Ambassador Henderson himself declared these proposals to be reasonable.
Point 3. It would have been possible, therefore, in the course of one day, the 31st, to give a hint to Warsaw and to tell the Poles to begin negociations with us. It would have been possible to do this in three Ways, either a Polish intermediary could have flown to Berlin in a flight, as the Fuehrer said, which would have taken an hour to an hour and a half; a meeting with the Foreign Minister could have taken place; or simply, Ambassador Lipsk could have been instructed to accept the German proposals. If this instruction had been ordered the crisis would have been eliminated and diplomatic negotiations would have been initiated that way. England, herself, if she had wanted to, could get in touch with her ambassador so that he could have been present at the negotiations, and any action like that would have been hailed on all sides.
the documents since I have been interned here, in this period of time nothing happened or took place which could have alleviated this very tense situation. There was and is Polish chauvinism, and we know from the word of Ambassador Henderson and through the testimony or affidavit of Mr. Dahlerus, Ambassador Lipski used very strong words, which characterized the Polish mentality. Poland knew very well that it would under all circumstances have the assistance of England and France. This attitude of Poland became such that for all practical purposes, war was inevitable. I believe that these facts are necessary for the complete and overall historical picture of the situation.
I would like to add that I regret this development of events. My labor of 25 years was abolished through this war, and in the last hours I tried repeatedly to do everything to avoid this war, and I believe that the documents of Ambassador Henderson show that my efforts in this direction were repeated and strong.
I told Hitler of Chamberlain's ardent desire to have good relations with Germany and to reach an agreement, and I had a special messenger sent to the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, to tell him how earnest and how serious the wish of the Fuehrer was and that he should do everything to tell the wish of Adolf Hitler to his government. On 31 May 1939 you had concluded a non-aggression pact with Denmark and on the basis of these facts you are accused by the Prosecution of perfidious diplomacy. of Denmark and Norway? neutral, and we tried to limit the war and to prevent it from spreading.
In April 1940 I was summoned to the Chancellery by Hitler. He told me that he had reports or intelligence, according to which the occupation or landings by the English in Norway were imminent and that he had decided therefore to occupy Norway and Denmark and that was to take place on the day after next. That was the first knowledge I had of this step.
which he had received through intelligence. He instructed me to prepare notes at once which were to inform Norway and Denmark that a German invasion was to take place. I told the Fuehrer that we had a non-aggression pact with Denmark and that Norway was neutral, and also told him that through our Ambassador at Oslo we had reports which did not show that an English landing was planned, but after I saw the documents of proof which the Fuehrer showed me and how serious the situation was, I realized that these reports were to be taken seriously. to be taken by place in the course of 8 April to Oslo and Copenhagen. On that day we worked day and night in order to complete these notes. It was the order of the Fuehrer that these notes would arrive shortly before the German occupation. This was done according to the Fuehrer's wish. know. I do not believe that even one shot was fired.
After the occupation we negotiated with the Danish government. Agreements were made so that everything would take place as quietly and in as friendly a manner as posible. Denmark received all guarantees for her integrity, and subsequent developments were rather quiet and orderly.
Things were a little different in Norway. There was resistance there We tried to keep the Norwegian King in the country and to ask him to remain in the country. We negotiated with him, but we did not succeed in our negotiations; he went to Narvik, I believe it was, and the possibility of negotiations was not present in Norway. was established there. The Foreign Office was not concerned with these matters after the occupation any longer.
I would like to add one mere thing. That is that the Fuehrer told me repeatedly that these measures which he had taken had been extraordinarily necessary, and the documents which were published showed that without doubt, without the occupation by Germany, the landing by England had been prepared long in advance and had been planned definitely.
