Q. You want us to assume that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what it names to shortly, isn't it? That is what you want us to understand that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what you want us to understand, sin't in?
A. I don't know whether you can talk about lies in this connection, Mr. Prosecutor. This is diplomacy; and if we were to bring about a powerful situation, then of course we couldn't go beating about the bush. The Fuehrer often used such language; he ordered me to use the same. I want to emphasize once more that I used such language particularly to my own department; the foreign office, so that there was a clear line of policy laid down if the Fuehrer were aiming at the solution of a problem,no matter what the circumstances, so that if a war would arise it was our only chance to indicate a very strong attitude. But if you didn't do that, then war would have arisen in any case.
Q. Well, now, I want you to have in mind what Count Ciano ways that you said to him on; I think the 11th or 12th of August, just before your meeting at, I think it was at Salzburg, with you and Hitler. You remember that according to Count Ciano's diary he said that he asked you "What do you want, the Corridor or Danzig?" and that you looked at him and said, "Not any more; we want war." Do you remember that?
A. Yes. That statement is quite untrue. I told Count Ciano at the time and this is on the same line -- that the Fuehrer is determined to solve the Polish problem one way or another. Those were the instructions I had from the Fuehrer. That I am supposed to have said that we wanted war, that is particularly bad. It must be clear to every diplomat that one doesn't say a thing like that, not even to one's best and most faithful ally; but most certainly not to Count Ciano.
Q. I'd just like you to look at a report of the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini and Count Ciano not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940 -- that is, about nine months later. If you look at the document 2835-PS, which will become GB 291, and if you will turn to; I think it is page 18, line 19 -
A. You mean page 18?
Q. I remind you again, a conversation between you and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March 1940. It begins by saying: The Reich Foreign minister recalled that he actually did state in Slexburg to Count Ciano that he did not believe that England and France would assist Poland without further ado; that at all times the possibility of intervention by western powers must still be reckoned with. He was glad now about the course of events, because first of all it has always been clear that the differences would have to come sooner or later and they were inevitable. conflict in the lifetime of the Fuehrer.
A. Yes; that was after the outbreak of war, wasn't it?
Q. Yes. what I am putting to you are these words: He was glad now about the course of events, because first of all it had always been clear that differences would have to come sooner or later and they were inevitable. And if you will look at where it says "secondly"
A. May I reply to that?
Q. Yes; but what I am suggesting to you is that that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, and that you were very glad that the war did come, because you thought this was an appropriate time for it to happen.
A. I don't find it; I can't find it. To the contrary, it says here that he was still expecting the possibility of an intervention on Britain's part. It says so here clearly.
Q. But it is the second part that I am putting to you. I pass from that point about British intervention. I say he was glad now about the course of events, and if you will look down at the paragraph, so that you will have it in mind, the third line says: was clear that the relationship of the powers would not fornulate itself in the long run in favor of Germany and Italy.
A. May I ask where it says that?
Q. A few lines further down. The word secondly is underlined, isn't it?
A. No, it doesn't say so here.
Q. Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general conscription It is about ten lines further on.
A. What is the British Prosecutor trying to prove here? I don't quite understand.
Q. I want you to look at the next sentence before you answer my question. This, along with the other things, was decisive for the Fuehrer's decision to solve the Polish question even under the danger of intervention by the western powers. The deciding fact was, however,that a great power could not take certain things lying down. That I am saying -
A. That appears correct to me.
Q. And that was your view at the time and the view that you declared afterwards as being your view -- that you were determined that you would solve the Polish question even if it meant war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying that you wanted war. That is what I am putting to you.
A. No; that is not correct. To the contrary, I told Court Ciano at the time at Berchtesgnden that the Fuehrer was determined to solve the problem one way or another, or so and so; and that expression was particularly necessary because the Fuehrer was convinced that whatever became know to Rome would go to London and Paris at once. Thus, he wanted clear language to be used, so that Italy would be on our side diplomatically. If the Fuehrer had said or if I had said that the Fuehrer was not so determined to solve that problem, then it would have been passed on immediately without doubt, but since the Fuehrer was determined, if necessary even by war, to solve it, if it couldn't be solved any other way, then this would definitely make war. That is the explanation for that clear and strong diplomatic attitude which I assumed at that time. But I don't know why what is being said here should be contradictory.
