diagram--are you desiring to make an exhibit of that?
DR. NELTE: Yes. I would like to submit it in evidence, and it will still be submitted in translations.
THE PRESIDENT: If so, what number will you give it? You must number all your exhibits.
DR. NELTE: I would like to number it, K-1, Keitel 1.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: K-1A, rather.
THE PRESIDENT: Who prepared it?
DR. NELTE: We have prepared it and the presentation department of the Prosecution has reproduced it.
The Prosecution also is in possession of that diagram.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you asked the Defendant to confirm that it is correct? BY DR. NELTE: diagram is correct?
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Prosecution has not received this diagram. Therefore, the Prosecution would like, before making conclusions, to acquaint itself with this diagram.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any more copies of it, Dr. Nelte?
DR. NELTE: Yes. I can have them brought up immediately, and I can distribute them right away. Then I would like for the Tribunal to reserve its decision until the diagrams have been distributed in sufficient number.
A (continuing) I recognize this diagram as correct. It does not contain the small minor changes which have occurred since the original creation of the OKW, which I have mentioned--changes in armament necessities and so on-but it shows the way in which it worked during the last years.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Nelte: BY DR. NELTE: the following: Is it correct that according to this all Keitel's orders, which have been designated as such and submitted by the Prosecution, should be considered Fuehrer orders--that is to say, orders which were based upon Hitler's orders? said. In summarizing, I would like to state that these orders, as I have said in the beginning, as far as they are brought in connection with my name, I assume responsibility and have to assume responsibility, because I knew, of course, the content of these orders which I executed. I recognize in the documents which have been submitted to my my signature, and therefore I have to accept the documents as authentic. May I add that as far as I may have objections as a soldier or other objections, of course I have mentioned these objections.
In the case of orders for which I thought objections existed, I attempted to avoid these orders--to prevent these orders--but I have to state at the same time that if the decision finally had been made by Hitler, without examining them any more, I had to issue these orders and to execute them.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, before I enter the next part of my questions I would like to state the following: and has deduced this participation from various facts, facts which as such were not always to be brought in connection with each other and could not always be coordinated. of the state. That is included in the Indictment.
Then the Prosecution said he had been a tool, a powerless tool; and then the Prosecution stated that the relation between himself and Hitler had been a rather intimate one. protest against these things. He has to speak some more about the relations between himself and Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, that is what the Defendant has been doing. He has been explaining his relationship to Hitler, and if you want to elucidate it further you must ask him further questions. So far it has only teen a relation of his office. Would you please tell us something about the work between you and Hitler? I ask you to be as brief as possible and tell us only the most necessary facts, but at the same time so that we can get a clear picture. one between a high military commander and his subordinate. In other words, such relations as I have always had in my career as a soldier toward my commanding officer of whose staff I was a member. From this strictly military and soldierly relation can best be explained the relation between Hitler and myself. Of course, it was my duty and my right at the same time to express my opinions, and how difficult that was can only be judged by someone who knows that Hitler, after a few words, used to assume the entire conversation and to speak about the subject from his point of view alone.
It was very difficult then, of course, to start speaking about that subject again. high staff functions to get around the superior commanders, but the conditions such as I have met them here were quite difficult. I was quite unaccustomed to it and they surprised me, and not infrequently they brought me into a state of uncertainty. That can only be understood if one knows that Hitler, in military or soldierly questions--if I may say it very carefully--was a man with extensive plans of reforms and considered me with my thirtyseven years of service as a soldier of the old school.
Apr-3-A-RT-14-1 times before the war?
A During the war these contrasts were moderated by the events; by the fact that the actuality of all events limited mannerisms and therefore these things did not come to the foreground. But, on the other hand, it was doubtless so that Hitler in his discussions, in his briefing discussions, had a compartively large circle of about twenty people around and speaking in terms of a soldier, in military terms, without consideration stated his criticism and his accusations, as a rule against people who were not present. I have taken the part of the absent person as a matter of principle because he himself could not defend himself. As a consequence I received all the accusations or criticisms and my training as a soldier forced me finally to exert a great deal of reticence because as an officer and before younger subordinates one cannot protest to a superior or utter any objections or protests. To protest before a number of personalities, regardless of what rank, was unbearable to the Fuehrer. One could only try to speak to him personally about these things and alone.
