Furthermore, in 1934, as I want to point out, this had nothing to do with my political activities, because I had just started in my political activities at that time from a small inheritance and from some funds which I had and from which I bought an estate, a small estate, Sonnenburg, near Berlin, with a small house. The other -- I would rather say, since that time I have not acquired a square metre of property anywhere in Germany or anywhere else. The other houses which have been mentioned here by the British prosecutor -- here we deal with the so-called Castle Fuschl, which had become known during the war through receptions of many foreign statesmen. That is not really a castle but a tower, an old hunting tower of the Archbishop of Salzburg, which the Fuehrer had put at my disposal because he wanted that when I was at Obersalzburg I should not live in the hotel, it was always very crowded and I had to bring my assistants with me, my staff, and that I should have a roof over my head.
This property, Schloss Fuschl, never belonged to me personally, but it was a so-called endowment of the Foreign Office, which belonged entirely to the State and was also supported by the State. I never knew the former owners of this castle or this tower, but only knew their names, and, therefore, I cannot say any more about them. I have only heard that during the time that the confiscations took place in Austria, the property of political enemies was also confiscated by the Reich Government. in Slovakia, and a third house in Sudetenland, which had belonged to a Count Czernin. I believe I can explain this also. and be able to talk to them informally and to arrange hunting parties. I was also a hunter. The Foreign Office, that is to say, the Reich Government, had leased hunting grounds and buildings in Sudetenland. I believe they were never bought. They were only leased. The same thing applied to Czechoslovakia and that estate did not belong to us at all. The Slovak Government only put it at our disposal a few days every week to hunt deer and I used it two or three days. But that has nothing to do with my own property. the Rhineland, It is the Tanne House. It is a small house, according to the description which I have received, where the feedmaster who took care of several horses lived. I was a cavalry man once and was interested in the horses which had been acquired by the state from the Aga Khan in France, who was the owner of the stables. And the horses had been brought there because there was no place for them in France. I want to state that these horses were paid for, according to their real value, and I think the Aga Khan can confirm this. They were brought to Germany in full agreement with the Fuehrer, although he had not much interest for horses, but he understood my point of view. These horses were later to be taken care of, together with horses belonging to the Reich Regierung. affairs are concerned, my defense counsel can present witnesses and affidavits showing that I have stated at the end of my ministry that I would not like to have a single mark more than I had in the beginning, with the exception of two gifts which I have received form the Fuehrer, but which I believe I have used up in the course of my expenses.
Q One last question: During your foreign political activity, did you see any possibilities to realize possibilities for the vision which had been granted for Germany but never realized? this war. Adolf Hitler wanted -- and he told me that very often -- he looked for a solution for all these problems in Europe to build up an ideal social state. That was his aim. New, the realization of these ideal aims of the Fuehrer were greatly hampered by the strenuous political system, as well in Europe as throughout the world, which at that time had been established. The Fuehrer has -- and then I have upon his orders, and I believe I may be a good witness for it myself -- always tried to solve these problemsin a diplomatic way. I was very much concerned with Paragraph 19 of the Statute of the League of Nations day and night, but the difficulty presented itself that the Fuehrer was not in the position, or was convinced that it was simply impossible through diplomatic channels and, without having a strong armed force to back it up, to get any results. The mistake was made, I believe, that in Paragraph 19, which was a very good paragraph of the Statute of the League of Nations, which we all would have been very willing to sign and execute, the practical execution to realize this paragraph was missing. It was simply not there. And that created a situation where the powers -- and that is quite natural -- who wanted to retain the status quo were against any steps taken by Germany, which, of course, caused some reaction with the Fuehrer, until finally it came to a point, and to the very tragic point, where a question like Danzig and the Corridor, which could have been solved relatively simply -- but over such a question this great war has started.
DR. HORN: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it would be possible to go any further with the examination of the witness today, but the Tribunal would welcome your assistance and the assistance of the Prosecution with reference to your documents. Could you tell us what the position is with reference to your documents, and could the Prosecution tell us how far they have been able to see these documents since they have been translated and how far they have been able to make up their minds as to what documents they wish to object to; what documents they are prepared to admit as being offered in evidence before us?
