That is, with such means one could not conduct the war, that this was an entirely new war, based on completely different arguments and principles. of a legal system in certain territories, regarding the fact that any resistance should be combatted with brutal means, that is, any local resistance which was caused by the deep controversy which existed between the two philosophical conceptions.
These were completely new and very impressive but also extremely upsetting thoughts.
orders or statements, or did you raise any arguments?
A No, I personally did not. And, of course, also theresistence, which I had always made known, against all these matters before, but I have no knowledge regarding which generals, or if any generals, did address the Fuehrer. At any rate, it did not happen after that discussion or conference.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I think that now the time has come to decide whether you will permit the documents contained in my Book No. 2 under the Numbers 3 and 5, whether that affidavit of the Defendant Keitel will be admitted in evidence although -- and I should like the Prosecution to find that also -- now we have merely discussed the history before the actual Russian Campaign and as far as the Defendant Keitel and the OKW is concerned, I should like to abbreviate the examination by submitting these two affidavits. This affidavit -- No. 3 -- is an account of the situations of the strength of orders in the East, considering the large territory and the numerousorganizations which led to extremely complicated channels for orders. So as to make it possible for you to ascertain whether the Defendant Keitel or the OKW, or whichever department may be concerned as responsible for these conditions of the power of command in the East, they have been discussed in detail and I believe that it would save a great deal of time if it would be possible for this document to be submitted to the Tribunal as evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, Sir Dodd and I have no objection to this procedure used by the Prosecution and we believe that it will probably help the Tribunal to have in front of them the printed accounts.
THE PRESIDENT: Does Dr. Nelte intend to read or only summarize these affidavits?
DR. NELTE: I was hoping merely to submit it to you after I have asked the Defendant whether the contents of the affidavit have been written and signed by him.
THE PRESIDENT: And the Prosecution, of course, have had these affi davits for some time?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: Yes.
DR. NELTE: The same allies, if I understand Sir David correctly, to affidavit No. 5?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it would be convenient, I think, if you gave these affidavits numbers in the sequence of your exhibit numbers and give us also the dates of them so that we can identify them. Can you give us the dates of the affidavits?
DR. NELTE: May I be permitted to arrange the matter during the luncheon interval?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The first is dated the 8th of March, isn't it? The other is the 18th, is it? Dr. Nelte, you can do it at the recess and give them numbers. You can give them numbers at the recess.
It is nearly 1:00 o'clock now, and we are just going to adjourn. You can give them numbers then. Does that conclude your examination?
DR. NELTE: We are now coming to the individual cases which I am hoping to conclude in the court room this afternoon. I must refer to the Prisoner of war circumstance and other certain individual matters and I think I shall require this afternoon for that purpose. I believe that if I considered the interest of the Defendant Keitel alone, I would confine myself to very little.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you desire to put your questions to him now or not?
DR. NELTE: Well, I think -- I don't know how the President feels, about an interval, but I think it would be suitable if we had one now so that in the meantime I could put the affidavits in their proper order.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours).
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, of the two documents mentioned this morning, the first document, No. 3 of the second document book, reads "The Command Relationships in the East".
THE PRESIDENT: That is dated the 14th of March, 1946? The document that I have got is headed the 23rd of February, 1946, and at the end the 14th of March, 1946. Is that the one?
DR. NELTE: The document was first written down and later sworn to. There is, therefore, a difference in the two dates.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to identify which it is, that is all.
DR. NELTE: It is the document of the 14th of March.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: It was sworn to on the 14th.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are giving it what number?
DR. NELTE: I give it No. K-10. The second document is fifth in this document book and is dated the 18th of March, 1946, and is sworn to at the end by the Defendant as of the 29th of March. This document hasreceived the number K-12. Permit me to read a few points on pages 11 and 12 of the German copy. This, as it appears to me, is a very important point for this trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Of which document?
DR. NELTE: Document No. 12.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. I don't think the interpreters have found the document yet, have they? It comes just after a certificate by Catherine Bedford, and I think it is about halfway through the book, and although the pages are not numbered consecutively, it appears to have the figures 51 on it.
