of these German minorities increased. I should also like to point out-- and I know this from having read the files of the Foreign Office--that the League of Nations' Committee for Minorities had collected the vast amount of material on the Sudeten question and knew something of the pressure to which Germans were submitted in their efforts to pursue their own cultural life. I do not believe it is too much to say that the manner in which the Sudeten Germans were treated by Prague was, in the opinion of the League of Nations' experts, in no way in accord with the provisions in the League of Nations' Charter regarding minorities. I, myself, say that it was absolutely necessary, in order that this problem should not result in conflict, that again, as in the case of Austria, we would have to reach some solution. I should like to emphasize that the Foreign Office and I were always concerned,from the very beginning, to solve the Sudeten problem by way of diplomatic negotiations with the main signatory powers of Versailles, and I may add that it was my personal conviction, which I also expressed to Hitler, that if we had time enough and treated it correctly, the Germany that we had in 1938 could have solved this problem in a diplomatic and peaceful way.
in Czechoslovakia in illegal ways, and thus having brought about the culmination of this crisis. I do not deny that between the Sudeten German Party and the National Socialist Party there had long been connections which were directed to the preservation of Sudeten German interests. I also do not wish to deny, for example, what was here mentioned, that the Sudeten German Party was supported financially by the Reich. I believe that that was an open secret that was also pretty well known in Prague. Foreign Office and myself to so direct these efforts that from the direction taken serious disturbances would arise. one point. Documents have been mentioned about mistreatment of Czech nationals in Germany as reprisals for Czech treatment of Germans. I can only say to that that these were measures that could only be understood in that context, but they were not brought about by us in the Foreign Office in order to make the situation more critical, but rather on the contrary. German Party better, and also attempted to restrain it in its relations with Prague. demonstrate that. I don't have these documents here, so I cannot go into them in greater detail, but I believe that perhaps the Defense has the opportunity of seeing them.
Q How did the critical situation in the summer arise?
A Such a people had, as is natural, its own dynamic. This question of the German groups that bordered on Germany was often called by us in the Foreign Office "the mysterious problem." This problem could not so be solved by the Foreign Office as foreign policy would seem to demand. It was not a question here of world powers, but of living people who had their own dynamic. The situation was this, that the Sudeten German Party strove for greater and greater independence, and it cannot be disputed that a number of responsible leaders demanded absolute autonomy, if not, indeed, the possibility of joining the Reich.
This is entirely clear, and that was also the goal of the Sudeten German Party. this. But then, as I have already said, the attempt was made to restrain these efforts. At that time, I received Conrad Henlein once or twice -- I don't political goals that might put German foreign policy under any obligation. This, of course, was perhaps not always easy for Henlein, and I know that the leaders of the Sudeten German Party were received in other offices of the Reich and that Adolf Hitler also interested himself in this problem and on occasion received Henlein. development because on the one hand the Sudeten Germans made their demands more and more strongly at Prague; the Czech Government opposed these demands, and in this way excesses took place, arrests and so on. Thus matters became more and more critical.
At thattime, I often spoke with the Czech Ambassador. I asked him to be as generous as he could towards the efforts of the Sudeten German Party, but matters developed in such a direction that the attitude on the part of Prague became stubborn and the Sudeten Germans more demanding.
Q How did Chamberlain's visit then come about? What were the reasons for it and the role that you played on that occasion? things were moving more and more toward a crisis of some sort. Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson, with whom I had often spoken and who was making efforts on his part to improve conditions, undoubtedly made continuous reports to his government. I no longer know precisely, but I believe that it was through his initiative that Lord Runciman made his visit to Prague. Runciman undoubtedly acted in good faith, and he also received a recommendation which, as far as I recall, was to the effect that the right of self-determination of the Sudetenland could not fail to be recognized. Nevertheless, the crisis was there.
I don't remember exactly what the date was, but I believe it happened that through Ambassador Henderson, Chamberlain got in touch with the Reich Government.
In this way it happened that in the first half of September Chamberlain visited the Fuehrer on the Obersalzburg.
