The Fuehrer said that the conclusion of the three-power pact had looked like a funeral to him. the conclusion of this pact--that there had been a putsch, or a riot. The Government had been overthrown and a new Government was set up, which, undoubtedly, was not friendly to Germany. British General Staff. I believe American observers on this problem know about this, and from English sources I have heard that British elements were also involved and cooperated in this putsch. It seemed to have been e ntirel natural, for we were at war.
All of these events caused the Fuehrer to intervene in the Balkans, firs+ of all, to help Italy, because she had been in very desperate straits in Albania; and secondly, to prevent Yugoslavia, through perhaps an attack through the North, to make the Italian situation much more serious and perhaps consider Italy our partner. the campaign and to intervene against Yugoslavia and Greece. her neutrality before the Italian attack in October of 1940, gave bases to the British fleet on her isles, andput these isles at her disposal. had a plan of an allied landing at Salonika, and he approved of this. When did Germany receive knowledge of these intentions? staff after the outbreak of the war. I know that all reports which the Fuehrer received from the various information branches, from the beginning, made him anxious about the imminent possibility of a new front in Salonika, that it might happen again, just as it had occurred in the first World War, and that this would mean a dispersal of German forces along many fronts.
Q In September of 1938 you were on a second visit to Moscow. What was the reason for this visit and what took place?
Polish campaign. I flew to Moscow toward the end of September, and while there I received an especially cordial reception. The situation was such that definite conditions had to be established in the Polish area. Soviet troops had occupied the eastern regions of Poland, and we had occupied the western parts up to the line of demarcation that had been agreed upon, and a clear demarcation and sphere of influence had to be made. Soviet Union and puttingthem on a friendly basis. An agreement was reached in Moscow with drew a final line of demarcation in Poland. Also, an economic agreement was planned, which would regulate economic connections and put them on an entirely new basis. It was a comprehensive treaty about the exchange of raw material. Later this agreement was concluded. At the same time a pact was made politically, as a pact of friendship, and this pact is well known Then there was one more question, dealing with Lithuania.
In a confidential relationahsip between Moscow and Berlin, the Fuehrer dispensed with any influence on Lithuania and gave Russia complete influence in Lithuania so that from that time on, territorially, conditions were regulated between Germany and Soviet Russia.
ultimatum, entire Lithuania and the part which was German was occupied by Russia without Russia notifying Germany? areas were actually occupied.
Q What further Russian measures made Hitler anxious as to Russia's actions and demeanor? attitude. First of all, the occupation which I have just mentioned was one of those points; furthermore, the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina which took place at the end of the French campaign and which was reported to us without previous consultation. The Rumanian king turned to us at that time for advice. The Fuehrer, because of his loyalty to the Soviet pact, told the Rumanian king to follow Russian demands and to evacuate Bessarabia.
In addition, the Finnish war in the year 1940: The German people had strong sympathy towards the Finnish people, and it caused the German people great anxiety over the Finnish people. The Fuehrer believed that he had to take this Finnish worry into consideration up to a certain point. Furthermore there were two additional points: One was that the Fuehrer received a report about communist propaganda in German factories, and this propaganda activity was to be centralized in a Russian economic representative. We also received word about military preparations which were being taken by Russia. I know after the French campaign he talked to me on several occasions about this matter and said that near East Prussia approximately twenty German divisions had been concentrated in that region. I believe there were about thirty corps which were to be concentrated in Bessarabia. The Fuehrer was anxious over these reports and asked me to observe these things very closely. He even said that this pact had been concluded only in the year 1939 so as to be able to dictate economic measures to us, and he wanted to take countermeasures from now on. I pointed out the danger of preventive wars, but the Fuehrer said that in all cases we would have to take all odds. I toldhim that we should make all efforts in diplomatic ways.
foreign commissar Molotov visited Berlin. On whose initiative did these visits take place and what was the content of the discussions and conferences?
A The conferences with Molotov at Berlin had the following contents: I might interpolate that in our efforts to come to a settlement with Russia in a diplomatic way I had the permission of the Fuehrer from a letter to Stalin in the late Fall and invited Molotov to come to Berlin. This invitation was accepted, and in the conversation which the Fuehrer had with Molotov the complete complex of German-Russian negotiations and relations was discussed. I was present at these discussions.
THE PRESIDENT: What date was this?
DR. HORN: That was from the 12th to the 14th, November, 1940.
