part handling the document, and that Hitler never said a word, to you about what he was arranging with the defendant Keitel, who was also there?
Q Well, now, just look at the next entry for the 14th of February:
"At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence Office and initiates the different measures.
"The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations." these military measures or the effect on Austria?
it quite possible that the Fuehrer, in order to put more pressure on his wishes, had done something in this field.-
Q Yes, I quite agree. That is just why I am putting it to that -- it did contribute -- but surely you as Foreign minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a Foreign Minister, know something about the effect in Austria, which General Jodl was saying, that the effect was quick and strong; the impression was created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations. Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, that you knew nothing about the effect in Austria ? not know anything and if I would have known, I wouldn't have had any cause to say now that it wasn't a fact. It is a fact, however, that during the years before and during the days before the conversations between the Fuehrer and Schuschnigg, I was busy at the time taking over the Foreign Office, and so much so, that as far as the Austrian problem was concerned, I only considered it as being on the edge of foreign political matters.
Q You know -- also you know, you were engaged in the Foreign Office; and my question was perfectly clear -- my question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that you didn't know anything about the effect in Austria -- you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich? Now, answer the question. Did you or did you not know of the effect in Austria? serve it in detail. rion, a touchstone of whether or not you are telling the truth; that you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich, say that you know nothing about the effect in Austria of the measures taken by Keiter on the Fuehrer orders? Is that your final answer? time later I went to London, and that is the first thing I remember about the entire Austrian affair, that these things proceeded somewhat according to the conversations in Berchtcsgaden.
In detail, any special observation according to my recollection, I did not know during these days -- it is possible that I forgot that in the meantime because there were many years between then and now.
Q Just look at the next two entries in Jodl's diary: "15 February. In the evening, an official communique about the positive results of the conference at Obersalzberg was issued." 16 February, Changes in the Austria Government and the general political amnesty." Do you remember me putting to you what Herr von Schschnigg signed -- and the condition was made that the matters would cone into effect within three days within three days there was a conference about the effects and the changes were announced in Austria in accordance with the note that you had put to Schuschnigg. You can see that that is clear, isn't it -- three days -- three days -- you still say -
A Of these three days I know nothing. I said that before, but that out of this meeting would have come consequences in the way of appeasing that was a matter of course.
Q You call it "appeasing"? Is that your considered view to the Tribunal that assuming that the defendant Jodl is telling the truth or assuming that the defendant Keitel said that to him, as General Jodl was saying, that these military preparations should be put in hand, isn't that the most severe political and military pressure that could be put on the chancellor of another state
A If one considered the problem from the higher point of view, no; but here we deal with a problem which, under the circumstances, could have led to war, to a European war, and I believe that it is better -- and I have later expressed that to Lord Halifax in London -- it was better that this problem should come to a solution than to be a point of disturbance in the European Continent.
Q I don't want to put words in your mouth. Do you mean by the last answer, that it was better that political and military pressure should be put on Schschnigg so long as the problem was solved? Is that your view ?
A I didn't got that question. May I ask you to repeat it ?
Q My question was: Is it your view that it was better that political and military pressure should be put on Herr von Schschnigg if by that means the problem was solved ? a war could be avoided, I considered that the better way.
for seven years?
A I don't know; at any rate, I believe at that time Schschnigg -- I don't know the details, but he must have taken some steps which were against the interests of the state, but if you say "prison", I know only from my own recollection that the Fuehrer, at many instances, had said and pointed out that Schuschnigg should be treated especially well and decently and that he was not in jail, not in prison, but in a house and that his wife was with him. I could not say more from my own experience and from my own observations of that.
Q You mean "prison". I will substitute for it "Buchenwald" and "Dachau" He was at both Buchenwald and Dachau. Do you think he was enjoying himself there? the first time I didn't know it before.
Q Just make a chance -- don't make a chance, but try -- just try to answer my question. Why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for seven years -- seven years ?
