A No, that is not correct. Strong pressure was not used to undertake Apr-1-M-RT-11-1 that from the side of the Czechs.
It is possible that at the time Tiso hesitated because at any rate it was a very decisive step to be taken. In regard to this fact the Fuehrer had the very clear desire to solve the question of Bohemia-Morvavia in some way.
Q One point. This is my last question before I come to the interview with President Hacha. Don't you remember that Herr Burckel and other Austrian associates, together with the Defendant Sess-Inquart and a number of German officers, at about 10:00 in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of March, went into a cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the Soi Disants Government that they should proclaim the independance of Slovakia? Don't you know that? It was reported by our Counsel.
A I don't recall it in detail, but I believe that something like it took place but I don't know exactly what it was. I believe that that was directed by the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to one now. We had better adjourn until 2:00.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)
1946, 1400-1700, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding: BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Witness, you were present at the interview between President Hacha and Hitler on the 15th of March, 1939, were you not?
A. Yes, I was present.
Q. Do you remember Hitler saying at that interview that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia, raid that at 6 o'clock in the morning the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides?
A. I can't recall the exact words, but I know that Hitler told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia.
Q. Do you remember him saying what I put to you, that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia?
A. Yes, that is just it.
Q. Do you remember the defendant Goering -- as he told the Tribunal -telling President Hacha that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague
A. I can't give any detailed statement on that subject.
Q. I am not asking you for a detailed statement; I am asking you if you remember what I should suppose was a rather remarkable statement, that the defendant Goering said to President Hacha that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague if Czech resistance was not called off. Do you remember that?
A. No, I don't know that; I wasn't present.
Q. You were ther during the whole interview, were you not?
A. No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor would allow me to do so, I would like to add my explanation as to exactly how things happened.
Q. I want you to answer my question at the moment. You say you don't remember that. At any rate, if the defendant Goering said that he said it, would you accept that it happened?
A. If Goering says so, then it will, of course, be true. I have only to relate that I was not present during that conference between President Hacha and the then Reichsmarshal Goering.
Q. Do you remember Hitler saying that within two days the Czech Army would not exist any jore?
A. I don't recall that in detail, no; it was a very long conference.
Q Do you remember Hitler saying that at 6 o'clock the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion.
A It is possible that something like that was said. However, I can't remember the details. intolerable pressure was put upon President Hacha?
A That question didn't come through. tolerable pressure was put upon President Hacha?
A Undoubtedly, Hitler's language was very clear. However, to that I have to add that President Hacha, on his part, did not come to Berlin for the purpose of finding a solution, together with Hitler. He was surprised that the march of troops into Czechoslovakia was to take place. That I know, and I remember it exactly. He eventually agreed, and contacted his government's Chief of Staff so that there would not be a hostile reception for the German troops. The agreement which I had drafted was then discussed with Hitler, and it was concluded with Hitler and the Czech Foreign Minister. threat of aggressive action by the German Army and Air Force?
Army would march in, and that naturally, under that impression, that document was signed. That is correct.
Q Don't you think you could answer one of my questions directly?
I will ask it again. Will you agree with me that that document was obtained by the most intolerable pressure and threat of aggression ? That is a simple question. Do you agree? to threaten him that your army would march in, in overwhelming strength, and your air force would bomb is capital?
Q What is that but war? Do you not consider it war that the Army would march in with a proportion of a division over a battalion, and that the air force would bomb Prague ? of his country into the Fuehrer's hands, and the Fuehrer had told Hacha -
Q I want you to answer my question. My question is a perfectly simple one, and I want you answer to it. were made.
A No, I didn'8 say that.
Q I put to you that that agreement was obtained by threat of war. Is that not so ? der which Germany stood through the Versailles Treaty and its sanctions. question ? Do you agree that that agreement was obtained by threat of war ? Prague, Czechoslovakia; there is no doubt about that. However,Idecisive to the whole matter was that the Fuehrer explained to President Hacha the reason why he would have to do this, and that President Hacha eventually, at the end agreed absolutely, after he had consulted his government and his general staff and heard their opinion.
