I personally knew about it and dis-
cussed it approximately two or three weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risks of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the foreign office. It was common knowledge in the foreign office, however, thatNeurath was the only person in government circles consulted by Hitler, who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France.
"Neurath's position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have mere faith in Neurath than in the general run of old-school diplomats whom he, Hitler, tended to hold in disrespect."
Then there is a paragraph about the sanctions in Italy which I don't think is a relevant matter before the Tribunal; and then, in paragraph 8, I will go on:
"Plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Goering visited Rome early in 1937 he declared that union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or later. Mussolini heard these words in German, remained silent, and protested when I translated them into French.
"The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a Party matter, in which von Papen's role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The speech delivered by Papen on 18 February 1938, following the Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement as a first step towards the establishment of a general European commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This wasgenerally recognized in the foreign office as a clear prophecy of a greater Germany which would embrace Austria." this affidavit voluntarily and without compulsion. That is right, isn't it, Schmidt?
Now, just one more point and then I have finished with you. It is correct, is it not, that in his period as foreign minister the Defendant Ribbentrop brought a number of people who had rank in the SS, or, in the old days, in the SA into the foreign office and made them part of the staff?
A Yes. Principally they were members of the so-called service department -- that is to say, a formal organization. They were taken over by the department. Some of them; not all of them, but some of them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Prosecutor want to cross-examine? Dr. Horn, do you want to reexamine?
DR. HORN: I have nofurther questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. LOEFFLER (Counsel for the SA): Mr. President, just one question to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Keep the witness.
DR. LOEFFLER: May I have your permission to put one question to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you say whom you are appearing for?
DR. LOEFFLER: Dr. Loeffler, Defense Counsel for theSA. BY DR. LOEFFLER: and you were there personally, Were you also present during the visit of statesmen during the Olympic Games of 1936? social installations and the works created by the National Socialist--in particular social works -- before or after 1936? is something I cannot remember at themoment; but that such wishes were expressed and that they were fulfilled becomes clear from a number of facts -for instance, Lloyd George's visit at the Obersalzberg and, later on, his inspection of social installations in Germany. A number of interested foreign persons took an interest -- a very lively one, in my opinion -- for social works in Germany.
Q Were you present personally during such visits? Do you remember an inspection during which you were present?
A Mostly I wasn't present. I only recollect that, for instance, the Worker's Front had an organization which was called "Joy at Work". That was theinternational organization. They ran a congress annually at Hamburg, and during thatCongress I often acted as interpreter. on foreign statesmen? impression on visitors.
Q Do you remember the visit of the Prince of Wales to Germany?
A Yes. I acted as interpreter there.
THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the charges in the Indictment? Dr. Loeffler, your duty was to ask any question you have got at the same time as I asked you whether you had any questions to ask. You said No, or you indicated that you had not. You now get up and say you have one question to ask and you have asked about --. I don't know how many you are going to ask, but they are all, in the opinion of the Tribunal, I think, irrelevant.
DR. LOEFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I am putting are caused by the cross examination carried out by Sir David.
Sir David has mentioned the SA, and I want to put corresponding counter questions to the witness, and apart from that -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Sir David hadn't asked any question as to thesocial conditions of Germany, and he didn't ask any questions about the Olympic games of 1936. In any event, you are not the right person to reexamine.
DR. LOEFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I have put are important, because through those visits which were made here and through the statements made by the foreign statesmen the impression was made among us as if important statesmen abroad were expressing their recognition to the leaders of National Socialist Germany. And as to the question of whether guilty or not guilty of millions of Germans whom I represent here, it is of the greatest importance, since these millions of Germans are regarding the attitude of those foreign statesmen as decisive and important.
It isn't, therefore, irrelevant, but for us, in fact, decisive, and he is the only witness who can really make authentic statements about the correctness of that. two more questions to ask, which I would like -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) The Tribunal thinks that the questions you are puttind to not arise out of the cross examination and are entirely irrelevant, and they will not hear any further questions from you.
