I do not remember anything like that, but of course I know that the Fuehrer at a certain time was determined to solve this problem. According to the experiences which Germany had made in past years, it was a matter of course for him that in one form or other it might be necessary to take military measures in order to put more pressure on his demand.
Q Let me help you about that. Turn on to page 31 of your document book. It is page 37 of the English document book.
A 31?
Q 31 of your document book, yes. It is a quotation from Hitler's speech in January, 1939, but it happens to make clear this point. You see he says--have you got it, Witness?
Q "On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still further emphasized by truly infamous persectuion and terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the Sudeten German question in a final and radical manner.
"On the 28th of May I gave, one, the order for the preparation of military steps against this State"--that is Czechoslovakia--"to be concluded by the 2nd of October. I ordered the forceful and speedy completion of cur defensive front in the west." of May, and that is Hitler's own account of it. Put another way, he said "It is my absolute will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from the map." And then he made clear the other thing about the defensive front in the west.
Now, do you remember that meeting, the 28th of May?
A I have here, I believe, seen the document about it. I do not recall that meeting. of the Fuehrer at that time; it was before he went abroad;--he says you were there, would you deny it?
A I have seen that, yes. I have seen that, but I believe that is an error by Wiedemann.
Q But you think you weren't there?
A I should like to assume I was not there. At least I do not remember that meeting. I could not say it for sure. Generally I was not present at military conferences, but in this case I could not say it for sure. But I knew, generally speaking, that the Fuehrer in the course of the year 1938 got more and more determined, as he said, to assurethe rights of the Sudeten Germans, and for that he also took military preparations. I remember that, but in what form and to what extent I could not say.
Just to put your point of view fairly--I don't want to put anything more into it--you knew that military preparations were being made, but you didn't know the details of what we know now as Fall Gruen.
A No, details I did not know about that. I had never heard them, but I know that if, first of all, during the last weeks, months, of the crisis-
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I protest against this question. I believe in order to save time that I may point out that by the agreement of Munich the entire Sudeten German policy has been by England, France, Italy and Germany sanctioned. Therefore, I don't see any room for questioning in the sense of violation of international law.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question isperfectly proper. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: of the possible war with the foreign personalities. Would you look on to page 34--that is page 40 of the English book.
These are the notes of a discussion with the Italian Ambassador. I don't know which of your officials it took place with, but I want you to look at where it says in a handwritten note "only for the Reichsminister."
"Atolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs unmistakably. Also, as to the date he had information so far that he might go on leave, maybe for two months, but certainly not later than that." months from the 18th of July would be the 18th of September. Then if you will look, a month later there is a note, I think signed by yourself, on the 27th of August:
"atolico paid me a visit. He had received another written instruction from Musso lini, asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini asked for such notification, as Atolico assured me, in order to be able to take in due time the necessary measures on the French Frontier.
"Note: I replied to Ambassador Atolico just as on his former demarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any decision."
So that it is quite clear, isn't it, that you knew that the German preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were under way but the date had not been fixed beyond the general directive of Hitler, that it was to be ready by the beginning of October. That was the position in July and August, wasn't it? crisis already between Germany and Czechoslovakia about that problem; and it is quite clear that during that time one had to think as to how this would finally come out. Therefore, according to this document, I have spoken with the Italian Ambassador that in case that this crisis would develop into a military action, certainly before that Mussolini would be notified. frontier in order to help forward your military plans; is that right?
A That is in this document, but I don't know anything about it. Apparently Atolico said that; if it is included here he must have said it. 41 to 43 of the English book. I don't want to take up time in reading it all, but that is the account of the meeting which you had with the Hungarian ministers Enredi and Kanja. And I should be very glad if, in the interest of time, you would try and answer the general question. Weren't you trying in your discussions with Enredi and Kanja to get the Hungarians to be prepared to attack Czechoslovakia should war eventuate?
A I do not know the content of this document very well. May I read it first, please?
A (Interposing) But from my recollection I may answer--I don't know what in detail is included in the document, but my recollection is that at that time there was a crisis.
It is quite natural that if a possibility of an armed conflict about the Sudeten German problem was in the air or within the reach of possibility that Germany then, at any rate at first, had to contact the neighboring states. That is a matter of fact.
But you went a little beyond contacting them, didn't you? The document says at the end of the sixth paragraph "Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate."
That is a bit beyond contacting people. What you are saying to the Hungarians is "If you want the revision of your boundaries, you have got to come into the war with us." It is quite clear, isn't it, Witness, that is what you were saying, that is what you were trying to do?