Q. I want you to pass on to the last week in August and take that again very shortly, because there is a lot of ground to cover. off the attack which was designed for the morning of the 26th. You remember that. I jst want you to have the dates in mind.
A. I know that date very well.
Q. Now, you have heard, you were here in court the day Dahlerus gave his evidence, were you not?
A. Yes, I was here.
Q. And let me remind you of the date, that on the evening of the 24th the Defendant Goering asked Herr Dahlerus to go to London the next morning to carry a foreward -- a pre-message -- of what the Fuehrer was going to say to Sir Neville Henderson on the 25th. Do you remember that was his evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30 -
A I can't recollect the dates quite exactly, but I think it was like that.
Apr-1-A-RT-16-1a am wrong, but I am giving them as I have looked them up. That was the night of the 24th; Dahlerus left on the morning of the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the 25th--you said about noon; I am not quarreling with you for a matter of minutes--midday on the 25th the Fuehrer saw Sir Neville Henderson.
A Yes, that's right.
Q And it was called the "Note Verbale", That is asking in general terms. day he only talked to him. In the evening he dispatched Ambassador Schmidt who said there was a special message, and asked him once more to put his government how serious the Fuehrer was about this message. I think that is contained in the British Blue Book. view in the oral conversation which he had with Sir Neville in the middle of the day?
A Yes, that's right. have said, was not done until you had had the message from Signor Mussolini about 3 o'clock, and the news that the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was going to be signed that evening about 4 o'clockm That is what you have said.
Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the time that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when the words were spoken by the Fuehrer to Sir Neville Henderson, it was the German intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and what I suggest is that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the words which were spoken to Sir Nevillw Henderson were simply designed in order to trouble the British Government in the hope that it night have some effect on them withdrawing from their aid to Poland; isn't that right?
A Do you want me to answer that?
Q Certainly; I am asking you.
A I didn't quite understand it, The situation is that I don't know the message Dahlerus had; I can't talk about it.
that in the morning I saw the correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Adolf Apr-1-A-RT-16-2a Hitler--I think dated the 22nd.
That correspondence finished in a sort of deadlock. I talked to the Fuehrer afterwards, wondering whether I shouldn't make yet another effort to come to a solution with England. Subsequently, towards midday--I think it was 1 or 2 o'clock-- the Fuehrer met Sir Neville in my presence and he told him that he should take his airplane and fly to London so as to talk to the British Government as quickly as possible. He had the intention that after solving the Polish problem of submitting yet wider proposals to Britain. I think he was dictating it, but I havn't got that in my recollection exactly.
Then Sir Neville Henderson flew to London. When th Fuehrer had that conversation, military measures were being taken. I heard that that day. Mussolini's refusal was received earlier. I don't think it was 3 o'clock; I think it was in the morning. Then at 4 or 5 in the afternoon I heard about the Polish-British agreement being ratified, and I went to see the Fuehrer and suggested to him to withdraw the military orders which lad been made. He did so after a short time. going on. Just how far they went I cannot, unfortunately, say; but when the Fuehrer was sending that Verbal note to England I was under the impression that if England would react proptly to that conflagration would not have arisen. In that case military measures which were automatic could have been arrested later on. But about that I cannot say anything in detail. from the Fuehrer -- which I to ink was towards the evening; certainly in the afternoon -- then those measures had already been stopped or they were in the process of being stopped. But exact hours of course I cannot at the moment give you. I would have to have detailed evidence which unfortunately I havn't got here. But one thing is certain, and that is that it was the Fuehrer's suggestion at the time to offer -- there was an offer made to England so as to try still to come to a solution of the Polish problem. When I saw the Note Verbale I told him, "How about the Polish solution?" and I still recollect that he said, "Let's send that note to the British, and if they react to it then we can still see what to do."
ped rpeviously or were stopped just after that.
