I do not propose to make a propaganda speech. I merely want to represent the facts, state facts, only as I experienced them at the time . There is no doubt that the defenselessness of the German people at that time was the cause, the cause for that fact, that that attitude became prevalent amongst our enemies, not tending towards an understanding but toward hatred and revenge. I am convinced that this was not the intention of the President of the United States Wilson at all and I believe that in later years, he personally must have suffered through it. At any rate that was my first contact with German politics.
closest personal knowledge, were not observed. That, too, is perhaps a consequence of the war, during which men drift into a certain direction and just cannot observe certain things or do not wish to. At any rate, the rules of Versailles are known, and they are, neither territorially speaking nor in many other important points, on record as having been observed. Silesia, Upper Silesia at the same time, and particularly Memel Land, that small land, and events which occurred, made a deep impression on me, Upper Silesia particularly because many personal ties of mine exist there and becau we all could not understand that those severe instructions of Versailles were not observed. be discussed, and later on I shall probably have to refer to this point more in detail, particularly in connection with the Polish crisis. But anyway, right from the beginning, German minorities, as known, were exposed to seriou difficulties. At that time, Upper Silesia particularly, and these territory which were suffering under that treatment, were concerned. was the question of disarmament, and that, too, has been referred to in this courtroom and at the moment I do not want to concern myself with it in detail of equal rights, was the cause of my interesting myself in politics. I woul like to say here quite openly that at that time I often talked to French and British friends, and it was a well known fact, of course, even then, that aft 1930 the NSDAP already had 100 or more seats in the Reichstag, and this was the symptom of the natural will of the German people breaking through to resi that treatment, which in fact meant nothing other than that that was what the German people desired. didn't know at the time. They asked me, "What sort of a man is Adolf Hitler What is to be expected from him?" I said to them frankly, "Give Germany a chance and you won't have Adolf Hitler. Don't give Germany a chance and Adolf Hitler will come into power."
That, I think, was approximately in 1930 or 1931. Germany wasn't given the chance, so on the 30th of January 1933, the seizure of power by the National Socialists happened.
Q How and when did you get to know Adolf Hitler? the Berghof. Since approximately 1930 or 1931 I had known Count Helldorf in Berlin, whose name as a National Socialist is known. He was a regimental comrade of mine in my squadron, and we went through four years of war together. Through him I became acquainted with National Socialists in Berlin for the first time, and I had asked him at that time to arrange for a conversation with Hitler. Hitler and had a long discussion with him at that time. That is to say, Adolf Hitler explained his thoughts on the situation in 1932 to me. Goering, and this happened at my house at Dahlem which I placed at their disposal for the purpose of doing everything to create a national front.
My impression of Adolf Hitler was a considerable one even then. I noticed particularly his blue eyes and his generally dark appearance, and then, his settled, I should like to say, final -- not closed, but final -character, and the way in which he expressed his thoughts. These thoughts and statements had something final and definite about them, and they appeared to come from his deepest, innermost self. I had the impression that I was facing a man who knew what he wanted and who had an unshakeable will and who was a very strong personality indeed. convinced that this man only, if anybody, would be in a position to save Germany from those difficulties and that emergency which existed at the time. like to tell you about one episode which happened in my house at Dahlem when the question arose whether Hitler was to become Chancellor or not. I know that at that time he was offered the Vice Chancellorship and I heard with what enormous strength and conviction, if you like, also brutality and hardness he could state his opinion when he believed that hurdles appeared on the way to resurrection of the German people.
Treaty by means of mutual understanding? years of 1920 to 1932, which took me abroad, proved to me how incredibly difficult it would be under the then existing system to settle by means of negotiations on a revision of the Versailles Treaty. In spite of that, I felt, I sensed, how as the years went by the groups in England and France grow who had been convinced that somehow Germany would have to be helped. During those years, I established many a contact with businessmen, social figures, and men of art and science, particularly in universities in England and France, and in that connection I learned to understand the attitude of the Englishmen and the Frenchmen. conviction that a change of that treaty could only be carried out through mutual understanding with France and Britain. I also believed that only in this way could the international situation be improved, and the very considerable substances of conflict existing everywhere, as consequences of the First WorldWar, be removed. us and the Western Powers and England and France, could a revision of Versailles be possible. And even then, I had the certain fouling that only by means of such an understanding could real peace in Europe be permanently preserved.