Regarding this visit, not very much can be said. The Fuehrer spoke alone with Chamberlain at that time. I do know, however, that we all felt that this was carried out in an altogether good and pleasant atmosphere. So far as I can now recall, the Fuehrer told me then that he had told Chamberlain frankly that the demand of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination and freedom would have to be met in some form or other. Chamberlain -- and this was the substance of that conference -- answered that he would inform the British Cabinet of these German wishes and would get in touch with Hitler later.
Q How did the second visit of Chamberlain to Godesberg then come about?
A So far as I recall, matters did not progress satisfactorily. The situation in the Sudetenland became more difficult and threatened to develop into a very serious crisis, not only within Czechoslovakia but also between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and into a European crisis. Thus it came about anew that Chamberlain took the initiative and in the middle of September visited Godesberg. in this solution?
A I might first report regarding Godesberg. In Godesberg, Hitler, in view of the crisis that had developed, informed Chamberlain that now he had to have a solution of this question under any circumstances. I may emphasize that I knew nothing regarding details of a military nature at that time, but I do knew that the Fuehrer concerned himself with the possibility that this problem might also be solved militarily. He said in Godesberg to Mr. Chamberlain that a solution of the Sudeten German problems would have to be found as rapidly as possible. Mr. Chamberlain was of the opinion that it would be difficult to persuade Prague to a quick solution, and finally things bogged down altogether in the conference.
Adolf Hitler dictated a memorandum which I was give to Chamberlain. Then Sir Horace Wilson, who was a friend of Chamberlain, visited me and I made arrangements for a new meeting. Fuehrer received a report of Czechoslovakia's mobilization. This was a most deplorable circumstance since Hitler felt that very strongly and both he and Chamberlain wanted to interrupt the conference. that negotiations were undertaken. After a few hours of negotiations the result was the Chamberlain told the Fuehrer he could see now that something would have to be done and he was ready, on his part, to submit this memorandum to the British cabinet. I believe he also said that he would recommend to the British Cabinet, that is to say his ministerial colleagues, that the memorandum should be recommended to Prague. The contents of the memorandum suggested, as a general solution, the annexation of the Sudetenland by Prague. I believe the Fuehrer stated in the memorandum his wish that in view of the critical situation there, it would be advisable that it should be decided upon within a certain period of time -- by the first of October, which was ten or fourteen days from that time.
Mr. Chamberlain then departed and a few days passed. The crisis did not improve but became worse. I remember that very well. Then, during the latter part of September, the French Ambassador reported to me and said that he had a report in regard to the Sudetenland question to bring to me, and later, the British Ambassador came. At the same time, Goering has already testified to this, Italy entered into the negotiations on the wish of Mussolini and offered to mediate. Mussolini proposed that a conference be held which should be attended by England, France and Germany, and this proposal was accepted. the probable solution which could be reached between England, France and Germany, this being the solution that he had thought out for the Sudetenland problem. The French Ambassador stated this solution was not satisfactory and further discussions would have to be conducted regarding the question as to exactly how far Sudetenland extended and what the German population was in certain places.
of this conference, I should like only to describe briefly the results of it. The Fuehrer explained to the statesmen, with the aid of a map, the necessity of the question and which part of the Sudetenland would have to be annexed to Germany. Discussions arose and the Italian Chief of State, Mussolini, agreed in general with Hitler's ideas. The English Prime Minister at first made certain counter-proposals and spoke of the fact that perhaps this could be discussed in detail with the Czechs. Daladier, the French Prime Minister, said, so far as I recall, that he thought that once these proposals had been entered upon the Four Great Powers could reach a solution and finally, at the conclusion of the four statements we were of this opinion and the Munich Agreement was drawn up in which the Sudetenland -- in which it was decided that the Sudetenland should be annexed to Germany as outlined on the map that was there. emphasize that here particularly. I also was happy, particularly in view of other versions of this matter that I have heard during the Trial here. we were very happy that this matter had been solved in this way.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 2:00 o'clock.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning at ten o'clock until one in open session. And, now, before going on, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal wishes me to say that they think that entirely too much time is being taken up by the defendant in detailed accounts of negotiations which led up to an agreement, which is a matter of history, and which is perfectly well known to everybody. That is not the case which the defendant has to meet. What the defendant has to meet is not the making of agreements which are perfectly well known, but the breach of those agreements by Germany and any part which he may have played in the breach of those agreements. It is very important that the time of this Tribunal should not be taken up by unnecessary detail of that sort. BY DR. HORN:
Q. What foreign political reaction did the Munich agreement have?
A. The Munich agreement, as is well known, contained the following. What Germany and England would not wage war; that by the naval agreement the ratio of 100 to 35 is to be maintained and that in important matters consultations were to be resorted to. Through this agreement, undoubtedly; the atmosphere between Germany and England was cleared up to a certain degree. I was to be expected and hoped that the consequences of this pact would bring about a final understanding. This appointment was really very great when a few days after Munich, rearmament at any price was made known in England. Then England started on a policy of close relationship with France and a working together in November of 1938. Commercial measures were taken towards Germany, and in December of '38, the British secretary for colonies made a speech, in which he was against any revision of the colonial question.
There were negotiations with the United States of America under consideration, also, and our reports, as I remember them, showed an increase of the stiffening of the English position towards Germany, and the impression was created in Germany of politics which practically would limit Germany.
Q. You are accused by the Prosecution of having acted against International Law for the solution of the Czechoslovakian question in separating the two states, the Czech and the Slovanian state. What part did you take in the solution of this problem?
A. There is no doubt that the efforts that were being made between Slovakia and other members of the National Socialist Party were known to the Foreign Office, and it would be wrong to say that we were unsympathetic to the stand. But it is not correct to say that the atonomy of the state was to be attacked. I remember that Dr. Tiso proclaimed this atonomy, and the Prague Government wished to recognize and did recognize the atonomy. As circumstance were at that time after Munich one can see from the fact that all national parts of Czechoslovakia were interested in atonomy and independence. Shortly thereafter the tripartite group made known its independence and some of the other groups made similar efforts in that behalf. After the Munich agreement, I would like to add that there was a clause in this agreement, according to which Germany and Italy would give Czechoslovakia a guarantee, but this declaration was never made. The reason for that was that Poland, according to the Munich agreement, or after it, sent an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia so that the Polish minorities of their own account would he separated and these areas were occupied by Poland. The Hungarians also wanted atonomy of a connection with Hungary. The situation in Czechoslovakia was not clear at that time and took form along difficult lines.
Then the Slovak, Tuka, came to us. He wanted to win Germany for the independence of Czechoslovakia. He wanted Germany to approve a step like tha The Fuehrer received Tuka at that time and, after a few preliminary remarks, the declaration of independence of Slovakia resulted, and that was on the 13th of March.
said, in this conversation which took place between the Fuehrer and Tuka, that it was only a matter of hours, instead of days, in which Czechoslovakia would have to make a decision. However, it was to be interpreted at that time that on the part of Hungary preparations for an invasion were present in order to occupy some of the regions of Czechoslovakia. He wanted to prevent this, and Hitler was of the opinion that there might be a war between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and he gladly agreed with the wish ot Tiso. Later, after the declaration of independence of Czechoslovakia, he agreed upon Tito's request, and took over the protection of Czechoslovakia.
Q What were some of the preceding events of Hacha's visit to Berlin on the 14th of March, 1933? chiefly with regard to Hitler those excesses against Volksdeutsche in the region of Prague, Bruenn and Biglau and other districts. Many fled to the Reich. with the Prague Government. Hitler was of the opinion and of the conviction that any negotiations that might be started in Prague would not be tolerated by the German Reich. The Fuehrer wished that Czechoslovakia would reduce its military power but this was denied by Prague. In these months I tried repeatedly to keep and maintain good relations between Germany and Prague, above all. I spoke frequently with Chvalkovski, the Slovakian Foreign Minister and in March Chvalkovski turned to our German representative in Prague to find out whether Hitler would grant Hacha a personal interview. I reported this to the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer agreed to receive Hacha. He then told me that he washed to deal with this matter personally. To that effect there was an exchange of wires with Prague; that a reserved attitude should be taken but that the Fuehrer would receive Hacha. not receive information of military plans. We found out about these things only shortly before these things took place, just a few days before. agreement was to be prepared. The Fuehrer answered as I recall distinctly that he was of the opinion that we should go much beyond that. told me that he wanted to put the fate of Czechoslovakia -- that he wanted to put the fate of this country into the Fuehrer's hands. I told the Fuehrer about this and the Fuehrer instructed me to prepare an agreement. The draf was submitted to him and Hacha was received by the Fuehrer and the contents of this conference as far as I know is already known and has been presented in documentary form so I do not have to go into it in detail.