A That is just in line of what I said. That is to say, I don't know if that was exactly the expression, but, at any rate, it is clear that at that time apparently--I do remember that I have spoken to these gentlemen--that the possibility of a conflict existed, and that in such a case of course it would be good if we would contact each other about our interests. fore considered it one of the hardest conditions of the Peace Treaty that all these territories and areas in the north had been separated from Hungary, and of course, they were very much interested.
Q You were very much interested in offering them revision. Just look at thelast two paragraphs. It is headed "The 29th." It should be page 38 of your document book. It begins--the very end of this statement: "Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a German-Czech conflict, von Kanja mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one or two years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. During today's conversation, von Kanja corrected this remark and said that Hungary's military situation was much better; his country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year."
You see that? What I am putting to you, Witness, is this: That your position was perfectly clear.
First of all, you get the Sudeten Germans under your control Then you learned from Hitler that there were military preparations.
Then you get the Italians in line. Then you get the Hungarians in line. You are getting everyone ready for aggression against Czechoslovakia, That is what I am putting to you. I want you to be quite clear about it, to be under no misapprehension. Now, look, what-
A (Interposing) May I answer to that? not under my control. Otherwise I am convinced that it is the primitive, first law and right of the Sudeten Germans, according to the right of independence which had been proclaimed in 1919, to decide themselves where they wanted to belong. strong. Adolf Hitler was determined to solve this problem, either by diplomatic means or by other means if it had to be done. That was clear, and it became clearer to me. along diplomatic lines. On the other hand, however, of course in order to lead to a situation such as Munich, I have done everything in order to assemble friends around us and to make our position as strong as possible.
Q. You knew perfectly well, did you not, that the Fall Gruen and that Hitler's military plans envisaged the conquest of the whole of Czechoslovakia? You knew that, did n't you?
A. No, that I did not know, and as far as the Sudetan-German problem is concerned, the British Government has agreed in Munich to solve the problem in a way which I have always thought to be the right one.
Q. Witness, I'm not going to argue politics with you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the Fall Gruen and Hitler's plans from this matter had only been known to his Majesty's Government since the end of the war, when it came into our possession as a captured document. What I asked you was-you say that as the Foreign Minister of the Reich you didn't know that these military plans, the conquest of the whole of Czechoslovakia, was envisaged. You say that? You want the Tribunal to believe that?
A. I repeat again that as far as the Fall Gruen was concerned, I have heard about it the first time here through the documents. I did not know that term at all before. But, in the course of later developments, for instance, in establishing the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia -- I was thinking of a solution of several regions -- that became clear to me, of course.
Q. Just a moment. We will get to that in a moment. I just want you to look at the final act of preparation which you were doing and I am suggesting for this clear aggression, if you will look at page 45 in the book in front of you, you will see a note from the Foreign Office to the Embassy in Prague.
"Please inform Deputy Kundt at Conrad Henlein's request to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start the demands for an autonomy tomorrow."
That was your office's further act, wasn't it, in order to make things difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting your friends to induce that right? Is that what your office was doing?
A. Beyond doubt this is a telegram which came from the Foreign Office. According to the contents, apparently, Henlein approached us to send a telegram for him, and apparently Henlein was of the opinion at that time that the demands for autonomy should be sent to the Prague Government by the Slovaks.
How it came to that, I could not say in detail today, but I would like to point out again that Conrad Henlein's -- and I say unfortunately, and I said it then -activity was not within my jurisdiction or control. I saw Henlein only once or twice during that entire time.
Q. I am not going to take you through all the details. You understand what I'm suggesting to you, that your office was now taking one of its last steps, because this was in the middle of the crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to weaken the Czech Government by inducing demands of autonomy from the Slovaks. You said that you were only passing on Henlein's wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I shall not trouble you further. Besides, you suggested-I come on to what took place in the spring and ask you one or two questions about that. In the spring Hitler was out and you acquiesced in his wishes without -- I was going to say swallowing, but I wan to choose my language carefully Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia.. Now, just look on to page 65 of the book in front of you. That's a telegram in secret code from the Foreign Office, from yourself, in fact, to the Embassy in Prague.
"With reference to telephone instructions given by you today, in case you should get any written communications from President Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action but pass them on here by secret telegrams. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech Government wants to communicate with you during the next few days."
