these events, and I believe the Defense has submitted a rood many of these documents. One of them was the position at the Polish crisis, the attitude taken by the U.S.A.'s diplomats at the Polish crisis. Germany. Destroyers were put at the disposal of England. Then the Lend-Lease Bill came through, and in other spheres the U.S.A. was approaching Europe in occupying Iceland and Greenland, then Africa. The help which she gave Soviet Russia after the outbreak of the war -- all these measures strengthened the Fuehrer in the opinion and in the view that sooner or later a war with America was to be counted on as a certainty. There was no doubt at least that a war was not desired by the Fuehrer, and I can say that in those years--and I think you can see this from many documents submitted by the Prosecution--that again and again I tried in diplomatic ways to do everything to keep the U.S.A. out of this war. the order to shoot to his Navy in order to prevent armament material to reach England. What was the reaction of this order on Hitler and on German diplomacy?
A It was a very regrettable incident for us. I cannot remember attitudes as far as technicalities are concerned, but I do remember that Hitler was very much excited about this order. I believe it was in a speech at some meeting, perhaps at Munich, but I do not recall exactly, that the Fuehrer replied to this speech. I recall the form of the reply because it seemed rather odd to me. He said "America has given the order to shoot on German ships." He said "I did not give any such order, but I ordered to shoot back." I believe that is the way he expressed it. of such events reached us, but the Navy has more definite information and knows more about these matters than I do. the measure and which clearly defined the German attitude; without referring to documents I cannot give you the exact nature of these protests. intention?
A No, that was not the case. At that time I tried, as far as Japan was concerned, to move her to attack Singapore. A peace with England did not seen possible, and I did not know in a military way which measures would be possible to reach this aim. everything to reach or bring about a weakening of the position of England in order that the peace might be brought about. We believed that this could be done best through an attack by Japan on the strong position of England in East Asia. Therefore, I tried to influence Japan to attack Singapore. Japan attack Russia, for in such a way I saw a quick ending of the war. Japan , however, did not do that. Rather I should say, she did neither the one thing we wanted nor the other, but she did do a third thing. She attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.
This attack was for us a complete surprise. We had considered the possibility that Japan might attack Singapore or perhaps Hong Kong or attack England, but we never considered that it should attack the United States or that was anything that we wanted; that is, the possibility of an attack on England but if that would happen, the United States would intervene. That was the question which we considered often at length but we hoped that this would not happen and that America would not intervene. The attack on Pearl Harbor was told in Berlin -- or rather, I received knowledge of it through the press and then I received Reuter's message from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. All other reports or proofs or anything else are completely untrue and I would like to testify to that under my oath. I would like to go further than that and concur and assert that even this attack was a surprise to the Japanese Ambassador -- as he told me, it was a complete surprise to him also.
DR. HORN: Do your Honors wish for a recess at this time?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, how much longer are you going to take?
DR. HORN: Not much more, your Honor. I would judge 15 or 20 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.) BY DR. HORN: war against the United States? decide. The wording of the Three-Power Pact indicated that we had to assist Japan only in case of an attack against Japan proper. I went to see the Fuehrer and submitted to him the details of the situation and told him at the time that of course we had to be gratified by a new ally against England, but that at the same time a new enemy would come into being, because the United States would also declare war now. cur ships and thereby a state of war already existed. It was therefore only a question of formality, or, at any rate, the official state of war was to be expected and it would not be possible that this condition, as it existed in the Atlantic, should continue without a German-American war.
and which meant that the Ambassador should get his passport. the allies of Germany?
A The cooperation with Italy was a very close one. That is to say, in fact, in the further course of the war we were forced to take care of all military matters there ourselves, to direct them. and that for the simple reason that we could only communicate with the Japanese Government by wireless. We had connections from time to time by U-boats, but a coordinated war together with them was not possible. Marshall is correct, that here a close strategic cooperation and planning of any kind did not take place. In fact, in reality, that was not the case.
