Its contents were made up of certain points that seemed unclear to the Fuehrer but the main point was that England foresaw a great solution of the problems in Germany and Poland, on the presupposition that the German-Polish question could be brought to a peaceful solution. In the discussion, Adolf Hitler told Sir Neville Henderson that he would look over the note and would then request again an audience with Henderson.
Q. Is it true that in this memorandum, England suggested direct negotiations between Germany and Poland?
A. That is true. One of the points in the note was that the English suggested that German-Polish direct negotiations should be undertaken as the most appropriate way to reach a solution; and secondly, that these negotiations should take place as soon as possible, because England had to admit that the situation, because of the frontier incidents, was very tense. The note stated that no matter what solution might be found -- I believe this was in the note-it should be guaranteed by the great powers.
Q. Did England suggest that it should mediate these direct negotiations between Germany and Poland?
A. Yes.
Q. How were these German suggestions accepted which, on the 29th of August, were issued as an answer to Henderson's memorandum and were given by Hitler to Henderson?
A. The situation was this: On the 29th, Hitler again received the British Ambassador and on this occasion again told him that he was ready to react to the English suggestion of the 28th; that is to say, that despite the great tension and despite the Polish attitude, he was prepared to make efforts for a peaceful solution of the German-Polish problems, as suggested in the British note of the 28th.
that a polish plenipotentiary be sent?
A In Hitler's communication to Henderson and the British Government, it was stated that the German Government, in view of the tsnse situation, would immediately make suggestions for a solution of the Danzig and Corridor problems. The German Government hoped to be in a position to have these proposals ready by the time a polish negotiator arrived, which they believed would take place before the 30th. plenipotentiary with a 24-hour lapse because he wanted to avoid a conflict because of the mobilization that was taking place on each side?
A That is quite true. I remember that on the 29th Ambassador Henderson asked Hitler whether that was an ultimatum. The Fuehrer answered that that was no ultimatum, but was simply a proposal born from the situation, or something of that sort. I should like to repeat that the situation on Danzig and the Corridor in the last days of August looked as if the guns would go off on their own unless something were done. That was the reason for this relatively short period of time that the Fuehrer allowed. He feared that if more time were allowed, matters would reach such a point that the danger of war would not become slighter, but greater. the point was given to Henderson, the British Government called this suggestion unreasonable? later. The reaction became clear first of all in my discussion with Henderson on the 30th. communication regarding Poland's total mobilization?
A That is true. On the 30th, Hitler awaited a report from the Polish negotiator. This, however, did not came. However, I believe on the evening of the 30th the news arrived that Poland had ordered general mobilization although it had not yet made that order public. It was made public, I believe, on the next morning. This, of course increased the seriousness of the situation enormously.
mediate in that it made further suggestions that direct negotiations should take place between Germany and Poland without England's mediation?
A That is so. This took place on the 30th. A Polish negotiator had arrived. In the meantime, Hitler had prepared the suggestion which he wanted to submit to a man who could act with complete authority on the part of Poland. Then, shortly before midnight, the news came that the British Ambassador wanted to communicate something to his government. The discussions with the Polish emissary were postponed, and around midnight of the 30th of August this well-known meeting took place between Henderson and myself.
Q You heard Schmidt's description of this meeting. Do you have anything to add to his description of it?
A I should like to say the following in regard to that meeting. It is perfectly clear that at that moment all of us were nervous, including both the English Ambassador and myself. I must mention here the fact that the British Ambassador had, on the day before, had a little scene with the Fuehrer and there was consequently a certain tension between the British Ambassador and myself and it was my task to try to calm him down. his communication. I hoped that this communicationwould consist of his presenting me to a Polish negotiator. However, this did not happen. Rather, Sir Nevile Henderson explained to me, first, that his government could not recommend this course of action despite the tense situation that had been brought about by Polish mobilization. Instead, the British Government left it up to the German Government to conduct matters in a diplomatic way. Secondly, he said that if the German Government would put the same suggestions at the disposal of the British Government, the British Government would be ready, in so far as these suggestions were reasonable, to exert its influence positively in Warsaw towards the finding of a solution. answer because, as I said, the situation was enormously tense and the Fuehrer had been waiting since the day before for a Polish emissary. as I said, the guns would go off by themselves.