Q Were you of the conviction that you had Hitler's confidence?
A I could not say defiately. I have to admit frankly that Hitler's confidence in me was not without reservations and today I know sufficiently well that there were many things concerning which he had never spoken frankly to me and never took me into his confidence. It was definately so that Hitler, as far as old soldiers were concerned at least, had a strong suspicion. They were products to him, of an old and ancient decadent school and in this sense to us old soldiers he was a man who brought revolutionary ideas into the Wehrmacht and into armed training and frequently that led to a most serious crisis. I believe I do not have to elucidate as to that. The worst thing, however, was that this lack of confidence manifested itself in one form, that is he always believed that I was in a sort of conspiracy with the Generals in the army behind his back and that I supported them against him. Perhaps that was a consquence of my habit of defending them in their absence and in various circumstances that led to extra-ordinary difficulty and serious crisis.
Apr-3-A-RT-14-2 can be evaluated, how far you could be considered his collaborator or advisor. Could you tell me whether Hitler, such as is done otherwise in close collaboration, discussed his plans with you?
A To that I have to answer no, in general terms. It did not agree in any way with the whole personality of Hitler to have advisors of that kind, that is if you call an advisor somebody who gives advise. I was an advisor, of course, in the sense of presenting a great number of military elements from long experience as an officer but not in the form of an advisor to help formulate a decision, those far-reaching decisions which are doubtlessly meant here. weeks or months of evaluation. During that period sometimes for days one had to assist by presenting material. But as far as the main point was concerned, the decision itself, there he did not except any influence and therefore it was always so that the final answer was, "This is my decision and nothing can be changed about it." That was the manifestation of his position. decisions, weren't there any discussions together, any conferences?
A No. I cannot remember or recall that any one of the really important decisions after the year 1938 had ever been formulated within the community of a conference, say between the politicians and the soldiers or ministers because it was the peculiarity of Adolp Hitler that each department and each chief of a department was heard alone and Hitler made use of whatever he could get out of those men and to find some element from them that could be used in the elaboration of his plans. But it is not as it may seem if one looks at the documents here of minutes of conference of generals, of meetings and similar things with a list of those present. Never did such a meeting have the character of a deliberation. That is quite out of the question. If the Fuehrer had an idea a certain trend of thought and if for various reasons he thought that there were ideas opposed to his he took that as a reason to explain his thoughts before a larger circle to clarify it. In other words, deliberations within these circles and when these meetings took place never existed. I have to add that the external form in which these things took place was so that, following the military example, the oldest general, the highest ranking general, reported. Then he Apr-3-A-RT-14-3 sat down, the Fuehrer arrived, talked and left.
Nobody in such a situation could have the possibility or could have found the energy to say anything. To use just one word for it, and I certainly do not exaggerate, it was the issuing of an order but not a conference. been a member of the Reich Government. What do you have to say about that?
A I never belonged to the Reich Government. I was never a member of the cabinet and I have to state that I never became a minister but as it is expressed in the decree of 1938 -- he had the rank of Reichsminister. He is not a Minister. The expression "Minister" is, of course, simply intended to mean with the rank of Minister. There was a good reason for that. that I had the rank of a Minister, I have to clarify that by saying that I put the question when the decree was issued with whom I had to deal, with the State Secretary or with the Minister and Hitler said: "If you deal on my orders with other departments of the Reich then, of course, you can only do that with the rank of a Minister." That is the explanation for that expression in the decree -- he has the rank of a Reichsminister.
such as Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Speer and Sauckel, did you have any conferences with them? following a certain plan and very seldom lead to the simultaneous presence of several of them. Generally, it was so devised that everyone was coming at a certain time. I was informed, of course, generally, that the Foreign Minister was there, or Mr. Speer, or the Plenipotentiary for Manpower Sauckel, but only in case of purely military questions I was called for conferences which the Fuehrer had with these gentlemen alone and I could name examples for that, but as it has been mentioned during the interrogation of State Secretary Steengracht, it would be wrong to believe that these gentlemen who came to headquarters would have formed a sort of small cabinet. Hitler dealt with and spoke to actually everyone of these officials alone, gave him his orders, and sent him away with these orders, and it certainly happened that on the way home, these gentlemen may have paid a visit to me, mostly with small questions and asking small favors which I could do for them, or with the order to forward a decision to those military officers who had to know about it. expression, which is included in the indictment, "intimate", whether that is correct in describing the relations between you and Hitler, privately or officially?
