A I said to that that it is not right in that sense, but I said quite clearly that England was resisting the German requests and that outwardly, if Germany wanted to achieve these aspirations, she had nothing left to her but to find friends and with the help of those friends bring England to the conference table so that England would agreeto these requests through diplomatic channels.
That was my task at that time. Poland. I will give you the opportunity of answering a question generally, and I hope in that way we may save time. German statesmen were full of the most profound affection and respect for Poland? Do you agree with that? randum of 26 August 1938? I will give you the page number. Page 107 of your document book. I wanted you to look at it. I think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia--", and you may take it from me that the method of approach was putting forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the return of all Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and objectively. That is what precedes. I want you to look at that paragraph.
A Which paragraph do you mean? I did not hear.
Q The fourth, "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia" it begins. The fourth on my copy.
A I have not found it yet. -Paragraph Five. Yes, I have it.
Q "This method of approach toward Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact that after the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn, but the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm picture, the better." time?
A Indubitably no. First of all, I do not know what this document is.
It appears that it came to me through the Secretary of State and from some official in the Foreign Office. He wrote it. It is some theoretical document which were sometimes proposed. I do not recollect having heard it at any time. Whether it reached me, I can not tell you at this moment, but it is possible that such thoughts occurred or were predominant with some of our officials.
Q I see. Now, if you do not agree, would you look at page 110, on which you will find extracts from Hitler's Reichstag Speech on 26 September 1938. I am sorry. I said Reichstag; I meant Sportpalast. regard to Poland, after a tribute to Marshal Pilsutzki, "We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification.
We realize that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 million will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way of understanding, then, had to be found. It has been found, and it will be continually extended further. Certainly, things were difficult for this area. The nationalities and small groups frequently quarreled among themselves, but the main fact is that the two governments and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two countries possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. This is a real work of peace, more valuable than all of the chattering at the League of Nations Palace in Geneva."
Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion?
A Yes, I believe that that was definitely the Fuehrer's view at the time. were a very unimportant matter; is that so?
A No, they were not unimportant. A very difficult point had been reached between Poland and ourselves, and such statements'were always directed at bridging the gap. I know the conditions in Poland particularly well because, for personal reasons, I followed that situation for many years. Since I took over the Foreign Ministry, the greatest difficulties continuously arose, which were always most generously solved by ourselves.
time--and you say quite honestly--were full of praise and affection for the Poles; is that right? German minorities to a satisfactory conclusion. We tried that since 1934. of Danzig with M. Lipski on, I think, in October, around 21 October.
Q 28 October. And the Poles had replied on the 31st. It may have reached-you a day Later through M. Lipski, suggesting the making of a bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland, but saying that the return of Danzig to the Reich would lead to a conflict.
I put it quite generally. I just wanted to remind you of the tenor of the reply. Do you remember?
A No, as far as I remember, it was not like that. The Fuehrer had ordered me on -- I think 28 October, I do not know for sure -- to call ambassador Lipski to Berchtesgaden. He had given me instructions because the Fuehrer was particularly anxious, probably after that speech in the Sportpalast, to clarify the relations with his neighbors. He wanted that particularly with respect to Poland. He instructed me, therefore, to discuss with Ambassador Lipski the question of Danzig and the question of a connection to East Prussia for the Reich.
I asked Lipski to come and see me, and in a very friendly atmosphere I stated Apr-1-A-RT-14-1a these wishes.
Ambassador Lipski remained reserved, and he said that Danzig was a complicated problem but that he would discuss the question with his government. I asked him would he please do so soon and inform me of the outcome. That was the beginning of the negotiations with Poland. get on quickley over this matter. If you will turn to page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Becks' conversation with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your attention to the last paragraph, where, after M.Beck had said that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem, "In answer to this, the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new formula, to which he used the term 'Koeroerschaft', which on the one hand would safeguard the interest of the GermansPopulation and, on the other hand the Polish interest. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at case; there would be no fait accompli in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish government."
Do you see that, before I ask you the question?