We young officers had experienced too much at that time. I am thinking of the battle for Silesia and the Baltic and all that, and I should like to add, and say it quite openly, that right from the beginning and from the first day when I read that Versailles Treaty, I, as a German, felt it to be my duty to fight against it and to try to do everything so that its place would be taken by a better one. Hitler's definite attitude against Versailles was the very thing that first bound me to him and the National Socialist Party.
Q Did you attempt to tell Hitler what your views were?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is 5:00 o'clock and the Tribunal thinks they had better adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 29 March 1946 at 1000 hours.)
of: The United States of America, the French Republic, The United King
THE PRESIDENT: Before the examination of defendant von Ribbentrop goes on the Tribunal desires me to draw the attention of Dr. Horn and of the defendant von Ribbentrop to what the Tribunal has said during the last few days.
In the first place the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal has allowed the defendant Goering, who has given the evidence first of the defendants and who has proclaimed himself to be responsible as the second leader of Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any interruption whatever, and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi regime from its inception to the defeat of Germany. The Tribunal does not propose to allow any of the order defendants to go over the same ground in their evidence except in so far as is necessary for their own defense. Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is inadmissible.
Thirdly, though this isn't in order of the Tribunal, I must point out that the Tribunal has been informed on many occasions of the view of the defendants and some of their witness that the Treaty of Versailles was unjust and therefore any evidence upon that point apart from its being inadmissible is cumulative, and the Tribunal will not hear it trerefore for that reason.
Ans lastly, the Tribunal wishes me to point out to Dr. Horn that it is the duty of counsel to examine their witness and not to leave them simply to make speeches, and if they are giving evidence which counsel knows is inadmissible according to the ruling of the Tribunal it is the duty of counsel to stop the witness. That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if you are going to refer to Gauss'affidavit the Tribunal will not deal with that matter now, it will be dealt with after the defendant von Ribbentrop has given evidence.
DR. SEIDL: (counsel for the defendant Hess) Mr. President, I spoke with Dr. Horn, counsel for the defendant Ribbentrop -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I don't care whether you spoke to Dr Horn or not or what arrangement you may have made with Dr. Horn; it is not convenient to the Tribunal to hear Dr. Gauss'evidence at the present moment, they want to go on with TRibbentrop's evidence.
__________ BY DR. HORN (counsel for defendant Ribbentrop):
sions in England and France. In connection with that I would like to put the following questions. Did you make efforts to tell Hitler your impressions and your views as you saw British and French politics at that time? course told him about my impressions which I gathered on my frequent travels to England and France, and reported to Hitler.
Q What was Hitler's attitude toward France and England at that time?
A Hitler's attitude and position was as follows: He saw an enemy to Germany in France, arising from the policies and politics which France carried on with regard to Germany, beginning with the end of the First World War, and especially the position which she took in questions of equality for Germany. This position of Hitler's is brought forth in his book Mein Kampf. there. At that time I told the Fuehrer much about France. He was interested in hearing my opinion, and I noticed that he had a growing interest for things French in the year 1933. Then I brought him together with a number of Frenchmen, and I believe some of these visits, and perhaps my pictures as to the position taken by many Frenchmen, as well as all of French culture-
Q What kind of Frenchmen were they? or politicans. The pictures I presented to Hitler were very interesting to theFuehrer, and gradually he received the impression that in France there were men who would not reject an understanding with Germany. ofmy deepest conviction and of my experience of the prior years. It was the great wish of the Fuehrer, as is well known, to come to a definite friendship with England and to come to an agreement with England as well. concerned, treated this separately or by itself. I believe at that time I succeeded in convincing the Fuehrer that an understanding with England would be possible only by having an agreement with France as well--an understanding with France as well. I remember very exactly some conversations I had with the Fuehrer. This made a strong impression on him. He told me then that since I had followed a rather personal course of understanding between Germany and France, I should continue on this task and report to him on the progress of my efforts.
Q Then, you were Hitler's Foreign political Counselor, not the counsel of the Party. Can you tell me a little more about that? my journeys. The impressions I gathered, which I told him on my return from England and France, were of interest to him, and without referring to special conferences or discussions, I was received repeatedly by Hitler.
I spoke with him repeatedly and in that way it came about, more or less in a natural way, that outside and beyond the official channels or politics he was interested in having my opinion; and asked my advice on things which I had seen in the foreign countries.