A I have found the "intimate" in the Indictment and I asked myself what made anybody think so and if I shall be quite frank, I can only answer that question by saying that nobody ever heard from a single word about the actual conditions and the difficulties that I have had. I kept quiet about them. "Intimate", -- we call these relations -- I don't know if the English translation "intimate" expresses the same thing which we call "intim" -that is to say, a relation of confidence, of frank statements. That did not exist. I have characterized it before already, that it was not in keeping with Hitler's mentality to stand on an "intimate" footing with his older generals, amongst whom I was the eldest, independent of the formal relations which had formerly been, sometimes for weeks and months, just the form that was kept.
The relation has never gotten to where one could classify it as that of a close advisor or a close assistant and such as I had known it from my many positions on staffs. I must say that with which I am then concerned, I have been faithful and loyal and I always considered it my duty in my position and I have also to say that a sincere relation based upon personal understanding and confidence never existed. It was always a correct relation but it was military, official, and never went beyond that. was established. According to the content of that decree, you are supposed to have been a member of that Cabinet Council. In order to save time, I only want to ask you: Do you confirm the statement made by Reichsmarshal Goering, from your own knowledge, that the establishment of that Secret Cabinet Council was only for reasons of prestige and that Cabinet Council was never constituted and that it never had a session?
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I should like to take the opportunity -- here is the English translation. I come now to the questions of the Reich Defense Council --"Reichsverteidigungsrat." In the session of the 23rd of November, the prosecutor has submitted in evidence as proof for the rearmament and the active participation of the Wehrmacht, of the Armed Forces, in the planning of wars of aggression. Submitted, among others, is the document EC-177, which was designated as "Meeting of the Reich Defense Council of the 22nd of May 1933." I have to say that I have taken the translation from the transcript and I am not sure whether the expression "Reichsverteidigungsrat" -- Reich Defense Council -- was translated correctly. It says in the transcript that it was a meeting of the committee, the working committee. For your orientation, may I say that the "Reichsverteidigungsrat" was supposed to be a sort of ministerial forum and that inside of it there existed a working committee. organization on the 7th of March 1934; and a third document 2261-PS dealing with the appointment of Dr. Schacht as Plenipotentiary for the Economy. BY DR. NELTE:
witness, and these documents are also used, submitted against you as evidence.
I ask you, therefore, to state your position as to whether these meetings in which you participated and which you have conducted, were concerned with the preparations for war and rearmament.
A One moment, please. From the very beginning, as long as we were concerned with these things, as long as it was a committee of experts from which everything else evolved, I have been active in these affairs and I may speak of myself as the founder of that committee of experts of the ministry for the purpose of coordination with the War Ministry. As Chief of the Department of the Organization of the Army, in the winter of 1929 and 1930, that is, three years before the time when Hitler came to power, I have formed that council, that committee after the Chancellor --- I believe it was Bruenig-and the Prussian and Reichsminister of the Interior Severing had consented to it, and there was always the Deputy of the Minister Severing present to make sure that nothing happened there which would have been in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. That work was very difficult because no minister and no chief of the department was obliged officially to carry out the demands of the War Ministry or the army and it was purely voluntary. Consequently, the work went along with great difficulties and very slowly. We dealt in this committee of experts, which convened perhaps twice or three times during the year; and if I may summarize it, we dealt with the problem, "what assistance can we get from the civilian departments in order to free the small army of one hundred thousand soldiers for purely military tasks?"