On the other hand -- and that is absolutely true -the Fuehrer ahd decided to solve this question under any circumstances. The reason for that was that it was the Fuehrer's conception that in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there was a conspiracy against the German Reich. Field Marshal Goering has already stated that Russian commissions were present at Czech airdromes. Consequently, the Fuehrer did that because he believed that it was necessary for the protection of the German Reich. in the Western Hemisphere, and England stated that it was interested in the entire globe ? And I think the fact that the Fuehrer showed interest in the remainder of Czechoslovakia in nothing unusual or undue for a large power, whatever you think of the method. But one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were occupied without a single drop of blood being shed.
shed because you had threatened to march in overwhelming strength and to bomb Prague if they didn't agree, isn't that so ? been agreed upon before, namely, that the German armed forces could march in without any opposition. your threatening to march in and threatenting to bomb Prague, was it not ?
A I have already once replied to you that it isn't like that, but that the Fuehrer talked to President Hacha and told him that he would march in and that a discussion between President Hacha and Goering -- I do not know, but after that President Hacha signed the agreement, after he consulted with his Government and his General Staff in Prague by telephone. No doubt, the person of the Fuehrer in the case of that argument mattered a lot, and the announced march of the German troops was the cause for President Hacha's signing the agreement.
Q Don't you remember -- would you mind standing, General, for a second (A Czechoslovak army officer stood up in the court room.)
Don't you remember General Etscher asking you some questions once, this General from Czechoslovakia ? March was contrary to the declaration of Hitler given to Chamberlain but in fact that Hitler saw in the occupation a vital necessity for Germany ?
A Yes, that is correct. I was wrong, in the first point. I will admit that openly, and I remembered it afterward. Because there is nothing likethat contained in the Munich agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain. And in the second point I think I stated that Hitler believed he was acting in the best interests of his country. views with regard to Great Britain. Is it correct that when you went to London as Ambassador of the Reich you thought there was very little chance of an agreement, in fact that it was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an understanding with Great Britain ?
standing with Great Britain ?
Q Here is a simple question I am asking you : Is it right that when you went to London as Ambassador you thought there was very little chance of an understanding with England,?in fact, that the chance was a hundred to one ?
A Yes, the chance wasn't large.
Q These are your own words, aren't they, that the chance was a hundred to one ? Do you remember saying that?
AA hundred to one ? I don't remember that but I did tell Hitler that the chance was very small. But I want to add something. I told the Fuehrer that I would do everything, nevertheless, to attempt to achieve a final Anglo German understanding.
Q Now, when you left England did you believe that war was inevitable? When you left England -- when you ceased being Ambassador -- did you believe that war was inevitable?
A No, I wasn't of that opinion, that it was inevitable; but that a possibility of war existed, considering the developments which were taking place in England, that that was possible -- of that I was convinced.
Q I want you to be careful about this; Did you say that you didn't think war was unavoidable when you left England ? but I was aware of the fact that that considering developments towards German policies in England a conflagration was within the possibilities that existed.
A Did you say 211 ?
Q Have you got that ?
Q Now, will you look at the second paragraph ? It reads like this :
He, the Reich Foreign Minister, had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London and had considered the chances for an understanding as a hundred to one, that war was in sight with England and also won the upper hand when he, the Reich Foreign Minister, left England, and said war was unavoidable Is that what you said to Ambassador Oschima ?
A I don't know now whether I said it just like that, but in any case that was preliminary diplomatic language and on the strength of the situation we considered it useful to tell the Japanese Ambassador that. What is interesting is that I remember when I left England I did not consider the war unavoidable and certain. Whether later in the course of years I said this or that ,we well, that isn't significant for what I thought at that time, when I said that, I don't think that is the least bit of evidence for that. Perhaps I tried to get him into the war against England and probably used strong language.
Q You probably told him what was untrue ?
A I don't know, and I don't know whether that is being put down accurately, in detail. That is a long report. I don't know where it comes from. purposes and not every word is weighed carefully. At any rate, the truth is when I left London there was no certainty that the war was inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical when leaving London and that I didn't know what things would drift into, and that particularly because of the strong pro-war party in England. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Defendant, will you speak a little bit more slowly ? BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: licy should be pretended friendliness toward England and actual formulation of a coalition against her?
A In that sense, no; that is not right. It was clear to me that at the time when I became Foreign Minister the achievement of the German wishes in Europe was difficult and that it was principally England that was in the way of those wishes.