He was ready to listen to my advice. Above all, he had a vital interest, of course, for questions English. I told him about public opinion and about personalities, and brought Frenchmen and Englishmen to him, and now he could do something which he loved to do, to exchange thoughts unofficially. with France in the years 1933 to 1935? What were your efforts in that direction? and brought this question up for discussion. I tried through my own private channels to tell the Frenchmen in Paris that a reasonable and quiet solution of the Saar question in the spirit of the plebiscite as laid down in the Versailles Treaty would be and should be a good omen for relations between the two countries. I spoke with many numbers of people during these years in Paris and made connections with members of the French cabinet. I would like to add that I had discussions and conversations with the then French president Poumergue, with the then assassinated Foreign Minister Barthou, with Mr. Laval, and above all with Mr. Daladier. complete agreement with Daladier on that. Then a little later I noticed that at those visits of Frenchmen with Hitler it was again and again mentioned, "Yes, now we have Mein Kampf to deal with, and your attitute and your policies toward France are established in that book." I tried to tell the Fuehrer to give forth an official revision of this chapter of Mein Kampf. The Fuehrer said, and I remember it verbatim, that he had decided, through his practical policies, to prove to the world that he had changed his view in this respect, that things which had been written down could not be changed, that they were historical fact, and his then view, or his former view toward France, had been determined by France's attitude toward Germany at that time.
But now one could turn over a new leaf in the history of the two countries and their relations to each other. perhaps through a public announcement a revision of his view as expressed in his book Mein Kampf -- to change the view and to affirm his new view to the world. interview. I don't exactly recall just when; it was sometime in 1933, though, I believe this article appeared in "Le Matin" and created quite a bit of excitement. I was very glad, for with this article all doubts were removed and a tremendous step toward an understanding with France had been reached. Then I contemplated what could be done subsequently and how, from the simple matters now, a connection between French and German statesmen could be arranged.
Q At that time wasn't there an intermediary meeting between Hitler and Daladier? Didn't you contemplate a meeting of that sort and did you make efforts in that behalf?
At that time Daladier was the Premier. I had suggested to him that he meet Adolf Hitler so that quite frankly, man to man, a discussion could be carried on, to see whether Franco-German relations could nor be put on an entirely new and different basis. Mr. Daladier was quite taken with this start. I reported this to Hitler and Hitler was ready to meet Daladier. I went to Paris so that the last arrangements could be made with that.
MR. DODD: If your Honor pleases, I am reluctant to interfere in any respect with this examination of the Defendant, but my colleagues and I feel that this particular part of the examination is quite immaterial and in any event much too detailed, and that we will never get along here. If Counsel would abide by the instruction of the Court given this morning, we could move along much more directly and much more quickly.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that the objection is really well founded. The Defendant is dealing with a period between 1933 and 1935, and the efforts which he made for good relations with France. Well, now, that is very remote from any question which we have to decide in this case, and therefore to deal with it in this detail seems to the Tribunal a waste of time.
DR. HORN: Then I will put other questions, which concern his direct cooperation.
Q What caused Hitler to appoint you Plenipotentiary for Disarmament? April. The reasons are as follows: and he believed that equality of armament would be possible only if and when negotiations could be carried on with France and England; and this, of course was my position also, at that time, in my efforts to establish good relations between Germany and England, since this was the pet wish of the Fuehrer. On this mission I went to London and while there made contacts with British political figures.
First of all I made connection with Lord Baldwin, with whom I spoke. I also spoke with the then Prime Minister Mc Donald. I mentioned the German desire for equality and sounded the opinion of these Ministers on the basis of a long discussion which I had with Lord Baldwin, I believe on the 1st of December 1933. I believe Lord Baldwin made a speech in Commons, in which he pointed out thay somehow one would have to meet Germany half-way. Equality of armament had been promised to Germany and therefore it would have to be reached in some way. In this connection there were three posibilities: One, that Germany would arm up to the level of the other powers -- and that was not desirable; the second possibility, that the others would disarm to the level of the Germany -- and that could hardly be carried through; and, three one would have to make compromise and meet in the center and permit Germany a limited rearmament, and the other countries for their part would have to disarm to meet Germany on an equal basis. In that way Adolf Hitler at that was very glad for this British position and he appreciated it, for he considered it a practicable way to carry through equality of armament for Germany put the suggestions of Lord Baldwin into practice. Adolf Hitler therefore subsequently took the view that a system -
( A slight pause.)
