Q. And it was quite clear that as far as your department was concerned you were getting the most favorable reports about the Soviet Union and about the unlikeliness of the Soviet Union making any incursion into political affairs inimical to Germany? Is that right, so far as your reports from your own Ambassador and your own people in Russia were concerned?
A. Reports of this sort came from the legations in Moscow. There were always such diplomatic reports, which I submitted to the Fuehrer. However, the Fuehrer insisted that the diplomats in Moscow were the worst informed men in the world.
Q. But that was your honest view, based on your own information, that there was no danger from Russia, that Russia was keeping honestly to the agreement that she had made with you. That was your honest view, was it not?
A. I didn't say that. Those were the reports from the diplomats, which
Q. Didn't you believe them? Didn't you believe your own staff yourself?
A. I was very skeptical myself as to whether these reports were reliable because they were reports of an altogether different sort that could be had at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Regarding the political attitude, some thing else was true again.
Q. At any rate, in the spring of 1931, your office joined in the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union, did it not?
A. I don't know precisely when, but in the spring things reached a climax and there must have been conferences that dealt with the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union. However, I don't know anything about that now, in detail.
Q. I see. Again, I don't want to occupy too much time over it, but it is right, is it not, that in April of 1941 you were cooperating with Rosenberg's office in preparing for the taking over of Eastern Territories, and, on the 18th of May, you issued a memorandum with regard to the preparation of the naval campaign?
A. So far as the preparations with Rosenberg are concerned, that is in error. I spoke about this matter to Rosenberg only after the outbreak of war. So far as that navy memorandum is concerned, I saw that document here; I had not known of it previously.
I believe it is a memorandum about international law matters which might arise in connection with a sea war in the Baltic Sea.
Q. It says: "The Foreign Office has prepared, for use in Barbarossa, the attached draft of a declaration of operational zones." Don't you remember anything about that?
A. No, that did not reach me at all then. That was settled by another office. Of course, I was entirely responsible for anything that happened in my ministry.
Q. Wasn't Ambassador Ritter the liaison officer between your office and the Wehrmacht?
A. Yes, that is so.
Q. Now, again, I want you to help me about one or two other matters. You have tell us that you negotiated the anti-Commintern pact back in 1936, and of course at that time the anti-Commintern pact -- and I think you said so yourself -- was directed against the Soviet Union. That is so, isn't it?
A. Yes. It was more an ideological pact, which, nevertheless, had certain political implications.
Q. And that was extended by the tripartite pact of the 27th of September, 1940? That was an extension of the first pact, was it not?
Apr-1-A-RT-20-1a
A It had in itself nothing to do with the first pact. That was a purely, economic, and military pact. that you were urging Japan to enter the war quite early in March of 1941, weren't you?
Q Yes. I am taking it shortly, because you have given your explanation. You say you were at war with England, and therefore you were entitled to see an ally in the Japanese. That is your point, is it not?
A I don't believe I did anything other then what any other diplomat would have done, either in England or Soviet Russia. did occur to you quite early, didn't it, that' if Japan came into the war, then it was a possibility that the United States might be brought in shortly after? And you agreed, in April of 1941, that if the coming in of Japan produced the fact that Japan would be involved with the United States, you would be preppared to fight the United States too. That is right, isn't it?
A No, not in that phrasing. I believe I did everything I could, until the day of Pearl Harbor, to keep America out of the war. I believe that that is proved by many documents that I have seen here for the first time. N-352 of your book, at page 204 of the English Document book.
A Yes, I know this document; I have read it here. and according to the Japanese Amnassador, you are saying this to him-- if you look at paragraph 1:
"Ribbentrop: It is essential that Japan effect the now order in the East Asia without losing this opportunity. There has never been, and probably never will be, a time when closer cooperation under the tripartite pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European new order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan. As Fuehrer Hitler said today, 'there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan. and the United States.'
