He also said this especially, as I recall. I believe he mentioned four special problems which, sooner or later, would have to be solved. He emphasized that such problems could be solved only with a strong Wehrmacht, not in the using of this Wehrmacht, but in the existence of the Wehrmacht, because a country which was not strongly armed could not carry on foreign policies, as we had experienced it in previous years. A country like that was really operating in a vacuum. He said we would have to enter upon a clear-cut relationship with our neighbors.
The four problems which he enumerated were, first of all, Austria; then he mentioned the solution of the Sudeten question; he spoke about Memel Land; he spoke about Danzig and the Corridor. He mentioned these as problems which would have to be solved in one way or another, and it was to be my task to assist him diplomatically. preparation of a solution of these problems, as he had expressed it to me, in a German sense.
THE PRESIDENT: I believe this would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken.)
policy continue? view of the business of the foreign office. German foreign policy, as I said before, had reached a certain point, namely, the point at which Germany had again achieved prestige in the eyes of the world. It was now a question of solving the important and basis problems that had resulted from the Versailles Treaty in Europe. This was all the more necessary as, for instance, the question of Volkstum led again to conflicts and thereby prevented peaceful solutions. ministry. That was at first not easy, as I was dealing with altogether new men, attitude toward the foreign office, and in the further pursuance of my efforts and of the efforts of my predecessor I saw it as my most important task to bring the foreign office closer to Hitler and to strike a bridge between the two fields. try that I was working under a certain shadow and that certain limitation were placed upon me -- that is to say, that I would not be in a position to so conduct the foreign policy as a foreign minister might otherwise be expected to do who was responsible to a parliament in a parliamentary system. The enormous personality of the Fuehrer dominated foreign policy, of course. He concerned himself with it in all detail. foreign policy reports through a liaison man, and he in turn gave me certain tasks, etc. problem of Austria, which had to firm some solution or other. Austria was from the very beginning a matter very close to the Fuehrer's heart, because he was an Austrian himself -- had been -- and it was of course clear that with the growing power of Germany the efforts that had existed for a long time for a closer connection between Germany and Austria would be carried out even more strongly than before.
At that time I was not so familiar with this problem, since the situation was such that Hitler handled this problem personally. randum dealing with a conference that took place on the 5th of November 1937 that is here referred to as the "Hoszbach" document?
A This document, which has been spoken of here several times, I did'n know of. I saw it here for the first time.
Q Did Hitler say anything in the spirit of this document to you ? but it was the Fuehrer's practice to speak with me very little about his goals and intentions. At any rate, he did so toward me very slightly. He did speak of the fact that Germany had to solve certain problems in Europe -- as I have already said -- and that for this reason it was necessary to be strong. He also spoke of the possibility that in this matter it could come to some sort of a showdown, but he told me nothing more specific about this, On the contrary, he always emphasized to me that it was his wish to solve these problems which had to be solved by way of diplomacy, and that once he had solved these problems he had the intention of creating what he called an ideal "Folk State" and that he would thereby create a model modern social state. In other words, to me he did mention the possibility of a military settlement, but he stated to me as his highest goal that it was his intention to achieve this solution of the impossibility of Versailles, as he called them, in a peaceful way. chtesgaden to speak with Hitler and Schuschnigg. What was discussed there and what was your role at this conference?
A I see that this is on the 12th of February 1938. Hitler then informed me that he was going to confer with federal chancellor Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. I see from my notes that this was on the 12th of February. In the meantime he told me what the solution was that he was pursuing and that in some form or other the German National Socialists in Austria must be assisted.
longer recall. At any rate, there were a number of National Socialtist in jail and as a consequence of the natural efforts of these people to bring about a social union between Austria and the Reich, these Austrian problems threatened to become a really serios source of difficulty between Germany and Austria. Hitler had asserted that he intended -- I believe this was in the year 1938 -to achieve the rights of self-determination that these six million Austrian Germans had. I did not know about this personally.
At the meetinf with Schschnigg on the Obersalzberg I was present. Hitler received Schuschnigg alone and had a long conversation with him. Details about this conversation are not known to me because I was not present at it. I recall that Schuschnigg after this talk met me, and that I in my turn had a long conversation with him. under political presure? whereas the other details of other meetings on the Obersalzberg are not so clear in my memory, since I was not present at either the first or the second meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. very friendly way. I felt that Schuschnigg had received a very strong impresssion from Hitler and the Fuehrer's personality. discussed with Schuschnigg, so that I could not speak to him about this matter -- or at least only very little. The talk confined itself to more general themes. I told Schuschmigg that in my opinion, these two countries must come closely together and that it was his historical task to assist in this.
long be held separate by artificial means.