A (Continued) Mr. Molotov spoke with the Fuehrer first about GermanRussian relations in general and then about Finland and then about the Balkans He said Russia had vital interests in Finland. He said that Russia, on the basis of the then demarcation of spheres of interest, considered Finland her sphere of influence. The Fuehrer replied that Germany also had strong interests in Finland, chiefly interests in nickel. One was not to forget that the entire German people had a sympathy for the entire Finnish people, and he requested Molotov to meet him on this question. This topic was discussed late: on on several occasions. a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria and closer connections with Bulgaria in general. Bases there were also mentioned. Molotov had told this to the Fuehrer. Then the Fuehrer asked him whether Bulgaria had turned to Molotov and approached him, but that did not seem to have been the case. Then the Fuehrer said that this question could be discussed by him and he could take a position only after he had discussed this thing with Mussolini, who was his ally and who was also interested in the Balkans.
Other points were also discussed. A final solution or settlement was not reached at this discussion. The conference took such a form which would not lead to a breaking of contradictions.
discussions withMolotov again and asked him if he would consent to my speaking to Molotov again about a joining on the part of Russia with the three-power pact. It was one of our intentions at that time to have Russia join the three-power pact. The Fuehrer agreed to this and I had further discussions with Molotov-lengthy discussions. This discussion dealt with the same questions again. Molotov mentioned the vital interest of Russia in Finland and the close connection between the Russian and the Bulgarian people and their interests in the Balkan countries. in order to see whether a settlement of this question could not be found. I proposed to him that they join the three-power pact and further proposed to him that I would talk with the Fuehrer about the questions whichhad been raised and would discuss these problems with him again. perhaps a settlement or a solution could be found that way, I suggested. The result of this conversation was that Molotov returned to Moscow with the intention that in some diplomatic way the questions between us could be clarified.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, as these negotiations didn't eventuate in any agreement, they are very remote from anything we are cnsidering. You are not suggesting that any agreements were comt to, are you?
DR. HORN: No. I wanted to show only that there were efforts on the part of Germany to prevent the conflict with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: There was no question of a conflict withRussia in any of these negotiations.
DR. HORN: No. From the total efforts on the part of Germany we can gather--and from the testimony of von Ribbentrop--that we were interested in preventing any possible conflict between Germany and Russia. The Prosecution asserts that the pact with Russia was made with the intention of violating it and attacking Russia, and that from the beginning there had been an intention to attack Russia.
I would like to show that that was not the case.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to no to be many remote, indeed. It only goes to show that Ribbentrop entered into certain negotiations with Russia which had no result. That is all. You may go on, Dr. Horn. BY DR. HORN: at the border of East Prussia, mentioning twenty German divisions. I assume that that was just a lapse of speech.
A I meant to say twenty Russian divisions. The Fuehrer mentioned this many time. He said, "I believe we have just one division in East Prussia."
Q Wasn't the occupation of the Balkans the reason for your discussion with Molotov?
Q I did not quite understand the question. Please repeat it.
Q Wasn't the Russian occupation in the Balkans and in the Baltic states the reason to have Molotov come to Berlin?
A Not as far as the Balkans are concerned. No Russian occupation applied there. But this did apply in Bessarabia. Bessarabia really does not belong to the Balkans in the exact sense. The occupation of Bessarabia, which came surprisingly quickly, and the occupation of Northern Bucovina, a region which had not been agreed upon as a Russian sphere of influence -- the Fuehrer at that time said that this was really Austrian territory -- and the occupation of the Baltic regions. It is true that the Fuehrer was filled with anxiety because of these occupations. presence of a French-English mission in Moscow and that you had knowledge of it?
A Yes. What was the date, please?
Q Summer of 1940; that is, after June 1940.
A Yes, that is correct. Such reports came in continually, but I cannot tell how far it actually applied to the summer of 1940. In the year 1939, when I arrived in Moscow, I found French and English military missions present there, so that according to instructions from the French and English governments they could conclude a military pact between Russia and England and France.
It was in line with this policy which the Fuehrer mentioned on the 26th of May in his speech to the Reichstag in which he mentioned that Germany was being encircled, and which in the year 1936 in the message by Churchill had been made public.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am trying very hard to follow this. I wonder if I could be helped? Did the witness refer to 1940? I wanted to get it cle ar whether it was 1940 or 1939?
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean about an English mission? June 1940.