Apr-1-A-RT-20-2a of the Japanese-United States negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact the United States is putting up a stiff front. If this is indeed the fact of the case, an if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interests of Germany and Japan Jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself." made to the Japanese Ambassador, that you were trying to prevent war with the United States? I suggest to you that you were doing everything to encourage Japan to go to war with the United States.
A I must contradict you there, Mr. Prosecutor; that is- not true. I don't know about this document; I do not know where it came from; I never at any rate said that, and I regret that all the other documents that prove the opposite, the documents which go to prove that I did make efforts to stop the United States from getting into the war, have not been produced here. have been brought about. All the other documents which have been presented here--a half dozen or so--prove very clearly my wish to keep America from the war. I can say that for years I had made efforts, despite the United States intransigent attitude, to keep America from the war.
I can only explain this in this way: That the Japanese ambassador wanted something to happen and I know I sent many telegrams to Tokyo in order to got Japan participation in the war against Singapore. I believe that what you have just read is an incorrect transcript of same conference or other. I ask you to give the defense an opportunity to submit many documents up to this very date, which will prove the exact opposite of what you have here stated.
Q. Well, this is the official report to the Government of the Japanese Ambassador. You say that he is wrong when he says that you told him -- he five: your exact words -- that you were comforted that it would nit only be in the interest of Germany and Japan, but would favorably bring the desired results?
Well, just lack at the next Document, if you deny that one. On page 356. This is another report of the Japanese ambassador and he said:
"The day after Pearly Harbor, at one o'clock, I called on Foreign Ministed Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at ones. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters, discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out, so as to make a good impression on the German people and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out properly."
Now, look at the last three words:
"At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th, Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they might meet the."
That was three days before the declaration of war. You say that that report of the Japanese ambassador is also wrong?
A. I believe that's in error.
Q. What's wrong about it?
A. I believe it's in error. That was after Pearly Harbor.
Q. Exactly, the day after Pearly Harbor.
A. That was an order of Adolf Hitler's to attack American ships with as everyone knows, had been attacking German ships for months.
Q. When you say "attacking German ships", do you mean defending themselves against German submarines?
A. No, so far as I know, for months before Pearly Harbor we had delivered an official protest to the United States, in which we pointed out, in the case of the two U-boats Gria and Kerne, that these two boats had pursued German submarines and had thrown depth bombs at them. I believe the United States admitted this openly. I mentioned yesterday that Hitler said in his speech in Munich that he did not give the order to shoot or to attack American vessels but he had given the order to fire back if they fired first.
Q What I sant to know from you is this: American ships whenever and wherever they might meet them three days before war was declared? Did you approve of that?
A. I can't say anything about that now because I don't remember it and don't even know the document.
Q. Now, I want to ask you about another point. Do you remember that the
A. It would have been understandable, that I must add.
Q. You have given your answer. Do you remember in June, 1944, that there was a conference about which we've heard evidence regarding the shooting of what is known as "terror flyers"? would. Is it correct, as is stated in the report, that you wished to include among terror flyers every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, including bombing attacks on cities? Is it right that you wish to include that the airmen engaged in attacks on German cities as terror flyers
A. No, it is not true.
Q. Well, look at page 391. This is a report signed by General Warliment on the conference on the 6th of June, and in the fourth line -- well, let me read it. It says:
"Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy chief of staff in Klessheim on the afternoon of the 6th that a conference on this question had been hold shortly before between Goering, Ribbentrop, and Himmler. Contrary to the original suggestion made by Ribbentrop, who wished to include very type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed at the above conference that merely the other attacks carried out with aircraft armament should be included."
include every type of attack?
A. Yesterday I answered this question at length. I answered this question I think, very exhaustively. If you wish, I can repeat it now.
Q. Well, I don't want you to repeat it. I want you to answer my question Do you say that Kaltenbrunner is wrong when he waid at this conference that you wished to include those who were engaged in the bombing of cities?
A. That is not so. First of all, so far as I know, this conference never took place; and,,secondly, I stated my attitude perfectly clearly yesterday.