Could you tell us what the position? How many of your documents have been translated?
DR. HORN: A gentleman from the British Prosecution told me this morning that the English document book will not be ready until Monday and then I, together with him, could work out the question of relevant documents. He also told me that through the British Prosecution everything would be arranged with the other delegations of the Prosecution. So that on Tuesday I should be in a position to submit the remaining documents and, I believe, within two or three hours this could be taken care of. I want to submit these documents in groups and would not have to read too much, I would only have to explain for what reason I would like to put these documents in evidence.
THE COURT: You said, did you not, it would take you longer than two or three hours to explain the documents after you had come to the arrangement with the Prosecution?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE COURT: And have you any other witnesses to call besides the defendant?
DR. HORN: No: I would only like to submit an affidavit by Legationsrat Gottfriedsen, which describes the personal relations of property of Ribbentrop. Gottfriedsen was officially charged in the Foreign Office with the handling of the official income of the Foreign Minister and was also very well informed about his private property in particular, as well as about the personal and official property in objects of art of the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Ministry. This information I have put in a few questions and they are contained in the affidavit. If the Prosecution has no objection and does not protest against this affidavit, I would not have to call the witness Gottfriedsen. However, if the Prosecution wants him to be here, then I would ask him about the contents and substance of the affidavit. Besides that, I have no witnesses for the defendant von Ribbentrop. Therefore, by presenting my documents, I could conclude the case Ribbentrop as far as the defense is concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the Prosecution tell us their view on this?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as far as the British Prosecution is concerned, we have now had six document books, I think, taking us up to 214, roughly two-thirds of the documents which Dr. Horn wishes to tender, and we have teen able to go through up to No. 191. I made out a list -- I could hand one to the Court and give Dr. Horn one -- of those documents that we object to, which are very briefly set out. I should think we object to something like seventy or eighty, between Nos. 45 and 191. There may be a little more. The Soviet delegation have, I think; in their position, to tender their objections, which are practically entirely in accord with ours. They were prepared separately. M. Champetier de Ribes has at least two batches of documents to which he wishes to make objections.
I think I may say that Mr. Dodd is more or less leaving this point to me and will act in accordance with the British Delegation's view on the point. So that is the position. It probably would be convenient if I handed in a very outlined list of objections which I have up to date.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal would like to know, Sir David, what the position of the Prosecution is about the translation of the documents. You remember that the Tribunal did make an order that the Prosecution should object to documents, if possible, before they were translated so as to avoid unnecessary translations and in any event of disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense any matter should be referred to the Tribunal. It is thought that there were a great number of documents which should to achieved in that way and the labor and time taken up in translation would be obviated.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. The difficulty we have been in over these documents is that we did our best to try and formulate our view on the index, but it is a very difficult matter when you pet a short description of only a line and a half about a document, to form a view. It might be that that would be the most practical way of being it, despite its difficulty. If the Prosecution were given an index with as fairly good a description as possible of the document, the Prosecution then formulated their objections on the index, and the Tribunal heard any outstanding differences before the documents were translated, I should think--I am afraid I can only put it tentatively--it would be worth a trial. Otherwise, you would get there terrible blockage of the translation department by a vast number of documents, such as we have had in this case, to which ultimately we would have to make very numerous objections, but that holds up the translation of documents by subsequent documents. Therefore, I should be prepared--my colleagues would support me--in making a trial, if the Tribunal thought it could be done, to have an index on a list of documents and see if we could in that way arrive at the results which would obviate the necessity of translating then all.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it be of assistance to the Prosecution, supposing the defendant's counsel were to give them the entire documents in German with also a full index, perhaps, in English, and then the Prosecution have some member of the Prosecution who is familiar with German go through the documents in German and the Prosecution can then make up their minds in that way?
I mean, that would be an assistance to the Prosecution. They would have not only the index to inform them as to what was the nature of the documents but they would have the documents in German.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think that would be a great help, especially, if the material passages were underlined.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, with the co-operation of the defendant's counsel, some measure of agreement might be arrived at as to what were the necessary documents to lay before the Tribunal?
