THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desires me to say that they think that your answers and your explanations are too long, too argumentative, and too repetitive and they are upon matters which have been gone over and over again before the Tribunal, so they would therefore ask you to try and keep your answers as short as possible.
THE WITNESS: Yes. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Did I understnad you correctly, witness, on Friday, that you didn't knew about the connection between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring and summer of 1939. It was well before the war--spring and summer, before June of 1939? in Norway and Quisling was one, but his name meant nothing at that time. On the wish of the Fuehrer, I gave Rosenberg certain money for his friends in Norway for newspaper propaganda, and so on.
Q You didn't know, as I understand your testimony, that some of quislings men had been in a training school in Germany in August of 1939, before the war?
A No, I don't remember that. I heard of it through a document here and I don't recall that I knew anything of it at that time. If I did know anything of it, then I didn't know what the matter was at hand. enlarge and extend the staff of the various German official agencies, the legation and the consulates, soon after the beginning of the war?
A No, I don't remember that at the moment at all. I didn't really find out about that if that was the case.
Q It is the quotation from the year book of the NSDAP. All I want to know at the moment is whether or not you knew about that. If you say you didn't-
A I didn't. interviews with Hitler on the 16th and 18th December?
A No. What was the date, may I ask?
A No, I knew nothing about these discussions.
to Norway was, first, when you got the letter from Raeder, dated the 3rd of April?
Q I beg your pardon. It is a mistake of mine. I am sorry. Do you remember a letter from Keitel, where he says "The Military Occupation of Denmark and Norway had been by command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht -- the High Command of the Wehrmacht had therefore ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation." So really, witness, I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter. You are really not a good person to ask about the earlier preparations with regard to Norway, because you weren't in on these earlier discussions with quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. Is that right? If so, I will leave the subject.
A No. I did not participate in those things but I should like to make one thing clear, that I received this letter only some days later. The first intimation I had of the intentions of the occupation of Norway, I received about thirty hours ahead of time. The letter was probably longer under way than it should have been. and I will take you straight to the question of the Low Countries. You have heard me read, and probably other people read, more than once, the statement of Hitler's on the 22nd of August 1939. "Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these States, as well as Scandanavia, will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. That is what Hitler said on the 22nd of August. You weren't there, and I ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you? 1939, that an Army Group order was given that Armed Group B is to make all preparations, according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so demands. Did you know of that order on the7th of October?
A No. I believe I heard it here but I didn't knew about it before.
directive: "A long waiting period results not only in the ending to the advantage of the Western Powers, of Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the neutrals in Germany final victory to wane. Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front, crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon as and as forcibly as possible." Did youknow that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of October?
A No, that I didn't know. Hitler gave his assurance, the many assurances, in August and October, without telling his foreign minister that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given the directive for the attack on the Low Countries, that he didn't tell you as to his order or his directive for his attack on the Lou Countries? Are you sure of that?
A I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should recall it. I know one thing, that such thoughts, whether or not one should advance in the West, after the Polish Campaign, had been brought up but nothing more specific.
Q I see. If you say that is the state of your knowledge, we will pass on to something about which you did know a little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of Hitler and yourself with Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August 1939?
A Yes. I saw the document regarding that, here. page 181. I want youto follow while I read one passage, which should be about 182. In as on my second page and it is a paragraph which begins, "As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict..."
A. I haven't found it.
Q Well, if you look for that "As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude...."
A On page 2?
Q It should be on page 2, on my page two. It may be further on in yours.
A Is that the beginning of the paragraph?
Q Yes, "As Poland makes it clear...." It is two paragraphs on from a single line that says at that point "Count Ciano showed signs of ..."
Q. Would you look at the next sentence, "Generally speaking..." This is the next sentence but one:
"Generally speaking, it would be best to liguidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other who is just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice cersa. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral.
"At the visit of Prince Regent Paul, he, Hitler suggested, particularly atthe consideration of Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis, and Yugoslavia's leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance of the Western Pwers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Kafenku who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the Western democracies."
Now, that was Hitler's formulation of his policy, and may I state that that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include among these pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia?
A. No, that is not to be understood in that way. I must state the following in this connection. The situation was this: Hitler wanted to keep Italy alert. Italy was always a very uncertain country. For that reason, he spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy that if it had any difficulties with Yugoslavia, Germany would support Italy.