heard of the great sufferings of the Norwegian and Danish people. I personally an of the opinion that the German occupation-- and your attitude may be whatever it is--but in practical effect the German occupation prevented Scandinavia from becoming a theater of war, and I believe that we did a great service to the Norwegian and Danish people and prevented untold suffering from coming to them. If a war had broken out between Germany and the Scandinavian countries, much suffering and privation would have been the lot of these people. Quisling? a concept much later. Before the occupation of Norway, it was no concept as far as I was concerned. It is true, of course, that on the part of Mr. Rosenberg connections were established with people in the Northern countries who were friendly to Germany so that we could support these people, and that is a natural course of events. At that time monies were given for propaganda purposes in the pressand for political activity in Norway. any talk of any taking over of power politically in Norway or any talk of military operations. We never discussed a point like that. occupation of Denmark? through an Ambassador. He was at the Danish Court. Later, because of certain events which I believe it would take too long to enumerate, the German government took him back and a Reich plenipotentiary was appointed. At the same time there was a military commander in Denmark and later a Higher SS and Police Fuehrer. of a normal and, perhaps, influential Ambassador, who could clarify matters and try to put aside difficulties which in the course of an occupation would naturally arise, and the activity of the Reich Plenipotentiary was, according to my instructions, to treat Denmark as a country which was not hostile to Germany but friendly to Germany, and we considered that our chief principle in Denmark -- to treat them as a friendly country.
severe, but through many long years of war, there was complete quiet and calm in Denmark, and we were very well satisfied with conditions there. Later, because of hostile enemy agents, we had to take a more severe attitude, but the attitude of the Reich Plenipotentiary was always to ameliorate conditions, to do everything possible to ease difficulties, so that good relations between the Danes and the Germans would prevail. Those were his instructions. Of course, it was not always easy for him to do that, but, all in all, he conducted his work very satisfactorily. French-British General Staff to take Belgium and Holland into the operational sphere?
this question is of great importance, and it has been repeatedly mentioned here in the proceedings.
The situation was this: In 1937, through an understanding at that time, Germany had made an agreement with Belgium in that year so that Germany would maintain and honor Belgium's neutrality on the condition that Belgium would maintain her neutrality on her part. according to intelligence reports, there were hostile intentions in the Ruhr area through Belgium and Holland. We on occasions received reports like that, but our reports were of a little less concrete nature. In any event, Adolf Hitler believed that an attack on the vitally important Ruhr was a possibility that he had to count on at all times. I spoke with the Fuehrer repeatedly of the significance of Belgium neutrality as far as the world was concerned, but even I knew that it would be a hard battle, a battle of large proportions, and that other norms would have to apply here. about such an attack became more and more concrete, and documents which were found later and published by the Foreign Office, documents of the French General Staff, proved conclusively that the reports which Germany had were absolutely true -- that actually the plan of an attack on the Ruhr area was planned by the then enemies of Germany. In this connection I would like to call attention to a document which concerns a discussion of Chamberlain with Daladier which took place in Paris, in which Chamberlain suggested an attack on the vitally important areas of the Ruhr. These proposals were made, and I believe this document is at your disposal, at the disposal of the defense. situation in the West was such that at any time he had to count on an attack. Therefore he decided to attack over these two neutral countries, and after the attack -- and I believe military sources will confirm this -- further documents were found that in fact corroborate my story, which showed the clos cooperation of Belgian and Dutch General Staffs with the French and English General Staffs. Of course it is always a difficult matter in a war of that scope to violate the neutrality of any country, and one shouldn't believe that these were things which we took Rightly.
I had many a sleepless night ever these things, and I would like to call to your attention that the same reasons were considered by the other side; other statesmen discussed this question., I remember a quotation: "It was really very fatiguing to think about the rights of the neutral." This statement was made by a great British statesman, Winston Churchill.
Q What caused Germany to violate the integrity of Luxemburg? as to Belgium and Holland. Luxemburg is a very small country, and it is clear that in a war of this size the army cannot suddenly eliminate or spare one country. As far as Luxemburg is concerned, I would like to point out one fact. In the summer of 1939 we had started negotiations with France and Luxemburg in order to reach concrete neutrality agreements. These negotiation seemed to have an auspicious start, but suddenly one day they were discontinue by France and Luxemburg. We couldn't quite understand the attitude of these countries at the time as to why this took place, but I know when I reported to the Fuehrer about this the Fuehrer became a little suspicious. Just what the motives of the other side might have been we never knew. after partial occupation of France? my request, even though we didn't have a complete peace with France and thereby have had cause to reopen diplomatic negotiations, because it was, after all, just a truce, the Fuehrer sent an ambassador to the Vichy Government. I was especially interested in having this step carried through, for it had always been my ambition to have close contact and close collaboration with France. I would like to emphasize that my efforts in this behalf immediately after the victory and truce were taken up again immediately. The Fuehrer was completely ready to follow my request, and in line with my request began to initiate the so-called Montoire politics and policies.