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: Yes, I think that could be done, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, Sir David, with reference to the immediate future, on Monday, of course, some of the defendants' counsel may wish to ask questions of the defendant Ribbentrop and then the Prosecution may wish to cross-examine him, and that, I suppose, might possibly take all Monday.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think that is highly probably, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Under these circumstances, if the scheme which Dr. Horn has outlined is carried out, there would not necessarily be any delay at all because by Tuesday morning his documents would have been all examined by the Prosecution and the objections to then would have been put in, and he could then go through, as he says, in two or three hours, the documents which remain for the consideration of the Tribunal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I respectfully agree, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the Tribunal would like to know what the position is with reference to the next defendant. It may be that on Tuesday of the midday adjournment the case of defendant Keitel would come on. Now, are his documents in order? As far as I remember, most of his documents are documents which have already been put in evidence.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: A great many.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that not so?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Perhaps Dr. Nelte could help us.
THE PRESIDENT: If he would, yes.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am ready to begin at any time. The documents have been presented and last week affidavits were presented to the Prosecution. I only wait for the decision of the prosecution about the question of relevance of these documents, which the defendant has submitted as his own statements, and which shall be submitted in order to shorten the examination.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: I have not had the chance of going through them myself but, as a matter of principle, we have always been quite prepared that a statement should be read so long as the witness is there to be crossexamined. If the Tribunal has no objection, there will be none from the Prosecution on that procedure.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal has no objection at all to that method of presenting written documents, provided the Prosecution does not object to then, and, therefore, no cross-examination is necessary. Could Dr. Nelte tell us whether the documents which he wishes to present in so far as they have not already been put in evidence, have been translated yet?
DR. NELTE: They were sent to the translation office, the last two documents three days ago. I assume, therefore, that the delegations of the Prosecutionhave in the meantime received the translations.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you received them?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No, My Lord, we have not received them.
DR. NELTE: Maybe they have not been sent to them yet. There are several of then, about two-thirds of the documents, which have already been submitted to the translation office about two weeks ago and they were all ready in French and in English, and, subsequently, I also presented these documents to the Russian delegation so that they could be translated into Russian.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am told, My Lord, from General Mitchel that the documents are translated. They have not yet been distributed.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then there ought to be no cause for delay in connection with the defendant Keitel's case.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I do not think so,
DR. NELTE: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, does the same apply to the defendant Kaltenbrunner, who is the next one? Dr. Kaufmann, are your documents yet translated?
DR. KAUFMANN: Mr. President, I have only very few affidavits and there is no doubt that they will be in the hands of the Prosecution in time.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. So that you will be quite ready to go on then?
DR. KAUFMANN: After Keitel, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, after Keitel. Very well. Sir David, then you will present to us the objections which you are making to Dr. Horn's documents, and the Soviet Prosecutor will present his objections?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, I shall hand then in as far as I have gone, if I may, at once.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and M. Champetier de Ribes, so far as his have gone.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If My Lordship please, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1 April 1946 at 1000 hours.)
(The Defendant Ribbentrop resumed the witness-stand.)
THE PRESIDENT: Have any of the Defendants' Counsel any questions they want to put to the Defendant?
DR. SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank): Yes, your Honor. BY DR. SEIDL: many is worded as follows:
"In view of the present tension between Germany and Poland, we agree to the following in case of conflict" -
Do you recall that the preamble had that wording?
A I don't remember the exact wording, but it was more or less like that August Ambassador Gauss took part as legal adviser and drew up this Pact? and along with me drew up the Pact. in connection with it -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, what document are you going to read?
DR. SEIDL: I shall read from the declaration made by Dr. Gauss, No,3, and in connection with it, ask a few questions of the witness, because a few points remain in connection with the Pact that have not been clarified sufficiently as yet.
(General Rudenko approached the lectern.)
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko?
GENERAL RUDENKO: I do not know, Mr. President, what relationship these questions have with the Defendant Heask who is defended by Dr. Seidl, or with the Defendant Frank. I do not wish to speak about this affidavit, as I do not attribute any importance to it. I only wish to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that we are not investigatting problems concerning the policy of Allied Nations, but we are investigating the charges against the main German by Defense Counsel to divert the attention of the Tribunal from the issues we are investigating.