The situation was this, that Germany, with Italy's assistance, had already taken some positions in Europe peacefully, during which Italy supported Hitler. I remember the situation.
Q. But it isn't an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing. "It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other." Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain neutrals?
A. No, than can't be taken so literally. They were diplomatic discussions, and I do -
Q. (Interposing) I want to -
A. (Interposing) This was a question of Yugoslavia.
Q. This had always been Mussolini's view, hadn't it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible opportunity?
A. That I don't know.
Q. Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My Lord, this will be GB-292. alliance pact between Germany and Italy made on the 22nd of May, 1939, and appended to it there are some comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May,1939. Do you see?
A. What page?
Q. Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages. Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the pact itself, do you see the comment by Mussolini?
A. Yes, here it is.
Q. Well now, No. 1 says:
"The war between the plutocratic and therfore selfishly conservative nations and the densely populated and poor nations is inevitable. One must prepare in the light of this situation." the war will be postponed, and he is saying what should happen if the war comes He says that:
"The war which the great democracies are preparing is a war of exhaustion. One must therefore start with the worst assumption which contains 100 per cent probability: The Axis will get nothing more from the rest of the world. This assumption is hard, but the strategic positions reached by the Axis diminish the *---*issitude and the danger of a war of exhaustion considerably. For this purpose one must take the whole Danube and Balkan area immediately after the first hours of the war. One cannot be satisfied with declarations of neutrality but must occupy the territories and use them for the procurement of necessary food and industrial war supplies."
Do you see that? O don't you agree that it was Mussolini's view that the Balkans should he attacked at the earliest possible moment?
A. As I remarked, this is the first time I have seen this report of Mussolini.
Q. Now, I want you to come to the remarks of Hitler's which you have seen considerably more than once. You remember, after the Simovitsch coup d'etat on the 26th of March, there was a meeting, a conference with Hitler, where he announced his policy:
"The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and in a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future, will be taken not of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops available for it are ready."
Do you remember Hitler saying that on the 27th of March?
A. I don't have that in my hand. Could I perhaps see the document?
Q. Don't you remember it? Don't you remember it? I has been read many times in this Court, Hitler's statement.
A. Yes, I remember it, not the individual words, but in general.
Q. Do you remember that was the sense of it, and I read his words. Now, that was the policy -
A. (Interposing) I don't know what you are driving at.
Q. Well, I'll put it to you now. What I am driving at is this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without asking them for assurance, without any diplomatic action of any kind. You decided to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. Isn't that right?
A. No, the situation was entirely different.
Q. I want your explanation of these points which I have specifically read and mentioned to you. "No diplomatic inquiries will be made." Why did you decide, or why did Hitler decide, and you help, in attaking Yugoslavia without making any diplomatic inquiries, without giving the new government any chance to give you assurances? Why did you do it?
A. Because the new government had been formed, above all, by England. As I discovered in the course of the previous negotiations, this was admitted to me. It was perfectly clear to me when the Simovitsch putsch was carried out that behind Simovitsch's government there were enemies of Germany and that this army was mobilizing in order to attack the Italian army from the rear. It was not my policy, but I entered these negotiations of which you are speaking later, and Hitler apodictically stated his attitude without giving anyone a chance to contradict. I was present then. I had a serious conversation with the Fuehrer on that occasion.
Q. Did you think it right to attack this country without any diplomatic measures being taken at all, to use Hitler's words "with unmerciful harshness"; military destruction, and to destroy the capital of Belgrad in attacks by waves of bombers? Did you think that was right?
I asked you a simple question. Did you think it was right?
A. I can answer this question neither with yes nor no without giving an explanation of my answer.
Q. Then you needn't answer it. If you can' answer that question yes or no, you needn't answer it at all. And you come on to the next point which is the question of Russia. had decided to attack the Soviet Union after M. Molotov's visit to Berlin on, I think, the 12th of November of 1940.
A. I didn't say that because I didn't know it.
Q. Well, as I understood it, one of the reasons which you were giving as a justification for the attack on the Soviet Union was what was said by M. Molotov during his visit of November 1940. Isn't that what you said?
A. That was one of the reasons that caused the Fuehrer concern. I did not know anything about an attack at that time.
Q. You know that the defendant Jodl says that even during the western campaign -- that is, May and June 1940 -- Hitler had told him that he had made a fundamental decision to take steps against this danger, that is, the Soviet Union, "the moment our military position made it at all possible."
Did you know that?