Q. Was there any mention of the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 at this conference?
A. I did not speak to Schuschnigg on this point.- I believe also that the Fuehrer -- I don't know the details -- the Fuehrer talked to him to this effect: That certain measures would have to be carried out in Austria in order to obviate the reason for conflict between the two countries. expressed to Schuschnigg the thought that the two countries should enter into closer relations. Schuschnigg adopted to me an altogether positive attitude so that at that time to a certain extent I was surprised by this positive attitude on his part. The discussion of the Fuehrer with him I believe was conducted in perfectly open terms, because the Fuehrer wanted, in the interest of obviating these problems between the two countries, to reach some improvement in relations; and if this was to be done then statesmen must be open and frank with one another.
I have heard here -- and I think this is based on an entry in Jodl's Diary -- that heavy military and political pressure was exerted. I believe I can testify here that I knew nothing of any military or political pressure at this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. I may reiterate, certainly the Feuhrer spoke perfectly frankly with Schuschnigg, but there can be no question of a pressure of a military nature or of a political nature, nor can there be any question of an ultimatum of any sort.
I also believe that Jodl's remark -- I don't believe he was present -it was perhaps only a notation in his diary that he had from hearsay. many people, including the Fuehrer -- I had an altogether pleasand and positive impression of Schuschnigg's personality. Schuschnigg indeed spoke of the fact that the two countries -- and I remember his words very exactly -- were fatefully bound together, and that he would have to assist in some way to bring these two countries closer together.
There was no talk in this discussion of Anschluss or any such thing. Whether the Fuehrer mentioned that I don't know, but I don't believe so.
Q. At that time, or shortly after, did the Fuehrer speak to you about an intention to depart from the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 and wished to find some other solution?
A. Hitler did not speak to me about this. On the question of Austria in toto I spoke very little with him. This may sound remarkable, but it can be understood from the fact that it was only on the 4th of February that I took over the foreign office, and I first had to work my way into all the problems. The Austrian problem was, as I already said, a problem with which Hilter concerned himself personally, which, consequently, was simply taken note of in the Foreign Ministry, and it was directed by him personally. Hitler, and the Foreign Office only received copies of his report. These reports were presented immediately to Hitler by the Reich Chancellory, so that the Foreign Office had nothing to do with them.
Q. You then went back to London in order to take your leave as Ambassador. What did you hear in London regarding the development of the Austrian question?
A. I may say the following in this connection: I personally could see a solution of the Austrian problem of this sort: That the two countries should have a customs union, as I personally believed that in this way the problem could be solved in its most natural way and close relations could be brought about between the two countries. I might remind you at this point that this thought of a customs union was already an old one and had already been proposed by governments before Hitler's, and I believe because of the interference of allied countries it was not brought about.
According to my notes, on the 8th of March I went to London. The situation then was this, as I have already mentioned. On the event of the celebration of the taking over of power on the 30th of January, I was in Berlin. Then on ment I did not have opportunity to take official leave from London.
On the 8th of March 1938, I returned to London. about English matters. I remember that he remarked on this occasion that the Austrian problem was progressing very nicely in the direction that had been discussed at Berchtesgaden with Schuschnigg. I must say that I did not know of what agreements had been reached in all the details. man. I reached London, and in the afternoon I heard, more or less by accident, over the radio in the legation building, a speech which the then Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg made in Innsbruck. I don't want to go into detail, that would take too long. I do know that the entire manner, and as it seemed to me, also the tone of this speech, was such that I immediately got the notion that the Fuehrer would not tolerate this; and that the entire speech, without any doubt, stood in contradiction to the spirit with which the conferences had been carried out on the Obersalzberg. take something, and I should like to say this also, perfectly openly, before this Tribunal. It appeared quite correct to me that the solution of this problem would take some form or other. We had to talk very openly with Schuschnigg in order to prevent things from coming to a catastrophe, even a European catastrophe.
