explained to him that he intended to occupy Czechoslovakia. He was concerned with the old historic territory which he intended to put under his protection. The Czechs were to have their complete economy and their own life and he believed that the decision which was being made at that time would work out to be very fortunate for the Czech people. Shortly thereafter I had a long discussion with the Foreign Minister Chvalkovski. He was agreeable to our point of view and I asked him to persuade Hacha to that effect so that the Fuehrer's decision and the whole action involved could be carried through without the shedding of blood. things which Hitler told him, which caused him to get in touch with his government in Prague. He got in touch with them by phone -- I believe with the Chief of Staff although I do not know this exactly -- and then got the approval of his government so that the agreement which I have already mentioned could be concluded. This agreement was then signed by Hitler, Hacha, the Foreign Minister and myself. Then Hacha, as I recall, gave instructions that the German Army was to be received cordially and as far as I am informed, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, that is Bohemia and Moravia, took place without incident of any sort.
After the occupation I traveled to Prague with the Fuehrer. In Prague, after the occupation,the Fuehrer gave me a proclamation, which declared that the countries of Bohemia and Moravia were to be protectorates of the Reich. This proclamation was a surprise to me and I read this proclamation in Prague. No protest of any sort was made according to my recollection and I believe I might mention that the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, the Fuehrer considered necessary and in the best interests of the Reich and the occupation took place also for historical and economic reasons and above all for security reasons. I believe that Goering has touched on these points. over of the rest of Czechoslovakia? lengthy discussion with the Fuehrer. I pointed out to the Fuehrer that this occupation, of course, would have important repercussions with the British and French.
In this connection I would like to add that in England those circles which had taken a position against Germany had grown larger and were led by important personalities. incident which took place while I was still Ambassador in London. I had a visit from Winston Churchill at the Embassy. Mr. Winston Churchill was not in Parliament at that time and I believe he was not leader of the opposition but he was one of the most significant personalities in England. I was especially interested in arranging a meeting between him and Adolf Hitler and had asked Churchill to come to see me at the Embassy for that reason. We had a conversation which lasted many hours and a conversation which I recall exactly. I believe it would take us too far afield to mention all details covered in this conversation. But, as Lord Vansittart in 1936 -
THE PRESIDENT: Documents with reference to Mr. Winston Churchill at this time when he was not a member of the government have already been ruled by the Tribunal to be irrelevant and what he said and such a conversation as this appears to the Tribunal to be absolutely irrelevant and the Tribunal will not hear it.
A (continued) I have already said that I called the attention of the Fuehrer to the British reaction. Hitler told me and explained to me the necessity of the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, especially on historic and strategic grounds. I remember that in this connection he cited the French Minister of Aviation Pierre Cat, that Czechoslovakia would be a mothership against Germany and I believe at that time we received intelligence and records of Russian fleets and Russian missions on Czech airdromes. Hitler said, and I remember these words distinctly, that he could not have a foreign Czechoslovakian thorn in German flesh. One could get along really well with Czechoslovakia but it was important that Germany have in her hands the protection of these countries. He mentioned further Soviet Russia as a factor of inestimable power if it were allied with Czechoslovakia. When I mentioned England he said that England was in no position to take over the protection of the Germans in Czechoslovakia and the Czech State and its structure had spli asunder and it was in the interest of German-English relations and he also considered it necessary that the countries of Bohemia and Moravia be in very close contact with the Reich. A protectorate seemed to be the best answer to this problem and for Germany this question was absolutely vital.
At once glance at the map -- and he used these exact words -- he "couldn't see how this occupation could disturb collaboration between Germany and England. and could therefore understand that such problems would have to be solved.
I told Hitler about the difficulties which Mr. Chamberlain personally might have from the steps which were being taken by Germany, that England might consider that Germany was increasing very strongly in power, but the Fuehrer explained the whole question to me with the reasons I have already just mentioned. Commons. Chamberlain said it wasn't a violation of the Munich agreement and the British Government was not tied to an obligation. The Czech State was decomposed and the guarantee which England had given was not to be invoked, or the obligation to carry through the guarantee did not apply. England. I believe it was two or three days later when Mr.-
THE PRESIDENT (interposing): What have we to do with the reactions in England unless they took the form of a note? I don't see what it has to do with it. What we want to know is the part the defendant Ribbentrop played in the breach of the Munich agreement.