For years, by order of the Fuehrer, I tried by means of a friendly understanding to achieve those points-
Q I want you now to answer my question: Did you advise the Fuehrer that that the proper policy was pretended friendliness with England and in actuality the formulation of a coalition against her ? Did you or did you not ? GB-28, and at your conclusions that are to be drawn. (Handing document to witness.) You will see it at the end under No. 5. "Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us." It is about the end of the third page. "Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us, outwardly further understanding with England while protecting the interests of our friends; formation under great secrecy but with wholehearted tenacity of a coalition against England; that is, in practice a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours, directly or indirectly; close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of the three greatest powers towards this purpose."
And the last sentence: "Every day on which -- no matter what tactical interludes of rapprochement towards us are carried oyt -- our political decision are divided fundamentally by the thoughts of England as our most dangerous adversary would be a gain for our enemies."
Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute or two ago that you hadn't advised the Fuehrer that you hadn't stressed outward friendly relations while in fact contemplating a coalition against her?
A First of all, may I have permission to look at that document?
Q It is signed by yourself on the 2nd of January 1939. It is your own report to the Fuehrer.
A Yes. Actually, that is quite right. And this is the decisive statement. Only in that way can we meet England's flea for an agreement or a conflict. The situation was clearly at that time that England would resist those German wishes for a decision which the Fuehrer had described as vital and that it merely appeared possible through diplomatic consultations to get England to solve their problem through diplomatic channels and not by war.
That was no doubt the decision at the time. advised Hitler in the sense I put it to you ?
A Which advice do you mean? secrecy of a coalition against her. I put that to you twice and you denied it. I want to know why you did deny it.
A I said to that that it is not right in that sense, but I said quite clearly that England was resisting the German requests and that outwardly, if Germany wanted to achieve these aspirations, she had nothing left to her but to find friends and with the help of those friends bring England to the conference table so that England would agreeto these requests through diplomatic channels.
That was my task at that time. Poland. I will give you the opportunity of answering a question generally, and I hope in that way we may save time. German statesmen were full of the most profound affection and respect for Poland? Do you agree with that? randum of 26 August 1938? I will give you the page number. Page 107 of your document book. I wanted you to look at it. I think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia--", and you may take it from me that the method of approach was putting forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the return of all Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and objectively. That is what precedes. I want you to look at that paragraph.
A Which paragraph do you mean? I did not hear.
Q The fourth, "This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia" it begins. The fourth on my copy.
A I have not found it yet. -Paragraph Five. Yes, I have it.
Q "This method of approach toward Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact that after the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn, but the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm picture, the better." time?
A Indubitably no. First of all, I do not know what this document is.
It appears that it came to me through the Secretary of State and from some official in the Foreign Office. He wrote it. It is some theoretical document which were sometimes proposed. I do not recollect having heard it at any time. Whether it reached me, I can not tell you at this moment, but it is possible that such thoughts occurred or were predominant with some of our officials.
Q I see. Now, if you do not agree, would you look at page 110, on which you will find extracts from Hitler's Reichstag Speech on 26 September 1938. I am sorry. I said Reichstag; I meant Sportpalast. regard to Poland, after a tribute to Marshal Pilsutzki, "We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification.
We realize that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 million will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way of understanding, then, had to be found. It has been found, and it will be continually extended further. Certainly, things were difficult for this area. The nationalities and small groups frequently quarreled among themselves, but the main fact is that the two governments and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two countries possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. This is a real work of peace, more valuable than all of the chattering at the League of Nations Palace in Geneva."
Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion?
A Yes, I believe that that was definitely the Fuehrer's view at the time. were a very unimportant matter; is that so?
A No, they were not unimportant. A very difficult point had been reached between Poland and ourselves, and such statements'were always directed at bridging the gap. I know the conditions in Poland particularly well because, for personal reasons, I followed that situation for many years. Since I took over the Foreign Ministry, the greatest difficulties continuously arose, which were always most generously solved by ourselves.
time--and you say quite honestly--were full of praise and affection for the Poles; is that right? German minorities to a satisfactory conclusion. We tried that since 1934. of Danzig with M. Lipski on, I think, in October, around 21 October.
Q 28 October. And the Poles had replied on the 31st. It may have reached-you a day Later through M. Lipski, suggesting the making of a bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland, but saying that the return of Danzig to the Reich would lead to a conflict.
I put it quite generally. I just wanted to remind you of the tenor of the reply. Do you remember?