DR. NELTE: I shall begin where it says, "In summing up". Those are the last three pages of this document:
"In summing up there must be established:
"1. Alongside the Armed Forces as the legal protector of the Reich internally and externally, as in every nation" -- interpolating, in the SS organizations -- "a completely independent factor arose and was legalized which politically, biologically, and in police and administrational matters actually drew the powers of the State to itself.
"2. Even at the beginning of military complications and conpolicy of conquest and power.
"3. After commencement of the military campaigns the Reichsleader SS hit upon the plan by which, while concealed at first and very little to be seen outside, bur from time to time making suitable appearances, he could in reality build up his power under the guise of 'protecting' the annexed or occupied territories from political opponents.
"4. From the occupation of the Sudeten territory, beginning with the organization of political unrest, that is, of the so-called "freedom movements and incidents', the road leads straight through Poland and the Western areas in a steep curve into the Russian territory.
"5. With the 'Outlines' to the 'Barbarossa' plan for the administration and utilization of the conquered Eastern territories, theArmed Forces were against their intention and without knowledge of the basic assumptions drawn further and further into the subsequent developments and activities.
"6. I (Keitel) and my colleagues had no deeper insight into the effects of Himmler's full powers, and had no idea of the possible effectof these powers.
"I assume without further discussion that the same holds true for the OKH, which according to the order of the Fuehrer joined Himmler's units and gave orders to the subordinate army commanders.
"7. In reality, it was not the Commander in Chief of the Army who had the executive power assigned to him and the power to decree law and maintain law in the occupied territories, but Himmler and Heydrich themselves of their own authority decidedon the life or death of the people and prisoners, including PW's, in whose camps they represented the executive power.
"8. The traditional training and concept of duty of the German Officer with regard to absolute obedience, with responsibility borne by his superior, led to an attitude, regrettable in retrospect, which in spite of his recognition of their lawlessness and his inward rejection of them, still shrank from a rebellion against those orders and methods.
"9. The Fuehrer, Hitler, abused his authority and his fundamental No. 1 order in an irresponsible way with respect to us. This No. 1 Order read, more or less:
'1. No one shall know about secret matters which do not belong within '2. No one shall learn more than he needs to fulfil the tasks assigned '3. No one shall receive information earlier than is necessary '4. No one shall transmit orders which are to be kept to subordinate the achievement of the purpose.
' "10.
It is my conviction that if the entire consequences which arose from granting Himmler authority in the East had been known beforehand, in this case the leading generals would have been the first to raise an unequivocal protest against it. That is my conviction. As these atrocities developed one out of the other, step by step and without any recognition in advance of the consequences, destiny took its tragic course, with its fateful consequences." as I have just read it? Are you perfectly familiar with its contents and have you sworn to it?
DR. NELTE: I shall submit the document in the original. BY DR. NELTE: war area involved in the Plan Barbarossa. I don't know whether you want to take an attitude toward what has been read in the meantime or whether that is already superfluous? 884-PS, are the record of the directives that were given in that general staff meeting on the 15th of July, and not in the sense -- and as is usual in such cases, these orders were set down in writing and then sent to the appropriate officers.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give the date right? You said "the 15th of July." What was the date?
THE WITNESS: 14th of June. That was the date of the conference. BY DR. NELTE:
Q One more question regarding the war against America. The prosecution asserts that you influenced the Germans to wage war against America and accused you of participation in German efforts to involve America in the war. Would you like to make some statement regarding this? which contains directives for cooperation with Japan. Of course, I have participated in the drawing up of this order and signed it.