Q And have was the cooperation with Italy? close one, but it proved to be difficult because there were many heterogeneous influences and Italy, from the very beginning, was a very weak ally in every direction. the making of partial peace agreements? and ourselves had been created, which also influenced the Fuehrer. I know that the Fuehrer, for instance, told me once that he had confidence that Stalin, whom he considered one of the really great men of history, but one could never tell what might still come. The power of the Soviets was tremendous, and therefore it was very difficult to know when and how one could come to a renewed agreement with Russia. certain contacts, because I always believed and hoped that one could come to a peace somehow or other which would relieve Germany, generally, in the East, and make it possible for us to concentrate on the West, and even possibly lead to a general peace.
rejected categorically any such peace or any such attempts at peace because he believed that that would only be used, if it became known, to create a defeatism and so on. I suggested to him at that time to negotiate on a very moderate basis with Russia for peace. of a long, written statement in 1943. I believe it was after the Italian collapse. The Fuehrer at that time was more prepared for such a peace and he already drafted or sketched a demarcation line which might have been found and he said that he would tell me the following day. The following day, however, I did not receive any authorization or directive from him. I believe that the Fuehrer was certainly of the opinion that the breach between National Socialism and Communism would be very difficult to mend and such a peace would only mean an armistice. of all a decisive military success had to be achieved and then only could we start to negotiate, otherwise any such negotiations would have no sense. seem to promise any success, I would like to say that I myself had my doubts about it. I believe in view of the strong attitude which our opponents took, especially England since the beginning of the war, that at no instance was there really any possibility for Germany to achieve a peace, that is to say, neither in the east or the west. And I am convinced that ever since the formulation at Casablanca of unconditional surrender such a possibility no longer existed. I base my opinion not only on abstract judgments but on continuous reports and information coming through indirect channels which sometimes the other side did not realize but which we had and which represented the opinions or informed us of the opinions of important personalities during the years, that one was definitely determined to carry out this war to the end, I believe the Fuehrer was perfectly right when he said that there was no sense in such negotiations. here that in September 1939 there had been a conversation on Hitler's train in which you also had taken part and where plans were made for an incitement of a rebellion during the polish campaign.
discussion? Intelligence of the Armed Forces, at that time Admiral Canaris, visited me for a short personal visit and I was at that time on the Fuehrer's train in my railroad car. I cannot remember that the witness Lahousen had been present and I had the impression when I saw Lahousen here that it was the first time I had actually seen him. reports and intelligence. I believe it was at that time he told me that he had put all his men to work, all his contact men to work in the rear of the Polish Army for a rebellion amongst the Ukrainian minorities. But such as it has been said here as to a directive on my part -- he never received such a directive and he could not say so for two reasons. to a military office. Secondly, the Foreign Office at the time the Polish campaign started was not at all concerned with these questions, Ukrainian minorities and so on. I did not even know any of the details as to those questions. Thus, I could have given no such directives.
A May I say some more about that? should be put on fire and the Jews should be killed. I would like to state categorically that I never made any such statements. although I do not remember exactly any more, that I may have talked to him casually later again. Apparently he had received instructions from the Fuehrer later as to what he was supposed to do in Poland concerning the Ukrainian and similar questions. at all because first, as to the Ukraine, those were Ukrainian villages, they were out friends, they were not our enemies and it would have been quite senseless of me to say that these villages should be put on fire.
thing, that this would be quite opposed to my own attitude and the question of killing Jews was never close to my thoughts. So that, summarizing, I may say that this is absolutely incorrect. Likewise, I have never given a directive or could have ever given a directive of that kind. was not quite convinced of that statement which I was supposed to have made. has been submitted by the Prosecution concerning the Jewish question as a factor in foreign politics in the year 1938?
It happened this way. There was an office in the foreign Office which was concerned with Party questions and with questions of ideology. That department was certainly coordinated with these departments of the Party which were competent for these things. I have seen the circular here and it seems to me that it is definitely along the same lines as were issued at that time for the enlightenment and education of officials. I could also believe that this circular passed through my office but I believe that the fact that I did not sign it and neither did the State Secretary should prove that the circular was not considered very important by me even if I had seen it. If it would have passed my office then it is quite certain that I did not read it because such long documents I did not care to read at all. But documents of that kind I had always submitted by my assistants with a few explanatory words and may I also say that in the course of the day's work there were hundreds of letters which we received and some of them were read to me, some of them I signed and many of them I may never have read, but I want to state that here too it is quite to be understood that if one of my officials signed the circular that I assumed the full responsibility for it.