I then told Henderson of the proposals that the Fuehrer had made. I read them to him, and I should like to state here again that the Fuehrer had specifically forbidden me to let these proposals out of my hands. He told me that I could only communicate them in their substance to the British Ambassador. I did a little more in that I read all the proposals from the beginning to the end to the British Ambassador. I'did this because I still hoped that the British Government could exert its influence in Warsaw and assist in a solution. the British Ambassador on the 30th of August, as well as from his whole attitude which Schmidt also described yesterday, as well as from the substance of the British communication, that England was not at this moment ready to face the situation in its full implications and was not ready to do its best to bring about a peaceful solution.
Q. What happened after the contents of Henderson's note was made public? what did the German public do?
A. After I talked with the British ambassador I reported to the Fuehrer. I told him it had been a serious conversation. I told him also that in pursuance of his instructions I had not given the memorandum to Henderson despite his wishes. I also had an impression how serious the situation was, and it was my conviction that the British guarantee to Poland was ineffective. That was my very definite impression of this conversation. Then in the course of the 31st the Fuehrer waited the whole day to see whether or not in some form or other a Polish negotiator would come or whether a new communication would come from the British Government. Goering in this matter. There can be no doubt that during the course of that night, at the latest in the morning, the precise proposals of the Reich Government were in the hands of both the London Government and the Warsaw Government. Throughout the whole of the 31st the Fuehrer waited, and I am of the conviction -- and I want to say it very learly here -- that he hoped that something would happen on the part of England. is known that he had no plenipotentiary powers to do anything or to enter int negotiations or even to accept proposals of any sort. I don't know whether Feuhrer would have authorized me on the 31st to make such proposals, but I h* is to be possible. But the Polish ambassador was not authorized to accept them, as he specifically told me. And I may point out briefly that regarding she attitude in Warsaw the witness Dahlerus has already given further testimony
Q. Is it correct that the German proposals that had been given on the 2 in the evening by you to Henderson were sent to Warsaw by London only on the evening of the 31st of August?
A. That I can't tell you precisely, but that undoubtedly can be verified from official documents.
Q. What consideration than led to the final decision to take military action against Poland?
A. I can not tell you the details of this. I only know that the Fuehrer considered again the proposals that a had made to the British ambassador on the midnight of the 30th and then on the 31st of August published them; made them public.
The reaction of the Warsaw radio -- and I remember this reaction precisely -- it was unfortunately on such a sort as to be an invitation for battle. And the German proposals had been characterized by Henderson as reasonable. They were called by the Polish radio a piece of arrogance. At any rate, shortly after these reports the suggestions were published, and Warsaw made a very sharp and negative answer. I believe that it was this that persuaded the Fuehrer in the night between the 31st of August and the 1st of September to issue the order to march. I for my part can only say that I came to the Reich Chancellory. The Fuehrer there told me that the order had been given, and that that was all that could be done, and the thing was now in motion. I then told the Fuehrer that I wished him the best of luck. I might also mention the outbreak of hostilities was the end of years of efforts on the part of Adolf Hitler to bring about friendship with England.
Q. Did Mussolini make another mediatory gesture, and how did this proposal come out?
A. Yes, that is true. On the 3rd of September, in the morning, such a proposal at mediation came about -- arrived at Berlin -- that Mussoline was still in a position, if the German Government agreed rapidly, to bring this problem to the form of a conference. It was said at the same time that the French Government was agreeable to this conference. Germany also immediately agreed, but a short time later -- I can not now precisely remember the hour-it was declared in a speech by Lord Halifax in the Mouse of Commons or some other British body that this proposal was turned down by London.
Q. Do you know whether France also turned down this suggestion?
A. I have already said we received the information through the Italian Government that the French Government either favored the suggestion or had already accepted it.
Q. After the conclusion of the Polish campaign did you see possibilities of peace and pursue them?
A. After the conclusion of the Polish campaign I had a few long talks with Adolf Hitler. The situation then was such that undoubtedly French look of enthusiasm for this whole war could be felt.