A No, as far as I remember, it was not like that. The Fuehrer had ordered me on -- I think 28 October, I do not know for sure -- to call ambassador Lipski to Berchtesgaden. He had given me instructions because the Fuehrer was particularly anxious, probably after that speech in the Sportpalast, to clarify the relations with his neighbors. He wanted that particularly with respect to Poland. He instructed me, therefore, to discuss with Ambassador Lipski the question of Danzig and the question of a connection to East Prussia for the Reich.
I asked Lipski to come and see me, and in a very friendly atmosphere I stated Apr-1-A-RT-14-1a these wishes.
Ambassador Lipski remained reserved, and he said that Danzig was a complicated problem but that he would discuss the question with his government. I asked him would he please do so soon and inform me of the outcome. That was the beginning of the negotiations with Poland. get on quickley over this matter. If you will turn to page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Becks' conversation with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your attention to the last paragraph, where, after M.Beck had said that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem, "In answer to this, the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new formula, to which he used the term 'Koeroerschaft', which on the one hand would safeguard the interest of the GermansPopulation and, on the other hand the Polish interest. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at case; there would be no fait accompli in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish government."
Do you see that, before I ask you the question?
Q Just look at the summary of your own conversation with M.Beck on the next day. It is page 115, at the beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will see that after M.Beck had mentioned the Danzig question. you said "In answer,M.von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution."
you see that?
Q Now, page 113. These are the defendant Keitel's orders to-- or rather, to put it exactly, the defendant Keitel's transmission of the Fuehrers order with regard to Danzig. It is dated 24 November. That was some six weeks before, and it is supplementary to an order of 21 October, and you see what it says:
"Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions of Apr-1-A-RT-14-2a 21 October, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise.
"Occupation of Danzig: The preparations will be made on the following basis. The condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland."
Did you know of these instructions?
A. No, I don't know that. This is the first time that I am seeing that order or whatever it might be. May I add something?
Q. Not for the moment. Hitler must have known of the order, mustn't he? It is an order of the Fuehrer?
A. Yes, of course, and I assume -- that is what I wanted to add, that the British prosecutor will appreciate that politics and minutes of people are two completely different things. There is no doubt that the Fuehrer was familiar with the difficulties of this thing, and that Danzig and the Corridor must certainly have resulted in orders of some sort. And I imagine that it is some such order. This is the first I am seeing it, anyway.
Q. Supposing that you had known of the orders, Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of January that Germany was not seeking a fait accompli or a violent solution? If you had seen this order and regarded it as what I considered it to be, namely, a certain General Staff instruction, then -
A. I think it is part of the General Staff's duty to take into consideration all possibilities and prepare for them principally. Thathas nothing to do with politics.
Q. Nothing to do with politics to have a cut-and-dried plan how the free state of Danzig is to be occupied by German troops by surprise when you are telling the Poles that you son't have a fait accompli? That is your idea of how matters should be carried on? If it is I will leave it.
A. No. I have to add I know that for a long time the Fuehrer was always anxious, particularly during 1939, and worried that a Polish coup against Danzig would arise. I am not a military man, but it appeared to be natural to me that all such possibilities should be prepared for. But of course I can't judge any details of the orders.
Q. Now, when did you learn that Hitler was determined to attack Poland?
A. That Hitler was expecting the necessity of military action to become necessary, -- that I think I heard for the first time during August 1939. That, of course, even before that he made certain military preparations for any eventuality becomes clear from this order. But about such orders I did not on principle hear anything, and I do not now recollect anything other than what I received through military information.
Q. Do you tell the Tribunal that you didn't know in May that Hitler's real view was that Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, byt that his real object was the acquisition of lebensaum in the East?
A. No, I didn't know it in that sense. The Fuehrer often talked about lebensaum, that is right, but I did not know that he had the intention to attack Poland.
Q. Well now, just look at page 117 -- or it may be 118 or your document May 1939 at the New Reich Chancellory.
A. Did you say 117?
Q. 117. I want you to look at -- it may be on page 118, and it begins: "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, it is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can only be expected from thinly populated areas over and above the natural fertility following German exploitation, which will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other possibility for Europe."
Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to you?