A I was going to answer to that. I already said that I wasn't exactly sure about 1940, but I did say that such reports were present in 1939. I know that this mission was there in 1939. discussion that Russia, upon the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish peace, was not satisfied and wanted to incorporate all of Finland? could see from the Russian position and attitude that Russia was going to consider Finland as her sphere of influence, and what measures Russia intended to take there I do not know. and friendship pact was concluded. What was the influence of this conclusion on Germany? fact that Russia was deviating from the policies of 1939. He received the conclusion of this pact as an affront -- as he expressed himself -- for he said that he had concluded a pact with the government and now shortly thereafter Russia was concluding a pact with that government which was expressly set against Germany.
taking further diplomatic steps against Russia or with Russia?
A It is correct. I told the Fuehrer at that time that from now on one must try all the harder to clarify Russia's position. He said that that would be useless, and in his opinion it would not change the Russian attitude.
Q What were the final reasons for the Russian conflict?
Q What were the causes for the conflict with Russia?
A I have to say the following. In the winter of 1940-41, the following situation confronted the Fuehrer, and it seems to me very important that I clarify this situation.
England was not ready to make peace. Therefore, the question was of decisive importance to the Fuehrer to know what the attitude of the United States of America was and the attitude of Russia. On these two points he told me the following. I had a very lengthy discussion with him about this at that time and asked him to give me clearly defined diplomatic principles and instructions.
He said, "The attitude of Japan is not completely certain for Germany. We have, of course, concluded the Three Power Pact, but there are strong elements at work in Japan which work in the opposite direction, and we do not know what position Japan will take. Italy, through Greece and her campaign there, showed herself to be a rather weak ally for us. It might be that Germany would stand completely alone."
Then he mentioned the position of the U.S.A. and the attitude of the U.S.A. He said that he had always wanted good relations with the U.S.A., but even though the attitude of the U.S.A. had become more and more hostile toward Germany, the conclusion of the Three Rower Pact was to keep the U.S.A. out of the war. It was our wish that through it those circles in the U.S.A. might be strengthened which were for peace and for good relations with Germany That was not successful. Even after the cnclusion of the Three Power Pact, the attitude of the U.S.A. toward Germany was not friendly, the chief idea which the Fuehrer and I had being that if the U.S.A. might enter to bring about two fronts, this did not actually obtain.
and the Fuehrer said the following: "We have a friendship pact with Russia. Russia has shown an attitude which gives me cause for misgiving and concern. We do not know, therefore, just what may befall us from that side." of a military nature upon which I an not informed. However, he had the great problem and care that sooner or later Russia on one side and the U.S.A. with England, on the other side, might proceed against Germany. He therefore counted on one side with an attack by Russia and on the other side with an attack from the U.S.A. and England, that is, an invasion on a large scale in the west. decided him in favor of a preventive war against Russia. lower Pact? The situation was, as I have just pictured it, that the Fuehrer was concerned that sooner or later the U.S.A. would enter the war. Therefore, I was interested in diplomatic ways to do everything possible to strengthen the German position. I believed we had our alliance with Italy, but Italy showed herself to be a weak ally. Then beyond that, the only friend that we could count on, outside the Balkans, since we could not get France to be friendly, would be Japan. Japan had made efforts along the same lines, and through the three working together the pact was put through. was to be a pact of a political, military and economic nature. There was no doubt, and we always considered it from the beginning, that this pact was to be a defensive one. By that I mean a pact which, above all, was to keep the U.S.A. out of the war, and I had to hope that through such a constellation the possibility would arise to bring about a peace with England. aggressive plans at the basis of this pact. The purpose of it was, as I have said, to bring about a constellation of power which would give Germany, on the one hand, the opportunity to order things in a new way in Europe, and to give Japan the possibility in East Asia-- the China problem was there-and Japan was to have the possibility to solve this problem.
That was the purpose of the pact.
The situation was not unfavorable that the U.S.A. would rely on this pact and England would be isolated, so that perhaps a compromise peace would be achieved, a compromise peace which we never lost sight of all during the course of the war, and which we wanted even at the end. the Anschluss of Austria and the Munich Agreement have on the United States? of Austria and after the Munich Pact, was against Germany, and in a sharper manner. to Washington to report to his Government, and the normal diplomatic relations with Germany were interfered with. According to your observations, what were the reasons for hisbeing recalled? exceedingly, for in this way we were forced forour part to recall our Ambassador in Washington, or to call him back home to report.
But it is of course clear that the total attitude of the U.S.A. was decisive for this measure. Many incidents had taken place which brought the Fuehrer to the conviction that sooner or later the U.S.A. would enter the war against us.