explained to him that he intended to occupy Czechoslovakia. He was concerned with the old historic territory which he intended to put under his protection. The Czechs were to have their complete economy and their own life and he believed that the decision which was being made at that time would work out to be very fortunate for the Czech people. Shortly thereafter I had a long discussion with the Foreign Minister Chvalkovski. He was agreeable to our point of view and I asked him to persuade Hacha to that effect so that the Fuehrer's decision and the whole action involved could be carried through without the shedding of blood. things which Hitler told him, which caused him to get in touch with his government in Prague. He got in touch with them by phone -- I believe with the Chief of Staff although I do not know this exactly -- and then got the approval of his government so that the agreement which I have already mentioned could be concluded. This agreement was then signed by Hitler, Hacha, the Foreign Minister and myself. Then Hacha, as I recall, gave instructions that the German Army was to be received cordially and as far as I am informed, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, that is Bohemia and Moravia, took place without incident of any sort.
After the occupation I traveled to Prague with the Fuehrer. In Prague, after the occupation,the Fuehrer gave me a proclamation, which declared that the countries of Bohemia and Moravia were to be protectorates of the Reich. This proclamation was a surprise to me and I read this proclamation in Prague. No protest of any sort was made according to my recollection and I believe I might mention that the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, the Fuehrer considered necessary and in the best interests of the Reich and the occupation took place also for historical and economic reasons and above all for security reasons. I believe that Goering has touched on these points. over of the rest of Czechoslovakia? lengthy discussion with the Fuehrer. I pointed out to the Fuehrer that this occupation, of course, would have important repercussions with the British and French.
In this connection I would like to add that in England those circles which had taken a position against Germany had grown larger and were led by important personalities. incident which took place while I was still Ambassador in London. I had a visit from Winston Churchill at the Embassy. Mr. Winston Churchill was not in Parliament at that time and I believe he was not leader of the opposition but he was one of the most significant personalities in England. I was especially interested in arranging a meeting between him and Adolf Hitler and had asked Churchill to come to see me at the Embassy for that reason. We had a conversation which lasted many hours and a conversation which I recall exactly. I believe it would take us too far afield to mention all details covered in this conversation. But, as Lord Vansittart in 1936 -
THE PRESIDENT: Documents with reference to Mr. Winston Churchill at this time when he was not a member of the government have already been ruled by the Tribunal to be irrelevant and what he said and such a conversation as this appears to the Tribunal to be absolutely irrelevant and the Tribunal will not hear it.
A (continued) I have already said that I called the attention of the Fuehrer to the British reaction. Hitler told me and explained to me the necessity of the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, especially on historic and strategic grounds. I remember that in this connection he cited the French Minister of Aviation Pierre Cat, that Czechoslovakia would be a mothership against Germany and I believe at that time we received intelligence and records of Russian fleets and Russian missions on Czech airdromes. Hitler said, and I remember these words distinctly, that he could not have a foreign Czechoslovakian thorn in German flesh. One could get along really well with Czechoslovakia but it was important that Germany have in her hands the protection of these countries. He mentioned further Soviet Russia as a factor of inestimable power if it were allied with Czechoslovakia. When I mentioned England he said that England was in no position to take over the protection of the Germans in Czechoslovakia and the Czech State and its structure had spli asunder and it was in the interest of German-English relations and he also considered it necessary that the countries of Bohemia and Moravia be in very close contact with the Reich. A protectorate seemed to be the best answer to this problem and for Germany this question was absolutely vital.