In this connection your name was also frequently mentioned. What was your attitude toward the Geneva Convention? beginning of the war the Foreign Office and I have always been very much in favor of the Geneva Convention. I should like to add that we have always found great interest and great understanding with the Army. That later perhaps one has departed in one point or another from these principles can be ascribed to the harsh necessity of the war and also of the Fuehrer. 1943 and 1944 English and American air raids became a terrible danger for Germany. My first impression at that time was Hamburg, and I do remember this incident very well because I was at that time together with the Fuehrer and I described to him the terrible depressed feeling I had had. I believe that nobody who has ever seen such a raid and the result and lived through such a raid can get any impression of what it means. It is quite clear therefore that on the German side Hitler continually had to try to find a solution. I must speak here about the terrible attack on Dresden, and I would like to ask if the Court agrees to call a witness, that is, the Danish minister, who was there during the attack and described it to me fee days later. fliers had to be solved by the Fuehrer somehow or other, and our attitude was that we wanted to find a solution within the Geneva Convention or at least a solution of which we could frankly notify the opposing side. My point of view, and which I have expressed frequently, although my field was not immediately interested in the question, that is to say, we were not interested in the job ofthe intelligence--that was a military or political question--but we were interested with regard to the Geneva Convention; and that attitude, our attitude, was that if one did anything about that question there had to be an official proclamation in which should be announced a definition of terror fliers, and in which it should be said that these terror fliers who had committed an attack upon the civilian population would be brought before military courts.
And those measures, that is, these preparatory measures, should relate to the Geneva Convention, which should be notified along with the enemy. If then any such fliers would have been convicted by a court, a military court, they should have been executed; if not they should be returned to the status of prisoners of war. practically it never came to that. It was not a suggestion which I had made, but a statement, a remark made during two conferences withHitler, and that was never practically realized because a definition could not be found. in Kressheim (?) where I proposed a very far-reaching solution. This conference itself, if I remember correctly, did not take place. I believe, but I do not remember correctly, that at that time I was not on good terms withHimmler, and that I had not talked to him or to Goering, whom I didn't see frequently about this question. I believe therefore that it is possible that in the course of a state visit in Kressheim, which happened frequently, that there was a conversation with the Fuehrer, a general conversation, about these facts, which happened frequently. But I do not remember that very accurately; I only know one thing, that if a more far-reaching proposal was made it was what I had mentioned, and that cam only refer to the following. expression "terror fliers," and there were the questions which arose and were discussed coming from various sides to the effect that certain categories of attack should be defined as "terror attacks." I believe attacks with weapons such as machine guns on the planes. It is possible, I believe, that this note or this remark implies that a person who know my impressions wanted to find a practical solution which later could have been brought into accord with the Geneva Convention or at least could have been discussed with Geneva officially. a suggestion, for an affidavit by an expert of the Foreign Office. That affidavit--I do not know new how it came up; whether I gave the order for it or whether some officers of the Army started it who wanted to know the opinion of the Foreign Office.
The details I do not know: I only know that the armed forces, the Wehrmacht, always stressed the importance to know our opinion concerning the Geneva Convention very clearly.
I remember that affidavit, however, and that I have seen it. I t has been said here that I had approved it. I believe details would lead too far. That is not correct, but I remember that at that time I considered that affidavit a very important matter which I did not like to decide myself, and I had it submitted to the Fuehrer. And I also believe, or rather I remember fairly well, that the Fuehrer said at that time that that was nonsense, and that therefore this affidavit did not find any approval with the Fuehrer. And in the farther course of events I only heard, because we were only indirectly interested, that it did not come to an order from the Fuehrer or the armed forces, the Wehrmacht, because the armed forces were of the same opinion on that question as we had been. I could not recall that in detail however; I can only say one thing with absolute certainly, and that is that since this question of the terror fliers had come up that I was not informed of a single case of lynching; I only heard here that they had taken place.
Q The other day the witness Dahlerus was brought here. Since when do you know Dahlerus?
A I believe that I saw Dahlerus here for the first time. Of course, it is possible that I may have seen him once from afar or possibly in the Reich Chancellory during one of his apparently frequent visits with the Fuehrer. But I do not remember him, and when I saw him here I had the impression that this was the first time. airplanes of the Reich Government?
