First of all I made connection with Lord Baldwin, with whom I spoke. I also spoke with the then Prime Minister Mc Donald. I mentioned the German desire for equality and sounded the opinion of these Ministers on the basis of a long discussion which I had with Lord Baldwin, I believe on the 1st of December 1933. I believe Lord Baldwin made a speech in Commons, in which he pointed out thay somehow one would have to meet Germany half-way. Equality of armament had been promised to Germany and therefore it would have to be reached in some way. In this connection there were three posibilities: One, that Germany would arm up to the level of the other powers -- and that was not desirable; the second possibility, that the others would disarm to the level of the Germany -- and that could hardly be carried through; and, three one would have to make compromise and meet in the center and permit Germany a limited rearmament, and the other countries for their part would have to disarm to meet Germany on an equal basis. In that way Adolf Hitler at that was very glad for this British position and he appreciated it, for he considered it a practicable way to carry through equality of armament for Germany put the suggestions of Lord Baldwin into practice. Adolf Hitler therefore subsequently took the view that a system -
( A slight pause.)
(Resuming) He saw that unfortunately in the system which was currently prevalent in international ideas, in negotiations the pleasant and agreeable thoughts of Lord Baldwin could not be carried through. carry through -- or were you instrumental in carrying through? Disarmament Conference, for he deemed it impossible through channels of negociation to carry through the German demands and desires. Hitler saw no other possibility, except through the power of the German people to achieve its aims from within -- through the power of the German people. He knew, of course, that this was a tremendous risk; but on the basis of his prior experience of the preceding few years he saw no other way out, so that then Germany decided to rearm.
Q (Interposing)--
As a practical result, these things took place. In the course of the year 1934 there was a closer contact between the German Government and the British Government. There were numerous visits of British statement in Berlin. Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden were among the visitors, and during these visits the suggestion was heard whether, as far as naval agreement was concerned, at least a pact, an agreement could be reached. Hitler was very much interested in this start, and in the course of the conversation between the British and the German Government it was agreed that I should go to London to existence. later materialized. Hitler from the beginning -- and of himself -- was of the opinion that if a final agreement or understanding with England could be reached one would have to acknowledge the absolute naval supremacy of Great Britain for all time. Then the Naval Pact of 1935 was made and the agreements which were made in 1935 were different in every respect from those which existed before the first World War. concluded in London. This Pact was very important to future British-German relations, and at that time it was the first practical result of an actual armament limitation. personally function in that regard? ordinarily happy at the conclusion of this pact. I know and I can stay it from personal experience -- that I had never seen Hitler as happy as I saw him at the time, at the moment when I told him personally in Hamburg of the conclusion of this naval agreement.
Q And what was France's attitude toward this pact?
A With France the situation was a little difficult. I had already noticed that while the negotiations were taking place, for the limitation of armaments had been deviated from. Then I told the gnetlemen of the Foreign Office -- if I may mention their names, Sir Robert Craigie and the then British Admiral Little among them -- that I would go to France so that I could strengthen my ties to French statesmen and to tell them about the importance of an agreement between Germany, France and England and to show them all the ramifications for the future.
I would like to point out a few details. In this Tribunal sometime ago film was shown in which there was a speech I made at the conclusion of this naval agreement and this film showed or allegedly showed that it was really a two-timing of Germany diplomacy. At that time I made that speech in London in order to document and to show in front of the whole world that we were not concerned with unilateral British-German matters but that it was a wish of Hitler -- and the naval agreement was in the spirit of this thought -- to bring about a general limitation of armament and that the naval pact would serve to further good relations between France and Germany. This wish was sincere and very real. a small way so that the first step in the limitation of armaments was considere reasonable by many Frenchmen, especially if you considered matters in the long run and with the thought that in the long run equality of rights would have to be granted to the German people.
Q Then you were made Ambassador at London. Can you tell me a little about the reasons for that?