MR. KUBUSCHOK: Dr. Kubuschok, for the defendant Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, as you know perfectly well, this is not the time to put questions on behalf of von Papen. You have had your opportunity, and you have not done it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I am merely proposing to rectify some words which were probably misrepresented through translation. I didn't receive copies of the affidavit, but I heard that in that affidavitaspeech of von Papen's of the 18th of February 1938 was mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. If that is correct you can correct anything in the translation you want to.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I would assume that here the name "Hitler" and "Papen" have been mixed up.
I heard "Papen" was in the translation, but Papen never made such a speech, and any conclusions drawn from that speech are incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you will receive the affidavit. You will have an opportunity to look at the affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall look at the affidavit, and, if necessary, apply to have it rectified.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If there is any mistake in the affidavit it must be corrected
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It really says Papen, but that is completely wrong since he has never made such a speech. This is on Page 4. It says "The speech delivered by Papen."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is what the affidavit said. Learned counsel says it is completely wrong, he didn't make a speech. But with the greatest respect to learned counsel, I must suggest if he wants to refute the affidavit, he will have the opportunity of recalling von Papen and giving evidence then.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, could this be a case where that one little question could be put to the witness as to whether he really meant Papen?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; put the question to the witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: Papen on the 18th of February 1938 made a speech? Where was that supposed to have been made? I made that affidavit; because If the speech wasn't made -- well, at any rate, at the moment I don't remember it. But I don't remember any such speech as I pictured in that affidavit. It is, therefore, perfectly possible that I have made a mistake. And perhaps that mistake is excusable if you take into consideration that this affidavit was submitted to me at a time when I was in a hospital seriously ill and in bed. It can well have happened that when I was reading through the affidavit themistake did not become apparent, and that it is actually a mistake.
Q That means that the fact and conclusions drawn from it, therefore, are a mistake; is that right?
AAfter what I have said, yes. I can't recollect thatspeech, and I think it is due to a mistake of mine that it appeared in that document. I say it again: I attribute it to the circumstances under which the affidavit was submitted to me and signed by me, as I was seriously ill, in other words.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn. The witness can now retire.
_________________________
DR. HORN: May I once more express the request to the Tribunal whether it can be ascertained by tomorrow morning the translations of my documents will be available. My further presentation of evidence wall depend on that since if I have the translations in the morning, then I would now start to examine the defendant von Ribbentrop as a witness. If translations cannot be completed by tomorrow, then I world ask the Tribunal now to continue with submitting my documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, this trial has been going on for many months, and it is taking a very much longer time than anybody anticipated, at any rate longer than any member of the Tribunal anticipated, and they cannot have it put off any longer. You must go on. Have you got any further witnesses to call?
DR. HORN: No, I haven't any further witnesses, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you not going to call the defendant von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Why can't you put him in the box now?
DR. HORN: I can examine him, but I asked the President whether I could have the assistance of the Tribunal to have the documents by the morning so that I would not start to examine the defendant as a witness and then submit the documents when the Prosecution have their documents too, and they can raise their objections here at the same time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the documents are translated, you shall have them, of course. We have sent out to find out whether they will be available by tomorrow morning, but we have got 35 minutes how before 5:00 o'clock. We want to occupy the time.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. In that case I shall name the defendant as witness now.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on please, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: Yes. In that case I shall continue by presenting documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you said you were going to call the defendant von Ribbentrop. We haven't got the documents here, and you must do as you said.
DR. HORN: In that case I request to be given permission to examine the defendant as a witness.
_________________ (JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP, a witness, took the stand and testified as fellows): BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you say your full name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. HORN: important points of your development.
A I was born on the 30th of April 1893 at Wesel. I came from an old family of soldiers. My mother came from the country.
I went to school at Kassel and Metz at Alsace-Lorraine. There, in Alsace- Lorraine, I had my first contact with French cultural circles, and at that tiem we learned to love that country. for that were differences at that time connected with the person of the Emperor, the Kaiser. My father at that time already had a strong foreign political interests and social interests, and I had a great admiration for him.