A. I found that out for the first time here in Nurnberg.
Q. That is L-172, US-34, Jodl's lecture. informed during a conference with Goering that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until the spring of 1941; that "later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands."
Did you know that?
A. No, I did not.
Q. And did you know that in November of 1940, General Thomas and Secretary of State Koerner, Neumann, Becker, and General von Hannecken were informed by Goering of the action planned in the East?
Did you know that?
A. No, I did not know that either.
Q. You know now, don't you, that a long time before any of the matters raised in M. Molotov's visit came up for discussion, Hitler had determined to attack the Soviet Union?
A. No, I did not know that at all. I know that Hitler had doubts, but about that I did not know. I knew nothing about military preparations, because that was out of my province.
Q. Even on the 18th of December, when Hitler issued the directive number 21 on Barbarossa, he told you nothing about it?
A. Yes, because precisely in December, as I happen to remember, I had a long talk with the Fuehrer in order to get his approval in winning the Soviet Union as a party to the three-power pact, and to incorporate them into the three-power pact. Hitler was not altogether enthusiastic about this idea, but he told me, "We have carried out various things, and we might even carry out that." This was in December, and I remember that very precisely as it happened.
Q. Do you understand what you are saying?
A. There is an affidavit available of a witness, who can testify to this, which the defense is going to produce.
Q. Do you understand what you are saying? This is after the defendant Goering had announced it to General Thomas and these under-secretaries, after the directive had actually gone out for Barbarossa, and you are saying that Hitler let you suggest that you should try and get the Soviet Union to join the three-power pact, without ever telling you that he had his orders out for the attack of the Soviet Union. Do you really expect anyone to believe that?
A. I didn't quite understand the question.
Q. The question was, do you really expect anyone to believe that after it had been announced time and again that the Riech was going to attack the Soviet Union, and after the actual directive had gone out for the attack, that Hitler let you tell him that you were thinking of asking them to join the three-power pact? Is that you evidence?
A. Yes, that is exactly the way it was., I suggested this to him again in December, and received his assurance that we would talk about it later. I knew of no plans for an attack on Russia.
Q. And it was quite clear that as far as your department was concerned you were getting the most favorable reports about the Soviet Union and about the unlikeliness of the Soviet Union making any incursion into political affairs inimical to Germany? Is that right, so far as your reports from your own Ambassador and your own people in Russia were concerned?
A. Reports of this sort came from the legations in Moscow. There were always such diplomatic reports, which I submitted to the Fuehrer. However, the Fuehrer insisted that the diplomats in Moscow were the worst informed men in the world.
Q. But that was your honest view, based on your own information, that there was no danger from Russia, that Russia was keeping honestly to the agreement that she had made with you. That was your honest view, was it not?
A. I didn't say that. Those were the reports from the diplomats, which
Q. Didn't you believe them? Didn't you believe your own staff yourself?
A. I was very skeptical myself as to whether these reports were reliable because they were reports of an altogether different sort that could be had at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Regarding the political attitude, some thing else was true again.
Q. At any rate, in the spring of 1931, your office joined in the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, did it not?
A. I don't know precisely when, but in the spring things reached a climax and there must have been conferences that dealt with the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union. However, I don't know anything about that now, in detail.
Q. I see. Again, I don't want to occupy too much time over it, but it is right, is it not, that in April of 1941 you were cooperating with Rosenberg's office in preparing for the taking over of Eastern Territories, and, on the 18th of May, you issued a memorandum with regard to the preparation of the naval campaign?
A. So far as the preparations with Rosenberg are concerned, that is in error. I spoke about this matter to Rosenberg only after the outbreak of war. So far as that navy memorandum is concerned, I saw that document here; I had not known of it previously.
I believe it is a memorandum about international law matters which might arise in connection with a sea war in the Baltic Sea.
Q. It says: "The Foreign Office has prepared, for use in Barbarossa, the attached draft of a declaration of operational zones." Don't you remember anything about that?
A. No, that did not reach me at all then. That was settled by another office. Of course, I was entirely responsible for anything that happened in my ministry.
Q. Wasn't Ambassador Ritter the liaison officer between your office and the Wehrmacht?
A. Yes, that is so.
Q. Now, again, I want you to help me about one or two other matters. You have tell us that you negotiated the anti-Commintern pact back in 1936, and of course at that time the anti-Commintern pact -- and I think you said so yourself -- was directed against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn't it?