Q Just look at the summary of your own conversation with M.Beck on the next day. It is page 115, at the beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will see that after M.Beck had mentioned the Danzig question. you said "In answer,M.von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution."
you see that?
Q Now, page 113. These are the defendant Keitel's orders to-- or rather, to put it exactly, the defendant Keitel's transmission of the Fuehrers order with regard to Danzig. It is dated 24 November. That was some six weeks before, and it is supplementary to an order of 21 October, and you see what it says:
"Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions of Apr-1-A-RT-14-2a 21 October, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise.
"Occupation of Danzig: The preparations will be made on the following basis. The condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland."
Did you know of these instructions?
A. No, I don't know that. This is the first time that I am seeing that order or whatever it might be. May I add something?
Q. Not for the moment. Hitler must have known of the order, mustn't he? It is an order of the Fuehrer?
A. Yes, of course, and I assume -- that is what I wanted to add, that the British prosecutor will appreciate that politics and minutes of people are two completely different things. There is no doubt that the Fuehrer was familiar with the difficulties of this thing, and that Danzig and the Corridor must certainly have resulted in orders of some sort. And I imagine that it is some such order. This is the first I am seeing it, anyway.
Q. Supposing that you had known of the orders, Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of January that Germany was not seeking a fait accompli or a violent solution? If you had seen this order and regarded it as what I considered it to be, namely, a certain General Staff instruction, then -
A. I think it is part of the General Staff's duty to take into consideration all possibilities and prepare for them principally. Thathas nothing to do with politics.
Q. Nothing to do with politics to have a cut-and-dried plan how the free state of Danzig is to be occupied by German troops by surprise when you are telling the Poles that you son't have a fait accompli? That is your idea of how matters should be carried on? If it is I will leave it.
A. No. I have to add I know that for a long time the Fuehrer was always anxious, particularly during 1939, and worried that a Polish coup against Danzig would arise. I am not a military man, but it appeared to be natural to me that all such possibilities should be prepared for. But of course I can't judge any details of the orders.
Q. Now, when did you learn that Hitler was determined to attack Poland?
A. That Hitler was expecting the necessity of military action to become necessary, -- that I think I heard for the first time during August 1939. That, of course, even before that he made certain military preparations for any eventuality becomes clear from this order. But about such orders I did not on principle hear anything, and I do not now recollect anything other than what I received through military information.
Q. Do you tell the Tribunal that you didn't know in May that Hitler's real view was that Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, byt that his real object was the acquisition of lebensaum in the East?
A. No, I didn't know it in that sense. The Fuehrer often talked about lebensaum, that is right, but I did not know that he had the intention to attack Poland.
Q. Well now, just look at page 117 -- or it may be 118 or your document May 1939 at the New Reich Chancellory.
A. Did you say 117?
Q. 117. I want you to look at -- it may be on page 118, and it begins: "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, it is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can only be expected from thinly populated areas over and above the natural fertility following German exploitation, which will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other possibility for Europe."
Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to you?
A. It may be. But first of all I want to say that I wasn't present during this conference. That was a military conference, and the Fuehrer used to hole these military conferences quite separately from the political field. Along those lines the Fuehrer did mention that we needed lebensraum, living space, but any intention of attacking Poland I never heard of at that time, that is, May 1939. He never told me about that. And I think that this was intentional. He always wanted a diplomat to work toward a diplomatic solution,
Q. You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately keeping you in the dark as to hei real aims that Danzig was not the subject of dispute and what he really wanted was lebensraum; is that your story?
A. Yes, I assume that he did that occasionally.
Q. Well now, just look at the very short paragraph a little further on where he says:
"There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with no alternative but to attack at the first suitable opportunity. We can not expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland."
Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his foreign Minister?
A. I didn't quite understand that question.
Q. It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland that you had to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to his foreign minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign policy?
A. No. At that point he didn't do that. In my opinion he did it much later in the summer of 1939. At that time he did talk about it, that he had decided to solve the problem one way or another; so or so.