The other document 1881-PS. Regarding a conference between the Fuehrer and Matsuoka, I do not know and I did not know anything of it at the time. I can only say the following forus soldiers. In the course of all this time until Japanese entry into the war against America, there were two points of view that were our basic principles and those were the principles which Hitler emphasized to us. One was to prevent under any circumstances that America enter the war and consequently renounce military operations in the waters where Americans were present. Secondly, the thought that guided us soldiers was the hope that Japan would enter the war against Russia and I recall, that around November and the beginning of December 1941, when the advance of the German armies west of Moscow was halted, we, when we visited the front or accompanied Hitler, were asked several times by the generals, "When is Japan going to enter the war?" The reasons for so asking were that again and again Russian Far-Eastern divisions were being thrown into the fight around Moscow; that is to say, fresh troops coming from the Far East. That was 18 to 20 divisions but I wouldn't want to say for certain how many it was, but I was present at Matsuoka's visit at Berlin and I saw him also socially but I did not have any conversation with him, and all the combinations that can be associated with this document 75, and which I have heard in my previous interrogations, are without any foundation for us soldiers and there is no justification for anyone's believing that we were guided by thoughts of bringing about a war between Japan and America. In conclusion, I can only say that this order was necessary because the branches of the army have resisted the idea of giving Japan certain military secrets unless she were in the war.
Q. There was also a letter submitted by the Prosecution, a letter from Falkenstein to the Air Staff. Reichsmarshal Goering has already testified about this. Did you know of this letter or do you have anything to add to Reichsmarshal's Goering's testimony?
A. I have nothing to add, I never saw this letter by von Falkenstein. I head baout it during the testimony.
Q. We come now to the individual facts and things with which you are charged in the OKW by the Prosecution. Because of the vast number of points brought up by the Prosecution I can only treat the individual and those of the most important groups of such points in order to try to ascertain to what extent you were involved in these things and what your attitude was as to the effect of the measures that were taken. In most cases it is a question of orders of Hitler but in your statement you have admitted to a certain participation and knowledge of these things. One of the most important of these questions is the question of hostages.
I want to show you document C-128. These are orders for operations in the west. Let me ask you though, first of all, what is the reason as given to the ( Witness handed document)
A. These are the Secret Army Regulations, G-2 and it is headed -
DR. NELTE: I ask you, Mr. President, to turn in document book number one to number seven on page 65 of my document book. BY DR. NELTE:
Q. I ask you to ascertain whether this is a copy from the aforementioned Army Regulations, Section 9, which treats of the question of hostages. This is document K-7 and it reads as follows:
"Hostages may only be taken by order of a Regimental Commander, an independent Battalion Commander or a Commander of equal rank. With regard to accomodation and feeding, it is to be noted that, though they should be kept under strictest guard, they are not convicts. Furthermore, only senior office holding the position of at least a Divisional Commander can decide on the fate of hostages."
that is the operational order of the army in the west. It is headed "3A, Measures to Assure the Safety of the Population; sub-heading (a) Hostages.2
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you offering that as K-7?
DR. NELTE: I ask to have this put in evidence as K-7.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you kindly say that you are putting it in as each time because if you simply say seven it will lead to confusion. BY DR. NELTE: the occasion of the march into France? tude of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. It is a letter to the Reichsminister for Aviation and in this letter I assume there are contained the convictions held by the office you headed.
Q What do you say today in connection with this letter? represent today because it states here with reference to the above mentioned order the following paragraph, beginning with the words -- "Security against any misuse--" and so on. regarding the fate of hostages. made by someone at least of as high a rank as a divisional commander. drawn up by the High Command of the Wehrmacht Legal Department and was perused with regard to its implications with regard to international law? view was taken into consideration. capacity as head of the OKW?
No other basic orders were issued on this question. cases have anything to do with them, as charged by the Prosecution? You or the OKW are charged by the Prosecution of having expressed yourself to Stuelpnagel or Falkenhausen.
(Witness handed document)
A This is document 1594-PS. It is a communication from Falkenhausen, military commander of Belgium and is directed to the High Command of the Army, to the Quartermaster General and to the Commander-in-Chief of the West, also attention of Netherlands, I do not know this document nor could I know it. It is directed to the Army. The assumption that the French Prosecutor made that I received a letter from Falkenhausen is not so. I do not know this letter and it was not sent on my authority. Official communication between the officers in France and Belgium took place only between the High Command of the Army and these two subordinate military commanders. In the OKW these commanders were not subordinate either to the OKW or to me. that this document was the basis for the hostage legislation in France; that there is, in other words, a basic connection between the order you signed of the 16th, ninth month, as to the treatment of hostages in France. I show you these documents, 1588-PS and 87, the same document as UK 25.