(Consultation between members of the Tribunal, en banc.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the questions.
Q. Ambassador Gauss stated, under No. 13 of his affidavit:
"The Reich Foreign Minister's airplane arrived around noon of the 31st of August at Moscow. I had accompanied him to advise on legal matters. On the afternoon of the same day Ribbentrop spoke with Stalin, at which time only Ambassador Hilger, as interpreter, and perhaps Ambassador Schulenburg were present as the German delegation. I was not present.
"The Reich Foreign Minister returned from this long conference and stated that the treaty wanted by the Germans would be brought about. Further discussion of the documents about to be signed was set for the late evening. I personally took part in the second conference. So also did Ambassador Schulenburg and Ambassador Hilger. On the Russian side the negotiations were conducted by Stalin and Molotov, whose interpreter was Favlov. Without difficulty and with rapidity, we reached an agreement on the text of this, German-Russian Non-aggression Pact.
"In the preamble of the text of the agreement that I drew up there was rather a long statement regarding friendship between Russia and Germany, to which Stalin objected with the remark that the Soviet Government, after it had been subjected to insult by the Nazi government for six years, could not make public all of a sudden protestations of friendship between Soviet Russia and Germany. That passage in the preamble was thereupon deleted or changed.
"Along with the Non-aggression Pact, a discussion took place about a secret protocol, which, as I recall, was called a secret protocol or secret additional protocol, the terms of which dealt with a limitation of the two spheres of interest in which various European countries were considered. Whether the expression "sphere of interest" or other such expressions were used therein, I do not recall. Germany declared that it had no interest in Latvia or Esthonia but did consider Lithuania to be part of its sphere of influence.
"Concerning Germany's interest in the other two Baltic countries, this can be said: The Reich Foreign Minister wanted to except a certain part of the Baltic from agreement, but the Soviet government, particularly since it was interested in the ice-free ports in this region, was not agreeable to this exception.
"Because of this point, which had already been discussed in Ribbentrop's first discussion, Ribbentrop had a telephone conversation with Berlin, which took place only during the second discussion, in which he was empowered, in direct conversation with Hitler, to accept the Soviet standpoint. A demarcation line was laid down for the Polish territory. Whether it was drawn on a map annexed to the protocol or whether it was simply described in words, I do not now recall. Moreover, in regard to Poland, an agreement was reached that the two powers, at the final decision of these questions, would act in concord. It is, however, possible that this last agreement regarding Poland was reached only after the change foreseen in Paragraph 5 of the protocol.
"Regarding the Baltic countries, it was determined that Germany had only economic interests there.
"The Non-aggression Pact and the second document were signed rather late that same evening."
Witness, in the sworn affidavit of Gauss, this is to be found: that at the final decision regarding Poland, the two countries would act with each other's knowledge. Was this agreement reached already on 31 August?
A. Yes, that is true. At that time the serious German-Polish crisis was already at hand, and this question was discussed, and I should like to emphasize that there was not the slightest doubt in either Stalin's or Hitler's mind that if all the negotiations with Poland came to naught the territory that had been taken from these two powers by force of arms would be reunited with the two powers by force of arms. In this,sense, the eastern territories would be turned over to Germany. It was also agreed that Stalin would never accuse Germany of aggression because of its actions in Poland.
Q. Another question -
A. Rather, if an aggression was spoken of here, this would be spoken of in both cases and that both parties would be spoken of as guilty of it.
Q. Was the demarcation line in this secret agreement described only in words or was it drawn on a map annexed to the agreement?
A. The line of demarcation was drawn roughly on a large map. It ran along the Rivers Rysia, Bug, Marew, and San, and that was the line of demarcation that was to be adhered to in case things reached Apr-1-M-RT-2a-1 the point of war with Poland.
agreement, not Germany, but Soviet Russia, was to receive the greater amount of territory? situation was this: That all regions east of these rivers were to go to Soviet Russia, and all west of these were to be occupied by German troops . The organization of this territory as intended by Germany still lay open and had not yet been discussed by Hitler and me. It later became the General Government of Poland after the regions lost to Germany following the first world war incorporated into Germany.