A Things developed as follows: In the time subsequent to naval agreement an agreement which was hailed in English circles, I made many efforts to bring Lord Baldwin and the Fuehrer together, and I would like to add in that connection that the meeting had been arranged through a friend of Mr. Baldwin, a Mr. Jones. The Fuehrer had agreed to fly to Chequers to meet Lord Baldwin, but unfortunately Lord Baldwin had to decline at the last minute. Just why Lord Baldwin had to decline at the last minute I do not know, but there was no doubt that certain forces in England at the time did not wish a GermanBritish understanding.
said on the part of Germany that one should make another last effort to come to a good agreement and good relations with England. already been appointed State Secretary for the Foreign Office and has asked personally that that appointment be recalled and that I be sent to London as German Ambassador. Hitler had a certain, definite opinion or picture of the theory of equality of rights as far as England was concerned, but my view deviated somewhat from Hitler's. My conviction was that England would continue to support her own balance-of-power theory before and after -- that England would maintain of power was rather obsolete and that from now on England would wish to see a much stronger Germany with reference to the changed picture in Europe and also taking into consideration the strength shown by Russia that Germany would in a way counterbalance the power of Russia. In order to give a definite and clear picture on the spot and to tell him how matters actually stood in England -- that must have been one of the reasons why the Fuehrer sent me to England. circles in England who were very friendly to Germany,that connections between the two countries could be made friendly and that perhaps we could reach an agreement. England.
Q In what way was your ambassadorial activity hampered in England?
A I would like to say first that in the 1930's -- roughly 1935 and 1936. I made many trips to England, and while I war there, on instructions from the Fuehrer, had discussions for a German-British pact. The basis of this pact is known, and it was to make the naval ratio 100 to 35, to make it permanent and that the integrity of the Low Countries and France was to be guaranteed forever.
That was the thought of the Fuehrer and that Germany would be ready to keep and maintain the British Empire and to use its power if necessary and that in regard to Germany and England, they should recognize each other's power. in the 1930's did not come to any concrete result. It was one of the Fuehrer' deepest disappointments, and I would like to say that at this point -- for it is very important for further developments -- that this pact upon which the Fuehrer had placed such a very great hope and which he had considered as the complete cornerstone of his foreign policy, that this pact never materialized. Just how and what forces operated so that it did not materialize I cannot tell for I do not know, but in any case we never got very far.
Then I remained in London as Ambassador. I referred to this question again and again while I was Ambassador, discussed it with circles who were friendly to Germany, and I must say that there were many Englishmen who had a very positive attitude toward Germany.
Q Did you receive any attitude that was negative? thought of a close connection with Germany, who were against a close understanding on basic principles and perhaps traditional elements who were not inclined toward a pact of this kind, and I would like to say briefly, even though I have to dip back into the year 1936, that during the Olympic games in the year 1936 I tried to win Lord Vansittart to the thought we had in mind on the pact. I had a discussion of several hours' duration with him at Berlin. Hitler also received him and discussed the same matter with him. Lord Vansittart, even though our personal relations were excellent, met our proposals with a certain reserve. were forming in England, one trend being very much inclined and very much in favor of dealing with Germany and promoting good relations and the second trend not wishing such an agreement or collaboration. but there were those gentlemen who did not wish close contact and connections with Germany. It was the later Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and others.
Then in London I made strenuous efforts in order to promote our thoughts but events occurred which made my activity there most difficult; first of all Spanish politics and policies.
It is well known that civil war raged in Spain at that time and in London the Non-Intervention Congress was meeting.