Why were you so anxious that your ambassador shouldn't carry out these ordinary functions and form a channel of communication with the Czech Government
A. That I remember very well. That had the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Chvalkovski, on one of these days, it may have been the same day, approached the ambassador in Prague, saying that President Hacha wanted to speak to the Fuehrer. I had reported that to the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer agreed to receive the Czechoslovak president of state, and the Fuehrer said at the same time that he wanted to conduct these negotiations himself and that he did not desire that anybody else, even the embassy, should interfere in any way.
That, according to my r ecollection, was the reason for that telegram, so that nobody should undertake anything in Prague, and whatever would be done should be done by the Fuehrer personally. Prague and ourselves, and from this entire situation resulted the desire of the President Hacha to see the Fuehrer.
Q. Well, now, I don't like to remind you what you and the Fuehrer were doing on that day. You will find that if you will look at page 66, which is 71 of the English book. You were having a conference, you and the Fuehrer, with Meissner and the defendant Keitel, and Dietrich and Keppler, and you were having the conference with the Slovaks, with M. Tiso. Do you remember that conference?
A. Yes, I remember that conference very well.
Q. Well, then, I will ask you a general question and perhaps without putting the details to you. What Hitler and you were doing at that conference was saying this to the Slovaks:
"If you don't declare your independence of Prague, we shall leave you to the tender mercies of Hungary."
Isn't that in a sense a fair summary of what Hitler and you were saying at that conference?
A That is correct to a certain degree. I would like to give a further Apr-1-M-RT-10-1a explanation though.
The situation was such that one has to understand it from a political point of view. The Hungarians were highly disatisfied and they wanted to regain the territories which they had lost by the Treaty of Trianon. They were in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. There were great difficulties between Pressburg (Bratislava) and Budapest, of course. We always had to expect that here an armed conflict would break out and at least half a dozen times it occurred that from the sight of the Hungarian Government we were made to understand that this could not go on like that. They had to have their revision and it was so that very strong tendencies for independence existed for quite some time among the Slovaks. Mainly, they approached us at first through Tuka and later through Tiso. In this conference, which is here described, it was so that after weeks of knowledge by the Fuehrer of the tendencies of the Slovaks to become autonomies, he finally received Tiso, the later president of the Slovak state, and told him then that he, of course, -- I believe he said during this discussion that he was not interested personally but, if anything should happen there, then the Slovaks should declare their autonomy as quickly as possible. There is no doubt that at the time we expected an aggression by the side of the Hungarians, but it is correct. action Hitler and yourself were taking to secure it--if you try and find it, it will probably be at page 67;it's at the end of a paragraph beginning:
"Now he has permitted Minister Tiso to come here" that he would not tolerate that interior instability and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days but of hours. He had stated at that time that Slovakia wished to make herself independent and that he would support this endeavour and even guarantee it; he would stand by his words so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to desolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of the events for which he was no longer responsible.
you are reported as saying:
Apr-1-M-RT-10-2a "The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours and not of days.
He assured Hitler a message he received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontier. The Fuehrer read this report and mentioned it to Tiso." strongest possible presure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve connections with Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to meet your pressure on Hacha which was coming in a couple of days?
A No, that is not correct. Strong pressure was not used to undertake Apr-1-M-RT-11-1 that from the side of the Czechs.
It is possible that at the time Tiso hesitated because at any rate it was a very decisive step to be taken. In regard to this fact the Fuehrer had the very clear desire to solve the question of Bohemia-Morvavia in some way.
Q One point. This is my last question before I come to the interview with President Hacha. Don't you remember that Herr Burckel and other Austrian associates, together with the Defendant Sess-Inquart and a number of German officers, at about 10:00 in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of March, went into a cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the Soi Disants Government that they should proclaim the independance of Slovakia? Don't you know that? It was reported by our Counsel.
A I don't recall it in detail, but I believe that something like it took place but I don't know exactly what it was. I believe that that was directed by the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to one now. We had better adjourn until 2:00.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)
1946, 1400-1700, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding: BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q. Witness, you were present at the interview between President Hacha and Hitler on the 15th of March, 1939, were you not?
A. Yes, I was present.
Q. Do you remember Hitler saying at that interview that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia, raid that at 6 o'clock in the morning the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides?