At once glance at the map -- and he used these exact words -- he "couldn't see how this occupation could disturb collaboration between Germany and England. and could therefore understand that such problems would have to be solved.
I told Hitler about the difficulties which Mr. Chamberlain personally might have from the steps which were being taken by Germany, that England might consider that Germany was increasing very strongly in power, but the Fuehrer explained the whole question to me with the reasons I have already just mentioned. Commons. Chamberlain said it wasn't a violation of the Munich agreement and the British Government was not tied to an obligation. The Czech State was decomposed and the guarantee which England had given was not to be invoked, or the obligation to carry through the guarantee did not apply. England. I believe it was two or three days later when Mr.-
THE PRESIDENT (interposing): What have we to do with the reactions in England unless they took the form of a note? I don't see what it has to do with it. What we want to know is the part the defendant Ribbentrop played in the breach of the Munich agreement.
DR. HORN: The defendant von Ribbentrop is accused of having participated in a conspiracy in the person of Foreign Minister, and that the conduct of carrying through foreign political activity was connected with aggressive war. If and when he is to defend himself against these charges he must picture circumstances as he saw them and to enumerate the motives which ruled him. He must be in a position to enumerate them, and I am asking him questions only about things which determined his views and opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you asked him any question about it.
THE INTERPRETER: It is not coming through quite audibly.
THE PRESIDENT: What I said was, I didn't think you asked him any questions as to the reactions in England.
THE INTERPRETER: The channels seems to be disturbed in some way. I think he is getting more than one language.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you hear me now?
DR. HORN: Now I can hear.
THE PRESIDENT: Can Doctor Horn hear?
DR. HORN: Now there are two languages on the same channel. French is one of the languages I get on this channel. There are still two languages on this channel. (Pause) I can still hear two languages including German.
(Pause) Now I can hear German.
Now I can hear French. (Pause)
THE PRESIDENT: Is it coming through now?
DR. HORN: Yes.
(Pause)
Just now we had two German voices, a lady's voice and gentleman's. Now I can hear a gentleman speaking French.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had better adjourn, I think.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what I was attempting to say to you when the system broke down was that it seems to the Tribunal that the defendant ought to be able to keep his evidence within stricter limits and not to go into so much detail; and that with regard to the reactions -- the political reactions-in England, they are not relevant in themselves, and any bearing which they may have upon the case is really remote. BY DR. HORN: enter into negotiations with Poland? caused great difficulties. Despite the agreement of 1934, this situation had not changed. In the year 1938 these measures against German minorities were continued by Poland. Germany wanted, with Poland, and with other countries, to reach some definite clarification. Consequently I was told, I believe during October 1938, to discuss, with the Polish Ambassador, a definite clarification of the problems between Germany and Poland.
Q Besides the minority problem, what other problems were there?
A There were two questions. One, the minority problem, was the most burning one; and the second problem was the question of Danzig and the Corridor, that is to say, a connection with East Prussia.
Q What was Hitler's attitude toward the Danzig and Corridor questions? caused the greatest difficulty since Versailles, and Hitler had to solve these problems one way or another. I, too, embraced the point of view that Danzig was under continual pressure on the part of Poland. It was being made more and more Polish. In October of 1938, from 800,000 to a million Germans left the Corridor and returned to Germany. 1935? himself, nor could he. Also, I brought the problem to him in such a way that he could discuss it in all peacefulness with his government, and did not ask for a definitive answer from him. He said that he saw great difficulties with reference to Danzig, and also that a connection between Germany and East Prussia was difficult.
promise to communicate my statements to his government and to give me an answer as soon as possible.
Q On the 17th of November, 1938, how did your second discussion end? problem had great difficulties connected with it and that Poland considered the Danzig question particularly difficult.
Q Did you then ask Lipski to step into(direct negotiations with Foreign Minister Beck?
Q Then when did Beck come to Berlin?
A Unfortunately, Beck did not come to Berlin; rather, he went to London.
Q You misunderstood my question. When did Foreign Minister Beck come to Berchtesgaden? about this problem. Thereupon -- I don't know the date exactly, but I believe it was the beginning of January -- he came to Berchtesgaden and had a long talk with Adolf Hitler.