At that time we moved to Switzerland, and after living there for about one year I went to London as a young man, and there for about one year I studied, mainly languages.
the British Empire. After about one year, in 1910, I went to Canada, originally I was to go to the German colonies but I went to Americaninstead. I wanted to see the world. I remained in Canada for several years, approximately two, and I worked as railway worker and later on I went to work in banks and in the building trade.
In 1914, the first World War surprised me in Canada. I,like, all Germans at the time, had only one thought -- "Every man is needed at home and how can we help our fatherland"? So I travelled to New-York and in September 1914, after a certain amount of difficulty, I arrived in Germany.
After active service at the front, during approximately four years, and after I was wounded, I was sent Constantinople, to Turkey, where I experienced the collapse of Germany after the first World War, At that time, my first impression was what the dreadful consequences of a lost war were. Our then Ambassador Count Bernsdorf and later Ambassor Dickhof, were the representatives of the Reich in Turkey. They were ordered to Berlin and the connections they had with President Wilson were to be explored and it was hoped by all of us that perhaps on the strength of that, some peace could be achieved and some understanding and reconciliation. Adjutant of the General von Segt for the Peace Delegation at Versailles. Subsequently, when the Treaty of Versailles was settled, I read that document one night and it was my impression that no government in the world could possibly sign such a document. That was my first impression of foreign policy at home. turned to work as a businessman. Through my commercial contacts, my business contacts, I learned to know, I got to know England and France quite intimately during the subsequent years. Several contacts with politicians were established already then. I tried to help my own country by voicing my views against Versailles. It was very difficult at the beginning but in 1919 and 1921, I found a certain amount of understanding in those countries in my own modest way. Later on, that is to say, since 1929 or 1930, I have seen that after seeming prosperity during the years 1927, 1928 and 1929 there was a sudden economic earthquare and that matter went downhill very fast.
I was at the time, that in practice the consequences of Versailles were such that German economic life was brought down more and more, so I looked around. At that time, I was closely attached to the German Peoples Party and when I saw how parties became more numerous in Germany. I rememberethat in the end we had something like thirty parties in Germany. I saw thatunemployment was growing steadily and that the government was losing the confidence more and more. I can recollect exactly those years of efforts made by the Chancellor Bruenig, which were certainly meant honestly but which nevertheless had no chance of success. Other governments came. It is known that they, too, could not succed. Exports and imports in Germany no longer tallied. The gold reserconfidence in the measures introduced by the government. That, roughly, was the picture which I saw in Germany in the year 1930 and 1931. I also saw how strikes increased, how people became more and more discontented, and how more and more demonstrations took place on the streets and how conditions became more and more chaotic. I do not think that I am exaggerating if I say that the picture which I found in the year 1931, 1932 and 1933, particularly 1932 in Germany was not unlike the first signs of civil war. For me as a German and I think I have always been a patriot -- that made an incredible impression Actually, I was not very close to the political world but during those years I told myself that something had to be done and that everyone, wherever he m might be, would have to help, would have to assist, so as to create a national front on a broad basis which would once more have the trust of men and the masses of the workers of our people. At the same time, I was aware that most of the men who were responsible for Versailles did not want that but this was a factor which no one, today even, can dispute. I have already mentioned what disappointment I experienced as a young officer through personal contact and in particular, to the then German Ambassador Dickhof, who is a relative of mine by marriage, the disappointment which we all experienced, all those of us in the German armed forces and the German people, and in government circles even more, that these points of Wilson's had been so quickly departed from.