Then on the next morning I had a long discussion with Lord Halifax. Lord Halifax had also received reports from Austria, and I attempted, without knowing very much about the situation, to persuade him that it would be better to solve this problem now in one form or another, and that it was precisely to the interest of German-English efforts toward friendship that this solution should take place now. It would be false to believe that the friendship between Germany and England that both of us were striving for would thereby be damaged.
the opportunity to speak with the Prime Minister Chamberlain the next morning at breakfast. Subsequently a breakfast was arranged with Chamberlain, and after this breakfast I had a long talk with Chamberlain. In this conference Mr. Chamberlain again emphasized his desire to reach an understanding with Germany. I was extraordinarily happy to hear this, and told him that I was of the firm conviction that this was also the Fuehrer's attitude. He gave me a specific message to the Fuehrer, that this was his attitude, and that he would do everything he could in this direction. from the English consul. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax asked me -- I believe the breakfast was in 10 Downing Street -- to come to their office in order to discuss these telegrams. I told him of course I had no precise reports, no knowledge of an ultimatum, and then later of the entrance of German troops. We arranged that we would maintain connections and would meet later, and that Lord Halifax would come to the German Embassy later to discuss these things further.
I must emphasize here, too, Mr. Chamberlain had beenvery quiet and it seemed to me, had a reasonable attitude towards the Austrian question. In the afternoon, Lord Halifax visited me and we had a long talk. In the meantime, the entrance of German troops had become known. I should like to emphasize the fact that this talk with Lord Halifax was very friendly and that at the conclusion of it, I invited the English Foreign Minister to a visit to Germany again. He said that he would be glad to come and perhaps another hunting party could be arranged. defendant Goering? This telephone conversation has been put in evidence by the prosecution, with the assertion that it is a sign of the doubletongued policy that you were carrying out? conversation and diplomatic conversations are carried on all over the world in the same way but I may say here that through this telephone conversation, I found out for the first time the real details of this Austrian affair. Without going into details I heard, above all, that this vote did not correspond to the real will of the Austrian people and a number of other points which I asked Goering to mention in his conversations with the English ministers; but I should like to say that for practical purposes, these discussions did not take place later because as I was taking leave from official English circles, on the basis of the talks I had with Goering, I had no further talks with Goering but sometime after, a short time after my telephone conversation with Goering, left London and went to Berlin and later to Vienna. I night say that first I went to Karin Hall to visit Goering and spoke with him there regarding the Anschluss--not about the Anschluss but about the whole development of circumstances in Austria. He was just as happy about this as I was. We all were happy. I flew, then, on the same day to Vienna and arrived there at about the same time as Hitler. I heard, in the meantime, about the Anschluss and it was in Vienna that I first heard that the thought of the Anschluss occurred to Hitler only during his travels through Austria. I believe it was on the occasion of a demonstration in Linz that this thought came to him and then, I think, he rapidly made up his mind to carry on the Anschluss.
solved in the question of the Anschluss? Sudeten Germans but this problem was not a problem emanating from the foreign office or Hitler or any office -- it was a problem that simply developed from itself. I believe it was the American prosecutor who told me, who said here that with the annexation of Czechoslovakia, a chapter had reached its conclusion that was shameful in the whole history of the relation between people, namely the destruction of the small Czechoslovak people. I should like to state the following from my own knowledge of these matters. One may speak perhaps of a Czechoslovakian State but not of the Czechoslovak people. This was a State, a nationality State, that contained the most heterogeneous folk groups. There were, besides Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, and Carpatho-Ukrainians. It was in itself a heterogeneous collection of elements that had been welded together in 1919 to form Czechoslovakia. It is certain, and a historical fact, that the efforts, of the different nationalities within the State were directed towards different aims and it was therefore necessary to surround the State with a so-called "iron ring". This pressure created counter-pressure on the part of the various peoples with the state and it is entirely clear that a strong Germany, a Germany of National Socialism at that time was interested in all the folk groups, forall the folk groups that bordered on Germany, and also had a great influence on these folk groups. It thus happened that the German minorities in the Sudetenland, who, since 1919, had been submitted to a considerable pressure on the part of Prague, now were submittedto an even greater pressure. I do not believe I have to enter into any details but I know, from my own knowledge and even from personal discussion that took place during my ambassadorship in London, that the question of the Sudetenland was a very clear concept of the Foreign Office in London and that it was precisely England that very often before 1936 had come out in favor of certain demands made by the Sudeten Germans, demands as expressed by Conrad Henlein.