Q. Now, something else: You stated last Friday that you wanted Russia to join in the Tripartite Pact. Why did that fail?
A That failed because of Russian demands. The Russian demands-I should perhaps say first that I had agreed with Molotov in Berlin that we would negotiate further over diplomatic channels. I would exert my influence on the Fuehrer to see to it that regarding the demands already made by Molotov in Berlin a compromise agreement of some sort could be reached. Russian demands. In this report, first, the demandswas renewed for Finland T he fuehrer, as known, told Molotov that he did not wish that, after the winter's war of 1940, up in the north there war should break out anew. The demand regarding Finland was brought up again, and we supposed that would lead to an occupation of Finland That was difficult, since it was a demand that the Fuehrer had already turned down.
A second demand concerned the Balkans, specifically, Bulgaria. Russia wanted basis there and close relations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, with which we had close relations, did not wish this. question to meet these Russian demands because of our economic interest an wheat, oil, and so on. Moreover, the will of the Bulgarian governmnet was against it.
Apr-1-M-RT-2a-2 military nature, and then, also, the wish that Molotov had expressed to me in Berlin to have the outlet of the Baltic Sea. Molotov told me at that time that, of course, Russia was interested in Jutland and other such regions.
the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer said we would have to get in touch with Mussolini, who was interested also in a part of these demands. This took place, but both the Balkan demand and the Dardenelles demand found no reception by Mussolini. and on the question of Finland, neither Finland nor the Fuehrer wanted to agree to these demands on the part of Russia.
Negotiations took place during several months. I recall that on the basis of a telegram from Moscow in December 1940 I had another long conversation with the Fuehrer. It was my idea that if we could reach some compromise between the Russian wishes and the wishes of the various participants, we could then reach such a strong coalition that would finally bring England to peace.
THE PRESIDENT: What is this all an answer to? What was your question that this is supposed to be an answer to?
DR. SEIDL: In essence he has answered the question already. The question was, what circumstances -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Seidl, if he has answered the question you should stop him.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. BY DR. SEIDL:
Q. I now come to another question. That intentions did Hitler have in regard to the military strength of Russia?
A. Adolf Hitler told me once and expressed himself so -- this was during the time that he became worried about what was taking place in Russia in the way of preparations against Germany. He said, "We of course do not know what is concealed behind this door, and we may one day be obliged to break this door open." state to him that on the basis of what he knew about Russia already it should cause him great concern about attacking Russia.
Q. What induced Hitler to run this danger of on offensive action against Russia?
A. This was as follows: -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Hasn't this been dealt with extensively and exhaustively by the defendant Goering? You are here as counsel for Hess.
DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal is of the conviction that this has already been adequately handled, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you sit down, Dr. Seidl, you were putting Gauss' affidavit to the defendant, I suppose with the intention that he should say that the affidavit was true; is that right?
DR. SEIDL: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You didn't put to him paragraph 4 of the affidavit at all, did you?
DR. SEIDL: I cited only number 3, numbers 1 and 2; 4 and 5 I did not read, in order to save time.
THE PRESIDENT: The answer to my question was, yes, you did not put it. Should you not put the end of paragraph 4 to him, which reads in this way:
"The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner that he let a war-like conflict of Germany with Poland appear not as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent possibility. No statements which could have included the approval or encouragement for such a conflict were made by the Soviet statesmen on this point. Rather the Soviet representatives limited themselves in this respect simply to taking cognizance of the explanations of the German representatives."
Is that correct?
DR. SEIDL: That is so.
THE PRESIDENT: I am asking the witness. Is that correct?
THE WITNESS: I may say the following to this. When I went to Moscow no final decision had been reached by the Fuehrer -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Well, couldn't you answer the question directly? I asked you whether the statement in the affidavit was correct or not. You can explain afterwards.
THE WITNESS: Not quite correct, no.
THE PRESIDENT: Now you can explain.