Apr-1-M-RT-7-1a
A I could not say anything to that point. I can only say no, only, that in my opinion. what I heard then, he was not in prison but he was confined in a villa and he had all the comforts which he could possibly have or which was possible under the circumstances. That is what I heard at that time. I liked that because he made a very favorable impression on me.
Q There is one tiling he didn't have, witness, he didn't have the opportunity of giving his account as to what had happened at Berchtesgarden or of his side of the Anschluss to anyone for these seven years, did he? That is quite obvious. with all you say, that he was very comfortable at Buchenwald and Dachau, wherever he was, but comfortable or not, he didn't get the chance of putting his side of the happenings to the world, did he?
Q You couldn't judge? You know perfectly well, don't you, that Herr von Schuschnigg was not allowed to publish his account of anything while he was under restraint for these seven years? Don't you know that quite well
Q Well, that is your view of it. We will pass to another subject. I am going to ask you a few questions now about your share in the dealing with Czechoslavakia. Will you agree with me, that in March of 1938, the Foreign Office, that is, you -- through your ambassador in Prague, took over control of the activities of the Sudeten Deutsche Party under Konrad Henlein?
A I am sorry but that isn't correct, May I explain that again? document book on page 20 in your book -- it is page 31 in the English bookand listen while I refer you to a letter from your ambassador.
A Which number, please?
Q Page 20. It is a letter from your ambassador in Prague to the Foreign Office.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: If I may explain to the Tribunal, it is not the defendant's document book, it is the prosecution's book. I will See that hereafter that is correct.
Apr-1-M-RT-7-2a
Q Now, this letter from your ambassador to the Foreign office?
A Yes, I know about that letter. May I -
Q Just let me refer you to paragraph 1. I refer you to paragraph 3, so you needn't be worried that I shall miss it. Paragraph 1: "The line of German policy, as transalated by the German Legation, is exclusively decisive for the policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party, My- -(that is, your ambassador)- - directives are to be complied with implicitly.-Paragraph 2. "Public speeches and the press will be coordinated uniformly with my approval. The editorial rights of citizens is to be improved," In paragraph 3, "Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which, in the end, might lead to political complications and adopt the line of gradual promotion of Sudenten German interests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and to be promoted by parrallel diplomatic action".
Having read that, don't you agree with me that I put to you a moment ago, that the activities of the Sudenten Deutsche Party were to take place according to the directives?
A May I explain that now? Tribunal will let you make an explanation. It is perfectly easy to answer that question yes or no. Isn't it right that that letter shows that the Sudenten Deutsche Party was acting under your directives; isn't that right?
Q Why not?
AAnd that I would like to explain; just this letter testimony of the fact that the things were quite to the contrary. Between the Sudenten Deutsche Party and many offices within the Reich, connections had been established and that was quite natural, because there was a very strong movement among the Sudenten Germans which desired a closer connection with the Reich, especially after Adolf Hitler had come to power. These tendencies started to impair the connections between Germany and Czechoslavakia and this letter bears proof of the fact that I desired and attempted to clarify these connections which existed between the Sudenten Germans and the Reich.
Apr-1-M-RT-7-3a and I put to you three times, I think, quite clearly. Does this letter show that that Party, the Sudenten Deutsche Party, were from that time acting under your directions? Are you still denying that?
A Yes, I deny that emphatically. Just the opposite is the case. This letter means an attempt to avoid the difficulties of the Sudeten Germans and the difficulties which were caused with the Czechoslovak people, and it shows an attempt to bring the matter into a sensible field, which could not be done. ambassador writes to the foreign office and says that the line of German policy as transmitted by the German legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party? What does that mean if it doesn't mean what you have said -- that the party was acting under your direction? What else can it mean if it doesn'tmean that? to get the leadership of the Sudeten Germans to accept a sensible program, so that the illegal tendencies which were existent should not impair relations between them and the Czechoslovak government. That was the sense of the conversation with the embassy in Prague. That is very clearly seen by this letter. The next day, on the 17th of March, Konrad Henlein writes to you and suggests a personal talk; and if you will turn over to page 26 of the German document book--page 33 of the English--you will find thenote of the personal talk which you had at the foreign office on the 29th of March with Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, and two other gentlemen whose names are not so well known. I only want you to look at four sentences in that, after the first one: conference which had been scheduled strictly a secret. And then you refer to the meeting that the Fuehrer had had with Konrad Henlein the afternoon before. I just want you to have that in mind. graph which begins "The foreign minister," and the second sentence is: "It is essential to propose a maximum program which as its final aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with the consent of the Czechoslovak government. This, on the one hand,would give the impression abroad that a solution has been found; and, on the other hand, would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans."