There was the phoney war in the west. Hitler, so far as I can judge from everything that he told me, did not want an extension of the war. I believe this was so for all of us members of the Government. I can remind you of the speech that Goering held at that time. Hitler held a speech in Danzig, and I believe later somewhere else, perhaps in the Reichstag, in which he twice told England and France in unmistakable terms that he was ready at any time to carry on negotiations. At that time also very cautiously we listened around in diplomatic circles to find out what the mood was in the foreign capitals, but the public statements and speeches showed Adolf Hitler clearly that peace could not be thought of as in the realm of possibility.
Q. What did you do to prevent the war from becoming more extended?
A. It was my most earnest endeavor after the Polish campaign to attempt to localize the war, that is, to prevent the war from spreading throughout Europe. I however was forced soon to the conclusion that once a war has broken cut politics is not the decisive factor any longer; that in such cases the machinery of the General Staff begins to move. Thus our diplomatic efforts were undoubtedly -- everywhere, in scandinavia and in the Balkans and elsewhere -- were against the war spreading. Things however did take the course they did. I should like to state that according to my conversation with Adolf Hitler-- and I am also of the conviction that the German military men are of the same opinion -- that Hitler wished in no way to extend the war.
Q. Is it correct that you received information which pointed out the intensions of the Western Powers to effect a break-through into the Ruhr?
A. Yes, that is true. There were a large number of such reports. The intelligence service that we had -- of which we had many channels -- all ran together from the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office did not have much of an intelligence service, but relied on the diplomatic channels. But carrying this on, we received reports that led one to conclude without any doubt that the Western Powers had he intension at the first appropriate opportunity to advance on the Puhr. The situation in the west was such that the West Wall was a very strong military barrier against France. It was clear to us that such an attack might come over neutral territory, such as in Belgium ant Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer do you intend being, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: I believe an hour to an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has listened with great patience to a very great deal of detail. All I can say is that this exaggerated going into detail doesn't do the defendant's case any good in my opinion. We will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 30 March 1946 at 1000 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report was made that the defendant Doenitz is absent from Court this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn BY DR. HORN: soveignty of the Memel Land was given to Littuania. It had already been annexed prior to that date. What caused Hitler to give you directives to take back the Memel Land in 1939? of Germany and was very dear to the heart of German people. The historical facts are well known. After the loss of the World War I, it was put under the control of the Allied Powers, and later it was occupied by Lithuanian soldiers. The country itself is purely German territory, and it was a natural development that this country wanted to return to Germany once more. The Fuehrer, already in the year 1938, assigned this problem to me which would have be solved sooner or later. In the spring of 1939 negotiations were taken up with Lithuanian Government. These negotiations brought about a meeting of the Foreign Minister of Lithuania and myself, and a pact was signed, through which the Memel Land was to be again incorporated with the German Reich. That was in March 1939. This country has suffered greatly in the past few years, and I do not need to mention the details. It was in accordance with the self determination of peoples, according to International Law, that the will of Memel Land people was taken into accord, and this pact just sealed a condition which had existed before and which would have to be restablished sooner or later again. some of the decisive causes which led to this war?
A I already testified as to this matter yesterday. The decisive point was the English guarantee toward Poland, and I do not need to elaborate on this point. Through this guarentee there was no possibility for us to deal or to negociate with Poland. As far as the actual outbreak of the war is concerned, the following facts should be taken into considerations:
1. There is no doubt -
MR. DOOD: If your Honor please, I generalized yesterday morning and I repeat my assertion that I am most reluctant to interfere with this examination, but my point is that the witness himself, before going into his answer stated that he had already given the causes for war yesterday afternoon, and I quite agree. I think it is entirely unnecessary for him to go over it again today. I might add parenthetically that we had some great doubt about the relevancy or the materiality of it even yesterday, but surely we do not have to hear him again.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: I would like to reply that the former minister, who is accused of having participated in an aggressive war, might perhaps say a few things about the decisive causes which led to this war. The defendant, of course, should not repeat what he said yesterday. I only wanted him to say those things today which he had not mentioned yesterday, and I will not take up any more time than is necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Horn, provided, of course, that he does not go over the identical grounds that he went over yesterday.
A There are just a few brief facts that I would like to mention. I will discuss only the events of the last two days. First of all, I would like to say that there is no doubt that on the 30th and 31st of August they knew about the high tension of the situation in England, These facts were made known to Hitler through a letter and Hitler said that a very quick decision and a quick solution would have to be taken. This letter was sent by Mr. Chamberlain to Hitler.