Q. And do you say that you didn't know in May that Hitler wanted war?
A. Did I what?
Q. You didn't know in May that Hitler wanted war?
A. I wasn't at all convinced of that.
Q. It is quite clear from the document that he did want war, isn't it ?
A. This document no doubt shows an intention of action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language towards his military personnel. And such a form indicating that he was firmly determined is contained therein, but whether that was realized politically, whether he would have carried it out, that is a completely different question. I know he told me repeatedly that one had to talk to military persons as if war was breaking out.
Q. Now, I want to ask you about another point. You said on Friday that you had never expressed the view that Great Britain would stay out of a war and would fail to honor her guarantee to Poland. Do you remember saying that?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that true?
A. Yes.
Q. Well now, I would just like you to look at one or two other documents. Do you remember on the 29th of April 1939 receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the foreign Minister at three-thirty in the afternoon?
A. No, I don't remember that.
Q. Well, we have the minutes of your meeting signed by -- I think von Erdmannsdorf. Did you say this to the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, "The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was his firm conviction that no matter what happened in Europe no French or British soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with Poland were gloomy at the moment."
Did you say that?
A. I don't think I ever said that. I consider that impossible.
Q. Well, if you got a copy -
A. May I perhaps have a look at the document?
Q. Oh, certainly; with pleasure. This will become GB 289, Document D-737,
A. I can't, of couse, now tell you in detail what I said at, that time, but what is possible is that at that time the Hungarians were concerned about the Polish problem and that one wanted to calm them down. That is perfectly feasible. But I hardly believe I said this. It could be that the Fuehrer knew and that the Fuehrer said that England would not march to the aid of Poland.
Q. If you are a little doubtful would you look at Document D-738, which will be GB 290. Evidently you saw these gentlemen again two days later. Just look at the last sentence of that. "The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out again that Poland presented no military problem for us. In case of a military clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch." That is quite straight speaking, isn't it, "The British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch."?
A. I don't know on just what page that is.
Q. It is paragraph 7, and it is the report of the 1st of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is signed by a gentleman called von Erdmannsdorf; it appears at about his signature. The words I am asking you about are "in case of a military clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch."
A. Is that on page 8 or where? On what page, if I may ask?
Q. My heading is paragraph 7. It begins: The Reich foreign minister then returned, to our attitude towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish attitude had aroused great bitterness.
A. It is perfectly feasible that I said something like that, and if it was said it was so as to not unsettle the Hungarians too much and keep their nose to the grindstone. That is a political conversation, that is all. That is clear.
Q. Did you have any requirement to tell the truth in a political con versation?
A. Well, we are not concerned with that. This is a question of bringing about a situation in which the question can be solved diplomatically. If I were to tell the Hungarians today -- and this applies to the Italains later on-that England would assist Poland and that a large war would break out, then this would create a diplomatic situation in which the problem couldn't be solved at all. There is no doubt, therefore, that I at that time used very strong language, just as the Fuehrer always ordered me. If his own foreign minister would have hinted at other possibilities, then that would naturally have caused great difficulties, and I should like to say that this would have meant that under all circumstances it would have led to war. He wanted to create a strong German position so that we could solve this problem peacefully.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you making that GB 290 or 289?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: 738 is 290.
A. (continuing) May I perhaps add that the Hungarians were always somewhat worried -- always agreeable to German foreign policy -- and the Fuehrer told me that I should use particularly forceful language in that connection, as I often used towards my own diplomats.
Q. You want us to assume that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what it names to shortly, isn't it? That is what you want us to understand that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what you want us to understand, sin't in?
A. I don't know whether you can talk about lies in this connection, Mr. Prosecutor. This is diplomacy; and if we were to bring about a powerful situation, then of course we couldn't go beating about the bush. The Fuehrer often used such language; he ordered me to use the same. I want to emphasize once more that I used such language particularly to my own department; the foreign office, so that there was a clear line of policy laid down if the Fuehrer were aiming at the solution of a problem,no matter what the circumstances, so that if a war would arise it was our only chance to indicate a very strong attitude. But if you didn't do that, then war would have arisen in any case.