remarks about Benes, it says:
"The aim of the negotiations to be carried out by the Sudeten German Party with theCzechoslovak government is finally this: to avoid entry into the government" -- observe the next words -- "by the extension and gradual specification of the demand to be made." And then you make the position of the Reichcabinet clear:
"The Reichcabinet" -- the next sentence but one -- "itself must refuse to appear towards the government in Prague or towards London and Paris as the advocate" -- note the next words-- "or peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands." the Sudeten Germans. They were to avoid agreement with the Czechoslovak government, avoid participation in the Czechoslovak government, and the Reichcabinet in its turn would avoid acting as peacemaker in the matter-in other words, witness, that you through your influence on the Sudeten Germans were taking every step and doing your utmost to see that no agreement could be come to about the difficulties or the minority problem. Isn't that right? Isn't that what you were telling them at that interview?
Q What would you say these words meant? was the only time--or maybe I have seen him once more; unfortunately, only once or twice--in order to influence him also to assure a quiet development of the Sudeten German problem. The demands of the Sudeten Germans went very far that time; they wanted to get back to the Reich. It seemed to me to present a dangerous solution which had to be caught in some form or another before it could lead to a war. Henlein came to see me then. But I want to point out that this was the only time, I believe, that I had a chance to speak to Henlein in detail about these questions. Soon afterwards the whole Sudeten German problem dropped out of my influence. What is in this document, and there is no doubt of it, is the following:
That first I wanted to assure a more quiet carrying out of the problem, so that diplomatically we could support it also with justification; secondly, that we should avoid that suddenly by acts of terror or other wild incidents a situation could arise which would lead to a crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
That was at that time the reason why I called for Henlein. clear the Sudeten German party at that time had very far-reaching demands. They would have liked to see that Adolf Hitler should, send an ultimatum to Prague saying "You have to do that", and that is all. We did, not want it; that was a matter of course. We wanted a quiet, peaceful solution of things. Therefore, I spoke to Henlien at that time to find a way in which the Sudeten German Party should proceed in order to get their demands, fulfilled in the end. These demands which I had in mind were demands of a far-reaching cultural autonomy. these gentlemen not to come to an agreement with the Prague government?
A I could not specify that now. That may have come from a tactical consideration. I assume that Konrad Henlein may have made a suggestion at that time and that I just agreed; but in detail I did not know the problems. I believe that it was so that Henlein himself developed his program. That is not said here in detail. I may have agreed to it more or less. I believe that more for tactical reasons it seemed advisable for Henlein not to enter into the government and to assume any responsibilities, butfirst to try in a different direction. ago about your anxiety for peace. You very soon knew that there wasn't going to be any question of relying on peaceful measures, didn't you? Can you remember? Just try and apply yourself to it, because you have obviously been applying your mind to this. Can you remember when Hitler disclosed to you that he was making the military preparations for the occupying of Czechoslovakia that autumn?
I do not remember anything like that, but of course I know that the Fuehrer at a certain time was determined to solve this problem. According to the experiences which Germany had made in past years, it was a matter of course for him that in one form or other it might be necessary to take military measures in order to put more pressure on his demand.
Q Let me help you about that. Turn on to page 31 of your document book. It is page 37 of the English document book.
A 31?