Point 2. England knew that the proposals made by Germany were reasons able for we know that England was in possession of these proposals on the night of the 30th to the 31st.
Ambassador Henderson himself declared these proposals to be reasonable.
Point 3. It would have been possible, therefore, in the course of one day, the 31st, to give a hint to Warsaw and to tell the Poles to begin negociations with us. It would have been possible to do this in three Ways, either a Polish intermediary could have flown to Berlin in a flight, as the Fuehrer said, which would have taken an hour to an hour and a half; a meeting with the Foreign Minister could have taken place; or simply, Ambassador Lipsk could have been instructed to accept the German proposals. If this instruction had been ordered the crisis would have been eliminated and diplomatic negotiations would have been initiated that way. England, herself, if she had wanted to, could get in touch with her ambassador so that he could have been present at the negotiations, and any action like that would have been hailed on all sides.
the documents since I have been interned here, in this period of time nothing happened or took place which could have alleviated this very tense situation. There was and is Polish chauvinism, and we know from the word of Ambassador Henderson and through the testimony or affidavit of Mr. Dahlerus, Ambassador Lipski used very strong words, which characterized the Polish mentality. Poland knew very well that it would under all circumstances have the assistance of England and France. This attitude of Poland became such that for all practical purposes, war was inevitable. I believe that these facts are necessary for the complete and overall historical picture of the situation.
I would like to add that I regret this development of events. My labor of 25 years was abolished through this war, and in the last hours I tried repeatedly to do everything to avoid this war, and I believe that the documents of Ambassador Henderson show that my efforts in this direction were repeated and strong.
I told Hitler of Chamberlain's ardent desire to have good relations with Germany and to reach an agreement, and I had a special messenger sent to the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, to tell him how earnest and how serious the wish of the Fuehrer was and that he should do everything to tell the wish of Adolf Hitler to his government. On 31 May 1939 you had concluded a non-aggression pact with Denmark and on the basis of these facts you are accused by the Prosecution of perfidious diplomacy. of Denmark and Norway? neutral, and we tried to limit the war and to prevent it from spreading.
In April 1940 I was summoned to the Chancellery by Hitler. He told me that he had reports or intelligence, according to which the occupation or landings by the English in Norway were imminent and that he had decided therefore to occupy Norway and Denmark and that was to take place on the day after next. That was the first knowledge I had of this step.
which he had received through intelligence. He instructed me to prepare notes at once which were to inform Norway and Denmark that a German invasion was to take place. I told the Fuehrer that we had a non-aggression pact with Denmark and that Norway was neutral, and also told him that through our Ambassador at Oslo we had reports which did not show that an English landing was planned, but after I saw the documents of proof which the Fuehrer showed me and how serious the situation was, I realized that these reports were to be taken seriously. to be taken by place in the course of 8 April to Oslo and Copenhagen. On that day we worked day and night in order to complete these notes. It was the order of the Fuehrer that these notes would arrive shortly before the German occupation. This was done according to the Fuehrer's wish. know. I do not believe that even one shot was fired.
After the occupation we negotiated with the Danish government. Agreements were made so that everything would take place as quietly and in as friendly a manner as posible. Denmark received all guarantees for her integrity, and subsequent developments were rather quiet and orderly.
Things were a little different in Norway. There was resistance there We tried to keep the Norwegian King in the country and to ask him to remain in the country. We negotiated with him, but we did not succeed in our negotiations; he went to Narvik, I believe it was, and the possibility of negotiations was not present in Norway. was established there. The Foreign Office was not concerned with these matters after the occupation any longer.