Q Now, you weren't present at the meeting of the Fuehrer and his Gene rals on the 22nd of August, but you must have heard many times the account of it read out since this trial started. You remember the Fuehrer is reported, according to minutes, to have said:
"I shall give up propagandists causes for starting the war; never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the right is what matters but victory."
That is what was said at Obersalzberf. Had Hitler ever said anything like that to you?
A Did you say 27th?
Q 22nd. What I am asking you is, had Hitler said anything similar to that to you ?
A No, During that discussion on the 22nd I wasn't present. I think I was on my way to Moscow.
Q I said you weren't present. That is why I put it in that way. Had he ever said anything similar to you ? You say no. Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th.
A May I just say something about that ?
Q No. If you say that he hadn't said it to you, I am not going to pursue it, because we musn't waste too much time on each of these details. I wan t you to come to the 29th of August when you saw Sir Neville Henderson, and while accepting with some reservation the idea of direct negotiation with Poland you said that it must be a condition of that negotiation that the poles whould send a plenipotentiary by the next day, by the 30th. You remember that ?
A Yes. Well, it was like this -
Q (Interposing) I really don't want to stop you, but I do want to keep it short an this point.
A Yes. In that case I have got to say no, because this isn't the correct version. May I then go on explaining ?
Q I am sorry, because this is only preliminary. I thought it was common ground that you saw Sir Neville on the 29th, that you put a number of terms. One of the terms was that a Polish plenipotentiary should be present by the 30th. If you don't agree with that, please tell me if I am wrong, because it is my recollection of all documents. a copy of the terms to Sir Neville was, first, because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That's right, isn't it ?
A Yes, that's correct. That's right. not ready on the 29th, because in your communication demanding a plenipotentiary you said if he came on the 30th you would have terms ready by that time. So may I take it that these terms were drawn up bu Hitler with the help of the Foreign Office between the 29th and the 30th.
A He dictated them personally. I think there were 16 points, if I remember rightly. of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles would be willing to send a fly into the spider 's parlor ?
A We certianly expected that; we hoped for it. And I think that one gesture, one hint, from the British government would have sufficed to bring that Ambassador to Berlin. these terms would stand as a, to use Hitler's phrase, propagandistic cause for the war, or else you would be able, by putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to do exactly what you had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and Hacha, and get a surrender from the Poles. Wasn't that what was in your mind ?
A No. The situation was different. I must say that on the 29th the Fuehrer told the British Ambassador that he would draft these conditions or this them at the disposal of the Birtish Government.
At least he was hoping that this would be possible. I think those were his words. after the British reply had been received on the 28th, once more and in spite of the extremely tense situation between Poland and Germany, agreed to this mean of negotiation.
Decisive, therefore, is the following : That during those critical days of the 30th and 31st, the Fuehrer had drafted these conditions. England knew that the possibility of a solution existed. During the whole of the 30th of August we never heard anything at all from Britain, at least nothing definite. Only at midnight, I think, did the British Ambassador report for this discusssion.
In the meantime, I must say that at 7:00 o'clock in the evening the news of general mobilization in Poland had been received, which excited the Fuehrer to a considerable degree. By that the situation had been brought to a more critical stage . I still remember exactly what the situation at the Chancellory was. News was received hourly tegarding the incidents, regarding streams of fugitives, and so forth and so on. In fact, the atmosphere was loaded with electricity and was extremely tense. any definite news. At midnight of the 36th, that conversation took place. It has been said by me here, and by the interpreter Schmidt, just how that conversation went. entire contents to Sir Neville Henderson, and I had hoped that perhaps England would nevertheless still make a move. Sir Neville Henderson had been clearly told by the Fuehrer that a Polish mission would be treated on equal terms. The possibility existed, therefore, either to meet at a third place or that some one would come to Berlin, or that the Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the necessary authorities. Those were the possibilities but I would like to go further.
late at night or until the morning when the march began, that at least the Polish Ambassador Lipski would receive authority to receive at least the German proposals, If this had been done, then the diplomatics negotiations would have started at least, and for the time being the crisis would have been averted. been no objections. that everybody would have appreciated it, if the basis for negotiations that I have described here had existed, any intervention from the British Government during the 30th or 31st and negotiations would have been put on a reasonable basis on the strength of proposals which England described as reasonable.