Q 31 of your document book, yes. It is a quotation from Hitler's speech in January, 1939, but it happens to make clear this point. You see he says--have you got it, Witness?
Q "On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still further emphasized by truly infamous persectuion and terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the Sudeten German question in a final and radical manner.
"On the 28th of May I gave, one, the order for the preparation of military steps against this State"--that is Czechoslovakia--"to be concluded by the 2nd of October. I ordered the forceful and speedy completion of cur defensive front in the west." of May, and that is Hitler's own account of it. Put another way, he said "It is my absolute will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from the map." And then he made clear the other thing about the defensive front in the west.
Now, do you remember that meeting, the 28th of May?
A I have here, I believe, seen the document about it. I do not recall that meeting. of the Fuehrer at that time; it was before he went abroad;--he says you were there, would you deny it?
A I have seen that, yes. I have seen that, but I believe that is an error by Wiedemann.
Q But you think you weren't there?
A I should like to assume I was not there. At least I do not remember that meeting. I could not say it for sure. Generally I was not present at military conferences, but in this case I could not say it for sure. But I knew, generally speaking, that the Fuehrer in the course of the year 1938 got more and more determined, as he said, to assurethe rights of the Sudeten Germans, and for that he also took military preparations. I remember that, but in what form and to what extent I could not say.
Just to put your point of view fairly--I don't want to put anything more into it--you knew that military preparations were being made, but you didn't know the details of what we know now as Fall Gruen.
A No, details I did not know about that. I had never heard them, but I know that if, first of all, during the last weeks, months, of the crisis-
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I protest against this question. I believe in order to save time that I may point out that by the agreement of Munich the entire Sudeten German policy has been by England, France, Italy and Germany sanctioned. Therefore, I don't see any room for questioning in the sense of violation of international law.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question isperfectly proper. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: of the possible war with the foreign personalities. Would you look on to page 34--that is page 40 of the English book.
These are the notes of a discussion with the Italian Ambassador. I don't know which of your officials it took place with, but I want you to look at where it says in a handwritten note "only for the Reichsminister."
"Atolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs unmistakably. Also, as to the date he had information so far that he might go on leave, maybe for two months, but certainly not later than that." months from the 18th of July would be the 18th of September. Then if you will look, a month later there is a note, I think signed by yourself, on the 27th of August:
"atolico paid me a visit. He had received another written instruction from Musso lini, asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini asked for such notification, as Atolico assured me, in order to be able to take in due time the necessary measures on the French Frontier.
"Note: I replied to Ambassador Atolico just as on his former demarche, that I could not impart any date to him; that, however, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of any decision."
So that it is quite clear, isn't it, that you knew that the German preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were under way but the date had not been fixed beyond the general directive of Hitler, that it was to be ready by the beginning of October. That was the position in July and August, wasn't it? crisis already between Germany and Czechoslovakia about that problem; and it is quite clear that during that time one had to think as to how this would finally come out. Therefore, according to this document, I have spoken with the Italian Ambassador that in case that this crisis would develop into a military action, certainly before that Mussolini would be notified. frontier in order to help forward your military plans; is that right?
A That is in this document, but I don't know anything about it. Apparently Atolico said that; if it is included here he must have said it. 41 to 43 of the English book. I don't want to take up time in reading it all, but that is the account of the meeting which you had with the Hungarian ministers Enredi and Kanja. And I should be very glad if, in the interest of time, you would try and answer the general question. Weren't you trying in your discussions with Enredi and Kanja to get the Hungarians to be prepared to attack Czechoslovakia should war eventuate?
A I do not know the content of this document very well. May I read it first, please?
A (Interposing) But from my recollection I may answer--I don't know what in detail is included in the document, but my recollection is that at that time there was a crisis.
It is quite natural that if a possibility of an armed conflict about the Sudeten German problem was in the air or within the reach of possibility that Germany then, at any rate at first, had to contact the neighboring states. That is a matter of fact.