at Montoire. I was present at this meeting. I believe that I may say in the interest of historical truth that the manner in which Hitler treated the heads of a conquered nation might be termed as "model and knightly." There are few parallels in history which could equal his demeanor. collaboration between Germany and France. Marshal Petain, even at the first meeting, was reserved and had at the first meeting many reservations, even from the beginning. To my great regret this first meeting was concluded a little more briefly and sooner than I had hoped. Nevertheless, in the course of events we tried systematically and methodically to carry on a policy of close collaboration and good relations with France. That this did not actually succeed might be traced back to the attitude in France and according to the will of the leading circles. But Germany had good will and showed it. conditions in Belgium -- after the occupation, that is? we had no influence whatsoever. The Fuehrer set up military and civil administrations and the Foreign Office was in no way connected with any of this It was represented only by a laison man who, in practicality, had no functions. I would like to add that subsequently it was a little different in France in this respect, since we had certain influence on the Vichy regime through our ambassador. I did that in the realm of finance. This matter has been discussed in this Tribunal.
I would like to say only that at that time I told Mr. Hemmen, no matter what his powers were -- I appointed him in order to prevent inflation and told him to keep the chief currency under control. That was the special mission that Hemmen had from me. France was essential to Germany economically; especially since it did not want to cooperate with Germany politically, I wanted to keep money sound and stable, and those were Hemmen's instructions, of the campaign in the West?
Fuehrer at headquarters about future developments. I asked him what he intended to do with England, and I suggested whether we had better not make another attempt with England. The Fuehrer seemed to have similar thoughts, and was very enthusiastic about my proposal of again making a peace offer, or bringing about a peace with England in some way. I asked the Fuehrer whether I should direct an agreement. The Fuehrer said, spontaneously, "No, that won't be necessary, I will do that myself, and that means you will not have to do it."
He said, "If England is ready for peace, there are only four points upon which I wish to agree with England. First of all, I want, after Dunkirk, that under no circumstances should any less of prestige on the part of England result. I do not want a peace which would let England lose prestige." four points: British Empire. strongest power on the Continent, especially because of her population.
Third, he said, "I want the German colonies, or I will be satisfied if I get one or two colonies back, because of the raw materials." the Greek-French conferences and the sending of French officers to Greece, or that you received knowledge of these goings on?
A Yes, that is correct. We were to keep the war in as close a scope as possible, as the Fuehrer had pointed out to me, and in accordance with this I had to keep an eye on the Balkan situation. Hitler wished, under all circumstances and at all costs, to keep the Balkans out of the war.
The situation was as follows: Greece had a British guarantee and had accepted that guarantee.
Also, connections were very close between Yugoslavia and England and Greece. Through our intelligence and through military channels we heard repeatedly about conferences of the general staffs between Athens, Belgrade, London and Paris, on the one side, which were allegedly taking place. called these things to his attention. I asked him to be very cautious, and said that Germany had no intention whatsoever of undertaking anything against the Greek people, who had always been very popular in Germany. British fleet, I believe, were being established in Greece. These things led to the intervention of Italy, which was not at all desired by us. I believe Reichsmarshal Goering has already discussed this topic. It was not possible to prevent Italian intervention. I was in Italy at the time, in Florence, with Hitler, and when we arrived it was too late already, I am sorry to say, because Mussolini said, "We are already on the march." The Fuehrer was very much depressed and sad when he received this news. Italy from spreading. For this, Yugoslavian policies and politics were decisive I tried, in all possible ways, to keep closer connections with Yugoslavia. The three-power pact had already been concluded, and I wanted Yugoslavia to join. It was very difficult. With the Regent, Prince Paul and the Government, we finally succeeded, one day, so that Yugoslavia joined the three-power pact. We knew very well that, in Belgrade, strong powers were at work against the joining of Yugoslavia to the three-power pact, or any closer connections with Germany at all.
The Fuehrer said that the conclusion of the three-power pact had looked like a funeral to him. the conclusion of this pact--that there had been a putsch, or a riot. The Government had been overthrown and a new Government was set up, which, undoubtedly, was not friendly to Germany. British General Staff. I believe American observers on this problem know about this, and from English sources I have heard that British elements were also involved and cooperated in this putsch. It seemed to have been e ntirel natural, for we were at war.