Q. Well, now, I want you to have in mind what Count Ciano ways that you said to him on; I think the 11th or 12th of August, just before your meeting at, I think it was at Salzburg, with you and Hitler. You remember that according to Count Ciano's diary he said that he asked you "What do you want, the Corridor or Danzig?" and that you looked at him and said, "Not any more; we want war." Do you remember that?
A. Yes. That statement is quite untrue. I told Count Ciano at the time and this is on the same line -- that the Fuehrer is determined to solve the Polish problem one way or another. Those were the instructions I had from the Fuehrer. That I am supposed to have said that we wanted war, that is particularly bad. It must be clear to every diplomat that one doesn't say a thing like that, not even to one's best and most faithful ally; but most certainly not to Count Ciano.
Q. I'd just like you to look at a report of the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini and Count Ciano not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940 -- that is, about nine months later. If you look at the document 2835-PS, which will become GB 291, and if you will turn to; I think it is page 18, line 19 -
A. You mean page 18?
Q. I remind you again, a conversation between you and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March 1940. It begins by saying: The Reich Foreign minister recalled that he actually did state in Slexburg to Count Ciano that he did not believe that England and France would assist Poland without further ado; that at all times the possibility of intervention by western powers must still be reckoned with. He was glad now about the course of events, because first of all it has always been clear that the differences would have to come sooner or later and they were inevitable. conflict in the lifetime of the Fuehrer.
A. Yes; that was after the outbreak of war, wasn't it?
Q. Yes. what I am putting to you are these words: He was glad now about the course of events, because first of all it had always been clear that differences would have to come sooner or later and they were inevitable. And if you will look at where it says "secondly"
A. May I reply to that?
Q. Yes; but what I am suggesting to you is that that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, and that you were very glad that the war did come, because you thought this was an appropriate time for it to happen.
A. I don't find it; I can't find it. To the contrary, it says here that he was still expecting the possibility of an intervention on Britain's part. It says so here clearly.
Q. But it is the second part that I am putting to you. I pass from that point about British intervention. I say he was glad now about the course of events, and if you will look down at the paragraph, so that you will have it in mind, the third line says: was clear that the relationship of the powers would not fornulate itself in the long run in favor of Germany and Italy.
A. May I ask where it says that?
Q. A few lines further down. The word secondly is underlined, isn't it?
A. No, it doesn't say so here.
Q. Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general conscription It is about ten lines further on.
A. What is the British Prosecutor trying to prove here? I don't quite understand.
Q. I want you to look at the next sentence before you answer my question. This, along with the other things, was decisive for the Fuehrer's decision to solve the Polish question even under the danger of intervention by the western powers. The deciding fact was, however,that a great power could not take certain things lying down. That I am saying -
A. That appears correct to me.
Q. And that was your view at the time and the view that you declared afterwards as being your view -- that you were determined that you would solve the Polish question even if it meant war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying that you wanted war. That is what I am putting to you.
A. No; that is not correct. To the contrary, I told Court Ciano at the time at Berchtesgnden that the Fuehrer was determined to solve the problem one way or another, or so and so; and that expression was particularly necessary because the Fuehrer was convinced that whatever became know to Rome would go to London and Paris at once. Thus, he wanted clear language to be used, so that Italy would be on our side diplomatically. If the Fuehrer had said or if I had said that the Fuehrer was not so determined to solve that problem, then it would have been passed on immediately without doubt, but since the Fuehrer was determined, if necessary even by war, to solve it, if it couldn't be solved any other way, then this would definitely make war. That is the explanation for that clear and strong diplomatic attitude which I assumed at that time. But I don't know why what is being said here should be contradictory.
Q. I want you to pass on to the last week in August and take that again very shortly, because there is a lot of ground to cover. off the attack which was designed for the morning of the 26th. You remember that. I jst want you to have the dates in mind.
A. I know that date very well.
Q. Now, you have heard, you were here in court the day Dahlerus gave his evidence, were you not?
A. Yes, I was here.
Q. And let me remind you of the date, that on the evening of the 24th the Defendant Goering asked Herr Dahlerus to go to London the next morning to carry a foreward -- a pre-message -- of what the Fuehrer was going to say to Sir Neville Henderson on the 25th. Do you remember that was his evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30 -
A I can't recollect the dates quite exactly, but I think it was like that.