DR. HORN: The defendant von Ribbentrop is accused of having participated in a conspiracy in the person of Foreign Minister, and that the conduct of carrying through foreign political activity was connected with aggressive war. If and when he is to defend himself against these charges he must picture circumstances as he saw them and to enumerate the motives which ruled him. He must be in a position to enumerate them, and I am asking him questions only about things which determined his views and opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you asked him any question about it.
THE INTERPRETER: It is not coming through quite audibly.
THE PRESIDENT: What I said was, I didn't think you asked him any questions as to the reactions in England.
THE INTERPRETER: The channels seems to be disturbed in some way. I think he is getting more than one language.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you hear me now?
DR. HORN: Now I can hear.
THE PRESIDENT: Can Doctor Horn hear?
DR. HORN: Now there are two languages on the same channel. French is one of the languages I get on this channel. There are still two languages on this channel. (Pause) I can still hear two languages including German.
(Pause) Now I can hear German.
Now I can hear French. (Pause)
THE PRESIDENT: Is it coming through now?
DR. HORN: Yes.
(Pause)
Just now we had two German voices, a lady's voice and gentleman's. Now I can hear a gentleman speaking French.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had better adjourn, I think.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what I was attempting to say to you when the system broke down was that it seems to the Tribunal that the defendant ought to be able to keep his evidence within stricter limits and not to go into so much detail; and that with regard to the reactions -- the political reactions-in England, they are not relevant in themselves, and any bearing which they may have upon the case is really remote. BY DR. HORN: enter into negotiations with Poland? caused great difficulties. Despite the agreement of 1934, this situation had not changed. In the year 1938 these measures against German minorities were continued by Poland. Germany wanted, with Poland, and with other countries, to reach some definite clarification. Consequently I was told, I believe during October 1938, to discuss, with the Polish Ambassador, a definite clarification of the problems between Germany and Poland.
Q Besides the minority problem, what other problems were there?
A There were two questions. One, the minority problem, was the most burning one; and the second problem was the question of Danzig and the Corridor, that is to say, a connection with East Prussia.
Q What was Hitler's attitude toward the Danzig and Corridor questions? caused the greatest difficulty since Versailles, and Hitler had to solve these problems one way or another. I, too, embraced the point of view that Danzig was under continual pressure on the part of Poland. It was being made more and more Polish. In October of 1938, from 800,000 to a million Germans left the Corridor and returned to Germany. 1935? himself, nor could he. Also, I brought the problem to him in such a way that he could discuss it in all peacefulness with his government, and did not ask for a definitive answer from him. He said that he saw great difficulties with reference to Danzig, and also that a connection between Germany and East Prussia was difficult.
promise to communicate my statements to his government and to give me an answer as soon as possible.
Q On the 17th of November, 1938, how did your second discussion end? problem had great difficulties connected with it and that Poland considered the Danzig question particularly difficult.
Q Did you then ask Lipski to step into(direct negotiations with Foreign Minister Beck?
Q Then when did Beck come to Berlin?
A Unfortunately, Beck did not come to Berlin; rather, he went to London.
Q You misunderstood my question. When did Foreign Minister Beck come to Berchtesgaden? about this problem. Thereupon -- I don't know the date exactly, but I believe it was the beginning of January -- he came to Berchtesgaden and had a long talk with Adolf Hitler.
Q What was the result of this talk?
A I was present at that conversation. The result was that Adolf Hitler informed Beck of all details of his wish for good German-Polish relations. He said that a completely new solution would have to be found regarding Danzig, and the connection with East Prussia should carry no great difficulty. Vistula, had difficulties connected with it, but he would devote himself to the problem in all its details. He did not repudiate any discussion of this problem, but rather, he pointed out the difficulties which, because of the Polish attitude, made a solution of the problem difficult.
and that he invited you, at the end of January, to make a visit to Warsaw?