There wouldn't have been a situation which would have been particularly depressing for the Poles. I believe that on the basis of these reasonable proposals which were perfectly in keeping with the rules of the League of Nationa with reference to the plebiscite in that Corridor, that this would have been a perfectly acceptable solution for Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn new for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal desires me to say that they think that your answers and your explanations are too long, too argumentative, and too repetitive and they are upon matters which have been gone over and over again before the Tribunal, so they would therefore ask you to try and keep your answers as short as possible.
THE WITNESS: Yes. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q Did I understnad you correctly, witness, on Friday, that you didn't knew about the connection between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg in the spring and summer of 1939. It was well before the war--spring and summer, before June of 1939? in Norway and Quisling was one, but his name meant nothing at that time. On the wish of the Fuehrer, I gave Rosenberg certain money for his friends in Norway for newspaper propaganda, and so on.
Q You didn't know, as I understand your testimony, that some of quislings men had been in a training school in Germany in August of 1939, before the war?
A No, I don't remember that. I heard of it through a document here and I don't recall that I knew anything of it at that time. If I did know anything of it, then I didn't know what the matter was at hand. enlarge and extend the staff of the various German official agencies, the legation and the consulates, soon after the beginning of the war?
A No, I don't remember that at the moment at all. I didn't really find out about that if that was the case.
Q It is the quotation from the year book of the NSDAP. All I want to know at the moment is whether or not you knew about that. If you say you didn't-
A I didn't. interviews with Hitler on the 16th and 18th December?
A No. What was the date, may I ask?
A No, I knew nothing about these discussions.
to Norway was, first, when you got the letter from Raeder, dated the 3rd of April?
Q I beg your pardon. It is a mistake of mine. I am sorry. Do you remember a letter from Keitel, where he says "The Military Occupation of Denmark and Norway had been by command of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht -- the High Command of the Wehrmacht had therefore ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation." So really, witness, I may perhaps be able to shorten the matter. You are really not a good person to ask about the earlier preparations with regard to Norway, because you weren't in on these earlier discussions with quisling and with Raeder and Hitler. Is that right? If so, I will leave the subject.
A No. I did not participate in those things but I should like to make one thing clear, that I received this letter only some days later. The first intimation I had of the intentions of the occupation of Norway, I received about thirty hours ahead of time. The letter was probably longer under way than it should have been. and I will take you straight to the question of the Low Countries. You have heard me read, and probably other people read, more than once, the statement of Hitler's on the 22nd of August 1939. "Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these States, as well as Scandanavia, will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. That is what Hitler said on the 22nd of August. You weren't there, and I ask you again if he expressed the same opinion to you? 1939, that an Army Group order was given that Armed Group B is to make all preparations, according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so demands. Did you know of that order on the7th of October?
A No. I believe I heard it here but I didn't knew about it before.
directive: "A long waiting period results not only in the ending to the advantage of the Western Powers, of Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the neutrals in Germany final victory to wane. Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front, crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon as and as forcibly as possible." Did youknow that Hitler issued that directive on the 9th of October?
A No, that I didn't know. Hitler gave his assurance, the many assurances, in August and October, without telling his foreign minister that on the 7th and 9th of October, he had given the directive for the attack on the Low Countries, that he didn't tell you as to his order or his directive for his attack on the Lou Countries? Are you sure of that?
A I am pretty sure of that, otherwise I should recall it. I know one thing, that such thoughts, whether or not one should advance in the West, after the Polish Campaign, had been brought up but nothing more specific.
Q I see. If you say that is the state of your knowledge, we will pass on to something about which you did know a little bit more. Do you remember the meeting of Hitler and yourself with Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August 1939?
A Yes. I saw the document regarding that, here. page 181. I want youto follow while I read one passage, which should be about 182. In as on my second page and it is a paragraph which begins, "As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict..."