Apr-1-A-RT-16-1a am wrong, but I am giving them as I have looked them up. That was the night of the 24th; Dahlerus left on the morning of the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the 25th--you said about noon; I am not quarreling with you for a matter of minutes--midday on the 25th the Fuehrer saw Sir Neville Henderson.
A Yes, that's right.
Q And it was called the "Note Verbale", That is asking in general terms. day he only talked to him. In the evening he dispatched Ambassador Schmidt who said there was a special message, and asked him once more to put his government how serious the Fuehrer was about this message. I think that is contained in the British Blue Book. view in the oral conversation which he had with Sir Neville in the middle of the day?
A Yes, that's right. have said, was not done until you had had the message from Signor Mussolini about 3 o'clock, and the news that the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was going to be signed that evening about 4 o'clockm That is what you have said.
Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the time that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when the words were spoken by the Fuehrer to Sir Neville Henderson, it was the German intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and what I suggest is that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the words which were spoken to Sir Nevillw Henderson were simply designed in order to trouble the British Government in the hope that it night have some effect on them withdrawing from their aid to Poland; isn't that right?
A Do you want me to answer that?
Q Certainly; I am asking you.
A I didn't quite understand it, The situation is that I don't know the message Dahlerus had; I can't talk about it.
that in the morning I saw the correspondence between Mr. Chamberlain and Adolf Apr-1-A-RT-16-2a Hitler--I think dated the 22nd.
That correspondence finished in a sort of deadlock. I talked to the Fuehrer afterwards, wondering whether I shouldn't make yet another effort to come to a solution with England. Subsequently, towards midday--I think it was 1 or 2 o'clock-- the Fuehrer met Sir Neville in my presence and he told him that he should take his airplane and fly to London so as to talk to the British Government as quickly as possible. He had the intention that after solving the Polish problem of submitting yet wider proposals to Britain. I think he was dictating it, but I havn't got that in my recollection exactly.
Then Sir Neville Henderson flew to London. When th Fuehrer had that conversation, military measures were being taken. I heard that that day. Mussolini's refusal was received earlier. I don't think it was 3 o'clock; I think it was in the morning. Then at 4 or 5 in the afternoon I heard about the Polish-British agreement being ratified, and I went to see the Fuehrer and suggested to him to withdraw the military orders which lad been made. He did so after a short time. going on. Just how far they went I cannot, unfortunately, say; but when the Fuehrer was sending that Verbal note to England I was under the impression that if England would react proptly to that conflagration would not have arisen. In that case military measures which were automatic could have been arrested later on. But about that I cannot say anything in detail. from the Fuehrer -- which I to ink was towards the evening; certainly in the afternoon -- then those measures had already been stopped or they were in the process of being stopped. But exact hours of course I cannot at the moment give you. I would have to have detailed evidence which unfortunately I havn't got here. But one thing is certain, and that is that it was the Fuehrer's suggestion at the time to offer -- there was an offer made to England so as to try still to come to a solution of the Polish problem. When I saw the Note Verbale I told him, "How about the Polish solution?" and I still recollect that he said, "Let's send that note to the British, and if they react to it then we can still see what to do."
ped rpeviously or were stopped just after that.
Q Now, you weren't present at the meeting of the Fuehrer and his Gene rals on the 22nd of August, but you must have heard many times the account of it read out since this trial started. You remember the Fuehrer is reported, according to minutes, to have said:
"I shall give up propagandists causes for starting the war; never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the right is what matters but victory."
That is what was said at Obersalzberf. Had Hitler ever said anything like that to you?
A Did you say 27th?
Q 22nd. What I am asking you is, had Hitler said anything similar to that to you ?
A No, During that discussion on the 22nd I wasn't present. I think I was on my way to Moscow.
Q I said you weren't present. That is why I put it in that way. Had he ever said anything similar to you ? You say no. Well, now, I want you to come to the 29th.
A May I just say something about that ?
