A That is true. I just said that Hitler accepted this serious report on the part of the Polish Ambassador very peacefully and that I should tell him that no solution could be founded on this basis.
Ambassador Beck traveled to London and reached a temporary agreement of mutual assistance between England and France and Poland and returned to Poland with that agreement?
Q What was the German reaction to this pact of mutual assistance?
A The German reaction--here I may refer to Hitler's Reichstag speech in which he stated his attitude towards this whole problem. We felt this pact of mutual assistance between Poland and England to be not in agreement with the German-Polish pact of 1934, for in the 1934 pact things were excluded between Germany and Poland which were then contradicted by this new pact between Poland and England. For example, Poland had obliged herself, if Germany became involved in a war with England, to enter on Germany's side. I know that Adolf Hitler felt that it was not in agreement with what he had agreed to with Chamberlain in Munich, namely, the elimination of the possibility of any complication of force between Germany and England. Poland regarding the cancellation of the Polish-German agreement of 1934?
A That was in the same Reichstag speech of the Fuehrer. This memorandum stated what I have just stated here--that the new treaty was not in agreement with the treaty of 1934 and that, consequently, Germany regarded the 1934 pact as no longer valid. about a sharpening in German-Polish relations and that new difficulties arose in the minority question?
A Yes, that is true. In the time theretofore negotiations had been taking place in order to put the minority problem on a new basis. These negotiations were before the 28th of May, and after the28th of May the situation of the German minorities in Poland become more difficult than they had been previously.
There was at that time a Polish group that was very active and carried out persecutions of Germans in Poland.
This was part of their regular program. I know that precisely. In the months that followed the 28th of May--that is to say, in the summer of 1939--the socalled reception camps for fleeing persons were set up. Turkey? How were they received in Germany? as meaning that England was undertaking systematically a policy of drawing up treaties in Europe. That was Hitler's attitude and also mine.
Q Is it true that these guarantees and that Roosevelt's messages were then, on the 22nd of May, 1939, the consequence of a German-Italian pact of assistance? And what were the reasons for this pact? friendly relations; and in view of the worsening situation in Europe, on the suggestion of Mussolini these relations were deepened and set down in a pact of assistance.
It was discussed first by Count Ciano and myself in Milan and prepared for. This was an answer to the efforts of EnglishFrench policy.
Q. Is it correct that the crisis with Poland became acute through the fact that on the 6th of August in Danzig a strike took place and thus Germany was forced to adopt an attitude?
A. Yes, that is so. There was a quarrel between the polish representatives and the senate of the city of Danzig. A note of the Polish representative was sent to the president of the Senate in which it was stated that certain persons of the senate wanted to act contrary to Polish regulations. This information proved later to be false, was answered by the senate, and led to a sharp exchange of notes between the Senate and the Polish representative. I then, on Hitler's commission, commissioned the secretary of state of the foreign office to make representations to the Polish Government.
Q. Is it true that Weisecker, on the 15th of August, called the French and English ambassadors in order to inform both these ambassadors in detail of the seriousness of the situation?
A. Yes, that is true. He did that on my commission.
Q. On the 18th of August was Henderson again asked, because the situation was becoming more acute in Poland and Danzig, to visit you?
A. Yes. Talks took place a few days later between the secretary of state and the English Ambassador. The state secretary told him in very clear words of the great difficulties in the situation and told him that things were taking a very serious development.
Q. Is it true that in this phase of the crisis you made up your mind, upon the basis of a suggestion made to you, to undertake negotiations with Russia, and what were your reasons for this?
A. Negotiations with Russia had already been undertaken sometime previously. Marshal Stalin, in March 1939, delivered a speech in which he made certain hints of his wish to have better relations with Germany. At that time I informed Adolf Hitler of this speech and asked him whether or not we couldn't see whether this hint on Stalin's part had something real behind it.
Hitler was at first hesitant; he then, however, became more and more receptive to this idea. Negotiations for commercial treaties were underway, and during these negotiations I, with the permission of the Fuehrer, conducted investigations to find out whether there could not be brought about a definite reconciliation between National Socialism and Bolshevism and whether we could not agree at least on the interests of the respective countries.