A. Yes. It was more an ideological pact, which, nevertheless, had certain political implications.
Q. And that was extended by the tripartite pact of the 27th of September, 1940? That was an extension of the first pact, was it not?
Apr-1-A-RT-20-1a
A It had in itself nothing to do with the first pact. That was a purely, economic, and military pact. that you were urging Japan to enter the war quite early in March of 1941, weren't you?
Q Yes. I am taking it shortly, because you have given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and therefore you were entitled to see an ally in the Japanese. That is your point, is it not?
A I don't believe I did anything other then what any other diplomat would have done, either in England or Soviet Russia. did occur to you quite early, didn't it, that' if Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility that the United States might be brought in shortly after? And you agreed, in April of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan would be involved with the United States, you would be preppared to fight the United States too. That is right, isn't it?
A No, not in that phrasing. I believe I did everything I could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America out of the war. I believe that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here for the first time. N-352 of your book, at page 204 of the English Document book.
A Yes, I know this document; I have read it here. and according to the Japanese Amnassador, you are saying this to him-- if you look at paragraph 1:
"Ribbentrop: It is essential that Japan effect the now order in the East Asia without losing this opportunity. There has never been, and probably never will be, a time when closer cooperation under the tripartite pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European new order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan. As Fuehrer Hitler said today, 'there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan. and the United States.'
Apr-1-A-RT-20-2a of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact the United States is putting up a stiff front. If this is indeed the fact of the case, an if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interests of Germany and Japan Jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself." made to the Japanese Ambassador, that you were trying to prevent war with the United States? I suggest to you that you were doing everything to encourage Japan to go to war with the United States.
A I must contradict you there, Mr. Prosecutor; that is- not true. I don't know about this document; I do not know where it came from; I never at any rate said that, and I regret that all the other documents that prove the opposite, the documents which go to prove that I did make efforts to stop the United States from getting into the war, have not been produced here. have been brought about. All the other documents which have been presented here--a half dozen or so--prove very clearly my wish to keep America from the war. I can say that for years I had made efforts, despite the United States intransigent attitude, to keep America from the war.
I can only explain this in this way: That the Japanese ambassador wanted something to happen and I know I sent many telegrams to Tokyo in order to got Japan participation in the war against Singapore. I believe that what you have just read is an incorrect transcript of same conference or other. I ask you to give the defense an opportunity to submit many documents up to this very date, which will prove the exact opposite of what you have here stated.
Q. Well, this is the official report to the Government of the Japanese Ambassador. You say that he is wrong when he says that you told him -- he five: your exact words -- that you were comforted that it would nit only be in the interest of Germany and Japan, but would favorably bring the desired results?
Well, just lack at the next Document, if you deny that one. On page 356. This is another report of the Japanese ambassador and he said:
"The day after Pearly Harbor, at one o'clock, I called on Foreign Ministed Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at ones. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters, discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out, so as to make a good impression on the German people and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out properly."
Now, look at the last three words:
"At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th, Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet the."
That was three days before the declaration of war. You say that that report of the Japanese ambassador is also wrong?
A. I believe that's in error.
Q. What's wrong about it?
A. I believe it's in error. That was after Pearly Harbor.
Q. Exactly, the day after Pearly Harbor.
A. That was an order of Adolf Hitler's to attack American ships with as everyone knows, had been attacking German ships for months.
Q. When you say "attacking German ships", do you mean defending themselves against German submarines?
A. No, so far as I know, for months before Pearly Harbor we had delivered an official protest to the United States, in which we pointed out, in the case of the two U-boats Gria and Kerne, that these two boats had pursued German submarines and had thrown depth bombs at them. I believe the United States admitted this openly. I mentioned yesterday that Hitler said in his speech in Munich that he did not give the order to shoot or to attack American vessels but he had given the order to fire back if they fired first.
Q What I sant to know from you is this: American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them three days before war was declared? Did you approve of that?
A. I can't say anything about that now because I don't remember it and don't even know the document.
Q. Now, I want to ask you about another point. Do you remember that the
A. It would have been understandable, that I must add.
Q. You have given your answer. Do you remember in June, 1944, that there was a conference about which we've heard evidence regarding the shooting of what is known as "terror flyers"? would. Is it correct, as is stated in the report, that you wished to include among terror flyers every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, including bombing attacks on cities? Is it right that you wish to include that the airmen engaged in attacks on German cities as terror flyers
A. No, it is not true.
Q. Well, look at page 391. This is a report signed by General Warliment on the conference on the 6th of June, and in the fourth line -- well, let me read it. It says:
"Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy chief of staff in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th that a conference on this question had been hold shortly before between Goering, Ribbentrop, and Himmler. Contrary to the original suggestion made by Ribbentrop, who wished to include very type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed at the above conference that merely the other attacks carried out with aircraft armament should be included."
include every type of attack?