I do not propose to make a propaganda speech. I merely want to represent the facts, state facts, only as I experienced them at the time . There is no doubt that the defenselessness of the German people at that time was the cause, the cause for that fact, that that attitude became prevalent amongst our enemies, not tending towards an understanding but toward hatred and revenge. I am convinced that this was not the intention of the President of the United States Wilson at all and I believe that in later years, he personally must have suffered through it. At any rate that was my first contact with German politics.
closest personal knowledge, were not observed. That, too, is perhaps a consequence of the war, during which men drift into a certain direction and just cannot observe certain things or do not wish to. At any rate, the rules of Versailles are known, and they are, neither territorially speaking nor in many other important points, on record as having been observed. Silesia, Upper Silesia at the same time, and particularly Memel Land, that small land, and events which occurred, made a deep impression on me, Upper Silesia particularly because many personal ties of mine exist there and becau we all could not understand that those severe instructions of Versailles were not observed. be discussed, and later on I shall probably have to refer to this point more in detail, particularly in connection with the Polish crisis. But anyway, right from the beginning, German minorities, as known, were exposed to seriou difficulties. At that time, Upper Silesia particularly, and these territory which were suffering under that treatment, were concerned. was the question of disarmament, and that, too, has been referred to in this courtroom and at the moment I do not want to concern myself with it in detail of equal rights, was the cause of my interesting myself in politics. I woul like to say here quite openly that at that time I often talked to French and British friends, and it was a well known fact, of course, even then, that aft 1930 the NSDAP already had 100 or more seats in the Reichstag, and this was the symptom of the natural will of the German people breaking through to resi that treatment, which in fact meant nothing other than that that was what the German people desired. didn't know at the time. They asked me, "What sort of a man is Adolf Hitler What is to be expected from him?" I said to them frankly, "Give Germany a chance and you won't have Adolf Hitler. Don't give Germany a chance and Adolf Hitler will come into power."
That, I think, was approximately in 1930 or 1931. Germany wasn't given the chance, so on the 30th of January 1933, the seizure of power by the National Socialists happened.
Q How and when did you get to know Adolf Hitler? the Berghof. Since approximately 1930 or 1931 I had known Count Helldorf in Berlin, whose name as a National Socialist is known. He was a regimental comrade of mine in my squadron, and we went through four years of war together. Through him I became acquainted with National Socialists in Berlin for the first time, and I had asked him at that time to arrange for a conversation with Hitler. Hitler and had a long discussion with him at that time. That is to say, Adolf Hitler explained his thoughts on the situation in 1932 to me. Goering, and this happened at my house at Dahlem which I placed at their disposal for the purpose of doing everything to create a national front.
My impression of Adolf Hitler was a considerable one even then. I noticed particularly his blue eyes and his generally dark appearance, and then, his settled, I should like to say, final -- not closed, but final -character, and the way in which he expressed his thoughts. These thoughts and statements had something final and definite about them, and they appeared to come from his deepest, innermost self. I had the impression that I was facing a man who knew what he wanted and who had an unshakeable will and who was a very strong personality indeed. convinced that this man only, if anybody, would be in a position to save Germany from those difficulties and that emergency which existed at the time. like to tell you about one episode which happened in my house at Dahlem when the question arose whether Hitler was to become Chancellor or not. I know that at that time he was offered the Vice Chancellorship and I heard with what enormous strength and conviction, if you like, also brutality and hardness he could state his opinion when he believed that hurdles appeared on the way to resurrection of the German people.
Treaty by means of mutual understanding? years of 1920 to 1932, which took me abroad, proved to me how incredibly difficult it would be under the then existing system to settle by means of negotiations on a revision of the Versailles Treaty. In spite of that, I felt, I sensed, how as the years went by the groups in England and France grow who had been convinced that somehow Germany would have to be helped. During those years, I established many a contact with businessmen, social figures, and men of art and science, particularly in universities in England and France, and in that connection I learned to understand the attitude of the Englishmen and the Frenchmen. conviction that a change of that treaty could only be carried out through mutual understanding with France and Britain. I also believed that only in this way could the international situation be improved, and the very considerable substances of conflict existing everywhere, as consequences of the First WorldWar, be removed. us and the Western Powers and England and France, could a revision of Versailles be possible. And even then, I had the certain fouling that only by means of such an understanding could real peace in Europe be permanently preserved.