A One cannot put it quite that way. After the meetingat Berchtesgaden with the Fuehrer, I had a further conversation with Beck in Munich. In this discussion Beck explained to me again that the problem was very difficult, but he would do everything he could in speaking to his governmental colleagues in an effort to find a solution. We then agreed that I would pay him a visit in Warsaw. During this visit we also spoke of the question of racial minorities and the Danzig Corridor.
Also, during this talk the theme was not carried much further; rather, Mr. Beck simply set forth the arguments again against the difficulties. I told him that it was impossible to simply leave this problem standing between Germany and Poland. I also pointed out the great difficulties implicit in the German minorities in Poland, and that it would be an undignified circumstance if Germany simply let this thing stand.
other questions. here the conversation reached no further results. did this visit take place? Or did Beck choose otherwise? visit was not an official one. Unfortunately, however, Beck did not come to Berlin, but, as I have already said, he went to London.
Q What was the reaction of his visit to London on further negotiations? Ambassador Lipski, I believe on the 21st of March, suddenly handed us a memorandum.
Q Let me interrupt you. On the 21st of March you had a conversation with Lipski regarding the division of Czechoslovakia and the problems that arose from an erection of the Protectorate? talk Lipski mentioned certain doubts of his which he had toward Germany's premise of protection to Czechoslovakia. He expressed the wish that between Hungary and Poland--two lands that had always had close connections with each other--a direct, common boundary should be established immediately. Since this was not possible, he had the feeling that Germany's protection of Czechoslovakia was directed immediately against Poland.
I told him that no one had said anything against Poland; this was a measure to point out to Hungary that these questions had to be clarified. However, I believe that Lipski looked forward to establishing a link over the Carpathia-Ukraine Mountains. British Government and the Russian Government around the 20th of March.
A Yes. Those consultations, so far as I recall, were based on the suggestion made by Lord Simon.
A common statement wasto be made with regard to Poland. But then, Poland did not regard this as satisfactory, and London made clear that this could not come into question as a solution of the Polish problem. England and France? strove for an alliance with England. promised support by England and France? England had promised Poland support?
A That became known--I can't tell you the date precisely, but it was, at any rate, the last third of March. I know, at least--it was the conviction of all of us then, and it has now become a fact--that these relations that existed in the last third of March between Warsaw and London were decisive, because of the answer that Poland, surprisingly enough, handed us in a memorandum on the 26th of March. further pursuit of the German goals regarding a change in the Danzig and Corridor questions would mean was so far as Poland was concerned?
A Yes, that is correct. That was a great surprise to us. I know that I read the memorandum, and for a moment I simply could not comprehend that such an answer had been made, when one considers that for months we had striven to find a solution, which--and I wish to emphasize this-Adolf Hitler, at that time, could bring about only because of his great authority with the German people.
I don't want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the Danzig and Corridor problems, since 1919, had been considered great problems by statesmen, and they considered that some revision of Versailles had to be undertaken. I should like to refer to statements of Winston Churchill on this subject.
a territorial revision of this Corridor would have to be undertaken. Hitler, in turn, wanted to make a clear break; he wanted to make perfectly clear to Poland that he accepted this Corridor, and that only Danzig should return to the Reich, so as to enable an economic solution. for four months, on Hitler's commission. Our surprise was all the greater when suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these goals, which we regarded as very generous, would mean war. it very quietly. Ambassador that the memorandum of the 26th of March, 1939, could not serve as the basis for a solution?
A That is true. I just said that Hitler accepted this serious report on the part of the Polish Ambassador very peacefully and that I should tell him that no solution could be founded on this basis.
Ambassador Beck traveled to London and reached a temporary agreement of mutual assistance between England and France and Poland and returned to Poland with that agreement?
Q What was the German reaction to this pact of mutual assistance?