A. Yesterday I answered this question at length. I answered this question I think, very exhaustively. If you wish, I can repeat it now.
Q. Well, I don't want you to repeat it. I want you to answer my question Do you say that Kaltenbrunner is wrong when he waid at this conference that you wished to include those who were engaged in the bombing of cities?
A. That is not so. First of all, so far as I know, this conference never took place; and,,secondly, I stated my attitude perfectly clearly yesterday.
Q. Well, answer my question.
A. No, that is not true as you have stated it.
Q. I see. Then answer this question. Did you approve that the treatment of those that you called "terror flyers" should be that they should be left to be lynched by the population or else that they should be handed over to the SS?
A. No, that was not my attitude.
Q. Well, new, would you look on to page 393, page 214 of the English. This, as you know, is a memorandum from the Foreign Office, and it is stated on page 396 that General Warliment states that Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft." The draft deals with the two actions in paragraph 1, that of lynching, and the draft says, "The German authorities are not directly responsible since death occurred before a German official intervened."
Do you agree with that view? Is that your view of the lynching of flyers?
A. No, that isn't my view either. I explained yesterday very exhaustivel what my attitude was. This document is a statement on the part of the Foreign Office. I don't know where it came from. It was submitted to me and I did not approve this document as it is submitted to me here.
I sent it to the Fuehrer and asked him to decide about it. The Fuehrer then regarded this document as nonsense and therwith the matter was dropped.
Q. So that, with regard to this, you say that when Warliment says that Ambassador Ritter advised the Wehrmacht by telephone on 29 June that you approved the draft, that either Warliment is not speaking the truth or Ritter is not speaking the truth?
A. At any rate, it is not true because it can be seen from another document that I have seen here that this document was sent to the Fuehrer and that I said there that the Fuehrer must approve it. I see no other document regarding it. That's my recollection of the matter.
Apr-1-A-RT-21-1a
Q Well, then, if you referred to the Fuehrer's view, let's just have a which is an account of a meeting that you and Hitler had with Oschima on the 27th of may, 1944. It's on page 11, line 9 to 12. Do you remember in your presence Hitler advising Oschima that the Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot; that the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did you agree with that view?
No, I do not agree with that view. If that is in this document, that is not my opinion.
Q. I see, Well, now-
A I don't even know if you said here where it is in the document.
A No, I don't remember that, but I can only say that this entire attitude of Hitler's be seen in this document was brought about by the terrible results of the air attacks at that time.
Q I heard all that before. I asked you whether you agreed or not; you said "no". I want you now to deal with another point. decisive importance. question on this. I want now to direct your attention to Stalag Luft 3. You may have heard me asking a number of witnesses a certain number of questions about it. These were the fifty British airmen who were murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you know that? Do you know what I'm talking about?
Q You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, made a strong statement in the House of Commons, saying that these men had been murdered and that Great Britain would exact justice upon the murders? Do you remember that, in June of 1944?
A I heard of this speech on the part of Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, yes. British via Switzerland this unqualifiable charge of the British Foreign Minister had been sharply refuted, that being issued in July, 1944? Do you remember that being issued?
A No, I don't remember the content. I do remember, however, this: That at that time we received documentation of what had happened and that it was communicated to us bySwitzerland. That's all I knew about it.
Q That is what I wanted to ask you: Did you know at the time that this statement was issued -- didyou know that these officers had been murdered in cold blood?
A No, I did not. I heard that these men had been shot while trying to escape. At that time we, to be sure, did have the impression that everything was not in order -
Q Let me take it in the statements. Who told you the lie that these men had been shot trying to escape? Who informed you of that lie?
A I don't remember. At that time we received documentation from the proper office -
Q From whom did you get your documentation which contained that lie? Did you get it from Himmler or Goering -
A I can't remember. not all right, hadn't you?
Q Thank you. Now, I want you to tell us a word about your connection with the SS. You are not suggesting, are you, at this stage of time that you were merely an honorary member of the SS?