But you went a little beyond contacting them, didn't you? The document says at the end of the sixth paragraph "Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate."
That is a bit beyond contacting people. What you are saying to the Hungarians is "If you want the revision of your boundaries, you have got to come into the war with us." It is quite clear, isn't it, Witness, that is what you were saying, that is what you were trying to do?
A That is just in line of what I said. That is to say, I don't know if that was exactly the expression, but, at any rate, it is clear that at that time apparently--I do remember that I have spoken to these gentlemen--that the possibility of a conflict existed, and that in such a case of course it would be good if we would contact each other about our interests. fore considered it one of the hardest conditions of the Peace Treaty that all these territories and areas in the north had been separated from Hungary, and of course, they were very much interested.
Q You were very much interested in offering them revision. Just look at thelast two paragraphs. It is headed "The 29th." It should be page 38 of your document book. It begins--the very end of this statement: "Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a German-Czech conflict, von Kanja mentioned several days ago that his country would need a period of one or two years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary. During today's conversation, von Kanja corrected this remark and said that Hungary's military situation was much better; his country would be ready, as far as armaments were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1 of this year."
You see that? What I am putting to you, Witness, is this: That your position was perfectly clear.
First of all, you get the Sudeten Germans under your control Then you learned from Hitler that there were military preparations.
Then you get the Italians in line. Then you get the Hungarians in line. You are getting everyone ready for aggression against Czechoslovakia, That is what I am putting to you. I want you to be quite clear about it, to be under no misapprehension. Now, look, what-
A (Interposing) May I answer to that? not under my control. Otherwise I am convinced that it is the primitive, first law and right of the Sudeten Germans, according to the right of independence which had been proclaimed in 1919, to decide themselves where they wanted to belong. strong. Adolf Hitler was determined to solve this problem, either by diplomatic means or by other means if it had to be done. That was clear, and it became clearer to me. along diplomatic lines. On the other hand, however, of course in order to lead to a situation such as Munich, I have done everything in order to assemble friends around us and to make our position as strong as possible.
Q. You knew perfectly well, did you not, that the Fall Gruen and that Hitler's military plans envisaged the conquest of the whole of Czechoslovakia? You knew that, did n't you?
A. No, that I did not know, and as far as the Sudetan-German problem is concerned, the British Government has agreed in Munich to solve the problem in a way which I have always thought to be the right one.
Q. Witness, I'm not going to argue politics with you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the Fall Gruen and Hitler's plans from this matter had only been known to his Majesty's Government since the end of the war, when it came into our possession as a captured document. What I asked you was-you say that as the Foreign Minister of the Reich you didn't know that these military plans, the conquest of the whole of Czechoslovakia, was envisaged. You say that? You want the Tribunal to believe that?
A. I repeat again that as far as the Fall Gruen was concerned, I have heard about it the first time here through the documents. I did not know that term at all before. But, in the course of later developments, for instance, in establishing the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia -- I was thinking of a solution of several regions -- that became clear to me, of course.
Q. Just a moment. We will get to that in a moment. I just want you to look at the final act of preparation which you were doing and I am suggesting for this clear aggression, if you will look at page 45 in the book in front of you, you will see a note from the Foreign Office to the Embassy in Prague.
"Please inform Deputy Kundt at Conrad Henlein's request to get into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start the demands for an autonomy tomorrow."
That was your office's further act, wasn't it, in order to make things difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting your friends to induce that right? Is that what your office was doing?
A. Beyond doubt this is a telegram which came from the Foreign Office. According to the contents, apparently, Henlein approached us to send a telegram for him, and apparently Henlein was of the opinion at that time that the demands for autonomy should be sent to the Prague Government by the Slovaks.
How it came to that, I could not say in detail today, but I would like to point out again that Conrad Henlein's -- and I say unfortunately, and I said it then -activity was not within my jurisdiction or control. I saw Henlein only once or twice during that entire time.