A The German reaction--here I may refer to Hitler's Reichstag speech in which he stated his attitude towards this whole problem. We felt this pact of mutual assistance between Poland and England to be not in agreement with the German-Polish pact of 1934, for in the 1934 pact things were excluded between Germany and Poland which were then contradicted by this new pact between Poland and England. For example, Poland had obliged herself, if Germany became involved in a war with England, to enter on Germany's side. I know that Adolf Hitler felt that it was not in agreement with what he had agreed to with Chamberlain in Munich, namely, the elimination of the possibility of any complication of force between Germany and England. Poland regarding the cancellation of the Polish-German agreement of 1934?
A That was in the same Reichstag speech of the Fuehrer. This memorandum stated what I have just stated here--that the new treaty was not in agreement with the treaty of 1934 and that, consequently, Germany regarded the 1934 pact as no longer valid. about a sharpening in German-Polish relations and that new difficulties arose in the minority question?
A Yes, that is true. In the time theretofore negotiations had been taking place in order to put the minority problem on a new basis. These negotiations were before the 28th of May, and after the28th of May the situation of the German minorities in Poland become more difficult than they had been previously.
There was at that time a Polish group that was very active and carried out persecutions of Germans in Poland.
This was part of their regular program. I know that precisely. In the months that followed the 28th of May--that is to say, in the summer of 1939--the socalled reception camps for fleeing persons were set up. Turkey? How were they received in Germany? as meaning that England was undertaking systematically a policy of drawing up treaties in Europe. That was Hitler's attitude and also mine.
Q Is it true that these guarantees and that Roosevelt's messages were then, on the 22nd of May, 1939, the consequence of a German-Italian pact of assistance? And what were the reasons for this pact? friendly relations; and in view of the worsening situation in Europe, on the suggestion of Mussolini these relations were deepened and set down in a pact of assistance.
It was discussed first by Count Ciano and myself in Milan and prepared for. This was an answer to the efforts of EnglishFrench policy.
Q. Is it correct that the crisis with Poland became acute through the fact that on the 6th of August in Danzig a strike took place and thus Germany was forced to adopt an attitude?
A. Yes, that is so. There was a quarrel between the polish representatives and the senate of the city of Danzig. A note of the Polish representative was sent to the president of the Senate in which it was stated that certain persons of the senate wanted to act contrary to Polish regulations. This information proved later to be false, was answered by the senate, and led to a sharp exchange of notes between the Senate and the Polish representative. I then, on Hitler's commission, commissioned the secretary of state of the foreign office to make representations to the Polish Government.
Q. Is it true that Weisecker, on the 15th of August, called the French and English ambassadors in order to inform both these ambassadors in detail of the seriousness of the situation?
A. Yes, that is true. He did that on my commission.
Q. On the 18th of August was Henderson again asked, because the situation was becoming more acute in Poland and Danzig, to visit you?
A. Yes. Talks took place a few days later between the secretary of state and the English Ambassador. The state secretary told him in very clear words of the great difficulties in the situation and told him that things were taking a very serious development.
Q. Is it true that in this phase of the crisis you made up your mind, upon the basis of a suggestion made to you, to undertake negotiations with Russia, and what were your reasons for this?
A. Negotiations with Russia had already been undertaken sometime previously. Marshal Stalin, in March 1939, delivered a speech in which he made certain hints of his wish to have better relations with Germany. At that time I informed Adolf Hitler of this speech and asked him whether or not we couldn't see whether this hint on Stalin's part had something real behind it.
Hitler was at first hesitant; he then, however, became more and more receptive to this idea. Negotiations for commercial treaties were underway, and during these negotiations I, with the permission of the Fuehrer, conducted investigations to find out whether there could not be brought about a definite reconciliation between National Socialism and Bolshevism and whether we could not agree at least on the interests of the respective countries.
Q. How did these negotiations between the negotiators for the commercial treaty continue?
A. Negotiations of A,bassador Schnurrer in a very short length of time made clear to me the fact that Stalin had meant this speech seriously. There was an exchange of ideas and exchange of telegrams with Moscow which, in the middle of August, led to Hitler's sending a telegram to Stalin, and Stalin in his answer to this telegram invited a plenipotentiary to Moscow. The conclusion of this was the Russo-German pact.