Q. Well, answer my question.
A. No, that is not true as you have stated it.
Q. I see. Then answer this question. Did you approve that the treatment of those that you called "terror flyers" should be that they should be left to be lynched by the population or else that they should be handed over to the SS?
A. No, that was not my attitude.
Q. Well, new, would you look on to page 393, page 214 of the English. This, as you know, is a memorandum from the Foreign Office, and it is stated on page 396 that General Warliment states that Ambassador Ritter has advised us by telephone that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has approved this draft." The draft deals with the two actions in paragraph 1, that of lynching, and the draft says, "The German authorities are not directly responsible since death occurred before a German official intervened."
Do you agree with that view? Is that your view of the lynching of flyers?
A. No, that isn't my view either. I explained yesterday very exhaustivel what my attitude was. This document is a statement on the part of the Foreign Office. I don't know where it came from. It was submitted to me and I did not approve this document as it is submitted to me here.
I sent it to the Fuehrer and asked him to decide about it. The Fuehrer then regarded this document as nonsense and therwith the matter was dropped.
Q. So that, with regard to this, you say that when Warliment says that Ambassador Ritter advised the Wehrmacht by telephone on 29 June that you approved the draft, that either Warliment is not speaking the truth or Ritter is not speaking the truth?
A. At any rate, it is not true because it can be seen from another document that I have seen here that this document was sent to the Fuehrer and that I said there that the Fuehrer must approve it. I see no other document regarding it. That's my recollection of the matter.
Apr-1-A-RT-21-1a
Q Well, then, if you referred to the Fuehrer's view, let's just have a which is an account of a meeting that you and Hitler had with Oschima on the 27th of may, 1944. It's on page 11, line 9 to 12. Do you remember in your presence Hitler advising Oschima that the Japanese should hang, not shoot, every American terror pilot; that the Americans will think it over before making such attacks? Did you agree with that view?
No, I do not agree with that view. If that is in this document, that is not my opinion.
Q. I see, Well, now-
A I don't even know if you said here where it is in the document.
A No, I don't remember that, but I can only say that this entire attitude of Hitler's be seen in this document was brought about by the terrible results of the air attacks at that time.
Q I heard all that before. I asked you whether you agreed or not; you said "no". I want you now to deal with another point. decisive importance. question on this. I want now to direct your attention to Stalag Luft 3. You may have heard me asking a number of witnesses a certain number of questions about it. These were the fifty British airmen who were murdered by the SS after they escaped. Do you know that? Do you know what I'm talking about?
Q You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, made a strong statement in the House of Commons, saying that these men had been murdered and that Great Britain would exact justice upon the murders? Do you remember that, in June of 1944?
A I heard of this speech on the part of Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, yes. British via Switzerland this unqualifiable charge of the British Foreign Minister had been sharply refuted, that being issued in July, 1944? Do you remember that being issued?
A No, I don't remember the content. I do remember, however, this: That at that time we received documentation of what had happened and that it was communicated to us bySwitzerland. That's all I knew about it.
Q That is what I wanted to ask you: Did you know at the time that this statement was issued -- didyou know that these officers had been murdered in cold blood?
A No, I did not. I heard that these men had been shot while trying to escape. At that time we, to be sure, did have the impression that everything was not in order -
Q Let me take it in the statements. Who told you the lie that these men had been shot trying to escape? Who informed you of that lie?
A I don't remember. At that time we received documentation from the proper office -
Q From whom did you get your documentation which contained that lie? Did you get it from Himmler or Goering -
A I can't remember. not all right, hadn't you?
Q Thank you. Now, I want you to tell us a word about your connection with the SS. You are not suggesting, are you, at this stage of time that you were merely an honorary member of the SS?
It has been suggested by your Counsel, and I am sure it must have been on some mistake of information that you were merely an honorary member of the SS. That is not the case, is it?