A. I haven't found it.
Q Well, if you look for that "As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude...."
A On page 2?
Q It should be on page 2, on my page two. It may be further on in yours.
A Is that the beginning of the paragraph?
Q Yes, "As Poland makes it clear...." It is two paragraphs on from a single line that says at that point "Count Ciano showed signs of ..."
Q. Would you look at the next sentence, "Generally speaking..." This is the next sentence but one:
"Generally speaking, it would be best to liguidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other who is just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice cersa. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral.
"At the visit of Prince Regent Paul, he, Hitler suggested, particularly atthe consideration of Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis, and Yugoslavia's leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reassurance of the Western Pwers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Kafenku who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the Western democracies."
Now, that was Hitler's formulation of his policy, and may I state that that was the policy which you were assisting to carry out, to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other, and include among these pseudo-neutrals Yugoslavia?
A. No, that is not to be understood in that way. I must state the following in this connection. The situation was this: Hitler wanted to keep Italy alert. Italy was always a very uncertain country. For that reason, he spoke at that time in a way designed to tell Italy that if it had any difficulties with Yugoslavia, Germany would support Italy.
The situation was this, that Germany, with Italy's assistance, had already taken some positions in Europe peacefully, during which Italy supported Hitler. I remember the situation.
Q. But it isn't an explanation of the words I put to you which is the important thing. "It would be best to liquidate uncertain neutrals one after the other." Are you denying that that was your policy, to liquidate uncertain neutrals?
A. No, than can't be taken so literally. They were diplomatic discussions, and I do -
Q. (Interposing) I want to -
A. (Interposing) This was a question of Yugoslavia.
Q. This had always been Mussolini's view, hadn't it, that the Balkans should be attacked at the earliest possible opportunity?
A. That I don't know.
Q. Well, would you look at Document 2818-PS. My Lord, this will be GB-292. alliance pact between Germany and Italy made on the 22nd of May, 1939, and appended to it there are some comments by Mussolini on the 30th of May,1939. Do you see?
A. What page?
Q. Well, I just wanted you to look at two passages. Do you see where the comments by Mussolini begin? Under the pact itself, do you see the comment by Mussolini?
A. Yes, here it is.
Q. Well now, No. 1 says:
"The war between the plutocratic and therfore selfishly conservative nations and the densely populated and poor nations is inevitable. One must prepare in the light of this situation." the war will be postponed, and he is saying what should happen if the war comes He says that:
"The war which the great democracies are preparing is a war of exhaustion. One must therefore start with the worst assumption which contains 100 per cent probability: The Axis will get nothing more from the rest of the world. This assumption is hard, but the strategic positions reached by the Axis diminish the *---*issitude and the danger of a war of exhaustion considerably. For this purpose one must take the whole Danube and Balkan area immediately after the first hours of the war. One cannot be satisfied with declarations of neutrality but must occupy the territories and use them for the procurement of necessary food and industrial war supplies."
Do you see that? O don't you agree that it was Mussolini's view that the Balkans should he attacked at the earliest possible moment?
A. As I remarked, this is the first time I have seen this report of Mussolini.
Q. Now, I want you to come to the remarks of Hitler's which you have seen considerably more than once. You remember, after the Simovitsch coup d'etat on the 26th of March, there was a meeting, a conference with Hitler, where he announced his policy:
"The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and in a national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future, will be taken not of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops available for it are ready."
Do you remember Hitler saying that on the 27th of March?
A. I don't have that in my hand. Could I perhaps see the document?
Q. Don't you remember it? Don't you remember it? I has been read many times in this Court, Hitler's statement.
A. Yes, I remember it, not the individual words, but in general.
Q. Do you remember that was the sense of it, and I read his words. Now, that was the policy -
A. (Interposing) I don't know what you are driving at.
Q. Well, I'll put it to you now. What I am driving at is this, that it was your policy to attack Yugoslavia without asking them for assurance, without any diplomatic action of any kind. You decided to attack Yugoslavia and to bomb Belgrade. Isn't that right?