Of course, the question of the perfection of our borders, such as is stated in the Treaty of Versailles, I could still say from memory what we talked about, since, with the exception of the time from '33 to '35 I have conducted every cue of these meetings myself or at least was the chairman of the meetings, rot the chairman of the committee. I can point to the mobilization book for civilian authorities, which I will mention later again, which was the outcome of this work. for our borders, and, in order to be better understood, I may mention some of them. The armed forces should be relieved of the duty to safeguard the bridges; the customs organization should take care of customs; the connection of East Prussia should be improved. These were all defensive measure in order to free the soldiers for purely military functions. This was for the purpose of a purely military use, and I do not have to clarify any more how little could have been done with an army of 100,000 men. All the questions which could have gone beyond that scope were never dealt with in that committee, and the way in which we worked was this: departments and then to try by persuasion to assure that these departments took care of the various tasks so that we could say that we had nothing to do with it. The question of an operational strategic nature, armament questions, supply questions, as I can guarantee, were never discussed in this committee. There were only questions of an organizational nature, of taking over functions which generally should be the task of the soldiers, but which we wanted to transfer to civil authorities. several times already in the heading of the minutes, we can see, until now the Reich War Ministry, and now by duty the department heads, that is the ministers, who received the designation "defense counsel". I have to say that more clearly so that it should not be misunderstood. Each member of the committee represented one ministry, and the superior competent for this member, who was a Minister, formed with his colleagues, according to our usage of the term at that time, the Reich Defense Counsel. Therefore this remark "So far, the competent Reich War Minister, now the others, are obliged to carry cut" that and that.
Especially in paragraph 3 the plans were mentioned.
The plans, in other words, have preceded the mobilization book, which is the final stage while these plans were in the intermediary stage, I would say in the year 1933. have been emphasized here by the Prosecution concerning the secrecy, where I have said, "Such, as the minutes, include that nothing written should pile up on the desks of the ministries which could lead to objections at the disarmament conference at Geneva." That is true as I have said it, and I have said it because those exports told me that, with the exception of a small drawer in the desk which could not be locked, they did not possess any place where they could safeguard the documents, and because the then Reich War Minister von Blomberg, who had been in Geneva almost two years, at the disarmament conference, gave me the definite order before that meeting was held to emphasize these things because people in Geneva were surrounded with a large number of agents who were only waiting to be able to present proof that, in spite of the negotiations for disarment, things were going on which represented violations of the Versailles Treaty. It is document RS-1639. It has been submitted in order to prove that we are confronted here with the planning of aggressive wars. Would you please explain to us what the purpose of this book was? '32, '33. The various ministries had so-called working schedules which included some sort of check lists, and in the curse of years, of course, a number of new tasks have been added to those listed, and that led to this mobilization book for the civil administration, the study of which would certainly not produce anything which would have anything to do with strategic or operational prepartions for war. On the other hand, I am not in a position to prove that everything which was in this book would sever have been useful in military operations which may be called aggressive war because one could say that most of these measures would not show, in the cases of mobilization, whether it is a measure for the defense or a measure which is necessary for an aggressive action.
That could not be determined. But I believe I can say, because I, myself, personally have engaged in this work more than anybody else, that there was no reason at all to burden the civilian experts with strategic questions of military planning and I believe that doesn't even have to be proved.
I have this mobilization book here and I went through it. I studied it. I do not wish to bore anybody by citing points which are of a defensive nature or the increase of the border supplies, measures against the interruptions of the railroad traffic, and similar things. One of the most important chapters, if I remember correctly, with which we occupied ourselves during four or five of these sessions, was the question of evacuation of territories close to the border, so that, in case of a war, we should not fall into the hands of the enemy. This problem of evacuation was one of the most difficult ones. To determine the border region which can be evacuated is one of the most difficult decisions. In supplementing the things which I have expressed before, until the year 1938, at no time has there been a meeting or a session of the Reich Defense Counsel. That is to say, the ministers who were superior to the committee never, not a single time -- I would have to know that -- although in the cabinet meeting, I believe already in the month of March, 1933, the resolution had been taken to give these ministers the responsibility of a Reich defense counsel and to oblige them to take over these tasks in the interest of the defense of the Reich, and, of course, also to finance them, -- that was the main purpose -- the Reich defense counsel never had a meeting. time from '33 to '38 are then meetings of committees, but you know that eight days ago minutes of meetings of the Reich defense counsel have been submitted; one meeting or assembly, supposedly, was in November, 1938, and the other one in March, 1939. Unfortunately, I have not received these documents, but I have looked at them and you have seen then also.