Q. How did these negotiations between the negotiators for the commercial treaty continue?
A. Negotiations of A,bassador Schnurrer in a very short length of time made clear to me the fact that Stalin had meant this speech seriously. There was an exchange of ideas and exchange of telegrams with Moscow which, in the middle of August, led to Hitler's sending a telegram to Stalin, and Stalin in his answer to this telegram invited a plenipotentiary to Moscow. The conclusion of this was the Russo-German pact.
Q. Is it true that you were sent to Moscow as plenipotentiary?
A. Yes, that is well known.
Q. When did you fly to Moscow, and what negotiations did you there carry on?
A. On the evening of the 22nd of August I arrived in Moscow. The reception given me by Stalin and Molotov was very friendly. We had at first a two hours discussion. In this discussion the entire complex of Russo-German relations was discussed. relations on a new basis. This should be expressed in a non-aggression pact. Secondly, the spheres of interests of the two countries were to be defined, which also came about through a secret additional agreement.
Q. For what reason was this secret protocol concluded? what was its content, and what were the political bases of it?
A. I should like to say, first of all, this secret protocol has been spoken about frequently here in this Court. In the negotiations at that time with Stalin and Molotov, I spoke very openly, as also the Russian gentlemen did with me. I described Hitler's desire that the two countries should reach a definitive agreement, and I also of course spoke of the critical situation in Europe. the situation in Poland and to settle it peacefully, despite everything, but I left no doubt that the situation was very serious and that it was possible that war might break out. That was in the clear. It was here a question for both statesmen, Stalin as well as Hitler, of territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. This problem would have to be solved one way or another. It was, therefore, well to look at these things from some other point of view. And just as Adolf Hitler was of the opinion that I stated in Moscow, that in some form or other this problem would have to be solved, and thus also on the Russian side it was clear that this was the case. be done by the Germans and the Russians. A line of demarcation was agreed on, it is known about, that in the event of intolerable polish provocation or if a war should break out, that this would be a boundary, so that Germany and Russia could not be accused of collusion as regards Poland.
This well known line was founded along the line of the Rivers Fisia and Bug. And it was agreed that in the case of conflict the territories lying to the west of these rivers would be the German sphere of interest, and these to the cast would be the Russian spheres of interest. was undertaken on the one hand by Germany and on the other by Russia. I may repeat that at that time I had the impression, both from Hitler and Stalin, that the territories, the Polish territories and other territories that had been delimited in these spheres of interest about which I shall speak shortly, that those were regions which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. And both statesman undoubtedly held the opinion that if the last chances for negotiations for the settlement of this problem had been exhausted, there was certainly a justification for Adolf Hilter to attempt to solve the problems connected with these territories in another way, and to incorporate these territories into Germany. were defined, Finland, the Baltic countries and Bessarabia. This was a great agreement which was reached in the interest at two great powers in the event of a peaceful settlement as well as in the case of war.
Q. Is it correct that these negotiations were drawn up specifically only in case that on the basis of the Non-aggression Pact between Russia and Germany, it should not be possible to solve the Polish question on a diplocatic basis?
A. Please repeat the question.
Q. Is it correct that this solution was thought of only in the case that, despite the pact of non-agression, the Polish question could not be solved in a diplomatic way, and only in this case was the pact to become effective?
A Yes, that is so. I stated at that time that on the German side everything would be attempted to solve the problem in a diplomatic and peaceful way.
neutrality in the search for this solution? the discussions in Moscow that this was so. It was perfectly clear that if because of the Polish attitude a war broke out, Russia would take a friendl attitude towards us. in Berlin? on the 23rd. On the 24th I returned to Germany. I had thought at first that I would fly to the Fuehrer in Berchtesgaden, but during the flight or later I was asked to come to Berlin. ment. The situation that I found there was indubitably tense. On the next day I noticed this particularly. situation be attributed? happened which generated electricity in the air--boundary incidents, difficulties between Danzig, and Poland. On the one hand, Germany was accused of interfering in Danzig, and, on the other hand, we accused Poland of taking military measures inside Danzig, and so on. informed of the signing of the Polish-British Pact of mutual assistance, and what was your and Hitler's reaction to this?
A That was on the 25th of August. On the 25th of August I found out about the conversations that the Fuehrer had had with Ambassador Henderson during my absence, I believe in Berchtesgaden. This was a very serious conversation. Henderson brought a letter from the British Prime Minister, which stated clearly that a war between Germany and Poland would involve also England.