All of these events caused the Fuehrer to intervene in the Balkans, firs+ of all, to help Italy, because she had been in very desperate straits in Albania; and secondly, to prevent Yugoslavia, through perhaps an attack through the North, to make the Italian situation much more serious and perhaps consider Italy our partner. the campaign and to intervene against Yugoslavia and Greece. her neutrality before the Italian attack in October of 1940, gave bases to the British fleet on her isles, andput these isles at her disposal. had a plan of an allied landing at Salonika, and he approved of this. When did Germany receive knowledge of these intentions? staff after the outbreak of the war. I know that all reports which the Fuehrer received from the various information branches, from the beginning, made him anxious about the imminent possibility of a new front in Salonika, that it might happen again, just as it had occurred in the first World War, and that this would mean a dispersal of German forces along many fronts.
Q In September of 1938 you were on a second visit to Moscow. What was the reason for this visit and what took place?
Polish campaign. I flew to Moscow toward the end of September, and while there I received an especially cordial reception. The situation was such that definite conditions had to be established in the Polish area. Soviet troops had occupied the eastern regions of Poland, and we had occupied the western parts up to the line of demarcation that had been agreed upon, and a clear demarcation and sphere of influence had to be made. Soviet Union and puttingthem on a friendly basis. An agreement was reached in Moscow with drew a final line of demarcation in Poland. Also, an economic agreement was planned, which would regulate economic connections and put them on an entirely new basis. It was a comprehensive treaty about the exchange of raw material. Later this agreement was concluded. At the same time a pact was made politically, as a pact of friendship, and this pact is well known Then there was one more question, dealing with Lithuania.
In a confidential relationahsip between Moscow and Berlin, the Fuehrer dispensed with any influence on Lithuania and gave Russia complete influence in Lithuania so that from that time on, territorially, conditions were regulated between Germany and Soviet Russia.
ultimatum, entire Lithuania and the part which was German was occupied by Russia without Russia notifying Germany? areas were actually occupied.
Q What further Russian measures made Hitler anxious as to Russia's actions and demeanor? attitude. First of all, the occupation which I have just mentioned was one of those points; furthermore, the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina which took place at the end of the French campaign and which was reported to us without previous consultation. The Rumanian king turned to us at that time for advice. The Fuehrer, because of his loyalty to the Soviet pact, told the Rumanian king to follow Russian demands and to evacuate Bessarabia.
In addition, the Finnish war in the year 1940: The German people had strong sympathy towards the Finnish people, and it caused the German people great anxiety over the Finnish people. The Fuehrer believed that he had to take this Finnish worry into consideration up to a certain point. Furthermore there were two additional points: One was that the Fuehrer received a report about communist propaganda in German factories, and this propaganda activity was to be centralized in a Russian economic representative. We also received word about military preparations which were being taken by Russia. I know after the French campaign he talked to me on several occasions about this matter and said that near East Prussia approximately twenty German divisions had been concentrated in that region. I believe there were about thirty corps which were to be concentrated in Bessarabia. The Fuehrer was anxious over these reports and asked me to observe these things very closely. He even said that this pact had been concluded only in the year 1939 so as to be able to dictate economic measures to us, and he wanted to take countermeasures from now on. I pointed out the danger of preventive wars, but the Fuehrer said that in all cases we would have to take all odds. I toldhim that we should make all efforts in diplomatic ways.
foreign commissar Molotov visited Berlin. On whose initiative did these visits take place and what was the content of the discussions and conferences?
A The conferences with Molotov at Berlin had the following contents: I might interpolate that in our efforts to come to a settlement with Russia in a diplomatic way I had the permission of the Fuehrer from a letter to Stalin in the late Fall and invited Molotov to come to Berlin. This invitation was accepted, and in the conversation which the Fuehrer had with Molotov the complete complex of German-Russian negotiations and relations was discussed. I was present at these discussions.
THE PRESIDENT: What date was this?
DR. HORN: That was from the 12th to the 14th, November, 1940.
A (Continued) Mr. Molotov spoke with the Fuehrer first about GermanRussian relations in general and then about Finland and then about the Balkans He said Russia had vital interests in Finland. He said that Russia, on the basis of the then demarcation of spheres of interest, considered Finland her sphere of influence. The Fuehrer replied that Germany also had strong interests in Finland, chiefly interests in nickel. One was not to forget that the entire German people had a sympathy for the entire Finnish people, and he requested Molotov to meet him on this question. This topic was discussed late: on on several occasions. a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria and closer connections with Bulgaria in general. Bases there were also mentioned. Molotov had told this to the Fuehrer. Then the Fuehrer asked him whether Bulgaria had turned to Molotov and approached him, but that did not seem to have been the case. Then the Fuehrer said that this question could be discussed by him and he could take a position only after he had discussed this thing with Mussolini, who was his ally and who was also interested in the Balkans.