Q No. If you say that he hadn't said it to you, I am not going to pursue it, because we musn't waste too much time on each of these details. I wan t you to come to the 29th of August when you saw Sir Neville Henderson, and while accepting with some reservation the idea of direct negotiation with Poland you said that it must be a condition of that negotiation that the poles whould send a plenipotentiary by the next day, by the 30th. You remember that ?
A Yes. Well, it was like this -
Q (Interposing) I really don't want to stop you, but I do want to keep it short an this point.
A Yes. In that case I have got to say no, because this isn't the correct version. May I then go on explaining ?
Q I am sorry, because this is only preliminary. I thought it was common ground that you saw Sir Neville on the 29th, that you put a number of terms. One of the terms was that a Polish plenipotentiary should be present by the 30th. If you don't agree with that, please tell me if I am wrong, because it is my recollection of all documents. a copy of the terms to Sir Neville was, first, because Hitler had ordered you not to give a copy. And I think your reason given at the time was that the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived, and therefore it was no good giving a copy of the terms. That's right, isn't it ?
A Yes, that's correct. That's right. not ready on the 29th, because in your communication demanding a plenipotentiary you said if he came on the 30th you would have terms ready by that time. So may I take it that these terms were drawn up bu Hitler with the help of the Foreign Office between the 29th and the 30th.
A He dictated them personally. I think there were 16 points, if I remember rightly. of Tiso, of Hacha, that the Poles would be willing to send a fly into the spider 's parlor ?
A We certianly expected that; we hoped for it. And I think that one gesture, one hint, from the British government would have sufficed to bring that Ambassador to Berlin. these terms would stand as a, to use Hitler's phrase, propagandistic cause for the war, or else you would be able, by putting pressure on the Polish plenipotentiary, to do exactly what you had done before with Schuschnigg and Tiso and Hacha, and get a surrender from the Poles. Wasn't that what was in your mind ?
A No. The situation was different. I must say that on the 29th the Fuehrer told the British Ambassador that he would draft these conditions or this them at the disposal of the Birtish Government.
At least he was hoping that this would be possible. I think those were his words. after the British reply had been received on the 28th, once more and in spite of the extremely tense situation between Poland and Germany, agreed to this mean of negotiation.
Decisive, therefore, is the following : That during those critical days of the 30th and 31st, the Fuehrer had drafted these conditions. England knew that the possibility of a solution existed. During the whole of the 30th of August we never heard anything at all from Britain, at least nothing definite. Only at midnight, I think, did the British Ambassador report for this discusssion.
In the meantime, I must say that at 7:00 o'clock in the evening the news of general mobilization in Poland had been received, which excited the Fuehrer to a considerable degree. By that the situation had been brought to a more critical stage . I still remember exactly what the situation at the Chancellory was. News was received hourly tegarding the incidents, regarding streams of fugitives, and so forth and so on. In fact, the atmosphere was loaded with electricity and was extremely tense. any definite news. At midnight of the 36th, that conversation took place. It has been said by me here, and by the interpreter Schmidt, just how that conversation went. entire contents to Sir Neville Henderson, and I had hoped that perhaps England would nevertheless still make a move. Sir Neville Henderson had been clearly told by the Fuehrer that a Polish mission would be treated on equal terms. The possibility existed, therefore, either to meet at a third place or that some one would come to Berlin, or that the Polish Ambassador Lipski would be given the necessary authorities. Those were the possibilities but I would like to go further.
late at night or until the morning when the march began, that at least the Polish Ambassador Lipski would receive authority to receive at least the German proposals, If this had been done, then the diplomatics negotiations would have started at least, and for the time being the crisis would have been averted. been no objections. that everybody would have appreciated it, if the basis for negotiations that I have described here had existed, any intervention from the British Government during the 30th or 31st and negotiations would have been put on a reasonable basis on the strength of proposals which England described as reasonable.
There wouldn't have been a situation which would have been particularly depressing for the Poles. I believe that on the basis of these reasonable proposals which were perfectly in keeping with the rules of the League of Nationa with reference to the plebiscite in that Corridor, that this would have been a perfectly acceptable solution for Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn new for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.)