Q. Is it true that you were sent to Moscow as plenipotentiary?
A. Yes, that is well known.
Q. When did you fly to Moscow, and what negotiations did you there carry on?
A. On the evening of the 22nd of August I arrived in Moscow. The reception given me by Stalin and Molotov was very friendly. We had at first a two hours discussion. In this discussion the entire complex of Russo-German relations was discussed. relations on a new basis. This should be expressed in a non-aggression pact. Secondly, the spheres of interests of the two countries were to be defined, which also came about through a secret additional agreement.
Q. For what reason was this secret protocol concluded? what was its content, and what were the political bases of it?
A. I should like to say, first of all, this secret protocol has been spoken about frequently here in this Court. In the negotiations at that time with Stalin and Molotov, I spoke very openly, as also the Russian gentlemen did with me. I described Hitler's desire that the two countries should reach a definitive agreement, and I also of course spoke of the critical situation in Europe. the situation in Poland and to settle it peacefully, despite everything, but I left no doubt that the situation was very serious and that it was possible that war might break out. That was in the clear. It was here a question for both statesmen, Stalin as well as Hitler, of territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. This problem would have to be solved one way or another. It was, therefore, well to look at these things from some other point of view. And just as Adolf Hitler was of the opinion that I stated in Moscow, that in some form or other this problem would have to be solved, and thus also on the Russian side it was clear that this was the case. be done by the Germans and the Russians. A line of demarcation was agreed on, it is known about, that in the event of intolerable polish provocation or if a war should break out, that this would be a boundary, so that Germany and Russia could not be accused of collusion as regards Poland.
This well known line was founded along the line of the Rivers Fisia and Bug. And it was agreed that in the case of conflict the territories lying to the west of these rivers would be the German sphere of interest, and these to the cast would be the Russian spheres of interest. was undertaken on the one hand by Germany and on the other by Russia. I may repeat that at that time I had the impression, both from Hitler and Stalin, that the territories, the Polish territories and other territories that had been delimited in these spheres of interest about which I shall speak shortly, that those were regions which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. And both statesman undoubtedly held the opinion that if the last chances for negotiations for the settlement of this problem had been exhausted, there was certainly a justification for Adolf Hilter to attempt to solve the problems connected with these territories in another way, and to incorporate these territories into Germany. were defined, Finland, the Baltic countries and Bessarabia. This was a great agreement which was reached in the interest at two great powers in the event of a peaceful settlement as well as in the case of war.
Q. Is it correct that these negotiations were drawn up specifically only in case that on the basis of the Non-aggression Pact between Russia and Germany, it should not be possible to solve the Polish question on a diplocatic basis?
A. Please repeat the question.
Q. Is it correct that this solution was thought of only in the case that, despite the pact of non-agression, the Polish question could not be solved in a diplomatic way, and only in this case was the pact to become effective?
A Yes, that is so. I stated at that time that on the German side everything would be attempted to solve the problem in a diplomatic and peaceful way.
neutrality in the search for this solution? the discussions in Moscow that this was so. It was perfectly clear that if because of the Polish attitude a war broke out, Russia would take a friendl attitude towards us. in Berlin? on the 23rd. On the 24th I returned to Germany. I had thought at first that I would fly to the Fuehrer in Berchtesgaden, but during the flight or later I was asked to come to Berlin. ment. The situation that I found there was indubitably tense. On the next day I noticed this particularly. situation be attributed? happened which generated electricity in the air--boundary incidents, difficulties between Danzig, and Poland. On the one hand, Germany was accused of interfering in Danzig, and, on the other hand, we accused Poland of taking military measures inside Danzig, and so on. informed of the signing of the Polish-British Pact of mutual assistance, and what was your and Hitler's reaction to this?