A That is no misunderstanding. That is exactly the way the situation was. I received from Adolf Hitler the SS uniform. I served no office in the SS, but as Foreign Minister or previously as Ambassador it was customary that one had a rank of some sort and I had the rank of SS Fuehrer. joined the SS before you became Ambassador at Large in May 1933, isn't that right? a uniform. I am putting it to you whether you joined the SS in May, 1933, in the ordinary way. Did you? I was always going around to assemblies in a brown coat and they wanted me to wear a uniform. I don't know when that was. It must have been 1933. rank of Standartenfuehrer, didn't you? Brigadefuehrer in June 1935 and Gruppenfuehrer on the 13th of September, 1936. That was after you became an Ambassador. And Obergruppenfuehrer on the 20th of April 1940. Before you were made an Ambassador you had been in all the SS offices for three years and you had received promotion in the ordinary way, when you did your work with theSS, isn't that so?
Q Just look. It is GB-24, Document D-744-A. The correspondence is 744-B. You may take it; you need not go through it in detail. That is your application, with all the particulars. I just want to ask you one or two things about it. You asked to join, did you not, the Totenkopf, the Death Head Division of the SS?
A No, that can't be so.
Q Don't you remember getting a special Death Head ring and dagger from Himmler for your services? Don't you?
A No, I don't remember. I never belonged to the Death Head Division. You were just talking about a Death Head Division, were you not?
A No, that isn't so. That is an error. It may be so that I at one time received a dagger; that is possible.
Q And the ring, too. Here is a letter dated the 5th of November, 1935, to the Personnel Office of the Reichsfuehrer SS: "In reply to your question, I have to inform you that Brigadefuehrer von Ribbentrop's ring size is 17. Heil Hitler, signed: Thorner." He is your adjutant. Do you remember getting that?
A I believe that everyone received such a ring but I don't remember precisely. But no doubt it is true.
Q And you took, didn't you, continuous interest in the SS from 1933 up to well into the war? I think your correspondence with Himmler goes on to well into 1941 or 1942.
A Yes, that is quite possible, yes. Of course, we had a great deal to do with the SS in all fields.
Q You had, and especially in the field of concentration camps, hadn't you? Are you saying that you didn't know that concentration camps were being carried on on an enormous scale?
Q I want you to look around for the moment. (A map in back of the witness-box was unveiled). That is an enlargement of the exhibits put in by the French Prosecution and these red spots are concentration camps. Now, I would just like you to look at it. We will see now what significance there is in the location of your various residences. There one north of Berlin, Sonneburg. Do you see roughly where that is on that map?
A Sonneburg is one hour's auto ride from Berlin.
Q North of Berlin?
Q Let's take another one. You are quite near it yourself -- your schloss or tower at Fuschl. That is quite near the border, just over the border, and very near it -- the group of camps which existed around Mauthausen.
Do you see them, just above your right hand? Do you see the group of camps, the Mauthausen group?
A I should like to state on my oath that I heard the word "Mauthausen" for the first time in Nurnberg.
Q Let's take another of the places. You say you didn't go there very often, but you used to -
A I believe I can make this much more brief for you. I can say I knew of only two concentration camps or had ever heard of them. One was Dachau, and Oranienburg, and Theresienstadt. All the others I heard here for the first time. Theresienstadt was an old people's home for Jews, and I believe was visited by the International Red Cross. I never heard previously of all the other camps. places, within a comparatively short distance, and 45 camps as to which the commandant didn't give the names because there were so many of them, and in the 33 camps there were over a hundred thousand internees? Are you willing to say that in all your journeys to Fuschl you never heard of the camps at Mauthausen, where a hundred thousand people were shut up? who can testify to that.
Q I don't care how many witnesses you produce. I ask you to look at that map again. You were a responsible Minister in the Government of that country from 4th of February, 1938 till the defeat of Germany in May, 1945, a period of seven and a quarter years. Are you telling the Tribunal that anyone could be a responsible Minister in that country where these hundreds of concentration camps existed and not know anything about them except two? incredible that it must be false. How could you be ignorant of those camps? Did you never see Himmler?
A No, I never saw him about these things. These things were kept entirely secret and I just heard about them here, as to what went on in them, and nobody knew what went on in there.