A. I can't recall the exact words, but I know that Hitler told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia.
Q. Do you remember him saying what I put to you, that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia?
A. Yes, that is just it.
Q. Do you remember the defendant Goering -- as he told the Tribunal -telling President Hacha that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague
A. I can't give any detailed statement on that subject.
Q. I am not asking you for a detailed statement; I am asking you if you remember what I should suppose was a rather remarkable statement, that the defendant Goering said to President Hacha that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague if Czech resistance was not called off. Do you remember that?
A. No, I don't know that; I wasn't present.
Q. You were ther during the whole interview, were you not?
A. No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor would allow me to do so, I would like to add my explanation as to exactly how things happened.
Q. I want you to answer my question at the moment. You say you don't remember that. At any rate, if the defendant Goering said that he said it, would you accept that it happened?
A. If Goering says so, then it will, of course, be true. I have only to relate that I was not present during that conference between President Hacha and the then Reichsmarshal Goering.
Q. Do you remember Hitler saying that within two days the Czech Army would not exist any jore?
A. I don't recall that in detail, no; it was a very long conference.
Q Do you remember Hitler saying that at 6 o'clock the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion.
A It is possible that something like that was said. However, I can't remember the details. intolerable pressure was put upon President Hacha?
A That question didn't come through. tolerable pressure was put upon President Hacha?
A Undoubtedly, Hitler's language was very clear. However, to that I have to add that President Hacha, on his part, did not come to Berlin for the purpose of finding a solution, together with Hitler. He was surprised that the march of troops into Czechoslovakia was to take place. That I know, and I remember it exactly. He eventually agreed, and contacted his government's Chief of Staff so that there would not be a hostile reception for the German troops. The agreement which I had drafted was then discussed with Hitler, and it was concluded with Hitler and the Czech Foreign Minister. threat of aggressive action by the German Army and Air Force?
Army would march in, and that naturally, under that impression, that document was signed. That is correct.
Q Don't you think you could answer one of my questions directly?
I will ask it again. Will you agree with me that that document was obtained by the most intolerable pressure and threat of aggression ? That is a simple question. Do you agree? to threaten him that your army would march in, in overwhelming strength, and your air force would bomb is capital?
Q What is that but war? Do you not consider it war that the Army would march in with a proportion of a division over a battalion, and that the air force would bomb Prague ? of his country into the Fuehrer's hands, and the Fuehrer had told Hacha -
Q I want you to answer my question. My question is a perfectly simple one, and I want you answer to it. were made.
A No, I didn'8 say that.
Q I put to you that that agreement was obtained by threat of war. Is that not so ? der which Germany stood through the Versailles Treaty and its sanctions. question ? Do you agree that that agreement was obtained by threat of war ? Prague, Czechoslovakia; there is no doubt about that. However,Idecisive to the whole matter was that the Fuehrer explained to President Hacha the reason why he would have to do this, and that President Hacha eventually, at the end agreed absolutely, after he had consulted his government and his general staff and heard their opinion.
On the other hand -- and that is absolutely true -the Fuehrer ahd decided to solve this question under any circumstances. The reason for that was that it was the Fuehrer's conception that in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there was a conspiracy against the German Reich. Field Marshal Goering has already stated that Russian commissions were present at Czech airdromes. Consequently, the Fuehrer did that because he believed that it was necessary for the protection of the German Reich. in the Western Hemisphere, and England stated that it was interested in the entire globe ? And I think the fact that the Fuehrer showed interest in the remainder of Czechoslovakia in nothing unusual or undue for a large power, whatever you think of the method. But one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were occupied without a single drop of blood being shed.
shed because you had threatened to march in overwhelming strength and to bomb Prague if they didn't agree, isn't that so ? been agreed upon before, namely, that the German armed forces could march in without any opposition. your threatening to march in and threatenting to bomb Prague, was it not ?
A I have already once replied to you that it isn't like that, but that the Fuehrer talked to President Hacha and told him that he would march in and that a discussion between President Hacha and Goering -- I do not know, but after that President Hacha signed the agreement, after he consulted with his Government and his General Staff in Prague by telephone. No doubt, the person of the Fuehrer in the case of that argument mattered a lot, and the announced march of the German troops was the cause for President Hacha's signing the agreement.
Q Don't you remember -- would you mind standing, General, for a second (A Czechoslovak army officer stood up in the court room.)
Don't you remember General Etscher asking you some questions once, this General from Czechoslovakia ? March was contrary to the declaration of Hitler given to Chamberlain but in fact that Hitler saw in the occupation a vital necessity for Germany ?