As Ambassador to the Court of St. James I had a very difficult task. On the one hand, with all means at my disposal, I wished to further a GermanEnglish pact, and cement German-English relations but on the other hand I had the instructions of my government as far as Spain was concerned to maintain my attitude in that connection. These instructions were often contradictory. Certain efforts of the politics of the British were at cross purposes and this sort of League of Nations which the Non-Intervention Congress represented, and of which I was the authorized German member, represented a mortgage on the chief aim with which Hitler had sent me to London. lieve it is important for me to show that it was not only the Spanish policy or politics but that doubtlessly in these years, 1937, beginning of 1938, in England the trend of thought became increasingly obvious. That, of course, today is known as a historical fact, that is that trend which did not wish a pact with Germany. Why? The answer is very simple, very clear. These circles saw that through a National Socialist Germany a factor which might disturb the traditional British balance of power on the Continent. intended ever at that time to proceed against England or to undertake anything against England of its own accord; that he had sent me to London with the ardent wish to reach an agreement and an understanding with England. From London I reported to the Fuehrer the situation as I found it and before this Tribunal now I wish to set forth a point and explain that point, a point which is relevant to my own defense. from England that England was degenerate and England would perhaps not fight. I may and must establish and assert here, from the beginning I reported exactly the opposite to the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that in my opinion the English leadership and the English people had a heroic attitude and position and that these people would be ready to fight for the existence of their empire to the last man.
Later, in the course of the war in a speech in the year 1941, after I had talked with the Fuehrer, I made this view publicly known in my speech. existing in London in the year 1937 and 1938, when I was acting ambassador, that I was fully cognizant of the fact thatit would be very difficult to conclude a pact with England. But even so I reported that all efforts would be made so that peaceful negotiations and an agreement with England could be reached. That was to be a decisive factor in Germany's politics, that is, to reach an understanding with England. By that I mean the development of German power in accord with British tendencies and views so that these two views would not conflict. Anti-Commintern Pact with Japan. How was it that you, especially as ambassador, concluded that agreement? the year 1938 I was appointed Foreign Minister on the 4th of February.
On the 4th of February I was in Berlin. The Fuehrer had me summoned and said that he wanted to make me Foreign Minister. Were you talking of the Three Power Agreement?
Q No, you misunderstood. I meant to say that during your activity as Ambassador you concluded the Anti-Commintern Pact in the year 1936. Italy joined in 1937, then Spain as well as other countries. How was it that you, as ambassador, concluded this pact? between Germany, that is National Socialism, and Communism one of the most decisive factors of his politics and policies. Therefore, there was the question as to how a way could be found to win additional countries to combat Communist efforts. We are concerned with idealogical questions in this case. and as to whether in some way we could create closer contact with Japan.
I replied that I personally had certain connections in Japan and would be glad to use my efforts in that behalf.
As Japan had anti-commintern thoughts as well as Germany, in the years 1933, 1934, 1935, I believe, the thought was raised and crystallized whether these neutral efforts might not be made the basis of a pact. I believe one of my co-workers then had the idea as to whether an Anti-Commintern Pact could not be concluded. I suggested this to the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer was in agreement and considered this a good thought. He did not wish, however, at that time, since it was an ideological question, that it should be made in line with German official policies and politics and therefore instructed me to prepare this pact which then, I believe, in the year 1936, was concluded in my office in Berlin. since you were the leader of the Department Ribbentrop?
A Yes, that is correct. The Department Ribbentrop consisted chiefly of my own person and a few collaborators. But it is correct to say that the Fuehrer wished that I conclude this pact since he did not wish to emphasize it publicly. idealogical aims? had an idealogical aim. It was to combat the work of the Commintern in the various countries at that time. But this pact had political reasons and political background also and this political move was an anti-Russian one, since Moscow has the center for the Commintern. Therefore, it appeared to the Fuehrer and to me that through this pact a certain balance or counterbalance against Russian efforts or against Russia in a political sense, as such, was being created; that idealogically as well as politically -
THE PRESIDENT: Do you and the defendant really think it is necessary to take as long as the defendant has taken to tell us why he, as an ambassador in London was called upon to sign the Anti-Commintern Pact?
DR. HORN: It is very difficult for me to hear your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: What I asked you was whether you and the defendant think it necessary for the defendant to make such a long speech in answer to your question; why was he as ambassador in London employed to sign the Anti-Commintern Pact.