(Witness handed document) individual matters with the individual commanders regarding the question of hostages.
Falkenhausen? called me up from Paris once on such a matter because he had received an order from the army to shoot a certain number of hostages for an attack on a German soldier. He wanted to have this order certified by me. That took place, and I believe it was testified to by a telegram, which testifies to the effect that I had a meeting with Stuelpnagel in Berlin. Moreover, the connection between me, personally, and these two commanders took place only in extraordinary matters, where they believed that they might have some support from me in matters that were unpleasant for them to carry out alone. I believe I can point out such questions as the use of forced Foreign labor from Belgium or France or, as in one case, conflicts between the military commanders and the police. In these cases I was called up directly in order to mediate.
THE PRESIDENT: It is impossible for the Tribunal to carry all these documents in their heads by reference to their numbers and we do not nave the documents before us. We do not knew what documents you are dealing with.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, for this reason, before the beginning of the session, I took the liberty of submitting to the Tribunal a list of these documents. If that did not take place, I regret it. I only regret that I could not submit the documents themselves. You will always find a number to the left of this list.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see that, but all that I see here is PS-1587, which is not the one that you are referring to, aparently, and it is described as a report to the Supreme Command of the Army. That does not give us much indication of what it is about. The next one is PS-1594, a letter to OHH. That again does not give us much indication of what it is about, except that they have something to do with the hostage question.
DR. NELTE: It is concerned with the question which the defendant Keitel is about to answer. Do you not also have No. C-128?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have that. That is "Directions for the Operation in the West."
DR. NELTE: And UK-25?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And PS-1588?
THE PRESIDENT: We have them all. The only thing that I was pointing out to you was that the description of than is inadequate to explain to us what they mean and what they are. Perhaps by a word or two you can indicate to us when you come to the document what it is about.
DR. NELTE: Document UK-25, regarding which the defendant Keitel is about to testify, is an order signed by him of the 16th of September regarding Communist uprisings in the occupied territories. It contains, among other thing the sentence, "The Fuehrer has now ordered that the sharpest measures should be taken everywhere in order to strike down this government as soon as possible." hostage Legislation was published in Franch, which is contained in Document 1588 PS. If you have the document 1588-PS, you will find on the third page a regular legislation regarding the taking and treatment of hostages. BY DR. NELTE: and whether the OKW was competant in these matters at all. concerned with Communist uprisings in occupied territories. The fact that this is a Fuehrer order has already been mentioned. I must clarify the fact that this order, so far as its contents are concerned, was directed solely to the eastern regions, particularly the Balkan countries. I believe that I can prove this by the fact that there is a list of the regions to which it pertains and begins "Wehrmacht Commanders, Southeast, for Bulgaria Southern Lands and Crete, and this was transmitted also to other Wehrmacht commanders and also to the OKW with the possibility of the OKH passing it on to its subordinate officers. I believe that this document, which, for the sake of saving time, I shall not read here, has several indications that the assumption on the part of the French Prosecution was the basis for the hostage law, to be found in 1588-PS, which is false and there was no basic connection between the two.
The date of this hostage law is also in September. The number is hard to read, but, as can be seen from its contents, these two matters are not connected and, moreover, the two military commanders in France and Belgium never received this order from the OKW but, perhaps, they received it through the OKH, a matter which I cannot check on because I do not know. say that its considerable strictness can be traced back to the personal influence of the Fuehrer, and the fact that it is concerned with the eastern region, which is to be seen already in the introduction, does not have to be substantiated any further. It is correct to say that this order of the 16th of September, 194 is signed by me the question of the "Nacht und Nebel". The Prosecution charges you of having participated in the "Nacht and Nebel" law of the 12th of December, 1939.
A May I say one more thing regarding the other question?
THE PRESIDENT: The date came through to us as 12 December 1941. That is not right, is it?