That may sound astounding but I am positively convinced that most of the menin the dock also knew nothing about what was going on.
Q We will hear from them in their turn. Did you know that from Auschwitz alone -
four million people were put to death in the camp. Are you telling the Tribunal that that happened without you knowing anything about it?
A That was entirely unknown to me. I can state that here on my oath. with, and here, fortunately, I am in the position of assisting your memory with some documents. It is a question of the partisans. I want you to look at a few documents, three documents, with regard to that.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you be able to finish tonight?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I shall, if Your Lordship will allow me five minutes. That is what I have been trying to do. people in the occupied countries?
A Could you repeat the question? view by saying that you were in favor of the harshest treatment of--I will put it first of all--of partisans? of partisans. I do not recall having done so. In general, however, I felt the opposite.
Q All right, look at Document D/735, which will be GB 295. That is a discussion between you and Count Ciano in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Cavallero in the Fuehrer's headquarters after breakfast on the 19th December 1942. Now, if you will look at page two, you will see that there is a passage where Field Marshal Keitel had told the Italian gentlemen that the "Croatian area was to be cleaned up by German and Italian troops working in cooperation, and this while it was still winter, in view of the strong British influence in this area. The Fuehrer had declared that the Serbian conspirators were to be burnt out, and that no gentle methods might be used in doing this. Field Marshal Keitel here interjected that every village in which partisans were found had to be burnt down. Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister declared that Roatta must not leave the third zone, but must on the contrary advance, and this in the closest collaboration with the German troops.
In this connection Field Marshal Keitel requested the Italian gentlemen not to regard the utilization of Croatian troops to help in this cleaning up operation as a favoring of the Creations. The Reich Foreign Minister stated in this connection that the Croatian Fuehrer to whom he had spoken very clearly, was 100 per cent ready to oome to an agreement with Italy."
Did that represent your view--that the "Serbian conspirators should be burnt out"?
A Please?
Q Did that represent your view, that "the Croatian conspirators should be burnt out"?
A I do not know that expression. At any rate-by fire.
A where did I say that? I do not believe I said that.
Q That is the Fuehrer's point of view. Was it your point of view?
A The Fuehrer took a very harsh attitude toward these people. I heard that occasionally also from other sources, including the military, harsh orders were issued, but they meant life and death.
Q You say that is not your point of view? Is that what you are saying? That it is not your point of view? Are you saying that it is not your point of view as to the way to treat them? Don't look at the next document. Tell me, is that your point of view? partisans? the rear should be treated harshly, yes. But I believe everyone is of that opinion, and every army and every politician.
Q Including women and children?
Lookat the document D/741.
My Lord, that will be document D/741. The last one is GB 296.
This is GB 297. My Lord, this will be GB 296.
Q Will you look at the end of that. That is a conference between you and Ambassador Alfieri in Berlin on 21 February 1943. The last paragraph says:
"Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized that the conditions which Roatta's policy had helped to produce in Croatia were causing the Fuehrer great concern. It was appreciated on the German side that Roatta wished to spare Italian blood, but it was believed that he was, as it were, trying to drive out Satan with Beelzebub by this policy. The gans had to be exterminated, and that included men, women and children, as their continued existence imperilled the lives of German and Italian men, women and children." children?
A What page is that on?
Q It is on page 10 to 13. It is the last paragraph on my translation. "The gans had to be exterminated, and that included men, women and children, as their continued existence imperilled the lives of German and Italian men, women and children." excitement. That did not express my ral opinion. I believe that that has been proved by my other acts during the war. final one, if the Tribunal will bear with me. It is document D/740, which will be GB 297. This is a memorandum of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Secretary of State Bastianini in the presence of Ambassadors von Mackensen and Alfieriat, Klessheim castle on the afternoon of the 8th of April 1943. If you will look at the beginning, I think you were discussing some strike in Italy. You say:
"The Reich Foreign Minister's supposition that this strike had perhaps been contrived by British agents was energetically contested by Bastianini. They had been Italian communists, who still existed in Italy. The Reich was any good."