I would like to add one mere thing. That is that the Fuehrer told me repeatedly that these measures which he had taken had been extraordinarily necessary, and the documents which were published showed that without doubt, without the occupation by Germany, the landing by England had been prepared long in advance and had been planned definitely.
heard of the great sufferings of the Norwegian and Danish people. I personally an of the opinion that the German occupation-- and your attitude may be whatever it is--but in practical effect the German occupation prevented Scandinavia from becoming a theater of war, and I believe that we did a great service to the Norwegian and Danish people and prevented untold suffering from coming to them. If a war had broken out between Germany and the Scandinavian countries, much suffering and privation would have been the lot of these people. Quisling? a concept much later. Before the occupation of Norway, it was no concept as far as I was concerned. It is true, of course, that on the part of Mr. Rosenberg connections were established with people in the Northern countries who were friendly to Germany so that we could support these people, and that is a natural course of events. At that time monies were given for propaganda purposes in the pressand for political activity in Norway. any talk of any taking over of power politically in Norway or any talk of military operations. We never discussed a point like that. occupation of Denmark? through an Ambassador. He was at the Danish Court. Later, because of certain events which I believe it would take too long to enumerate, the German government took him back and a Reich plenipotentiary was appointed. At the same time there was a military commander in Denmark and later a Higher SS and Police Fuehrer. of a normal and, perhaps, influential Ambassador, who could clarify matters and try to put aside difficulties which in the course of an occupation would naturally arise, and the activity of the Reich Plenipotentiary was, according to my instructions, to treat Denmark as a country which was not hostile to Germany but friendly to Germany, and we considered that our chief principle in Denmark -- to treat them as a friendly country.
severe, but through many long years of war, there was complete quiet and calm in Denmark, and we were very well satisfied with conditions there. Later, because of hostile enemy agents, we had to take a more severe attitude, but the attitude of the Reich Plenipotentiary was always to ameliorate conditions, to do everything possible to ease difficulties, so that good relations between the Danes and the Germans would prevail. Those were his instructions. Of course, it was not always easy for him to do that, but, all in all, he conducted his work very satisfactorily. French-British General Staff to take Belgium and Holland into the operational sphere?
this question is of great importance, and it has been repeatedly mentioned here in the proceedings.
The situation was this: In 1937, through an understanding at that time, Germany had made an agreement with Belgium in that year so that Germany would maintain and honor Belgium's neutrality on the condition that Belgium would maintain her neutrality on her part. according to intelligence reports, there were hostile intentions in the Ruhr area through Belgium and Holland. We on occasions received reports like that, but our reports were of a little less concrete nature. In any event, Adolf Hitler believed that an attack on the vitally important Ruhr was a possibility that he had to count on at all times. I spoke with the Fuehrer repeatedly of the significance of Belgium neutrality as far as the world was concerned, but even I knew that it would be a hard battle, a battle of large proportions, and that other norms would have to apply here. about such an attack became more and more concrete, and documents which were found later and published by the Foreign Office, documents of the French General Staff, proved conclusively that the reports which Germany had were absolutely true -- that actually the plan of an attack on the Ruhr area was planned by the then enemies of Germany. In this connection I would like to call attention to a document which concerns a discussion of Chamberlain with Daladier which took place in Paris, in which Chamberlain suggested an attack on the vitally important areas of the Ruhr. These proposals were made, and I believe this document is at your disposal, at the disposal of the defense. situation in the West was such that at any time he had to count on an attack. Therefore he decided to attack over these two neutral countries, and after the attack -- and I believe military sources will confirm this -- further documents were found that in fact corroborate my story, which showed the clos cooperation of Belgian and Dutch General Staffs with the French and English General Staffs. Of course it is always a difficult matter in a war of that scope to violate the neutrality of any country, and one shouldn't believe that these were things which we took Rightly.
I had many a sleepless night ever these things, and I would like to call to your attention that the same reasons were considered by the other side; other statesmen discussed this question., I remember a quotation: "It was really very fatiguing to think about the rights of the neutral." This statement was made by a great British statesman, Winston Churchill.
Q What caused Germany to violate the integrity of Luxemburg? as to Belgium and Holland. Luxemburg is a very small country, and it is clear that in a war of this size the army cannot suddenly eliminate or spare one country. As far as Luxemburg is concerned, I would like to point out one fact. In the summer of 1939 we had started negotiations with France and Luxemburg in order to reach concrete neutrality agreements. These negotiation seemed to have an auspicious start, but suddenly one day they were discontinue by France and Luxemburg. We couldn't quite understand the attitude of these countries at the time as to why this took place, but I know when I reported to the Fuehrer about this the Fuehrer became a little suspicious. Just what the motives of the other side might have been we never knew. after partial occupation of France? my request, even though we didn't have a complete peace with France and thereby have had cause to reopen diplomatic negotiations, because it was, after all, just a truce, the Fuehrer sent an ambassador to the Vichy Government. I was especially interested in having this step carried through, for it had always been my ambition to have close contact and close collaboration with France. I would like to emphasize that my efforts in this behalf immediately after the victory and truce were taken up again immediately. The Fuehrer was completely ready to follow my request, and in line with my request began to initiate the so-called Montoire politics and policies.