He has spoken for at least five minutes about it. BY DR. HORN: Give the reasons for the appointment. Berlin. The Fuehrer asked me to come to him and told me that because of a change in various high places he contemplated a change of Foreign Minister also; that the then Foreign Minister von Neurath hadbeen made the president of another organization. I then replied to the Fuehrer that I, of course, would be glad to follow his suggestion.
Q At this opportunity did you receive a high rank in the SS? The Prosecution has claimed that this rank was not purely honorary. Can you give us the details on that?
A I must clarify this point, I believe. I had received a rank in the SS prior to this time and I do not recall whether it was at this appointment or at some other time when I was made SS Gruppenfuehrer. The Fuehrer granted me the rank and the uniform of an SS Gruppenfuehrer. That was a position I had formerly, or a rank a la suite, in the Army and at that time I agreed with the thoughts of the SS. My connections with Himmler were fairly good at the time. I saw in the aims of the SS at that time the possible basis for the establishment of an idealogical fuehrer group, such as perhaps we find in England and then later the Waffen SS had shown its bravery in war. Later my position and relation to Himmler changed. and at Party meetings I would have the Party uniform and would have rank in the Party. Yesterday or the day before yesterday the question was raised whether I was a typical National Socialist.
only in later years that I met Hitler. So far as National Socialist doctrines and the program were concerned, I did not concern myself with that too much. I did not know about their race theory. I was no anti-Semite; I did not understand the church question, although I had severed my church connections quite some time back, for my own spiritual reasons, in the early 20's, in the development of German church matters. However, I believe that I was a good Christian nevertheless. time. The party wanted a strong, flourishing, and social Germany, and I wanted that too. For that reason, in the year 1932, I did, after full deliberation, become a member of the Party. prosecution claims, and especially since the year 1930? Socialism gained more than 100 seats in the Reichstag. I set forth yesterday, and perhaps do not need to repeat, just what the conditions in Germany were at that time. Party. I believe I entered the Party in August of 1932, and from that moment on, up until the end of this war, I devoted my entire power and strength to National Socialist Germany. that I was always interested and made every effort to be a good National Socialist, and that I was proudof the fact that I belonged to a small group of men, idealists, who did not want anything but to bring prestige back to Germany once more. appointment, problems whichhad to be solved? What instructions did he give you for the carrying on of foreign policies? He said only that Germany had assumed a new position from that time on. Germany had once more entered the circle of nations and equality of rights, and it was to be clearly seen that certain problems would have to be solved in the future.
He also said this especially, as I recall. I believe he mentioned four special problems which, sooner or later, would have to be solved. He emphasized that such problems could be solved only with a strong Wehrmacht, not in the using of this Wehrmacht, but in the existence of the Wehrmacht, because a country which was not strongly armed could not carry on foreign policies, as we had experienced it in previous years. A country like that was really operating in a vacuum. He said we would have to enter upon a clear-cut relationship with our neighbors.
The four problems which he enumerated were, first of all, Austria; then he mentioned the solution of the Sudeten question; he spoke about Memel Land; he spoke about Danzig and the Corridor. He mentioned these as problems which would have to be solved in one way or another, and it was to be my task to assist him diplomatically. preparation of a solution of these problems, as he had expressed it to me, in a German sense.
THE PRESIDENT: I believe this would be a good time to break off.