of these German minorities increased. I should also like to point out-- and I know this from having read the files of the Foreign Office--that the League of Nations' Committee for Minorities had collected the vast amount of material on the Sudeten question and knew something of the pressure to which Germans were submitted in their efforts to pursue their own cultural life. I do not believe it is too much to say that the manner in which the Sudeten Germans were treated by Prague was, in the opinion of the League of Nations' experts, in no way in accord with the provisions in the League of Nations' Charter regarding minorities. I, myself, say that it was absolutely necessary, in order that this problem should not result in conflict, that again, as in the case of Austria, we would have to reach some solution. I should like to emphasize that the Foreign Office and I were always concerned,from the very beginning, to solve the Sudeten problem by way of diplomatic negotiations with the main signatory powers of Versailles, and I may add that it was my personal conviction, which I also expressed to Hitler, that if we had time enough and treated it correctly, the Germany that we had in 1938 could have solved this problem in a diplomatic and peaceful way.
in Czechoslovakia in illegal ways, and thus having brought about the culmination of this crisis. I do not deny that between the Sudeten German Party and the National Socialist Party there had long been connections which were directed to the preservation of Sudeten German interests. I also do not wish to deny, for example, what was here mentioned, that the Sudeten German Party was supported financially by the Reich. I believe that that was an open secret that was also pretty well known in Prague. Foreign Office and myself to so direct these efforts that from the direction taken serious disturbances would arise. one point. Documents have been mentioned about mistreatment of Czech nationals in Germany as reprisals for Czech treatment of Germans. I can only say to that that these were measures that could only be understood in that context, but they were not brought about by us in the Foreign Office in order to make the situation more critical, but rather on the contrary. German Party better, and also attempted to restrain it in its relations with Prague. demonstrate that. I don't have these documents here, so I cannot go into them in greater detail, but I believe that perhaps the Defense has the opportunity of seeing them.
Q How did the critical situation in the summer arise?
A Such a people had, as is natural, its own dynamic. This question of the German groups that bordered on Germany was often called by us in the Foreign Office "the mysterious problem." This problem could not so be solved by the Foreign Office as foreign policy would seem to demand. It was not a question here of world powers, but of living people who had their own dynamic. The situation was this, that the Sudeten German Party strove for greater and greater independence, and it cannot be disputed that a number of responsible leaders demanded absolute autonomy, if not, indeed, the possibility of joining the Reich.
This is entirely clear, and that was also the goal of the Sudeten German Party. this. But then, as I have already said, the attempt was made to restrain these efforts. At that time, I received Conrad Henlein once or twice -- I don't political goals that might put German foreign policy under any obligation. This, of course, was perhaps not always easy for Henlein, and I know that the leaders of the Sudeten German Party were received in other offices of the Reich and that Adolf Hitler also interested himself in this problem and on occasion received Henlein. development because on the one hand the Sudeten Germans made their demands more and more strongly at Prague; the Czech Government opposed these demands, and in this way excesses took place, arrests and so on. Thus matters became more and more critical.
At thattime, I often spoke with the Czech Ambassador. I asked him to be as generous as he could towards the efforts of the Sudeten German Party, but matters developed in such a direction that the attitude on the part of Prague became stubborn and the Sudeten Germans more demanding.
Q How did Chamberlain's visit then come about? What were the reasons for it and the role that you played on that occasion? things were moving more and more toward a crisis of some sort. Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson, with whom I had often spoken and who was making efforts on his part to improve conditions, undoubtedly made continuous reports to his government. I no longer know precisely, but I believe that it was through his initiative that Lord Runciman made his visit to Prague. Runciman undoubtedly acted in good faith, and he also received a recommendation which, as far as I recall, was to the effect that the right of self-determination of the Sudetenland could not fail to be recognized. Nevertheless, the crisis was there.
I don't remember exactly what the date was, but I believe it happened that through Ambassador Henderson, Chamberlain got in touch with the Reich Government.
In this way it happened that in the first half of September Chamberlain visited the Fuehrer on the Obersalzburg.
Regarding this visit, not very much can be said. The Fuehrer spoke alone with Chamberlain at that time. I do know, however, that we all felt that this was carried out in an altogether good and pleasant atmosphere. So far as I can now recall, the Fuehrer told me then that he had told Chamberlain frankly that the demand of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination and freedom would have to be met in some form or other. Chamberlain -- and this was the substance of that conference -- answered that he would inform the British Cabinet of these German wishes and would get in touch with Hitler later.