Q. I am not going to take you through all the details. You understand what I'm suggesting to you, that your office was now taking one of its last steps, because this was in the middle of the crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to weaken the Czech Government by inducing demands of autonomy from the Slovaks. You said that you were only passing on Henlein's wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I shall not trouble you further. Besides, you suggested-I come on to what took place in the spring and ask you one or two questions about that. In the spring Hitler was out and you acquiesced in his wishes without -- I was going to say swallowing, but I wan to choose my language carefully Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia.. Now, just look on to page 65 of the book in front of you. That's a telegram in secret code from the Foreign Office, from yourself, in fact, to the Embassy in Prague.
"With reference to telephone instructions given by you today, in case you should get any written communications from President Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take any other action but pass them on here by secret telegrams. Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the Embassy to make a point of not being available if the Czech Government wants to communicate with you during the next few days."
Why were you so anxious that your ambassador shouldn't carry out these ordinary functions and form a channel of communication with the Czech Government
A. That I remember very well. That had the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Chvalkovski, on one of these days, it may have been the same day, approached the ambassador in Prague, saying that President Hacha wanted to speak to the Fuehrer. I had reported that to the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer agreed to receive the Czechoslovak president of state, and the Fuehrer said at the same time that he wanted to conduct these negotiations himself and that he did not desire that anybody else, even the embassy, should interfere in any way.
That, according to my r ecollection, was the reason for that telegram, so that nobody should undertake anything in Prague, and whatever would be done should be done by the Fuehrer personally. Prague and ourselves, and from this entire situation resulted the desire of the President Hacha to see the Fuehrer.
Q. Well, now, I don't like to remind you what you and the Fuehrer were doing on that day. You will find that if you will look at page 66, which is 71 of the English book. You were having a conference, you and the Fuehrer, with Meissner and the defendant Keitel, and Dietrich and Keppler, and you were having the conference with the Slovaks, with M. Tiso. Do you remember that conference?
A. Yes, I remember that conference very well.
Q. Well, then, I will ask you a general question and perhaps without putting the details to you. What Hitler and you were doing at that conference was saying this to the Slovaks:
"If you don't declare your independence of Prague, we shall leave you to the tender mercies of Hungary."
Isn't that in a sense a fair summary of what Hitler and you were saying at that conference?
A That is correct to a certain degree. I would like to give a further Apr-1-M-RT-10-1a explanation though.
The situation was such that one has to understand it from a political point of view. The Hungarians were highly disatisfied and they wanted to regain the territories which they had lost by the Treaty of Trianon. They were in the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. There were great difficulties between Pressburg (Bratislava) and Budapest, of course. We always had to expect that here an armed conflict would break out and at least half a dozen times it occurred that from the sight of the Hungarian Government we were made to understand that this could not go on like that. They had to have their revision and it was so that very strong tendencies for independence existed for quite some time among the Slovaks. Mainly, they approached us at first through Tuka and later through Tiso. In this conference, which is here described, it was so that after weeks of knowledge by the Fuehrer of the tendencies of the Slovaks to become autonomies, he finally received Tiso, the later president of the Slovak state, and told him then that he, of course, -- I believe he said during this discussion that he was not interested personally but, if anything should happen there, then the Slovaks should declare their autonomy as quickly as possible. There is no doubt that at the time we expected an aggression by the side of the Hungarians, but it is correct. action Hitler and yourself were taking to secure it--if you try and find it, it will probably be at page 67;it's at the end of a paragraph beginning:
"Now he has permitted Minister Tiso to come here" that he would not tolerate that interior instability and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days but of hours. He had stated at that time that Slovakia wished to make herself independent and that he would support this endeavour and even guarantee it; he would stand by his words so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to desolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of the events for which he was no longer responsible.
you are reported as saying:
Apr-1-M-RT-10-2a "The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours and not of days.
He assured Hitler a message he received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontier. The Fuehrer read this report and mentioned it to Tiso." strongest possible presure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve connections with Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to meet your pressure on Hacha which was coming in a couple of days?