THE WITNESS: Not precisely correct insofar as a decision on the part of the Fuehrer to attack Poland had not yet been reached. There is, however, no doubt that during the discussions in Moscow it was perfectly clear that the possibility, if the last effort at negotiations failed, could be taken at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the difference between that and what I have just read to you? What I read to you was this:
"The Reich Foreign Minister regulated his words in such a manner that he let a war-like conflict of Germany with Poland appear not as a matter already finally decided upon but only as an imminent possibility. " That's all.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, may I mention something very beiefly in this connection? The witness Fauss was only present at the second conference. He was, however, not present at the previous conference between the witness von Ribbentrop or the one hand and Molotov and Stalin on the other hand. At this conference only Ambassador Hilger was present. Consequently, I ask the Tribune in view of the importance of this point, to call the witness Hilger
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, as you know, you can make any application in writing for calling any witness that you like, and also the Tribunal wishes me to say that if the Prosecution wish to have the witness Gauss here for a cross examination they may do so.
DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I should like to put in evidence as Number 16 the sworn affidavit of Ambassador Gauss.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
MR. DODD: May it please the Court, as far as I understand, there is some slight danger of the witness Gauss being removed from Nurnberg. I would like to state at this time that we would like to have him retained here for long enough time for possible cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Do any other members of the defendants' counsel want to ask questions?
BY DR. NELTE (Counsel for Keitel):
Q. The defendant Keitel states that in the autumn of 1940 he discussed the question with Hitler of war with Russia, and in order to do so came to Fuschl to talk these questions over with you. He believed that you too had doubts about this. Do you recall that at the end of August he was in Fuschl?
A. Yes, he visited me there.
Q. Do you recall that Keitel then stated to you his opinion of the war that might be threatening?
A. Yes, that is so. He spoke of that at that time. I believe he said that the Fuehrer also discussed it.
Q. What I am driving at is this. Keitel states that he spoke with you about a memorandum that he intended to submit to Hitler, and this concerned itself with the doubts that he felt about waging a was with Soviet Russia.
A. That is so. Keitel told me at that time that he intended to submit a memorandum to Hitler, and he expressed his doubts about a conflict between the Soviet Union and Germany.
Q. Did you have the impression that Keitel was an opponent of that war at that time?
A. Yes, that is so. I had that impression very clearly.
Q. Is it true that he, as a result of this discussion, asked you in your turn to support his point of view by talking with Hitler about these doubts?
A. Yes, that is so, and I told him at that time that I would do so, that I would speak to Hitler, and he also would do the same.
Q. Another question, regarding the flight of the French General Giraud. Is it true that Keitel, when the French General Giraud escaped from Koenigsteir asked you to take measures in order to bring about, through the French Government, the voluntary return of Giraud to Germany?
A. Yes, at that time he suggested whether or not it might be possible, by way of negotiations with the French Government, in some way or other to induce Giraud to return to imprisonment.
a meeting took place with Giraud in occupied France?
A. Yes, such a meeting took place, I believe Amabssador Abetz met Giraud, who, as I recall, appeared in the company of Laval. The Ambassador did everything he could in order to induce the General to return, but that finally did not succeed. He was promised safe, conduct for this return. However, then Laval and the General went away again. branding of Soviet prisoners of war by marking on their skin. Keitel, who is asserted to be responsible for this order, states that he spoke with you about these questions at the headquarters at that time in Vinnitza, that he had to speak with you because this question of prisoners of war had touched the international law department of the Foreign Office. international law scruples against this branding which Hitler wished?
A The situation was this. We heard of the intention of identifying prisoners of war in this way. We went to the headquarters and spoke with Keitel about this matter. It was my opinion that such a way of identifying prisoners was out of the question. Keiter was also of this opinion and, so far as I recall, gave orders that this intended form of identification should not be used.
DR. NELTE: I have no further question. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER (counsel for defendant Doenitz):
Q Witness, when did you make the acquaintance of Admiral Doenitz? of the Navy.
Q That was in 1943? influence on foreign policy or attempt to have such an influence? on foreign policy.
Q Do you recall Marshal Antonescu's visit to the Fuehrer's headquarters on the 27th of February 1944?