Other points were also discussed. A final solution or settlement was not reached at this discussion. The conference took such a form which would not lead to a breaking of contradictions.
discussions withMolotov again and asked him if he would consent to my speaking to Molotov again about a joining on the part of Russia with the three-power pact. It was one of our intentions at that time to have Russia join the three-power pact. The Fuehrer agreed to this and I had further discussions with Molotov-lengthy discussions. This discussion dealt with the same questions again. Molotov mentioned the vital interest of Russia in Finland and the close connection between the Russian and the Bulgarian people and their interests in the Balkan countries. in order to see whether a settlement of this question could not be found. I proposed to him that they join the three-power pact and further proposed to him that I would talk with the Fuehrer about the questions whichhad been raised and would discuss these problems with him again. perhaps a settlement or a solution could be found that way, I suggested. The result of this conversation was that Molotov returned to Moscow with the intention that in some diplomatic way the questions between us could be clarified.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely, as these negotiations didn't eventuate in any agreement, they are very remote from anything we are cnsidering. You are not suggesting that any agreements were comt to, are you?
DR. HORN: No. I wanted to show only that there were efforts on the part of Germany to prevent the conflict with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: There was no question of a conflict withRussia in any of these negotiations.
DR. HORN: No. From the total efforts on the part of Germany we can gather--and from the testimony of von Ribbentrop--that we were interested in preventing any possible conflict between Germany and Russia. The Prosecution asserts that the pact with Russia was made with the intention of violating it and attacking Russia, and that from the beginning there had been an intention to attack Russia.
I would like to show that that was not the case.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to no to be many remote, indeed. It only goes to show that Ribbentrop entered into certain negotiations with Russia which had no result. That is all. You may go on, Dr. Horn. BY DR. HORN: at the border of East Prussia, mentioning twenty German divisions. I assume that that was just a lapse of speech.
A I meant to say twenty Russian divisions. The Fuehrer mentioned this many time. He said, "I believe we have just one division in East Prussia."
Q Wasn't the occupation of the Balkans the reason for your discussion with Molotov?
Q I did not quite understand the question. Please repeat it.
Q Wasn't the Russian occupation in the Balkans and in the Baltic states the reason to have Molotov come to Berlin?
A Not as far as the Balkans are concerned. No Russian occupation applied there. But this did apply in Bessarabia. Bessarabia really does not belong to the Balkans in the exact sense. The occupation of Bessarabia, which came surprisingly quickly, and the occupation of Northern Bucovina, a region which had not been agreed upon as a Russian sphere of influence -- the Fuehrer at that time said that this was really Austrian territory -- and the occupation of the Baltic regions. It is true that the Fuehrer was filled with anxiety because of these occupations. presence of a French-English mission in Moscow and that you had knowledge of it?
A Yes. What was the date, please?
Q Summer of 1940; that is, after June 1940.
A Yes, that is correct. Such reports came in continually, but I cannot tell how far it actually applied to the summer of 1940. In the year 1939, when I arrived in Moscow, I found French and English military missions present there, so that according to instructions from the French and English governments they could conclude a military pact between Russia and England and France.
It was in line with this policy which the Fuehrer mentioned on the 26th of May in his speech to the Reichstag in which he mentioned that Germany was being encircled, and which in the year 1936 in the message by Churchill had been made public.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am trying very hard to follow this. I wonder if I could be helped? Did the witness refer to 1940? I wanted to get it cle ar whether it was 1940 or 1939?
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean about an English mission? June 1940.
A I was going to answer to that. I already said that I wasn't exactly sure about 1940, but I did say that such reports were present in 1939. I know that this mission was there in 1939. discussion that Russia, upon the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish peace, was not satisfied and wanted to incorporate all of Finland? could see from the Russian position and attitude that Russia was going to consider Finland as her sphere of influence, and what measures Russia intended to take there I do not know. and friendship pact was concluded. What was the influence of this conclusion on Germany? fact that Russia was deviating from the policies of 1939. He received the conclusion of this pact as an affront -- as he expressed himself -- for he said that he had concluded a pact with the government and now shortly thereafter Russia was concluding a pact with that government which was expressly set against Germany.
taking further diplomatic steps against Russia or with Russia?