(Resuming) He saw that unfortunately in the system which was currently prevalent in international ideas, in negotiations the pleasant and agreeable thoughts of Lord Baldwin could not be carried through. carry through -- or were you instrumental in carrying through? Disarmament Conference, for he deemed it impossible through channels of negociation to carry through the German demands and desires. Hitler saw no other possibility, except through the power of the German people to achieve its aims from within -- through the power of the German people. He knew, of course, that this was a tremendous risk; but on the basis of his prior experience of the preceding few years he saw no other way out, so that then Germany decided to rearm.
Q (Interposing)--
As a practical result, these things took place. In the course of the year 1934 there was a closer contact between the German Government and the British Government. There were numerous visits of British statement in Berlin. Sir John Simon and Mr. Eden were among the visitors, and during these visits the suggestion was heard whether, as far as naval agreement was concerned, at least a pact, an agreement could be reached. Hitler was very much interested in this start, and in the course of the conversation between the British and the German Government it was agreed that I should go to London to existence. later materialized. Hitler from the beginning -- and of himself -- was of the opinion that if a final agreement or understanding with England could be reached one would have to acknowledge the absolute naval supremacy of Great Britain for all time. Then the Naval Pact of 1935 was made and the agreements which were made in 1935 were different in every respect from those which existed before the first World War. concluded in London. This Pact was very important to future British-German relations, and at that time it was the first practical result of an actual armament limitation. personally function in that regard? ordinarily happy at the conclusion of this pact. I know and I can stay it from personal experience -- that I had never seen Hitler as happy as I saw him at the time, at the moment when I told him personally in Hamburg of the conclusion of this naval agreement.
Q And what was France's attitude toward this pact?
A With France the situation was a little difficult. I had already noticed that while the negotiations were taking place, for the limitation of armaments had been deviated from. Then I told the gnetlemen of the Foreign Office -- if I may mention their names, Sir Robert Craigie and the then British Admiral Little among them -- that I would go to France so that I could strengthen my ties to French statesmen and to tell them about the importance of an agreement between Germany, France and England and to show them all the ramifications for the future.
I would like to point out a few details. In this Tribunal sometime ago film was shown in which there was a speech I made at the conclusion of this naval agreement and this film showed or allegedly showed that it was really a two-timing of Germany diplomacy. At that time I made that speech in London in order to document and to show in front of the whole world that we were not concerned with unilateral British-German matters but that it was a wish of Hitler -- and the naval agreement was in the spirit of this thought -- to bring about a general limitation of armament and that the naval pact would serve to further good relations between France and Germany. This wish was sincere and very real. a small way so that the first step in the limitation of armaments was considere reasonable by many Frenchmen, especially if you considered matters in the long run and with the thought that in the long run equality of rights would have to be granted to the German people.
Q Then you were made Ambassador at London. Can you tell me a little about the reasons for that?
A Things developed as follows: In the time subsequent to naval agreement an agreement which was hailed in English circles, I made many efforts to bring Lord Baldwin and the Fuehrer together, and I would like to add in that connection that the meeting had been arranged through a friend of Mr. Baldwin, a Mr. Jones. The Fuehrer had agreed to fly to Chequers to meet Lord Baldwin, but unfortunately Lord Baldwin had to decline at the last minute. Just why Lord Baldwin had to decline at the last minute I do not know, but there was no doubt that certain forces in England at the time did not wish a GermanBritish understanding.
said on the part of Germany that one should make another last effort to come to a good agreement and good relations with England. already been appointed State Secretary for the Foreign Office and has asked personally that that appointment be recalled and that I be sent to London as German Ambassador. Hitler had a certain, definite opinion or picture of the theory of equality of rights as far as England was concerned, but my view deviated somewhat from Hitler's. My conviction was that England would continue to support her own balance-of-power theory before and after -- that England would maintain of power was rather obsolete and that from now on England would wish to see a much stronger Germany with reference to the changed picture in Europe and also taking into consideration the strength shown by Russia that Germany would in a way counterbalance the power of Russia. In order to give a definite and clear picture on the spot and to tell him how matters actually stood in England -- that must have been one of the reasons why the Fuehrer sent me to England. circles in England who were very friendly to Germany,that connections between the two countries could be made friendly and that perhaps we could reach an agreement. England.
Q In what way was your ambassadorial activity hampered in England?