Then on the 25th in the morning the Fuehrer answered this letter--I believe the same day--and the answer was so couched that at the moment a solution by diplomatic means could not be anticipated.
and I asked him in my turn to consider this question once more. I asked him whether we might not make one more effort with England.
This 25th of August was a very eventful day. In the morning a communication came fromthe Italian government, according to which Italy, in the case of a conflict regarding the question of Poland, would not stand at Germany's side.
The Fuehrer decided then to receive Ambassador Henderson once more in the course of that day. This meeting took place around noon of the 25th. I was present at it. The Fuehrer explained once more to Henderson in detail his earnest wish to reach an understanding with England. He described to him the very difficult situation with Poland and asked him to fly back to England to discuss this whole situation with the British Government. Ambassador Henderson agreed to this and I sent him, I believe in the course of the afternoon, a verbal note in which the Fuehrer expressed his hopes for an understanding and stated again his hope for an understanding between England and Germany, so that the ambassador could inform his government correctly of this.
Q. Is it correct that after the British-Polish guarantee became known, you asked Hitler to with draw the military measures that were being taken?
A. Yes, that is so. I just wanted to tell you about it. During the course of the afternoon, I heard in the course of the day that certain military measures were being taken and I received in the course of the afternoon, a Reuter despatch -- at any rate, a press dispatch of some sort -- that the Polish-British Pact had been ratified in London. I believe there was a note appended that the Polish Ambassador Raschitzki (?) had been sick but had nevertheless suddenly turned up in the Foreign Office in order to sign the Pact.
Q. Was this treaty signed before or after it was known that Italy would not assist Germany?
A. It was undoubtedly concluded aftersards: I, of course, do not know the hour of the day but I believe it was on the afternoon of the 25th of August, and Italy's refusal had already reached us by noon: In other words, it had been definitively decided at Rome in the morning or on the day before; at any rate, I can judge this only from other facts. Perhaps I might, however, answer your other question. When I received this press despatch, which was given to me again when I reached the Chancellory, I went immediately to Hitler and asked him to stop the military measures, whatever they were, although I was not oriented in military matters, and I told him that it was perfectly clear that this meant war with England and that England could never deny having signed that Pact with Poland, could never repudiate that Pact.
The Fuehrer reflected only a short while and then he said that was true and immediately called his military adjutant -- I believe it was Fieldmarshal Keitel-- and asked him to call together the generals and stop the military measures that were then being taken. On this occasion, he expressed himself to the effect that he said "We had received two pieces of bad news today and I hope it were possible that the"report about the attitude of Italy had been noted immediately in London" and that it was thereupon that the final Pact with Poland had been signed.
Q. Did you and Hitler, during these days, make efforts with Henderson to clear up the conflict, and what were your proposals?
A. I have already stated that the Fuehrer -- I believe it was on the 25th at noon -- told Henderson that he still and always had the intention of reaching some final understanding with England. The question of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved in some form and he wanted to make some general and conclusive offer to England in order tosettle these things in a perfectly regular way.
Q. Is it true that Hitler then put an airplane at Henderson's disposal in order to enable him to explain these proposals to his government and in order to ask his government?
A. Yes, that is true. I know Henderson -- I believe it was on the next day, the 26th -- flew to England in a German airplane but what the details of this were I don't know, but I know that the Fuehrer told him in his discussion "Take an airplane and immediately fly to your government."
Q. What results did Henderson bring back to Berlin on the 28th of August?
A. I should like to say in this connection, that in view of the critical situation between Germany and Poland, which were also know to the British Ambassador, Hitler expressed a certain disappointment to me that the British Ambassador had not returned more quickly with his answer, for the atmosphere was highly charged with electricity. On the 28th, Henderson then had a new disucssion with the Fuehrer. I was again present. The answer that Sir Neville Henderson brought back with him from London, appeared at first unsatisfactory to the Fuehrer.
Its contents were made up of certain points that seemed unclear to the Fuehrer but the main point was that England foresaw a great solution of the problems in Germany and Poland, on the presupposition that the German-Polish question could be brought to a peaceful solution. In the discussion, Adolf Hitler told Sir Neville Henderson that he would look over the note and would then request again an audience with Henderson.