I would to clarify or mention a few points. It was the attitude of President Roosevelt even in the year 1937, through a speech which he made then, that there was a campaign by the press even as early as that. Then when the Ambassador was recalled the situation became more critical and more severe, which took place on every level of relations between Germany and the U.S.A.
these events, and I believe the Defense has submitted a rood many of these documents. One of them was the position at the Polish crisis, the attitude taken by the U.S.A.'s diplomats at the Polish crisis. Germany. Destroyers were put at the disposal of England. Then the Lend-Lease Bill came through, and in other spheres the U.S.A. was approaching Europe in occupying Iceland and Greenland, then Africa. The help which she gave Soviet Russia after the outbreak of the war -- all these measures strengthened the Fuehrer in the opinion and in the view that sooner or later a war with America was to be counted on as a certainty. There was no doubt at least that a war was not desired by the Fuehrer, and I can say that in those years--and I think you can see this from many documents submitted by the Prosecution--that again and again I tried in diplomatic ways to do everything to keep the U.S.A. out of this war. the order to shoot to his Navy in order to prevent armament material to reach England. What was the reaction of this order on Hitler and on German diplomacy?
A It was a very regrettable incident for us. I cannot remember attitudes as far as technicalities are concerned, but I do remember that Hitler was very much excited about this order. I believe it was in a speech at some meeting, perhaps at Munich, but I do not recall exactly, that the Fuehrer replied to this speech. I recall the form of the reply because it seemed rather odd to me. He said "America has given the order to shoot on German ships." He said "I did not give any such order, but I ordered to shoot back." I believe that is the way he expressed it. of such events reached us, but the Navy has more definite information and knows more about these matters than I do. the measure and which clearly defined the German attitude; without referring to documents I cannot give you the exact nature of these protests. intention?
A No, that was not the case. At that time I tried, as far as Japan was concerned, to move her to attack Singapore. A peace with England did not seen possible, and I did not know in a military way which measures would be possible to reach this aim. everything to reach or bring about a weakening of the position of England in order that the peace might be brought about. We believed that this could be done best through an attack by Japan on the strong position of England in East Asia. Therefore, I tried to influence Japan to attack Singapore. Japan attack Russia, for in such a way I saw a quick ending of the war. Japan , however, did not do that. Rather I should say, she did neither the one thing we wanted nor the other, but she did do a third thing. She attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.
This attack was for us a complete surprise. We had considered the possibility that Japan might attack Singapore or perhaps Hong Kong or attack England, but we never considered that it should attack the United States or that was anything that we wanted; that is, the possibility of an attack on England but if that would happen, the United States would intervene. That was the question which we considered often at length but we hoped that this would not happen and that America would not intervene. The attack on Pearl Harbor was told in Berlin -- or rather, I received knowledge of it through the press and then I received Reuter's message from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. All other reports or proofs or anything else are completely untrue and I would like to testify to that under my oath. I would like to go further than that and concur and assert that even this attack was a surprise to the Japanese Ambassador -- as he told me, it was a complete surprise to him also.
DR. HORN: Do your Honors wish for a recess at this time?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, how much longer are you going to take?
DR. HORN: Not much more, your Honor. I would judge 15 or 20 minutes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will recess for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken.) BY DR. HORN: war against the United States? decide. The wording of the Three-Power Pact indicated that we had to assist Japan only in case of an attack against Japan proper. I went to see the Fuehrer and submitted to him the details of the situation and told him at the time that of course we had to be gratified by a new ally against England, but that at the same time a new enemy would come into being, because the United States would also declare war now. cur ships and thereby a state of war already existed. It was therefore only a question of formality, or, at any rate, the official state of war was to be expected and it would not be possible that this condition, as it existed in the Atlantic, should continue without a German-American war.
and which meant that the Ambassador should get his passport. the allies of Germany?
A The cooperation with Italy was a very close one. That is to say, in fact, in the further course of the war we were forced to take care of all military matters there ourselves, to direct them. and that for the simple reason that we could only communicate with the Japanese Government by wireless. We had connections from time to time by U-boats, but a coordinated war together with them was not possible. Marshall is correct, that here a close strategic cooperation and planning of any kind did not take place. In fact, in reality, that was not the case.