(A recess was taken.)
policy continue? view of the business of the foreign office. German foreign policy, as I said before, had reached a certain point, namely, the point at which Germany had again achieved prestige in the eyes of the world. It was now a question of solving the important and basis problems that had resulted from the Versailles Treaty in Europe. This was all the more necessary as, for instance, the question of Volkstum led again to conflicts and thereby prevented peaceful solutions. ministry. That was at first not easy, as I was dealing with altogether new men, attitude toward the foreign office, and in the further pursuance of my efforts and of the efforts of my predecessor I saw it as my most important task to bring the foreign office closer to Hitler and to strike a bridge between the two fields. try that I was working under a certain shadow and that certain limitation were placed upon me -- that is to say, that I would not be in a position to so conduct the foreign policy as a foreign minister might otherwise be expected to do who was responsible to a parliament in a parliamentary system. The enormous personality of the Fuehrer dominated foreign policy, of course. He concerned himself with it in all detail. foreign policy reports through a liaison man, and he in turn gave me certain tasks, etc. problem of Austria, which had to firm some solution or other. Austria was from the very beginning a matter very close to the Fuehrer's heart, because he was an Austrian himself -- had been -- and it was of course clear that with the growing power of Germany the efforts that had existed for a long time for a closer connection between Germany and Austria would be carried out even more strongly than before.
At that time I was not so familiar with this problem, since the situation was such that Hitler handled this problem personally. randum dealing with a conference that took place on the 5th of November 1937 that is here referred to as the "Hoszbach" document?
A This document, which has been spoken of here several times, I did'n know of. I saw it here for the first time.
Q Did Hitler say anything in the spirit of this document to you ? but it was the Fuehrer's practice to speak with me very little about his goals and intentions. At any rate, he did so toward me very slightly. He did speak of the fact that Germany had to solve certain problems in Europe -- as I have already said -- and that for this reason it was necessary to be strong. He also spoke of the possibility that in this matter it could come to some sort of a showdown, but he told me nothing more specific about this, On the contrary, he always emphasized to me that it was his wish to solve these problems which had to be solved by way of diplomacy, and that once he had solved these problems he had the intention of creating what he called an ideal "Folk State" and that he would thereby create a model modern social state. In other words, to me he did mention the possibility of a military settlement, but he stated to me as his highest goal that it was his intention to achieve this solution of the impossibility of Versailles, as he called them, in a peaceful way. chtesgaden to speak with Hitler and Schuschnigg. What was discussed there and what was your role at this conference?
A I see that this is on the 12th of February 1938. Hitler then informed me that he was going to confer with federal chancellor Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden. I see from my notes that this was on the 12th of February. In the meantime he told me what the solution was that he was pursuing and that in some form or other the German National Socialists in Austria must be assisted.
longer recall. At any rate, there were a number of National Socialtist in jail and as a consequence of the natural efforts of these people to bring about a social union between Austria and the Reich, these Austrian problems threatened to become a really serios source of difficulty between Germany and Austria. Hitler had asserted that he intended -- I believe this was in the year 1938 -to achieve the rights of self-determination that these six million Austrian Germans had. I did not know about this personally.
At the meetinf with Schschnigg on the Obersalzberg I was present. Hitler received Schuschnigg alone and had a long conversation with him. Details about this conversation are not known to me because I was not present at it. I recall that Schuschnigg after this talk met me, and that I in my turn had a long conversation with him. under political presure? whereas the other details of other meetings on the Obersalzberg are not so clear in my memory, since I was not present at either the first or the second meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. very friendly way. I felt that Schuschnigg had received a very strong impresssion from Hitler and the Fuehrer's personality. discussed with Schuschnigg, so that I could not speak to him about this matter -- or at least only very little. The talk confined itself to more general themes. I told Schuschmigg that in my opinion, these two countries must come closely together and that it was his historical task to assist in this.
long be held separate by artificial means.
Q. Was there any mention of the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 at this conference?
A. I did not speak to Schuschnigg on this point.- I believe also that the Fuehrer -- I don't know the details -- the Fuehrer talked to him to this effect: That certain measures would have to be carried out in Austria in order to obviate the reason for conflict between the two countries. expressed to Schuschnigg the thought that the two countries should enter into closer relations. Schuschnigg adopted to me an altogether positive attitude so that at that time to a certain extent I was surprised by this positive attitude on his part. The discussion of the Fuehrer with him I believe was conducted in perfectly open terms, because the Fuehrer wanted, in the interest of obviating these problems between the two countries, to reach some improvement in relations; and if this was to be done then statesmen must be open and frank with one another.