Q. Is it true that in this memorandum, England suggested direct negotiations between Germany and Poland?
A. That is true. One of the points in the note was that the English suggested that German-Polish direct negotiations should be undertaken as the most appropriate way to reach a solution; and secondly, that these negotiations should take place as soon as possible, because England had to admit that the situation, because of the frontier incidents, was very tense. The note stated that no matter what solution might be found -- I believe this was in the note-it should be guaranteed by the great powers.
Q. Did England suggest that it should mediate these direct negotiations between Germany and Poland?
A. Yes.
Q. How were these German suggestions accepted which, on the 29th of August, were issued as an answer to Henderson's memorandum and were given by Hitler to Henderson?
A. The situation was this: On the 29th, Hitler again received the British Ambassador and on this occasion again told him that he was ready to react to the English suggestion of the 28th; that is to say, that despite the great tension and despite the Polish attitude, he was prepared to make efforts for a peaceful solution of the German-Polish problems, as suggested in the British note of the 28th.
that a polish plenipotentiary be sent?
A In Hitler's communication to Henderson and the British Government, it was stated that the German Government, in view of the tsnse situation, would immediately make suggestions for a solution of the Danzig and Corridor problems. The German Government hoped to be in a position to have these proposals ready by the time a polish negotiator arrived, which they believed would take place before the 30th. plenipotentiary with a 24-hour lapse because he wanted to avoid a conflict because of the mobilization that was taking place on each side?
A That is quite true. I remember that on the 29th Ambassador Henderson asked Hitler whether that was an ultimatum. The Fuehrer answered that that was no ultimatum, but was simply a proposal born from the situation, or something of that sort. I should like to repeat that the situation on Danzig and the Corridor in the last days of August looked as if the guns would go off on their own unless something were done. That was the reason for this relatively short period of time that the Fuehrer allowed. He feared that if more time were allowed, matters would reach such a point that the danger of war would not become slighter, but greater. the point was given to Henderson, the British Government called this suggestion unreasonable? later. The reaction became clear first of all in my discussion with Henderson on the 30th. communication regarding Poland's total mobilization?
A That is true. On the 30th, Hitler awaited a report from the Polish negotiator. This, however, did not came. However, I believe on the evening of the 30th the news arrived that Poland had ordered general mobilization although it had not yet made that order public. It was made public, I believe, on the next morning. This, of course increased the seriousness of the situation enormously.
mediate in that it made further suggestions that direct negotiations should take place between Germany and Poland without England's mediation?
A That is so. This took place on the 30th. A Polish negotiator had arrived. In the meantime, Hitler had prepared the suggestion which he wanted to submit to a man who could act with complete authority on the part of Poland. Then, shortly before midnight, the news came that the British Ambassador wanted to communicate something to his government. The discussions with the Polish emissary were postponed, and around midnight of the 30th of August this well-known meeting took place between Henderson and myself.
Q You heard Schmidt's description of this meeting. Do you have anything to add to his description of it?
A I should like to say the following in regard to that meeting. It is perfectly clear that at that moment all of us were nervous, including both the English Ambassador and myself. I must mention here the fact that the British Ambassador had, on the day before, had a little scene with the Fuehrer and there was consequently a certain tension between the British Ambassador and myself and it was my task to try to calm him down. his communication. I hoped that this communicationwould consist of his presenting me to a Polish negotiator. However, this did not happen. Rather, Sir Nevile Henderson explained to me, first, that his government could not recommend this course of action despite the tense situation that had been brought about by Polish mobilization. Instead, the British Government left it up to the German Government to conduct matters in a diplomatic way. Secondly, he said that if the German Government would put the same suggestions at the disposal of the British Government, the British Government would be ready, in so far as these suggestions were reasonable, to exert its influence positively in Warsaw towards the finding of a solution. answer because, as I said, the situation was enormously tense and the Fuehrer had been waiting since the day before for a Polish emissary. as I said, the guns would go off by themselves.