A. No, the situation was entirely different.
Q. I want your explanation of these points which I have specifically read and mentioned to you. "No diplomatic inquiries will be made." Why did you decide, or why did Hitler decide, and you help, in attaking Yugoslavia without making any diplomatic inquiries, without giving the new government any chance to give you assurances? Why did you do it?
A. Because the new government had been formed, above all, by England. As I discovered in the course of the previous negotiations, this was admitted to me. It was perfectly clear to me when the Simovitsch putsch was carried out that behind Simovitsch's government there were enemies of Germany and that this army was mobilizing in order to attack the Italian army from the rear. It was not my policy, but I entered these negotiations of which you are speaking later, and Hitler apodictically stated his attitude without giving anyone a chance to contradict. I was present then. I had a serious conversation with the Fuehrer on that occasion.
Q. Did you think it right to attack this country without any diplomatic measures being taken at all, to use Hitler's words "with unmerciful harshness"; military destruction, and to destroy the capital of Belgrad in attacks by waves of bombers? Did you think that was right?
I asked you a simple question. Did you think it was right?
A. I can answer this question neither with yes nor no without giving an explanation of my answer.
Q. Then you needn't answer it. If you can' answer that question yes or no, you needn't answer it at all. And you come on to the next point which is the question of Russia. had decided to attack the Soviet Union after M. Molotov's visit to Berlin on, I think, the 12th of November of 1940.
A. I didn't say that because I didn't know it.
Q. Well, as I understood it, one of the reasons which you were giving as a justification for the attack on the Soviet Union was what was said by M. Molotov during his visit of November 1940. Isn't that what you said?
A. That was one of the reasons that caused the Fuehrer concern. I did not know anything about an attack at that time.
Q. You know that the defendant Jodl says that even during the western campaign -- that is, May and June 1940 -- Hitler had told him that he had made a fundamental decision to take steps against this danger, that is, the Soviet Union, "the moment our military position made it at all possible."
Did you know that?
A. I found that out for the first time here in Nurnberg.
Q. That is L-172, US-34, Jodl's lecture. informed during a conference with Goering that the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until the spring of 1941; that "later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands."
Did you know that?
A. No, I did not.
Q. And did you know that in November of 1940, General Thomas and Secretary of State Koerner, Neumann, Becker, and General von Hannecken were informed by Goering of the action planned in the East?
Did you know that?
A. No, I did not know that either.
Q. You know now, don't you, that a long time before any of the matters raised in M. Molotov's visit came up for discussion, Hitler had determined to attack the Soviet Union?
A. No, I did not know that at all. I know that Hitler had doubts, but about that I did not know. I knew nothing about military preparations, because that was out of my province.
Q. Even on the 18th of December, when Hitler issued the directive number 21 on Barbarossa, he told you nothing about it?
A. Yes, because precisely in December, as I happen to remember, I had a long talk with the Fuehrer in order to get his approval in winning the Soviet Union as a party to the three-power pact, and to incorporate them into the three-power pact. Hitler was not altogether enthusiastic about this idea, but he told me, "We have carried out various things, and we might even carry out that." This was in December, and I remember that very precisely as it happened.
Q. Do you understand what you are saying?
A. There is an affidavit available of a witness, who can testify to this, which the defense is going to produce.
Q. Do you understand what you are saying? This is after the defendant Goering had announced it to General Thomas and these under-secretaries, after the directive had actually gone out for Barbarossa, and you are saying that Hitler let you suggest that you should try and get the Soviet Union to join the three-power pact, without ever telling you that he had his orders out for the attack of the Soviet Union. Do you really expect anyone to believe that?
A. I didn't quite understand the question.
Q. The question was, do you really expect anyone to believe that after it had been announced time and again that the Riech was going to attack the Soviet Union, and after the actual directive had gone out for the attack, that Hitler let you tell him that you were thinking of asking them to join the three-power pact? Is that you evidence?
A. Yes, that is exactly the way it was., I suggested this to him again in December, and received his assurance that we would talk about it later. I knew of no plans for an attack on Russia.