I have heard here -- and I think this is based on an entry in Jodl's Diary -- that heavy military and political pressure was exerted. I believe I can testify here that I knew nothing of any military or political pressure at this meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler. I may reiterate, certainly the Feuhrer spoke perfectly frankly with Schuschnigg, but there can be no question of a pressure of a military nature or of a political nature, nor can there be any question of an ultimatum of any sort.
I also believe that Jodl's remark -- I don't believe he was present -it was perhaps only a notation in his diary that he had from hearsay. many people, including the Fuehrer -- I had an altogether pleasand and positive impression of Schuschnigg's personality. Schuschnigg indeed spoke of the fact that the two countries -- and I remember his words very exactly -- were fatefully bound together, and that he would have to assist in some way to bring these two countries closer together.
There was no talk in this discussion of Anschluss or any such thing. Whether the Fuehrer mentioned that I don't know, but I don't believe so.
Q. At that time, or shortly after, did the Fuehrer speak to you about an intention to depart from the German-Austrian Treaty of 1936 and wished to find some other solution?
A. Hitler did not speak to me about this. On the question of Austria in toto I spoke very little with him. This may sound remarkable, but it can be understood from the fact that it was only on the 4th of February that I took over the foreign office, and I first had to work my way into all the problems. The Austrian problem was, as I already said, a problem with which Hilter concerned himself personally, which, consequently, was simply taken note of in the Foreign Ministry, and it was directed by him personally. Hitler, and the Foreign Office only received copies of his report. These reports were presented immediately to Hitler by the Reich Chancellory, so that the Foreign Office had nothing to do with them.
Q. You then went back to London in order to take your leave as Ambassador. What did you hear in London regarding the development of the Austrian question?
A. I may say the following in this connection: I personally could see a solution of the Austrian problem of this sort: That the two countries should have a customs union, as I personally believed that in this way the problem could be solved in its most natural way and close relations could be brought about between the two countries. I might remind you at this point that this thought of a customs union was already an old one and had already been proposed by governments before Hitler's, and I believe because of the interference of allied countries it was not brought about.
According to my notes, on the 8th of March I went to London. The situation then was this, as I have already mentioned. On the event of the celebration of the taking over of power on the 30th of January, I was in Berlin. Then on ment I did not have opportunity to take official leave from London.
On the 8th of March 1938, I returned to London. about English matters. I remember that he remarked on this occasion that the Austrian problem was progressing very nicely in the direction that had been discussed at Berchtesgaden with Schuschnigg. I must say that I did not know of what agreements had been reached in all the details. man. I reached London, and in the afternoon I heard, more or less by accident, over the radio in the legation building, a speech which the then Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg made in Innsbruck. I don't want to go into detail, that would take too long. I do know that the entire manner, and as it seemed to me, also the tone of this speech, was such that I immediately got the notion that the Fuehrer would not tolerate this; and that the entire speech, without any doubt, stood in contradiction to the spirit with which the conferences had been carried out on the Obersalzberg. take something, and I should like to say this also, perfectly openly, before this Tribunal. It appeared quite correct to me that the solution of this problem would take some form or other. We had to talk very openly with Schuschnigg in order to prevent things from coming to a catastrophe, even a European catastrophe.