A It is correct. I told the Fuehrer at that time that from now on one must try all the harder to clarify Russia's position. He said that that would be useless, and in his opinion it would not change the Russian attitude.
Q What were the final reasons for the Russian conflict?
Q What were the causes for the conflict with Russia?
A I have to say the following. In the winter of 1940-41, the following situation confronted the Fuehrer, and it seems to me very important that I clarify this situation.
England was not ready to make peace. Therefore, the question was of decisive importance to the Fuehrer to know what the attitude of the United States of America was and the attitude of Russia. On these two points he told me the following. I had a very lengthy discussion with him about this at that time and asked him to give me clearly defined diplomatic principles and instructions.
He said, "The attitude of Japan is not completely certain for Germany. We have, of course, concluded the Three Power Pact, but there are strong elements at work in Japan which work in the opposite direction, and we do not know what position Japan will take. Italy, through Greece and her campaign there, showed herself to be a rather weak ally for us. It might be that Germany would stand completely alone."
Then he mentioned the position of the U.S.A. and the attitude of the U.S.A. He said that he had always wanted good relations with the U.S.A., but even though the attitude of the U.S.A. had become more and more hostile toward Germany, the conclusion of the Three Rower Pact was to keep the U.S.A. out of the war. It was our wish that through it those circles in the U.S.A. might be strengthened which were for peace and for good relations with Germany That was not successful. Even after the cnclusion of the Three Power Pact, the attitude of the U.S.A. toward Germany was not friendly, the chief idea which the Fuehrer and I had being that if the U.S.A. might enter to bring about two fronts, this did not actually obtain.
and the Fuehrer said the following: "We have a friendship pact with Russia. Russia has shown an attitude which gives me cause for misgiving and concern. We do not know, therefore, just what may befall us from that side." of a military nature upon which I an not informed. However, he had the great problem and care that sooner or later Russia on one side and the U.S.A. with England, on the other side, might proceed against Germany. He therefore counted on one side with an attack by Russia and on the other side with an attack from the U.S.A. and England, that is, an invasion on a large scale in the west. decided him in favor of a preventive war against Russia. lower Pact? The situation was, as I have just pictured it, that the Fuehrer was concerned that sooner or later the U.S.A. would enter the war. Therefore, I was interested in diplomatic ways to do everything possible to strengthen the German position. I believed we had our alliance with Italy, but Italy showed herself to be a weak ally. Then beyond that, the only friend that we could count on, outside the Balkans, since we could not get France to be friendly, would be Japan. Japan had made efforts along the same lines, and through the three working together the pact was put through. was to be a pact of a political, military and economic nature. There was no doubt, and we always considered it from the beginning, that this pact was to be a defensive one. By that I mean a pact which, above all, was to keep the U.S.A. out of the war, and I had to hope that through such a constellation the possibility would arise to bring about a peace with England. aggressive plans at the basis of this pact. The purpose of it was, as I have said, to bring about a constellation of power which would give Germany, on the one hand, the opportunity to order things in a new way in Europe, and to give Japan the possibility in East Asia-- the China problem was there-and Japan was to have the possibility to solve this problem.
That was the purpose of the pact.
The situation was not unfavorable that the U.S.A. would rely on this pact and England would be isolated, so that perhaps a compromise peace would be achieved, a compromise peace which we never lost sight of all during the course of the war, and which we wanted even at the end. the Anschluss of Austria and the Munich Agreement have on the United States? of Austria and after the Munich Pact, was against Germany, and in a sharper manner. to Washington to report to his Government, and the normal diplomatic relations with Germany were interfered with. According to your observations, what were the reasons for hisbeing recalled? exceedingly, for in this way we were forced forour part to recall our Ambassador in Washington, or to call him back home to report.
But it is of course clear that the total attitude of the U.S.A. was decisive for this measure. Many incidents had taken place which brought the Fuehrer to the conviction that sooner or later the U.S.A. would enter the war against us.
I would to clarify or mention a few points. It was the attitude of President Roosevelt even in the year 1937, through a speech which he made then, that there was a campaign by the press even as early as that. Then when the Ambassador was recalled the situation became more critical and more severe, which took place on every level of relations between Germany and the U.S.A.