Q Another question. As foreign minister what real estate was under your jurisdiction? been asserted -- that I had had one house first and later six houses. I want to clarify this for the Court. After I had lost my entire fortune, which I acquired by my own work, I became quite wealthy again. Besides, I had certain possibilities through relatives and through my wife and through relatives of my wife to -- in the years 1922 and 1923 I built a house in Berlin-Dahlem and bought real estate, and we lived there for many years.
Furthermore, in 1934, as I want to point out, this had nothing to do with my political activities, because I had just started in my political activities at that time from a small inheritance and from some funds which I had and from which I bought an estate, a small estate, Sonnenburg, near Berlin, with a small house. The other -- I would rather say, since that time I have not acquired a square metre of property anywhere in Germany or anywhere else. The other houses which have been mentioned here by the British prosecutor -- here we deal with the so-called Castle Fuschl, which had become known during the war through receptions of many foreign statesmen. That is not really a castle but a tower, an old hunting tower of the Archbishop of Salzburg, which the Fuehrer had put at my disposal because he wanted that when I was at Obersalzburg I should not live in the hotel, it was always very crowded and I had to bring my assistants with me, my staff, and that I should have a roof over my head.
This property, Schloss Fuschl, never belonged to me personally, but it was a so-called endowment of the Foreign Office, which belonged entirely to the State and was also supported by the State. I never knew the former owners of this castle or this tower, but only knew their names, and, therefore, I cannot say any more about them. I have only heard that during the time that the confiscations took place in Austria, the property of political enemies was also confiscated by the Reich Government. in Slovakia, and a third house in Sudetenland, which had belonged to a Count Czernin. I believe I can explain this also. and be able to talk to them informally and to arrange hunting parties. I was also a hunter. The Foreign Office, that is to say, the Reich Government, had leased hunting grounds and buildings in Sudetenland. I believe they were never bought. They were only leased. The same thing applied to Czechoslovakia and that estate did not belong to us at all. The Slovak Government only put it at our disposal a few days every week to hunt deer and I used it two or three days. But that has nothing to do with my own property. the Rhineland, It is the Tanne House. It is a small house, according to the description which I have received, where the feedmaster who took care of several horses lived. I was a cavalry man once and was interested in the horses which had been acquired by the state from the Aga Khan in France, who was the owner of the stables. And the horses had been brought there because there was no place for them in France. I want to state that these horses were paid for, according to their real value, and I think the Aga Khan can confirm this. They were brought to Germany in full agreement with the Fuehrer, although he had not much interest for horses, but he understood my point of view. These horses were later to be taken care of, together with horses belonging to the Reich Regierung. affairs are concerned, my defense counsel can present witnesses and affidavits showing that I have stated at the end of my ministry that I would not like to have a single mark more than I had in the beginning, with the exception of two gifts which I have received form the Fuehrer, but which I believe I have used up in the course of my expenses.
Q One last question: During your foreign political activity, did you see any possibilities to realize possibilities for the vision which had been granted for Germany but never realized? this war. Adolf Hitler wanted -- and he told me that very often -- he looked for a solution for all these problems in Europe to build up an ideal social state. That was his aim. New, the realization of these ideal aims of the Fuehrer were greatly hampered by the strenuous political system, as well in Europe as throughout the world, which at that time had been established. The Fuehrer has -- and then I have upon his orders, and I believe I may be a good witness for it myself -- always tried to solve these problemsin a diplomatic way. I was very much concerned with Paragraph 19 of the Statute of the League of Nations day and night, but the difficulty presented itself that the Fuehrer was not in the position, or was convinced that it was simply impossible through diplomatic channels and, without having a strong armed force to back it up, to get any results. The mistake was made, I believe, that in Paragraph 19, which was a very good paragraph of the Statute of the League of Nations, which we all would have been very willing to sign and execute, the practical execution to realize this paragraph was missing. It was simply not there. And that created a situation where the powers -- and that is quite natural -- who wanted to retain the status quo were against any steps taken by Germany, which, of course, caused some reaction with the Fuehrer, until finally it came to a point, and to the very tragic point, where a question like Danzig and the Corridor, which could have been solved relatively simply -- but over such a question this great war has started.