A I would like to say first that in the 1930's -- roughly 1935 and 1936. I made many trips to England, and while I war there, on instructions from the Fuehrer, had discussions for a German-British pact. The basis of this pact is known, and it was to make the naval ratio 100 to 35, to make it permanent and that the integrity of the Low Countries and France was to be guaranteed forever.
That was the thought of the Fuehrer and that Germany would be ready to keep and maintain the British Empire and to use its power if necessary and that in regard to Germany and England, they should recognize each other's power. in the 1930's did not come to any concrete result. It was one of the Fuehrer' deepest disappointments, and I would like to say that at this point -- for it is very important for further developments -- that this pact upon which the Fuehrer had placed such a very great hope and which he had considered as the complete cornerstone of his foreign policy, that this pact never materialized. Just how and what forces operated so that it did not materialize I cannot tell for I do not know, but in any case we never got very far.
Then I remained in London as Ambassador. I referred to this question again and again while I was Ambassador, discussed it with circles who were friendly to Germany, and I must say that there were many Englishmen who had a very positive attitude toward Germany.
Q Did you receive any attitude that was negative? thought of a close connection with Germany, who were against a close understanding on basic principles and perhaps traditional elements who were not inclined toward a pact of this kind, and I would like to say briefly, even though I have to dip back into the year 1936, that during the Olympic games in the year 1936 I tried to win Lord Vansittart to the thought we had in mind on the pact. I had a discussion of several hours' duration with him at Berlin. Hitler also received him and discussed the same matter with him. Lord Vansittart, even though our personal relations were excellent, met our proposals with a certain reserve. were forming in England, one trend being very much inclined and very much in favor of dealing with Germany and promoting good relations and the second trend not wishing such an agreement or collaboration. but there were those gentlemen who did not wish close contact and connections with Germany. It was the later Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and others.
Then in London I made strenuous efforts in order to promote our thoughts but events occurred which made my activity there most difficult; first of all Spanish politics and policies.
It is well known that civil war raged in Spain at that time and in London the Non-Intervention Congress was meeting.
As Ambassador to the Court of St. James I had a very difficult task. On the one hand, with all means at my disposal, I wished to further a GermanEnglish pact, and cement German-English relations but on the other hand I had the instructions of my government as far as Spain was concerned to maintain my attitude in that connection. These instructions were often contradictory. Certain efforts of the politics of the British were at cross purposes and this sort of League of Nations which the Non-Intervention Congress represented, and of which I was the authorized German member, represented a mortgage on the chief aim with which Hitler had sent me to London. lieve it is important for me to show that it was not only the Spanish policy or politics but that doubtlessly in these years, 1937, beginning of 1938, in England the trend of thought became increasingly obvious. That, of course, today is known as a historical fact, that is that trend which did not wish a pact with Germany. Why? The answer is very simple, very clear. These circles saw that through a National Socialist Germany a factor which might disturb the traditional British balance of power on the Continent. intended ever at that time to proceed against England or to undertake anything against England of its own accord; that he had sent me to London with the ardent wish to reach an agreement and an understanding with England. From London I reported to the Fuehrer the situation as I found it and before this Tribunal now I wish to set forth a point and explain that point, a point which is relevant to my own defense. from England that England was degenerate and England would perhaps not fight. I may and must establish and assert here, from the beginning I reported exactly the opposite to the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that in my opinion the English leadership and the English people had a heroic attitude and position and that these people would be ready to fight for the existence of their empire to the last man.
Later, in the course of the war in a speech in the year 1941, after I had talked with the Fuehrer, I made this view publicly known in my speech. existing in London in the year 1937 and 1938, when I was acting ambassador, that I was fully cognizant of the fact thatit would be very difficult to conclude a pact with England. But even so I reported that all efforts would be made so that peaceful negotiations and an agreement with England could be reached. That was to be a decisive factor in Germany's politics, that is, to reach an understanding with England. By that I mean the development of German power in accord with British tendencies and views so that these two views would not conflict. Anti-Commintern Pact with Japan. How was it that you, especially as ambassador, concluded that agreement? the year 1938 I was appointed Foreign Minister on the 4th of February.
On the 4th of February I was in Berlin. The Fuehrer had me summoned and said that he wanted to make me Foreign Minister. Were you talking of the Three Power Agreement?