at Montoire. I was present at this meeting. I believe that I may say in the interest of historical truth that the manner in which Hitler treated the heads of a conquered nation might be termed as "model and knightly." There are few parallels in history which could equal his demeanor. collaboration between Germany and France. Marshal Petain, even at the first meeting, was reserved and had at the first meeting many reservations, even from the beginning. To my great regret this first meeting was concluded a little more briefly and sooner than I had hoped. Nevertheless, in the course of events we tried systematically and methodically to carry on a policy of close collaboration and good relations with France. That this did not actually succeed might be traced back to the attitude in France and according to the will of the leading circles. But Germany had good will and showed it. conditions in Belgium -- after the occupation, that is? we had no influence whatsoever. The Fuehrer set up military and civil administrations and the Foreign Office was in no way connected with any of this It was represented only by a laison man who, in practicality, had no functions. I would like to add that subsequently it was a little different in France in this respect, since we had certain influence on the Vichy regime through our ambassador. I did that in the realm of finance. This matter has been discussed in this Tribunal.
I would like to say only that at that time I told Mr. Hemmen, no matter what his powers were -- I appointed him in order to prevent inflation and told him to keep the chief currency under control. That was the special mission that Hemmen had from me. France was essential to Germany economically; especially since it did not want to cooperate with Germany politically, I wanted to keep money sound and stable, and those were Hemmen's instructions, of the campaign in the West?
Fuehrer at headquarters about future developments. I asked him what he intended to do with England, and I suggested whether we had better not make another attempt with England. The Fuehrer seemed to have similar thoughts, and was very enthusiastic about my proposal of again making a peace offer, or bringing about a peace with England in some way. I asked the Fuehrer whether I should direct an agreement. The Fuehrer said, spontaneously, "No, that won't be necessary, I will do that myself, and that means you will not have to do it."
He said, "If England is ready for peace, there are only four points upon which I wish to agree with England. First of all, I want, after Dunkirk, that under no circumstances should any less of prestige on the part of England result. I do not want a peace which would let England lose prestige." four points: British Empire. strongest power on the Continent, especially because of her population.
Third, he said, "I want the German colonies, or I will be satisfied if I get one or two colonies back, because of the raw materials." the Greek-French conferences and the sending of French officers to Greece, or that you received knowledge of these goings on?
A Yes, that is correct. We were to keep the war in as close a scope as possible, as the Fuehrer had pointed out to me, and in accordance with this I had to keep an eye on the Balkan situation. Hitler wished, under all circumstances and at all costs, to keep the Balkans out of the war.
The situation was as follows: Greece had a British guarantee and had accepted that guarantee.
Also, connections were very close between Yugoslavia and England and Greece. Through our intelligence and through military channels we heard repeatedly about conferences of the general staffs between Athens, Belgrade, London and Paris, on the one side, which were allegedly taking place. called these things to his attention. I asked him to be very cautious, and said that Germany had no intention whatsoever of undertaking anything against the Greek people, who had always been very popular in Germany. British fleet, I believe, were being established in Greece. These things led to the intervention of Italy, which was not at all desired by us. I believe Reichsmarshal Goering has already discussed this topic. It was not possible to prevent Italian intervention. I was in Italy at the time, in Florence, with Hitler, and when we arrived it was too late already, I am sorry to say, because Mussolini said, "We are already on the march." The Fuehrer was very much depressed and sad when he received this news. Italy from spreading. For this, Yugoslavian policies and politics were decisive I tried, in all possible ways, to keep closer connections with Yugoslavia. The three-power pact had already been concluded, and I wanted Yugoslavia to join. It was very difficult. With the Regent, Prince Paul and the Government, we finally succeeded, one day, so that Yugoslavia joined the three-power pact. We knew very well that, in Belgrade, strong powers were at work against the joining of Yugoslavia to the three-power pact, or any closer connections with Germany at all.