I then told Henderson of the proposals that the Fuehrer had made. I read them to him, and I should like to state here again that the Fuehrer had specifically forbidden me to let these proposals out of my hands. He told me that I could only communicate them in their substance to the British Ambassador. I did a little more in that I read all the proposals from the beginning to the end to the British Ambassador. I'did this because I still hoped that the British Government could exert its influence in Warsaw and assist in a solution. the British Ambassador on the 30th of August, as well as from his whole attitude which Schmidt also described yesterday, as well as from the substance of the British communication, that England was not at this moment ready to face the situation in its full implications and was not ready to do its best to bring about a peaceful solution.
Q. What happened after the contents of Henderson's note was made public? what did the German public do?
A. After I talked with the British ambassador I reported to the Fuehrer. I told him it had been a serious conversation. I told him also that in pursuance of his instructions I had not given the memorandum to Henderson despite his wishes. I also had an impression how serious the situation was, and it was my conviction that the British guarantee to Poland was ineffective. That was my very definite impression of this conversation. Then in the course of the 31st the Fuehrer waited the whole day to see whether or not in some form or other a Polish negotiator would come or whether a new communication would come from the British Government. Goering in this matter. There can be no doubt that during the course of that night, at the latest in the morning, the precise proposals of the Reich Government were in the hands of both the London Government and the Warsaw Government. Throughout the whole of the 31st the Fuehrer waited, and I am of the conviction -- and I want to say it very learly here -- that he hoped that something would happen on the part of England. is known that he had no plenipotentiary powers to do anything or to enter int negotiations or even to accept proposals of any sort. I don't know whether Feuhrer would have authorized me on the 31st to make such proposals, but I h* is to be possible. But the Polish ambassador was not authorized to accept them, as he specifically told me. And I may point out briefly that regarding she attitude in Warsaw the witness Dahlerus has already given further testimony
Q. Is it correct that the German proposals that had been given on the 2 in the evening by you to Henderson were sent to Warsaw by London only on the evening of the 31st of August?
A. That I can't tell you precisely, but that undoubtedly can be verified from official documents.
Q. What consideration than led to the final decision to take military action against Poland?
A. I can not tell you the details of this. I only know that the Fuehrer considered again the proposals that a had made to the British ambassador on the midnight of the 30th and then on the 31st of August published them; made them public.
The reaction of the Warsaw radio -- and I remember this reaction precisely -- it was unfortunately on such a sort as to be an invitation for battle. And the German proposals had been characterized by Henderson as reasonable. They were called by the Polish radio a piece of arrogance. At any rate, shortly after these reports the suggestions were published, and Warsaw made a very sharp and negative answer. I believe that it was this that persuaded the Fuehrer in the night between the 31st of August and the 1st of September to issue the order to march. I for my part can only say that I came to the Reich Chancellory. The Fuehrer there told me that the order had been given, and that that was all that could be done, and the thing was now in motion. I then told the Fuehrer that I wished him the best of luck. I might also mention the outbreak of hostilities was the end of years of efforts on the part of Adolf Hitler to bring about friendship with England.
Q. Did Mussolini make another mediatory gesture, and how did this proposal come out?
A. Yes, that is true. On the 3rd of September, in the morning, such a proposal at mediation came about -- arrived at Berlin -- that Mussoline was still in a position, if the German Government agreed rapidly, to bring this problem to the form of a conference. It was said at the same time that the French Government was agreeable to this conference. Germany also immediately agreed, but a short time later -- I can not now precisely remember the hour-it was declared in a speech by Lord Halifax in the Mouse of Commons or some other British body that this proposal was turned down by London.
Q. Do you know whether France also turned down this suggestion?
A. I have already said we received the information through the Italian Government that the French Government either favored the suggestion or had already accepted it.
Q. After the conclusion of the Polish campaign did you see possibilities of peace and pursue them?
A. After the conclusion of the Polish campaign I had a few long talks with Adolf Hitler. The situation then was such that undoubtedly French look of enthusiasm for this whole war could be felt.
There was the phoney war in the west. Hitler, so far as I can judge from everything that he told me, did not want an extension of the war. I believe this was so for all of us members of the Government. I can remind you of the speech that Goering held at that time. Hitler held a speech in Danzig, and I believe later somewhere else, perhaps in the Reichstag, in which he twice told England and France in unmistakable terms that he was ready at any time to carry on negotiations. At that time also very cautiously we listened around in diplomatic circles to find out what the mood was in the foreign capitals, but the public statements and speeches showed Adolf Hitler clearly that peace could not be thought of as in the realm of possibility.