And then, after a statement with regard to the information, you say:
"He did not want to discuss Italy, but rather the occupied territories, where it had been shown that one would not got anywhere with soft methods on the endeavor to reach an agreement. The Reich Foreign Minister them emphasized his train of thought by a comparison between Denmark and Norway. In Norway brutal measures had been taken which had evoked lively protests, particularly in Sweden." And then you go on and after a certain criticism of Dr. Best-
A I can't find it; just what page is it on, please?
Q The paragraph begins: "The Reich Minister's supposition that this strike has perhaps been contrived by British agents"-
Q Well, you see what I have put to you. You say, "Only merciless action wouldbe any good. In Norway brutal measures had been taken." And at the beginning of the next paragraph: "In Greece, too, brutal action would have to be taken if the Greeks get fresh. He was of the opinion that the demobilized Greek Army should be departed from Greece with lightning speed, and that the Greeks should be shown in iron manner who was master in the country. Hard methods of this kind were necessary if one was waging a war against Stalin, which was not a gentleman's war but a brutal war of extermination." you say, "Coming back to Greece, the Reich Foreign Minister once again stressed the necessity of taking severe masures."
And in the third line of the next paragraph, "The Fuehrer would have to take radical measures in the occupied territories to mobilize the local labor potential in order that the American armament potential might be opposed by something of equal value." Do you agree? Does that fairly express your view, that you wanted the most severe measures taken in occupied territories in order to mobilize labor to increase the Reich war potential?
Q Well, you can say that, but you can answer my question first. Do these views express your view that-in occupied territories. Does that document express your views?
Q Then why did you say it? Why did you say these things? the Italian nose to the grindstone, because the relations between Germany and Italy were in complete chaos; and in the rear areas of the German Army things were in complete confusion. That is why I, on the commission of the Fuehrer, had to talk very harsh language. At that time the Italians were in part fighting against German troops, and for this reason I used rather harsh language to the Italian diplomat, or rather an exasperated language. But things actually were quite different.
Q It wasn't exaggeration, was it, in both Norway and Greece? You were taking the most brutal measures against the occupied countries.
A No, that is not so. We had nothing to say in Norway; we always tried to bring things about differently. And in Denmark we did everything to reduce these harsh measures, which were in part necessary, because of the paratroopers and so on. I think that can be proved from other documents. I and the Foreign Office worked toward compromise. I don't believe that it is fair and correct to take one or two such statements from the many documents that have been submitted where occasionally I did use harsh words. Before the war I used harsh language. I can recall to you that foreign statesmen also used harsh language rewarding the treatment of Germany.
Q Tell me this: every time today when you have been confronted with a document which attributes to you some harsh language or the opposite of what you have said here you say that on that occasion you were telling a diplomatic lie. Is that what it comes to? Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, do you have all of these documents in evidence
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 2 April 1946 at 1000 hours.)
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, Your Lordship will have noticed that I did not deal with the question of Jews. That will now be taken up by my learned friend, M. Faure, of the French Delegation.
DR. KAUFFMANN (Counsel for defendant Kaltenbrunner):
Mr. President, may I say a few words on an important question? Yesterday a map was discussed here, the map which is now visible in Court. From that map the Prosecution drew the conclusion that a large number of concentration camps were distributed all over Germany. The defendants are contradicting that statement energetically. My client, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, is going to try to prove that only very few of these red spots are correct. I would like to say that right now, so that during subsequent cases the impression will not be created again and again that that map is correct.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, this is only a reproduction of what has already been put in evidence.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but I am at liberty, am I not, to prove the contrary?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course you are, but it is not necessary for you to say so now. The fact that the evidence was put in by the Prosecution at an earlier date, of course, gives you every opportunity to answer it, but not to answer it at this moment.
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP (Resumed) CROSS EXAMINATION (Continued) BY M. FAURE:
Q. Defendant, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, you were the head of the diplomatic personnel, were you not?
A. Yes.
Q. The personnel followed your instructions, did they not?
A. Yes.