Q And have was the cooperation with Italy? close one, but it proved to be difficult because there were many heterogeneous influences and Italy, from the very beginning, was a very weak ally in every direction. the making of partial peace agreements? and ourselves had been created, which also influenced the Fuehrer. I know that the Fuehrer, for instance, told me once that he had confidence that Stalin, whom he considered one of the really great men of history, but one could never tell what might still come. The power of the Soviets was tremendous, and therefore it was very difficult to know when and how one could come to a renewed agreement with Russia. certain contacts, because I always believed and hoped that one could come to a peace somehow or other which would relieve Germany, generally, in the East, and make it possible for us to concentrate on the West, and even possibly lead to a general peace.
rejected categorically any such peace or any such attempts at peace because he believed that that would only be used, if it became known, to create a defeatism and so on. I suggested to him at that time to negotiate on a very moderate basis with Russia for peace. of a long, written statement in 1943. I believe it was after the Italian collapse. The Fuehrer at that time was more prepared for such a peace and he already drafted or sketched a demarcation line which might have been found and he said that he would tell me the following day. The following day, however, I did not receive any authorization or directive from him. I believe that the Fuehrer was certainly of the opinion that the breach between National Socialism and Communism would be very difficult to mend and such a peace would only mean an armistice. of all a decisive military success had to be achieved and then only could we start to negotiate, otherwise any such negotiations would have no sense. seem to promise any success, I would like to say that I myself had my doubts about it. I believe in view of the strong attitude which our opponents took, especially England since the beginning of the war, that at no instance was there really any possibility for Germany to achieve a peace, that is to say, neither in the east or the west. And I am convinced that ever since the formulation at Casablanca of unconditional surrender such a possibility no longer existed. I base my opinion not only on abstract judgments but on continuous reports and information coming through indirect channels which sometimes the other side did not realize but which we had and which represented the opinions or informed us of the opinions of important personalities during the years, that one was definitely determined to carry out this war to the end, I believe the Fuehrer was perfectly right when he said that there was no sense in such negotiations. here that in September 1939 there had been a conversation on Hitler's train in which you also had taken part and where plans were made for an incitement of a rebellion during the polish campaign.
discussion? Intelligence of the Armed Forces, at that time Admiral Canaris, visited me for a short personal visit and I was at that time on the Fuehrer's train in my railroad car. I cannot remember that the witness Lahousen had been present and I had the impression when I saw Lahousen here that it was the first time I had actually seen him. reports and intelligence. I believe it was at that time he told me that he had put all his men to work, all his contact men to work in the rear of the Polish Army for a rebellion amongst the Ukrainian minorities. But such as it has been said here as to a directive on my part -- he never received such a directive and he could not say so for two reasons. to a military office. Secondly, the Foreign Office at the time the Polish campaign started was not at all concerned with these questions, Ukrainian minorities and so on. I did not even know any of the details as to those questions. Thus, I could have given no such directives.
A May I say some more about that? should be put on fire and the Jews should be killed. I would like to state categorically that I never made any such statements. although I do not remember exactly any more, that I may have talked to him casually later again. Apparently he had received instructions from the Fuehrer later as to what he was supposed to do in Poland concerning the Ukrainian and similar questions. at all because first, as to the Ukraine, those were Ukrainian villages, they were out friends, they were not our enemies and it would have been quite senseless of me to say that these villages should be put on fire.
thing, that this would be quite opposed to my own attitude and the question of killing Jews was never close to my thoughts. So that, summarizing, I may say that this is absolutely incorrect. Likewise, I have never given a directive or could have ever given a directive of that kind. was not quite convinced of that statement which I was supposed to have made. has been submitted by the Prosecution concerning the Jewish question as a factor in foreign politics in the year 1938?
It happened this way. There was an office in the foreign Office which was concerned with Party questions and with questions of ideology. That department was certainly coordinated with these departments of the Party which were competent for these things. I have seen the circular here and it seems to me that it is definitely along the same lines as were issued at that time for the enlightenment and education of officials. I could also believe that this circular passed through my office but I believe that the fact that I did not sign it and neither did the State Secretary should prove that the circular was not considered very important by me even if I had seen it. If it would have passed my office then it is quite certain that I did not read it because such long documents I did not care to read at all. But documents of that kind I had always submitted by my assistants with a few explanatory words and may I also say that in the course of the day's work there were hundreds of letters which we received and some of them were read to me, some of them I signed and many of them I may never have read, but I want to state that here too it is quite to be understood that if one of my officials signed the circular that I assumed the full responsibility for it.