Can you explain to us how it came to these meetings and what they mean?
A. I only want to say a few words after the explanation which Reichsmarshal Goering has already given. In September, 1938, the Reich Defense Law, which existed until then, since 1935, and had not been published, had to be changed for the reason that the Reich Defense Law of '35 was based upon the function of the Reich War Minister and commander in chief of the armed forces, and that office did not exist any more. I was with the Reichsmarshal Goering to discuss with him. how to find a new basis for this law, which until then had existed without having been published. That law of the fall of 1938 had a number of supplementary points compared to the old one, and perhaps I will have a chance to mention the details later. Among other things, here, also, the Reichsmarshal Goering was the deputy of the Fuehrer, whereas before it had been the Reich War Minister, a function which I could not have. by the Reichsmarshal in order to present this non-published law and this law which was not supposed to be published, but to present it to a circle of about seventy or more people, to whom the Reichsmarshal explained the purpose and the essence of this law in the form of a speech. Discussions of any kind did not take place beyond that speech, and one cannot speak of it as a meeting, definitely, of the Reich defense counsel. Defense counsel the other day, Reichsverteidigungsrat, and also the minutes of that meeting of summer, 1939.
Q. No, March, 1939.
A. That was called here, and I believe it was also the second meeting of the Reich defense counsel. I can explain that.
Goering, and the schedule was presented to Goering and the names of the people who were to be invited. Reich Marshal Goering let me know that he would come himself and he would extend the circle to include a number of people who would be present. This discussion, therefore, was based on a definite agenda; concrete questions were brought up. It is, however, remarkable that according to the list of those present, the members of the Reich Defense Council were only representedby a very small number, although there were about forty or fifty people present. The Reich Defense Council itself was an organization of twelve people, and it needs no further explanation that according to the form in which these two discussions or meetings took place, one could not say that this was a plenary session of the Reich Defense Counsel based on a definite schedule; but there were two meetings, and to the extent which I have described.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal think that you might get on a little more quickly with the Defendant. The Tribunal recall that you asked a few days ago that you might submit an affidavit of the Defendant's evidence, and there is in your document book an affidavit. You have been over all those matters in the affidavit at very much greater length than you would have gone into them if you read the affidavit, and we hope that you will be able to deal more shortly with the evidence in future.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I believe I made every effort to be as brief and concise in my questions as possible, but the evaluation and judgment is, of course, always subjective. The Defendant is the one who is the most often quotedin this proceeding and he is the most often mentioned, and naturally he is interested in having those matters clarified which he considers vital, in order to present his picture clearly and decisively.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Nelte, I don't think it is necessary to discuss the matter further; but the Tribunal have expressed their wish.
DR. NELTE: As far as I am able, I shall comply with your request, Mr. President.
(The Defendant Keitel resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
BY DR. NELTE (Continued): how they differed. You must have a clear picture that we are not so much concerned and should not be concerned so much, whether decisions were made by the Reich Defense Counsel or its committee. We are concerned and interested in those things which actually did take place and whether the things that did take place and happen were in accordance with the assertion and contention of the Prosecution, and to that extent I request you to tell me those things which you deliberated on in your committee. Was it such as to justify the suspicion that you were considering aggressive war? whether it was the Council or its committee, but the committee was a group of small insignificant experts. And we are concerned with those things which actually did take place, what was done, and with the limitation that in the year 1934 and until the autumn of 1935 I was not present at these deliberations and discussions, and therefore cannot vouch for every word which was spoken at that time. I must state that any and all things which might be for the preparation of wars in an operational armament or strategical preparation, such matters were never discussed. and as a result of that you are supposed to have had certain obligations or certain commands as far as the German Reich Government was concerned. I am submitting Document 2194.-PS to you. In this document you will find regarding the Reich Defense Law of 1936, paragraph 5, sub-section 4, the source of the term which in itself, of course, is not official.