DR. NELTE: In the order of the 2nd of February, 1942. the date was corrected as the 7th of December, 1941. BY DR. NELTE:
Q You wanted to say something to the previous question?
Q Do you have the document, L-90?
Q What was the reason for this order, so terrible in its consequences? my name with this so-called "Nacht und Nebel* order is a serious charge against me, even though it can be seen from the order that it is a Fuehrer order. Consequently I should like to state how this order came about. of 1941 until the spring of 1942 the resistance movement and sabotage and so on in all the occupied territories became very strong indeed. Militarily it meant that troops were tied down -- troops who had to take care of the local unrest, that is, from the military point of view. And day by day, reports came in telling of what was taking place in the individual sectors.
It was impossible to handle this summarily; rather, Hitler demanded that he be informed of each individual occurrence, and he was very displeased if such matters were concealed from him by the military authorities. In this connection he said to me that it was displeasing to himand unfavorable to general peace and quiet that court-martial death sentences against saboteurs were lacking. He wished this not to occur, since it has in his interest to see that peace and order be maintained. He said that it was necessary that these things be limited, that sabotage acts be made less frequent, and to this end that it was necessary to have a clear sentence of death as punishment for such action, instead of longwinded court-martial proceedings with a long list of witnesses. be taken without further ado and without anyone's knowledge and taken to Germany and there interned and dealt with. said at that time that I feared exactly the opposite results of those that were hoped for. I then had serious discussions with the legal adviser of the Wehrmacht, who had similar scruples, because there was an elimination of the ordinary legal processes, and he advised me to try to prevent this order from being issued. My efforts were in vain. I was threatened, and consequently I gave the War Minister an order to draw up this order.
I can refer to details only in so far as this order is contained in L-90. It is intended to prevent arbitrary sabotage. deportation into Reich territory should take place only after a regular court martial proceeding and that in every case the judge or the divisional commander, together with his legal adviser, had dealt with the matter. I say that I honestly believed then that every arbitrary application of this order was by this provision avoided, and you can perhaps agree with me that the words in the order, "It is my will," meaning the Fuehrer's will, were not in there in vain. The military commanders were to see from this that this was a method with which I did not agree and which I did not consider to be the correct method. so that through regular court-martial channels an appeal was possible, This was in order that there should still be the possibility of a legal proceeding in an appeal if the verdict appeared to be challengeable. The entire and enormous tragedy, which I found out here for the first time, is this: that this order, which was only intended for the Wehrmacht and which could only determine whether a saboteur could be made to disappear in this Nacht and Nebel fashion, the whole tragedy is that this procedure was generalized, extended beyond the Wehrmacht -- it was used by the police -- and so this horrible circumstance arose, that entire groups of people were deported through this Nacht and Nebel procedure. I and those who participated in the drawing up of this order did not knew of this and certainly did not intend it. At any rate I was not informed of it. and abandoned certain requirements of law such as we understand them, came to have the consequences which the Prosecution has brought up. deported from their home country to Germany, because a penal service in prison would be considered by these patriots as dishonorable, and we felt that it would be better that they be taken to Germany where they would not be submitted to this dishonor.
Q Please elucidate one point. In the order for the carrying out of this Nacht und Nebel policy, it stated that the Gestapo was to carry out the transportation of the condemned to Germany. You stated that the people who came to Germany were to be turned over to the Minister of Justice for normal custody. Did you have some scruples about turning these people over to the SS? In other words, did you have some idea what would happen to them? Can you say anything in elucidation of that matter?
A Yes. The order that was given at that time was that these people should be turned over to the German Justice authorities. This document originated in Amt Abwehr. It characterizes the conference or agreements which had to be reached at that time regarding the method by which these people were to be taken from their native countries to Germany. That was led apparently by this Amt Abwehr, and then the police commanders. I can say in this connection -- and I have always witnessed it -- that it did not seem objectionable at that time, because I was not then of the opinion that these people were being turned over to be liquidated but that the Gestapo was simply being used as the medium in charge of the transportation. I should like to emphasize that particularly, so that there can be no doubt of it: that it was not our original idea for the people to be so treated as it later turned out they were treated as a result of the Nacht und Nebel command.