A. It may be. But first of all I want to say that I wasn't present during this conference. That was a military conference, and the Fuehrer used to hole these military conferences quite separately from the political field. Along those lines the Fuehrer did mention that we needed lebensraum, living space, but any intention of attacking Poland I never heard of at that time, that is, May 1939. He never told me about that. And I think that this was intentional. He always wanted a diplomat to work toward a diplomatic solution,
Q. You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately keeping you in the dark as to hei real aims that Danzig was not the subject of dispute and what he really wanted was lebensraum; is that your story?
A. Yes, I assume that he did that occasionally.
Q. Well now, just look at the very short paragraph a little further on where he says:
"There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with no alternative but to attack at the first suitable opportunity. We can not expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland."
Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his foreign Minister?
A. I didn't quite understand that question.
Q. It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland that you had to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to his foreign minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign policy?
A. No. At that point he didn't do that. In my opinion he did it much later in the summer of 1939. At that time he did talk about it, that he had decided to solve the problem one way or another; so or so.
Q. And do you say that you didn't know in May that Hitler wanted war?
A. Did I what?
Q. You didn't know in May that Hitler wanted war?
A. I wasn't at all convinced of that.
Q. It is quite clear from the document that he did want war, isn't it ?
A. This document no doubt shows an intention of action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language towards his military personnel. And such a form indicating that he was firmly determined is contained therein, but whether that was realized politically, whether he would have carried it out, that is a completely different question. I know he told me repeatedly that one had to talk to military persons as if war was breaking out.
Q. Now, I want to ask you about another point. You said on Friday that you had never expressed the view that Great Britain would stay out of a war and would fail to honor her guarantee to Poland. Do you remember saying that?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that true?
A. Yes.
Q. Well now, I would just like you to look at one or two other documents. Do you remember on the 29th of April 1939 receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the foreign Minister at three-thirty in the afternoon?
A. No, I don't remember that.
Q. Well, we have the minutes of your meeting signed by -- I think von Erdmannsdorf. Did you say this to the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, "The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was his firm conviction that no matter what happened in Europe no French or British soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with Poland were gloomy at the moment."
Did you say that?
A. I don't think I ever said that. I consider that impossible.
Q. Well, if you got a copy -
A. May I perhaps have a look at the document?
Q. Oh, certainly; with pleasure. This will become GB 289, Document D-737,
A. I can't, of couse, now tell you in detail what I said at, that time, but what is possible is that at that time the Hungarians were concerned about the Polish problem and that one wanted to calm them down. That is perfectly feasible. But I hardly believe I said this. It could be that the Fuehrer knew and that the Fuehrer said that England would not march to the aid of Poland.
Q. If you are a little doubtful would you look at Document D-738, which will be GB 290. Evidently you saw these gentlemen again two days later. Just look at the last sentence of that. "The Reich Foreign Minister pointed out again that Poland presented no military problem for us. In case of a military clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch." That is quite straight speaking, isn't it, "The British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch."?
A. I don't know on just what page that is.
Q. It is paragraph 7, and it is the report of the 1st of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is signed by a gentleman called von Erdmannsdorf; it appears at about his signature. The words I am asking you about are "in case of a military clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch."
A. Is that on page 8 or where? On what page, if I may ask?
Q. My heading is paragraph 7. It begins: The Reich foreign minister then returned, to our attitude towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish attitude had aroused great bitterness.
A. It is perfectly feasible that I said something like that, and if it was said it was so as to not unsettle the Hungarians too much and keep their nose to the grindstone. That is a political conversation, that is all. That is clear.
Q. Did you have any requirement to tell the truth in a political con versation?
A. Well, we are not concerned with that. This is a question of bringing about a situation in which the question can be solved diplomatically. If I were to tell the Hungarians today -- and this applies to the Italains later on-that England would assist Poland and that a large war would break out, then this would create a diplomatic situation in which the problem couldn't be solved at all. There is no doubt, therefore, that I at that time used very strong language, just as the Fuehrer always ordered me. If his own foreign minister would have hinted at other possibilities, then that would naturally have caused great difficulties, and I should like to say that this would have meant that under all circumstances it would have led to war. He wanted to create a strong German position so that we could solve this problem peacefully.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you making that GB 290 or 289?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: 738 is 290.
A. (continuing) May I perhaps add that the Hungarians were always somewhat worried -- always agreeable to German foreign policy -- and the Fuehrer told me that I should use particularly forceful language in that connection, as I often used towards my own diplomats.