Q How did the second visit of Chamberlain to Godesberg then come about?
A So far as I recall, matters did not progress satisfactorily. The situation in the Sudetenland became more difficult and threatened to develop into a very serious crisis, not only within Czechoslovakia but also between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and into a European crisis. Thus it came about anew that Chamberlain took the initiative and in the middle of September visited Godesberg. in this solution?
A I might first report regarding Godesberg. In Godesberg, Hitler, in view of the crisis that had developed, informed Chamberlain that now he had to have a solution of this question under any circumstances. I may emphasize that I knew nothing regarding details of a military nature at that time, but I do knew that the Fuehrer concerned himself with the possibility that this problem might also be solved militarily. He said in Godesberg to Mr. Chamberlain that a solution of the Sudeten German problems would have to be found as rapidly as possible. Mr. Chamberlain was of the opinion that it would be difficult to persuade Prague to a quick solution, and finally things bogged down altogether in the conference.
Adolf Hitler dictated a memorandum which I was give to Chamberlain. Then Sir Horace Wilson, who was a friend of Chamberlain, visited me and I made arrangements for a new meeting. Fuehrer received a report of Czechoslovakia's mobilization. This was a most deplorable circumstance since Hitler felt that very strongly and both he and Chamberlain wanted to interrupt the conference. that negotiations were undertaken. After a few hours of negotiations the result was the Chamberlain told the Fuehrer he could see now that something would have to be done and he was ready, on his part, to submit this memorandum to the British cabinet. I believe he also said that he would recommend to the British Cabinet, that is to say his ministerial colleagues, that the memorandum should be recommended to Prague. The contents of the memorandum suggested, as a general solution, the annexation of the Sudetenland by Prague. I believe the Fuehrer stated in the memorandum his wish that in view of the critical situation there, it would be advisable that it should be decided upon within a certain period of time -- by the first of October, which was ten or fourteen days from that time.
Mr. Chamberlain then departed and a few days passed. The crisis did not improve but became worse. I remember that very well. Then, during the latter part of September, the French Ambassador reported to me and said that he had a report in regard to the Sudetenland question to bring to me, and later, the British Ambassador came. At the same time, Goering has already testified to this, Italy entered into the negotiations on the wish of Mussolini and offered to mediate. Mussolini proposed that a conference be held which should be attended by England, France and Germany, and this proposal was accepted. the probable solution which could be reached between England, France and Germany, this being the solution that he had thought out for the Sudetenland problem. The French Ambassador stated this solution was not satisfactory and further discussions would have to be conducted regarding the question as to exactly how far Sudetenland extended and what the German population was in certain places.
of this conference, I should like only to describe briefly the results of it. The Fuehrer explained to the statesmen, with the aid of a map, the necessity of the question and which part of the Sudetenland would have to be annexed to Germany. Discussions arose and the Italian Chief of State, Mussolini, agreed in general with Hitler's ideas. The English Prime Minister at first made certain counter-proposals and spoke of the fact that perhaps this could be discussed in detail with the Czechs. Daladier, the French Prime Minister, said, so far as I recall, that he thought that once these proposals had been entered upon the Four Great Powers could reach a solution and finally, at the conclusion of the four statements we were of this opinion and the Munich Agreement was drawn up in which the Sudetenland -- in which it was decided that the Sudetenland should be annexed to Germany as outlined on the map that was there. emphasize that here particularly. I also was happy, particularly in view of other versions of this matter that I have heard during the Trial here. we were very happy that this matter had been solved in this way.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 2:00 o'clock.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow morning at ten o'clock until one in open session. And, now, before going on, Dr. Horn, the Tribunal wishes me to say that they think that entirely too much time is being taken up by the defendant in detailed accounts of negotiations which led up to an agreement, which is a matter of history, and which is perfectly well known to everybody. That is not the case which the defendant has to meet. What the defendant has to meet is not the making of agreements which are perfectly well known, but the breach of those agreements by Germany and any part which he may have played in the breach of those agreements. It is very important that the time of this Tribunal should not be taken up by unnecessary detail of that sort. BY DR. HORN:
Q. What foreign political reaction did the Munich agreement have?
A. The Munich agreement, as is well known, contained the following. What Germany and England would not wage war; that by the naval agreement the ratio of 100 to 35 is to be maintained and that in important matters consultations were to be resorted to. Through this agreement, undoubtedly; the atmosphere between Germany and England was cleared up to a certain degree. I was to be expected and hoped that the consequences of this pact would bring about a final understanding. This appointment was really very great when a few days after Munich, rearmament at any price was made known in England. Then England started on a policy of close relationship with France and a working together in November of 1938. Commercial measures were taken towards Germany, and in December of '38, the British secretary for colonies made a speech, in which he was against any revision of the colonial question.
There were negotiations with the United States of America under consideration, also, and our reports, as I remember them, showed an increase of the stiffening of the English position towards Germany, and the impression was created in Germany of politics which practically would limit Germany.
Q. You are accused by the Prosecution of having acted against International Law for the solution of the Czechoslovakian question in separating the two states, the Czech and the Slovanian state. What part did you take in the solution of this problem?
A. There is no doubt that the efforts that were being made between Slovakia and other members of the National Socialist Party were known to the Foreign Office, and it would be wrong to say that we were unsympathetic to the stand. But it is not correct to say that the atonomy of the state was to be attacked. I remember that Dr. Tiso proclaimed this atonomy, and the Prague Government wished to recognize and did recognize the atonomy. As circumstance were at that time after Munich one can see from the fact that all national parts of Czechoslovakia were interested in atonomy and independence. Shortly thereafter the tripartite group made known its independence and some of the other groups made similar efforts in that behalf. After the Munich agreement, I would like to add that there was a clause in this agreement, according to which Germany and Italy would give Czechoslovakia a guarantee, but this declaration was never made. The reason for that was that Poland, according to the Munich agreement, or after it, sent an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia so that the Polish minorities of their own account would he separated and these areas were occupied by Poland. The Hungarians also wanted atonomy of a connection with Hungary. The situation in Czechoslovakia was not clear at that time and took form along difficult lines.
Then the Slovak, Tuka, came to us. He wanted to win Germany for the independence of Czechoslovakia. He wanted Germany to approve a step like tha The Fuehrer received Tuka at that time and, after a few preliminary remarks, the declaration of independence of Slovakia resulted, and that was on the 13th of March.
said, in this conversation which took place between the Fuehrer and Tuka, that it was only a matter of hours, instead of days, in which Czechoslovakia would have to make a decision. However, it was to be interpreted at that time that on the part of Hungary preparations for an invasion were present in order to occupy some of the regions of Czechoslovakia. He wanted to prevent this, and Hitler was of the opinion that there might be a war between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and he gladly agreed with the wish ot Tiso. Later, after the declaration of independence of Czechoslovakia, he agreed upon Tito's request, and took over the protection of Czechoslovakia.
Q What were some of the preceding events of Hacha's visit to Berlin on the 14th of March, 1933? chiefly with regard to Hitler those excesses against Volksdeutsche in the region of Prague, Bruenn and Biglau and other districts. Many fled to the Reich. with the Prague Government. Hitler was of the opinion and of the conviction that any negotiations that might be started in Prague would not be tolerated by the German Reich. The Fuehrer wished that Czechoslovakia would reduce its military power but this was denied by Prague. In these months I tried repeatedly to keep and maintain good relations between Germany and Prague, above all. I spoke frequently with Chvalkovski, the Slovakian Foreign Minister and in March Chvalkovski turned to our German representative in Prague to find out whether Hitler would grant Hacha a personal interview. I reported this to the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer agreed to receive Hacha. He then told me that he washed to deal with this matter personally. To that effect there was an exchange of wires with Prague; that a reserved attitude should be taken but that the Fuehrer would receive Hacha. not receive information of military plans. We found out about these things only shortly before these things took place, just a few days before. agreement was to be prepared. The Fuehrer answered as I recall distinctly that he was of the opinion that we should go much beyond that. told me that he wanted to put the fate of Czechoslovakia -- that he wanted to put the fate of this country into the Fuehrer's hands. I told the Fuehrer about this and the Fuehrer instructed me to prepare an agreement. The draf was submitted to him and Hacha was received by the Fuehrer and the contents of this conference as far as I know is already known and has been presented in documentary form so I do not have to go into it in detail.