A Yes, that is correct. I was wrong, in the first point. I will admit that openly, and I remembered it afterward. Because there is nothing likethat contained in the Munich agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain. And in the second point I think I stated that Hitler believed he was acting in the best interests of his country. views with regard to Great Britain. Is it correct that when you went to London as Ambassador of the Reich you thought there was very little chance of an agreement, in fact that it was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an understanding with Great Britain ?
standing with Great Britain ?
Q Here is a simple question I am asking you : Is it right that when you went to London as Ambassador you thought there was very little chance of an understanding with England,?in fact, that the chance was a hundred to one ?
A Yes, the chance wasn't large.
Q These are your own words, aren't they, that the chance was a hundred to one ? Do you remember saying that?
AA hundred to one ? I don't remember that but I did tell Hitler that the chance was very small. But I want to add something. I told the Fuehrer that I would do everything, nevertheless, to attempt to achieve a final Anglo German understanding.
Q Now, when you left England did you believe that war was inevitable? When you left England -- when you ceased being Ambassador -- did you believe that war was inevitable?
A No, I wasn't of that opinion, that it was inevitable; but that a possibility of war existed, considering the developments which were taking place in England, that that was possible -- of that I was convinced.
Q I want you to be careful about this; Did you say that you didn't think war was unavoidable when you left England ? but I was aware of the fact that that considering developments towards German policies in England a conflagration was within the possibilities that existed.
A Did you say 211 ?
Q Have you got that ?
Q Now, will you look at the second paragraph ? It reads like this :
He, the Reich Foreign Minister, had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London and had considered the chances for an understanding as a hundred to one, that war was in sight with England and also won the upper hand when he, the Reich Foreign Minister, left England, and said war was unavoidable Is that what you said to Ambassador Oschima ?
A I don't know now whether I said it just like that, but in any case that was preliminary diplomatic language and on the strength of the situation we considered it useful to tell the Japanese Ambassador that. What is interesting is that I remember when I left England I did not consider the war unavoidable and certain. Whether later in the course of years I said this or that ,we well, that isn't significant for what I thought at that time, when I said that, I don't think that is the least bit of evidence for that. Perhaps I tried to get him into the war against England and probably used strong language.
Q You probably told him what was untrue ?
A I don't know, and I don't know whether that is being put down accurately, in detail. That is a long report. I don't know where it comes from. purposes and not every word is weighed carefully. At any rate, the truth is when I left London there was no certainty that the war was inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical when leaving London and that I didn't know what things would drift into, and that particularly because of the strong pro-war party in England. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Defendant, will you speak a little bit more slowly ? BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: licy should be pretended friendliness toward England and actual formulation of a coalition against her?
A In that sense, no; that is not right. It was clear to me that at the time when I became Foreign Minister the achievement of the German wishes in Europe was difficult and that it was principally England that was in the way of those wishes.
For years, by order of the Fuehrer, I tried by means of a friendly understanding to achieve those points-
Q I want you now to answer my question: Did you advise the Fuehrer that that the proper policy was pretended friendliness with England and in actuality the formulation of a coalition against her ? Did you or did you not ? GB-28, and at your conclusions that are to be drawn. (Handing document to witness.) You will see it at the end under No. 5. "Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us." It is about the end of the third page. "Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us, outwardly further understanding with England while protecting the interests of our friends; formation under great secrecy but with wholehearted tenacity of a coalition against England; that is, in practice a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours, directly or indirectly; close and confidential cooperation of the diplomats of the three greatest powers towards this purpose."
And the last sentence: "Every day on which -- no matter what tactical interludes of rapprochement towards us are carried oyt -- our political decision are divided fundamentally by the thoughts of England as our most dangerous adversary would be a gain for our enemies."
Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute or two ago that you hadn't advised the Fuehrer that you hadn't stressed outward friendly relations while in fact contemplating a coalition against her?
A First of all, may I have permission to look at that document?
Q It is signed by yourself on the 2nd of January 1939. It is your own report to the Fuehrer.
A Yes. Actually, that is quite right. And this is the decisive statement. Only in that way can we meet England's flea for an agreement or a conflict. The situation was clearly at that time that England would resist those German wishes for a decision which the Fuehrer had described as vital and that it merely appeared possible through diplomatic consultations to get England to solve their problem through diplomatic channels and not by war.
That was no doubt the decision at the time. advised Hitler in the sense I put it to you ?
A Which advice do you mean? secrecy of a coalition against her. I put that to you twice and you denied it. I want to know why you did deny it.