Q We come now to the question of commandos, parachute troops. The French Prosecution treats in detail of the origin and effect of the two Fuehrer orders of the 18th of October, 1942, regarding the treatment of parachute troopers and commandos.
DR. NELTE (to the Tribunal): Does the Tribunal have a copy of this order? It is 498 -
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got a copy of the order. You mean 553-PS or 498?
DR. NELTE: The second is 553-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got that, either, "Combatting of individual parachuters, decree 4842" -
DR. NELTE: Could you please repeat your statement? It didn't come through.
THE PRESIDENT:PS-553, "Combatting of parachuters, Decree of 4842.
That is what we have, nothing else. You also have 498 -
QPS-553 is a notice Signed by Keitel. The French Prosecution has assumed correctly that these is some connection between the document, PS-553 and the Fuehrer order of the 18th of October, 1942. The Defendant is to testify what the Seasons were that lay behind this fuehrer order and this notice.
A First of all, Document 553-PS: This notice was published by me in August of 1942 in a way similar to the Nacht und Nevel decree that I have described. The dropping by parachute of saboteurs, agents, paratroopers with explosives after this reached greater and greater proportions. The materials were dropped in thinly populated reg ions. They were then distributed all over the area governed by Germany at that time. It extended from France as far as Czechoslovakia and, from the east, as far west as Berlin. captured. This memorandum was to inform all offices outside the Wehrmacht of these things and to solicit their support in combatting them. a sort of war in the dark, and, even today, after reading this document through again, I consider this memorandum as unobjectionable. It provides that members of foreign armed forces, if they were captured by the police, should be taken to the nearest Wehrmacht office after their identification and there be turned in. French police played a large and honorable role in reducing these acts of sabotage. This will perhaps make clear how extensive these activities were: On any one day we sometimes had as many as a hundred blowings-up of bridges or railroads. So much for the memorandum. mentioned very often here and which I can characterize as subsequent results of this memorandum to the extent that those methods, illegal methods, of waging war kept on increasing. Small commando units were formed by the enemy and materials and men were landed by parachute. They were now under orders not to create disturbances in general but to attack vital and important military objects. For instance, they had the task in Norway of blowing up the aluminum works. camps discussions were devoted to how to handle these saboteurs, matters reached the point whore the Fuehrer demanded other methods, vigorous measures to combat this activity, which he characterized as "terrorism" and said that the only method that could be used to combat it was terror. I recall that the words were spoken, "As long as the paratrooper runs the danger only of being taken as a prisoner of war, he incurs no practical danger.
He had nothing to fear, and that can not be allowed to continue to be the case."
I made several attempts to express myself in this matter. General Jodl will also recallthis. We did not knew what we as soldiers were to do. We could make no suggestion.
If I may sum up briefly, daily we heard Hitler's temperamental explosions on this subject, but we did not know what we could do. He declared that this was against the Hague Convention and illegal, that it was a method of waging war that had not been foreseen in the Hague Convention. He said that this was a new war in which new methods were being used that we had to deal with. order itself and the order that those who did not carry out the first order should be punished were published. They were published, I believe, by the Chief of the Fuehrung Stab, Jodl, and then distributed. questions about how it was to be applied, particularly in connection with the threat that they would be punished if they did not carry it out, and we simply told them what was in the order. We were not in a position to change this written order. order to kill the English saboteurs involved in the sabotage actions at Stavanga. In this connection I submit to you. Document 498-PS, 508-PS, and 527-PS.
DR. NELTE: This, Mr. President, was a commando mission in the neighbourhood of Stavanga. The troops that fell into German hands alive were obliged, according to the Fuehrer decree to be killed. There was a remote possibility of letting these people testify about their case if that was demanded by military necessity. In this case the commander in chief in Norway concerned himself with the matter. General Falkenhorst. "He turned to the OKW, as he has already testified in an affidavit.
Q Would you make any statement in this connection?