Q. What did you do to prevent the war from becoming more extended?
A. It was my most earnest endeavor after the Polish campaign to attempt to localize the war, that is, to prevent the war from spreading throughout Europe. I however was forced soon to the conclusion that once a war has broken cut politics is not the decisive factor any longer; that in such cases the machinery of the General Staff begins to move. Thus our diplomatic efforts were undoubtedly -- everywhere, in scandinavia and in the Balkans and elsewhere -- were against the war spreading. Things however did take the course they did. I should like to state that according to my conversation with Adolf Hitler-- and I am also of the conviction that the German military men are of the same opinion -- that Hitler wished in no way to extend the war.
Q. Is it correct that you received information which pointed out the intensions of the Western Powers to effect a break-through into the Ruhr?
A. Yes, that is true. There were a large number of such reports. The intelligence service that we had -- of which we had many channels -- all ran together from the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office did not have much of an intelligence service, but relied on the diplomatic channels. But carrying this on, we received reports that led one to conclude without any doubt that the Western Powers had he intension at the first appropriate opportunity to advance on the Puhr. The situation in the west was such that the West Wall was a very strong military barrier against France. It was clear to us that such an attack might come over neutral territory, such as in Belgium ant Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: How much longer do you intend being, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: I believe an hour to an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has listened with great patience to a very great deal of detail. All I can say is that this exaggerated going into detail doesn't do the defendant's case any good in my opinion. We will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 30 March 1946 at 1000 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report was made that the defendant Doenitz is absent from Court this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn BY DR. HORN: soveignty of the Memel Land was given to Littuania. It had already been annexed prior to that date. What caused Hitler to give you directives to take back the Memel Land in 1939? of Germany and was very dear to the heart of German people. The historical facts are well known. After the loss of the World War I, it was put under the control of the Allied Powers, and later it was occupied by Lithuanian soldiers. The country itself is purely German territory, and it was a natural development that this country wanted to return to Germany once more. The Fuehrer, already in the year 1938, assigned this problem to me which would have be solved sooner or later. In the spring of 1939 negotiations were taken up with Lithuanian Government. These negotiations brought about a meeting of the Foreign Minister of Lithuania and myself, and a pact was signed, through which the Memel Land was to be again incorporated with the German Reich. That was in March 1939. This country has suffered greatly in the past few years, and I do not need to mention the details. It was in accordance with the self determination of peoples, according to International Law, that the will of Memel Land people was taken into accord, and this pact just sealed a condition which had existed before and which would have to be restablished sooner or later again. some of the decisive causes which led to this war?
A I already testified as to this matter yesterday. The decisive point was the English guarantee toward Poland, and I do not need to elaborate on this point. Through this guarentee there was no possibility for us to deal or to negociate with Poland. As far as the actual outbreak of the war is concerned, the following facts should be taken into considerations:
1. There is no doubt -
MR. DOOD: If your Honor please, I generalized yesterday morning and I repeat my assertion that I am most reluctant to interfere with this examination, but my point is that the witness himself, before going into his answer stated that he had already given the causes for war yesterday afternoon, and I quite agree. I think it is entirely unnecessary for him to go over it again today. I might add parenthetically that we had some great doubt about the relevancy or the materiality of it even yesterday, but surely we do not have to hear him again.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: I would like to reply that the former minister, who is accused of having participated in an aggressive war, might perhaps say a few things about the decisive causes which led to this war. The defendant, of course, should not repeat what he said yesterday. I only wanted him to say those things today which he had not mentioned yesterday, and I will not take up any more time than is necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Horn, provided, of course, that he does not go over the identical grounds that he went over yesterday.
A There are just a few brief facts that I would like to mention. I will discuss only the events of the last two days. First of all, I would like to say that there is no doubt that on the 30th and 31st of August they knew about the high tension of the situation in England, These facts were made known to Hitler through a letter and Hitler said that a very quick decision and a quick solution would have to be taken. This letter was sent by Mr. Chamberlain to Hitler.
Point 2. England knew that the proposals made by Germany were reasons able for we know that England was in possession of these proposals on the night of the 30th to the 31st.