DR. HORN: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it would be possible to go any further with the examination of the witness today, but the Tribunal would welcome your assistance and the assistance of the Prosecution with reference to your documents. Could you tell us what the position is with reference to your documents, and could the Prosecution tell us how far they have been able to see these documents since they have been translated and how far they have been able to make up their minds as to what documents they wish to object to; what documents they are prepared to admit as being offered in evidence before us?
Could you tell us what the position? How many of your documents have been translated?
DR. HORN: A gentleman from the British Prosecution told me this morning that the English document book will not be ready until Monday and then I, together with him, could work out the question of relevant documents. He also told me that through the British Prosecution everything would be arranged with the other delegations of the Prosecution. So that on Tuesday I should be in a position to submit the remaining documents and, I believe, within two or three hours this could be taken care of. I want to submit these documents in groups and would not have to read too much, I would only have to explain for what reason I would like to put these documents in evidence.
THE COURT: You said, did you not, it would take you longer than two or three hours to explain the documents after you had come to the arrangement with the Prosecution?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE COURT: And have you any other witnesses to call besides the defendant?
DR. HORN: No: I would only like to submit an affidavit by Legationsrat Gottfriedsen, which describes the personal relations of property of Ribbentrop. Gottfriedsen was officially charged in the Foreign Office with the handling of the official income of the Foreign Minister and was also very well informed about his private property in particular, as well as about the personal and official property in objects of art of the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. This information I have put in a few questions and they are contained in the affidavit. If the Prosecution has no objection and does not protest against this affidavit, I would not have to call the witness Gottfriedsen. However, if the Prosecution wants him to be here, then I would ask him about the contents and substance of the affidavit. Besides that, I have no witnesses for the defendant von Ribbentrop. Therefore, by presenting my documents, I could conclude the case Ribbentrop as far as the defense is concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the Prosecution tell us their view on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as far as the British Prosecution is concerned, we have now had six document books, I think, taking us up to 214, roughly two-thirds of the documents which Dr. Horn wishes to tender, and we have teen able to go through up to No. 191. I made out a list -- I could hand one to the Court and give Dr. Horn one -- of those documents that we object to, which are very briefly set out. I should think we object to something like seventy or eighty, between Nos. 45 and 191. There may be a little more. The Soviet delegation have, I think; in their position, to tender their objections, which are practically entirely in accord with ours. They were prepared separately. M. Champetier de Ribes has at least two batches of documents to which he wishes to make objections.
I think I may say that Mr. Dodd is more or less leaving this point to me and will act in accordance with the British Delegation's view on the point. So that is the position. It probably would be convenient if I handed in a very outlined list of objections which I have up to date.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal would like to know, Sir David, what the position of the Prosecution is about the translation of the documents. You remember that the Tribunal did make an order that the Prosecution should object to documents, if possible, before they were translated so as to avoid unnecessary translations and in any event of disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense any matter should be referred to the Tribunal. It is thought that there were a great number of documents which should to achieved in that way and the labor and time taken up in translation would be obviated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The difficulty we have been in over these documents is that we did our best to try and formulate our view on the index, but it is a very difficult matter when you pet a short description of only a line and a half about a document, to form a view. It might be that that would be the most practical way of being it, despite its difficulty. If the Prosecution were given an index with as fairly good a description as possible of the document, the Prosecution then formulated their objections on the index, and the Tribunal heard any outstanding differences before the documents were translated, I should think--I am afraid I can only put it tentatively--it would be worth a trial. Otherwise, you would get there terrible blockage of the translation department by a vast number of documents, such as we have had in this case, to which ultimately we would have to make very numerous objections, but that holds up the translation of documents by subsequent documents. Therefore, I should be prepared--my colleagues would support me--in making a trial, if the Tribunal thought it could be done, to have an index on a list of documents and see if we could in that way arrive at the results which would obviate the necessity of translating then all.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be of assistance to the Prosecution, supposing the defendant's counsel were to give them the entire documents in German with also a full index, perhaps, in English, and then the Prosecution have some member of the Prosecution who is familiar with German go through the documents in German and the Prosecution can then make up their minds in that way?
I mean, that would be an assistance to the Prosecution. They would have not only the index to inform them as to what was the nature of the documents but they would have the documents in German.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think that would be a great help, especially, if the material passages were underlined.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, with the co-operation of the defendant's counsel, some measure of agreement might be arrived at as to what were the necessary documents to lay before the Tribunal?