In this connection your name was also frequently mentioned. What was your attitude toward the Geneva Convention? beginning of the war the Foreign Office and I have always been very much in favor of the Geneva Convention. I should like to add that we have always found great interest and great understanding with the Army. That later perhaps one has departed in one point or another from these principles can be ascribed to the harsh necessity of the war and also of the Fuehrer. 1943 and 1944 English and American air raids became a terrible danger for Germany. My first impression at that time was Hamburg, and I do remember this incident very well because I was at that time together with the Fuehrer and I described to him the terrible depressed feeling I had had. I believe that nobody who has ever seen such a raid and the result and lived through such a raid can get any impression of what it means. It is quite clear therefore that on the German side Hitler continually had to try to find a solution. I must speak here about the terrible attack on Dresden, and I would like to ask if the Court agrees to call a witness, that is, the Danish minister, who was there during the attack and described it to me fee days later. fliers had to be solved by the Fuehrer somehow or other, and our attitude was that we wanted to find a solution within the Geneva Convention or at least a solution of which we could frankly notify the opposing side. My point of view, and which I have expressed frequently, although my field was not immediately interested in the question, that is to say, we were not interested in the job ofthe intelligence--that was a military or political question--but we were interested with regard to the Geneva Convention; and that attitude, our attitude, was that if one did anything about that question there had to be an official proclamation in which should be announced a definition of terror fliers, and in which it should be said that these terror fliers who had committed an attack upon the civilian population would be brought before military courts.
And those measures, that is, these preparatory measures, should relate to the Geneva Convention, which should be notified along with the enemy. If then any such fliers would have been convicted by a court, a military court, they should have been executed; if not they should be returned to the status of prisoners of war. practically it never came to that. It was not a suggestion which I had made, but a statement, a remark made during two conferences withHitler, and that was never practically realized because a definition could not be found. in Kressheim (?) where I proposed a very far-reaching solution. This conference itself, if I remember correctly, did not take place. I believe, but I do not remember correctly, that at that time I was not on good terms withHimmler, and that I had not talked to him or to Goering, whom I didn't see frequently about this question. I believe therefore that it is possible that in the course of a state visit in Kressheim, which happened frequently, that there was a conversation with the Fuehrer, a general conversation, about these facts, which happened frequently. But I do not remember that very accurately; I only know one thing, that if a more far-reaching proposal was made it was what I had mentioned, and that cam only refer to the following. expression "terror fliers," and there were the questions which arose and were discussed coming from various sides to the effect that certain categories of attack should be defined as "terror attacks." I believe attacks with weapons such as machine guns on the planes. It is possible, I believe, that this note or this remark implies that a person who know my impressions wanted to find a practical solution which later could have been brought into accord with the Geneva Convention or at least could have been discussed with Geneva officially. a suggestion, for an affidavit by an expert of the Foreign Office. That affidavit--I do not know new how it came up; whether I gave the order for it or whether some officers of the Army started it who wanted to know the opinion of the Foreign Office.
The details I do not know: I only know that the armed forces, the Wehrmacht, always stressed the importance to know our opinion concerning the Geneva Convention very clearly.
I remember that affidavit, however, and that I have seen it. I t has been said here that I had approved it. I believe details would lead too far. That is not correct, but I remember that at that time I considered that affidavit a very important matter which I did not like to decide myself, and I had it submitted to the Fuehrer. And I also believe, or rather I remember fairly well, that the Fuehrer said at that time that that was nonsense, and that therefore this affidavit did not find any approval with the Fuehrer. And in the farther course of events I only heard, because we were only indirectly interested, that it did not come to an order from the Fuehrer or the armed forces, the Wehrmacht, because the armed forces were of the same opinion on that question as we had been. I could not recall that in detail however; I can only say one thing with absolute certainly, and that is that since this question of the terror fliers had come up that I was not informed of a single case of lynching; I only heard here that they had taken place.
Q The other day the witness Dahlerus was brought here. Since when do you know Dahlerus?
A I believe that I saw Dahlerus here for the first time. Of course, it is possible that I may have seen him once from afar or possibly in the Reich Chancellory during one of his apparently frequent visits with the Fuehrer. But I do not remember him, and when I saw him here I had the impression that this was the first time. airplanes of the Reich Government?
Q Another question. As foreign minister what real estate was under your jurisdiction? been asserted -- that I had had one house first and later six houses. I want to clarify this for the Court. After I had lost my entire fortune, which I acquired by my own work, I became quite wealthy again. Besides, I had certain possibilities through relatives and through my wife and through relatives of my wife to -- in the years 1922 and 1923 I built a house in Berlin-Dahlem and bought real estate, and we lived there for many years.