Q No, you misunderstood. I meant to say that during your activity as Ambassador you concluded the Anti-Commintern Pact in the year 1936. Italy joined in 1937, then Spain as well as other countries. How was it that you, as ambassador, concluded this pact? between Germany, that is National Socialism, and Communism one of the most decisive factors of his politics and policies. Therefore, there was the question as to how a way could be found to win additional countries to combat Communist efforts. We are concerned with idealogical questions in this case. and as to whether in some way we could create closer contact with Japan.
I replied that I personally had certain connections in Japan and would be glad to use my efforts in that behalf.
As Japan had anti-commintern thoughts as well as Germany, in the years 1933, 1934, 1935, I believe, the thought was raised and crystallized whether these neutral efforts might not be made the basis of a pact. I believe one of my co-workers then had the idea as to whether an Anti-Commintern Pact could not be concluded. I suggested this to the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer was in agreement and considered this a good thought. He did not wish, however, at that time, since it was an ideological question, that it should be made in line with German official policies and politics and therefore instructed me to prepare this pact which then, I believe, in the year 1936, was concluded in my office in Berlin. since you were the leader of the Department Ribbentrop?
A Yes, that is correct. The Department Ribbentrop consisted chiefly of my own person and a few collaborators. But it is correct to say that the Fuehrer wished that I conclude this pact since he did not wish to emphasize it publicly. idealogical aims? had an idealogical aim. It was to combat the work of the Commintern in the various countries at that time. But this pact had political reasons and political background also and this political move was an anti-Russian one, since Moscow has the center for the Commintern. Therefore, it appeared to the Fuehrer and to me that through this pact a certain balance or counterbalance against Russian efforts or against Russia in a political sense, as such, was being created; that idealogically as well as politically -
THE PRESIDENT: Do you and the defendant really think it is necessary to take as long as the defendant has taken to tell us why he, as an ambassador in London was called upon to sign the Anti-Commintern Pact?
DR. HORN: It is very difficult for me to hear your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: What I asked you was whether you and the defendant think it necessary for the defendant to make such a long speech in answer to your question; why was he as ambassador in London employed to sign the Anti-Commintern Pact.
He has spoken for at least five minutes about it. BY DR. HORN: Give the reasons for the appointment. Berlin. The Fuehrer asked me to come to him and told me that because of a change in various high places he contemplated a change of Foreign Minister also; that the then Foreign Minister von Neurath hadbeen made the president of another organization. I then replied to the Fuehrer that I, of course, would be glad to follow his suggestion.
Q At this opportunity did you receive a high rank in the SS? The Prosecution has claimed that this rank was not purely honorary. Can you give us the details on that?
A I must clarify this point, I believe. I had received a rank in the SS prior to this time and I do not recall whether it was at this appointment or at some other time when I was made SS Gruppenfuehrer. The Fuehrer granted me the rank and the uniform of an SS Gruppenfuehrer. That was a position I had formerly, or a rank a la suite, in the Army and at that time I agreed with the thoughts of the SS. My connections with Himmler were fairly good at the time. I saw in the aims of the SS at that time the possible basis for the establishment of an idealogical fuehrer group, such as perhaps we find in England and then later the Waffen SS had shown its bravery in war. Later my position and relation to Himmler changed. and at Party meetings I would have the Party uniform and would have rank in the Party. Yesterday or the day before yesterday the question was raised whether I was a typical National Socialist.
only in later years that I met Hitler. So far as National Socialist doctrines and the program were concerned, I did not concern myself with that too much. I did not know about their race theory. I was no anti-Semite; I did not understand the church question, although I had severed my church connections quite some time back, for my own spiritual reasons, in the early 20's, in the development of German church matters. However, I believe that I was a good Christian nevertheless. time. The party wanted a strong, flourishing, and social Germany, and I wanted that too. For that reason, in the year 1932, I did, after full deliberation, become a member of the Party. prosecution claims, and especially since the year 1930? Socialism gained more than 100 seats in the Reichstag. I set forth yesterday, and perhaps do not need to repeat, just what the conditions in Germany were at that time. Party. I believe I entered the Party in August of 1932, and from that moment on, up until the end of this war, I devoted my entire power and strength to National Socialist Germany. that I was always interested and made every effort to be a good National Socialist, and that I was proudof the fact that I belonged to a small group of men, idealists, who did not want anything but to bring prestige back to Germany once more. appointment, problems whichhad to be solved? What instructions did he give you for the carrying on of foreign policies? He said only that Germany had assumed a new position from that time on. Germany had once more entered the circle of nations and equality of rights, and it was to be clearly seen that certain problems would have to be solved in the future.