Q What was the result of this talk?
A I was present at that conversation. The result was that Adolf Hitler informed Beck of all details of his wish for good German-Polish relations. He said that a completely new solution would have to be found regarding Danzig, and the connection with East Prussia should carry no great difficulty. Vistula, had difficulties connected with it, but he would devote himself to the problem in all its details. He did not repudiate any discussion of this problem, but rather, he pointed out the difficulties which, because of the Polish attitude, made a solution of the problem difficult.
and that he invited you, at the end of January, to make a visit to Warsaw?
A One cannot put it quite that way. After the meetingat Berchtesgaden with the Fuehrer, I had a further conversation with Beck in Munich. In this discussion Beck explained to me again that the problem was very difficult, but he would do everything he could in speaking to his governmental colleagues in an effort to find a solution. We then agreed that I would pay him a visit in Warsaw. During this visit we also spoke of the question of racial minorities and the Danzig Corridor.
Also, during this talk the theme was not carried much further; rather, Mr. Beck simply set forth the arguments again against the difficulties. I told him that it was impossible to simply leave this problem standing between Germany and Poland. I also pointed out the great difficulties implicit in the German minorities in Poland, and that it would be an undignified circumstance if Germany simply let this thing stand.
other questions. here the conversation reached no further results. did this visit take place? Or did Beck choose otherwise? visit was not an official one. Unfortunately, however, Beck did not come to Berlin, but, as I have already said, he went to London.
Q What was the reaction of his visit to London on further negotiations? Ambassador Lipski, I believe on the 21st of March, suddenly handed us a memorandum.
Q Let me interrupt you. On the 21st of March you had a conversation with Lipski regarding the division of Czechoslovakia and the problems that arose from an erection of the Protectorate? talk Lipski mentioned certain doubts of his which he had toward Germany's premise of protection to Czechoslovakia. He expressed the wish that between Hungary and Poland--two lands that had always had close connections with each other--a direct, common boundary should be established immediately. Since this was not possible, he had the feeling that Germany's protection of Czechoslovakia was directed immediately against Poland.
I told him that no one had said anything against Poland; this was a measure to point out to Hungary that these questions had to be clarified. However, I believe that Lipski looked forward to establishing a link over the Carpathia-Ukraine Mountains. British Government and the Russian Government around the 20th of March.
A Yes. Those consultations, so far as I recall, were based on the suggestion made by Lord Simon.
A common statement wasto be made with regard to Poland. But then, Poland did not regard this as satisfactory, and London made clear that this could not come into question as a solution of the Polish problem. England and France? strove for an alliance with England. promised support by England and France? England had promised Poland support?
A That became known--I can't tell you the date precisely, but it was, at any rate, the last third of March. I know, at least--it was the conviction of all of us then, and it has now become a fact--that these relations that existed in the last third of March between Warsaw and London were decisive, because of the answer that Poland, surprisingly enough, handed us in a memorandum on the 26th of March. further pursuit of the German goals regarding a change in the Danzig and Corridor questions would mean was so far as Poland was concerned?
A Yes, that is correct. That was a great surprise to us. I know that I read the memorandum, and for a moment I simply could not comprehend that such an answer had been made, when one considers that for months we had striven to find a solution, which--and I wish to emphasize this-Adolf Hitler, at that time, could bring about only because of his great authority with the German people.
I don't want to get lost in details, but I do want to say that the Danzig and Corridor problems, since 1919, had been considered great problems by statesmen, and they considered that some revision of Versailles had to be undertaken. I should like to refer to statements of Winston Churchill on this subject.
a territorial revision of this Corridor would have to be undertaken. Hitler, in turn, wanted to make a clear break; he wanted to make perfectly clear to Poland that he accepted this Corridor, and that only Danzig should return to the Reich, so as to enable an economic solution. for four months, on Hitler's commission. Our surprise was all the greater when suddenly, the other side declared that a further pursuit of these goals, which we regarded as very generous, would mean war. it very quietly. Ambassador that the memorandum of the 26th of March, 1939, could not serve as the basis for a solution?