Then on the next morning I had a long discussion with Lord Halifax. Lord Halifax had also received reports from Austria, and I attempted, without knowing very much about the situation, to persuade him that it would be better to solve this problem now in one form or another, and that it was precisely to the interest of German-English efforts toward friendship that this solution should take place now. It would be false to believe that the friendship between Germany and England that both of us were striving for would thereby be damaged.
the opportunity to speak with the Prime Minister Chamberlain the next morning at breakfast. Subsequently a breakfast was arranged with Chamberlain, and after this breakfast I had a long talk with Chamberlain. In this conference Mr. Chamberlain again emphasized his desire to reach an understanding with Germany. I was extraordinarily happy to hear this, and told him that I was of the firm conviction that this was also the Fuehrer's attitude. He gave me a specific message to the Fuehrer, that this was his attitude, and that he would do everything he could in this direction. from the English consul. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax asked me -- I believe the breakfast was in 10 Downing Street -- to come to their office in order to discuss these telegrams. I told him of course I had no precise reports, no knowledge of an ultimatum, and then later of the entrance of German troops. We arranged that we would maintain connections and would meet later, and that Lord Halifax would come to the German Embassy later to discuss these things further.
I must emphasize here, too, Mr. Chamberlain had beenvery quiet and it seemed to me, had a reasonable attitude towards the Austrian question. In the afternoon, Lord Halifax visited me and we had a long talk. In the meantime, the entrance of German troops had become known. I should like to emphasize the fact that this talk with Lord Halifax was very friendly and that at the conclusion of it, I invited the English Foreign Minister to a visit to Germany again. He said that he would be glad to come and perhaps another hunting party could be arranged. defendant Goering? This telephone conversation has been put in evidence by the prosecution, with the assertion that it is a sign of the doubletongued policy that you were carrying out? conversation and diplomatic conversations are carried on all over the world in the same way but I may say here that through this telephone conversation, I found out for the first time the real details of this Austrian affair. Without going into details I heard, above all, that this vote did not correspond to the real will of the Austrian people and a number of other points which I asked Goering to mention in his conversations with the English ministers; but I should like to say that for practical purposes, these discussions did not take place later because as I was taking leave from official English circles, on the basis of the talks I had with Goering, I had no further talks with Goering but sometime after, a short time after my telephone conversation with Goering, left London and went to Berlin and later to Vienna. I night say that first I went to Karin Hall to visit Goering and spoke with him there regarding the Anschluss--not about the Anschluss but about the whole development of circumstances in Austria. He was just as happy about this as I was. We all were happy. I flew, then, on the same day to Vienna and arrived there at about the same time as Hitler. I heard, in the meantime, about the Anschluss and it was in Vienna that I first heard that the thought of the Anschluss occurred to Hitler only during his travels through Austria. I believe it was on the occasion of a demonstration in Linz that this thought came to him and then, I think, he rapidly made up his mind to carry on the Anschluss.
solved in the question of the Anschluss? Sudeten Germans but this problem was not a problem emanating from the foreign office or Hitler or any office -- it was a problem that simply developed from itself. I believe it was the American prosecutor who told me, who said here that with the annexation of Czechoslovakia, a chapter had reached its conclusion that was shameful in the whole history of the relation between people, namely the destruction of the small Czechoslovak people. I should like to state the following from my own knowledge of these matters. One may speak perhaps of a Czechoslovakian State but not of the Czechoslovak people. This was a State, a nationality State, that contained the most heterogeneous folk groups. There were, besides Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, and Carpatho-Ukrainians. It was in itself a heterogeneous collection of elements that had been welded together in 1919 to form Czechoslovakia. It is certain, and a historical fact, that the efforts, of the different nationalities within the State were directed towards different aims and it was therefore necessary to surround the State with a so-called "iron ring". This pressure created counter-pressure on the part of the various peoples with the state and it is entirely clear that a strong Germany, a Germany of National Socialism at that time was interested in all the folk groups, forall the folk groups that bordered on Germany, and also had a great influence on these folk groups. It thus happened that the German minorities in the Sudetenland, who, since 1919, had been submitted to a considerable pressure on the part of Prague, now were submittedto an even greater pressure. I do not believe I have to enter into any details but I know, from my own knowledge and even from personal discussion that took place during my ambassadorship in London, that the question of the Sudetenland was a very clear concept of the Foreign Office in London and that it was precisely England that very often before 1936 had come out in favor of certain demands made by the Sudeten Germans, demands as expressed by Conrad Henlein.