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: Yes, I think that could be done, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, Sir David, with reference to the immediate future, on Monday, of course, some of the defendants' counsel may wish to ask questions of the defendant Ribbentrop and then the Prosecution may wish to cross-examine him, and that, I suppose, might possibly take all Monday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think that is highly probably, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Under these circumstances, if the scheme which Dr. Horn has outlined is carried out, there would not necessarily be any delay at all because by Tuesday morning his documents would have been all examined by the Prosecution and the objections to then would have been put in, and he could then go through, as he says, in two or three hours, the documents which remain for the consideration of the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I respectfully agree, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal would like to know what the position is with reference to the next defendant. It may be that on Tuesday of the midday adjournment the case of defendant Keitel would come on. Now, are his documents in order? As far as I remember, most of his documents are documents which have already been put in evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: A great many.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Perhaps Dr. Nelte could help us.
THE PRESIDENT: If he would, yes.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am ready to begin at any time. The documents have been presented and last week affidavits were presented to the Prosecution. I only wait for the decision of the prosecution about the question of relevance of these documents, which the defendant has submitted as his own statements, and which shall be submitted in order to shorten the examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: I have not had the chance of going through them myself but, as a matter of principle, we have always been quite prepared that a statement should be read so long as the witness is there to be crossexamined. If the Tribunal has no objection, there will be none from the Prosecution on that procedure.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal has no objection at all to that method of presenting written documents, provided the Prosecution does not object to then, and, therefore, no cross-examination is necessary. Could Dr. Nelte tell us whether the documents which he wishes to present in so far as they have not already been put in evidence, have been translated yet?
DR. NELTE: They were sent to the translation office, the last two documents three days ago. I assume, therefore, that the delegations of the Prosecutionhave in the meantime received the translations.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you received them?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No, My Lord, we have not received them.
DR. NELTE: Maybe they have not been sent to them yet. There are several of then, about two-thirds of the documents, which have already been submitted to the translation office about two weeks ago and they were all ready in French and in English, and, subsequently, I also presented these documents to the Russian delegation so that they could be translated into Russian.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am told, My Lord, from General Mitchel that the documents are translated. They have not yet been distributed.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then there ought to be no cause for delay in connection with the defendant Keitel's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so,
DR. NELTE: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, does the same apply to the defendant Kaltenbrunner, who is the next one? Dr. Kaufmann, are your documents yet translated?
DR. KAUFMANN: Mr. President, I have only very few affidavits and there is no doubt that they will be in the hands of the Prosecution in time.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. So that you will be quite ready to go on then?
DR. KAUFMANN: After Keitel, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, after Keitel. Very well. Sir David, then you will present to us the objections which you are making to Dr. Horn's documents, and the Soviet Prosecutor will present his objections?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, I shall hand then in as far as I have gone, if I may, at once.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and M. Champetier de Ribes, so far as his have gone.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If My Lordship please, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1 April 1946 at 1000 hours.)
(The Defendant Ribbentrop resumed the witness-stand.)
THE PRESIDENT: Have any of the Defendants' Counsel any questions they want to put to the Defendant?
DR. SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank): Yes, your Honor. BY DR. SEIDL: many is worded as follows:
"In view of the present tension between Germany and Poland, we agree to the following in case of conflict" -
Do you recall that the preamble had that wording?
A I don't remember the exact wording, but it was more or less like that August Ambassador Gauss took part as legal adviser and drew up this Pact? and along with me drew up the Pact. in connection with it -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, what document are you going to read?
DR. SEIDL: I shall read from the declaration made by Dr. Gauss, No,3, and in connection with it, ask a few questions of the witness, because a few points remain in connection with the Pact that have not been clarified sufficiently as yet.
(General Rudenko approached the lectern.)
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?
GENERAL RUDENKO: I do not know, Mr. President, what relationship these questions have with the Defendant Heask who is defended by Dr. Seidl, or with the Defendant Frank. I do not wish to speak about this affidavit, as I do not attribute any importance to it. I only wish to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that we are not investigatting problems concerning the policy of Allied Nations, but we are investigating the charges against the main German by Defense Counsel to divert the attention of the Tribunal from the issues we are investigating.