A That was on the 25th of August. On the 25th of August I found out about the conversations that the Fuehrer had had with Ambassador Henderson during my absence, I believe in Berchtesgaden. This was a very serious conversation. Henderson brought a letter from the British Prime Minister, which stated clearly that a war between Germany and Poland would involve also England.
Then on the 25th in the morning the Fuehrer answered this letter--I believe the same day--and the answer was so couched that at the moment a solution by diplomatic means could not be anticipated.
and I asked him in my turn to consider this question once more. I asked him whether we might not make one more effort with England.
This 25th of August was a very eventful day. In the morning a communication came fromthe Italian government, according to which Italy, in the case of a conflict regarding the question of Poland, would not stand at Germany's side.
The Fuehrer decided then to receive Ambassador Henderson once more in the course of that day. This meeting took place around noon of the 25th. I was present at it. The Fuehrer explained once more to Henderson in detail his earnest wish to reach an understanding with England. He described to him the very difficult situation with Poland and asked him to fly back to England to discuss this whole situation with the British Government. Ambassador Henderson agreed to this and I sent him, I believe in the course of the afternoon, a verbal note in which the Fuehrer expressed his hopes for an understanding and stated again his hope for an understanding between England and Germany, so that the ambassador could inform his government correctly of this.
Q. Is it correct that after the British-Polish guarantee became known, you asked Hitler to with draw the military measures that were being taken?
A. Yes, that is so. I just wanted to tell you about it. During the course of the afternoon, I heard in the course of the day that certain military measures were being taken and I received in the course of the afternoon, a Reuter despatch -- at any rate, a press dispatch of some sort -- that the Polish-British Pact had been ratified in London. I believe there was a note appended that the Polish Ambassador Raschitzki (?) had been sick but had nevertheless suddenly turned up in the Foreign Office in order to sign the Pact.
Q. Was this treaty signed before or after it was known that Italy would not assist Germany?
A. It was undoubtedly concluded aftersards: I, of course, do not know the hour of the day but I believe it was on the afternoon of the 25th of August, and Italy's refusal had already reached us by noon: In other words, it had been definitively decided at Rome in the morning or on the day before; at any rate, I can judge this only from other facts. Perhaps I might, however, answer your other question. When I received this press despatch, which was given to me again when I reached the Chancellory, I went immediately to Hitler and asked him to stop the military measures, whatever they were, although I was not oriented in military matters, and I told him that it was perfectly clear that this meant war with England and that England could never deny having signed that Pact with Poland, could never repudiate that Pact.
The Fuehrer reflected only a short while and then he said that was true and immediately called his military adjutant -- I believe it was Fieldmarshal Keitel-- and asked him to call together the generals and stop the military measures that were then being taken. On this occasion, he expressed himself to the effect that he said "We had received two pieces of bad news today and I hope it were possible that the"report about the attitude of Italy had been noted immediately in London" and that it was thereupon that the final Pact with Poland had been signed.
Q. Did you and Hitler, during these days, make efforts with Henderson to clear up the conflict, and what were your proposals?
A. I have already stated that the Fuehrer -- I believe it was on the 25th at noon -- told Henderson that he still and always had the intention of reaching some final understanding with England. The question of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved in some form and he wanted to make some general and conclusive offer to England in order tosettle these things in a perfectly regular way.
Q. Is it true that Hitler then put an airplane at Henderson's disposal in order to enable him to explain these proposals to his government and in order to ask his government?
A. Yes, that is true. I know Henderson -- I believe it was on the next day, the 26th -- flew to England in a German airplane but what the details of this were I don't know, but I know that the Fuehrer told him in his discussion "Take an airplane and immediately fly to your government."
Q. What results did Henderson bring back to Berlin on the 28th of August?
A. I should like to say in this connection, that in view of the critical situation between Germany and Poland, which were also know to the British Ambassador, Hitler expressed a certain disappointment to me that the British Ambassador had not returned more quickly with his answer, for the atmosphere was highly charged with electricity. On the 28th, Henderson then had a new disucssion with the Fuehrer. I was again present. The answer that Sir Neville Henderson brought back with him from London, appeared at first unsatisfactory to the Fuehrer.