We young officers had experienced too much at that time. I am thinking of the battle for Silesia and the Baltic and all that, and I should like to add, and say it quite openly, that right from the beginning and from the first day when I read that Versailles Treaty, I, as a German, felt it to be my duty to fight against it and to try to do everything so that its place would be taken by a better one. Hitler's definite attitude against Versailles was the very thing that first bound me to him and the National Socialist Party.
Q Did you attempt to tell Hitler what your views were?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, it is 5:00 o'clock and the Tribunal thinks they had better adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 29 March 1946 at 1000 hours.)
of: The United States of America, the French Republic, The United King
THE PRESIDENT: Before the examination of defendant von Ribbentrop goes on the Tribunal desires me to draw the attention of Dr. Horn and of the defendant von Ribbentrop to what the Tribunal has said during the last few days.
In the first place the Tribunal said this: The Tribunal has allowed the defendant Goering, who has given the evidence first of the defendants and who has proclaimed himself to be responsible as the second leader of Nazi Germany, to give his evidence without any interruption whatever, and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi regime from its inception to the defeat of Germany. The Tribunal does not propose to allow any of the order defendants to go over the same ground in their evidence except in so far as is necessary for their own defense. Versailles Treaty or whether it was made under duress is inadmissible.
Thirdly, though this isn't in order of the Tribunal, I must point out that the Tribunal has been informed on many occasions of the view of the defendants and some of their witness that the Treaty of Versailles was unjust and therefore any evidence upon that point apart from its being inadmissible is cumulative, and the Tribunal will not hear it trerefore for that reason.
Ans lastly, the Tribunal wishes me to point out to Dr. Horn that it is the duty of counsel to examine their witness and not to leave them simply to make speeches, and if they are giving evidence which counsel knows is inadmissible according to the ruling of the Tribunal it is the duty of counsel to stop the witness. That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if you are going to refer to Gauss'affidavit the Tribunal will not deal with that matter now, it will be dealt with after the defendant von Ribbentrop has given evidence.
DR. SEIDL: (counsel for the defendant Hess) Mr. President, I spoke with Dr. Horn, counsel for the defendant Ribbentrop -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I don't care whether you spoke to Dr Horn or not or what arrangement you may have made with Dr. Horn; it is not convenient to the Tribunal to hear Dr. Gauss'evidence at the present moment, they want to go on with TRibbentrop's evidence.
__________ BY DR. HORN (counsel for defendant Ribbentrop):
sions in England and France. In connection with that I would like to put the following questions. Did you make efforts to tell Hitler your impressions and your views as you saw British and French politics at that time? course told him about my impressions which I gathered on my frequent travels to England and France, and reported to Hitler.
Q What was Hitler's attitude toward France and England at that time?
A Hitler's attitude and position was as follows: He saw an enemy to Germany in France, arising from the policies and politics which France carried on with regard to Germany, beginning with the end of the First World War, and especially the position which she took in questions of equality for Germany. This position of Hitler's is brought forth in his book Mein Kampf. there. At that time I told the Fuehrer much about France. He was interested in hearing my opinion, and I noticed that he had a growing interest for things French in the year 1933. Then I brought him together with a number of Frenchmen, and I believe some of these visits, and perhaps my pictures as to the position taken by many Frenchmen, as well as all of French culture-
Q What kind of Frenchmen were they? or politicans. The pictures I presented to Hitler were very interesting to theFuehrer, and gradually he received the impression that in France there were men who would not reject an understanding with Germany. ofmy deepest conviction and of my experience of the prior years. It was the great wish of the Fuehrer, as is well known, to come to a definite friendship with England and to come to an agreement with England as well. concerned, treated this separately or by itself. I believe at that time I succeeded in convincing the Fuehrer that an understanding with England would be possible only by having an agreement with France as well--an understanding with France as well. I remember very exactly some conversations I had with the Fuehrer. This made a strong impression on him. He told me then that since I had followed a rather personal course of understanding between Germany and France, I should continue on this task and report to him on the progress of my efforts.
Q Then, you were Hitler's Foreign political Counselor, not the counsel of the Party. Can you tell me a little more about that? my journeys. The impressions I gathered, which I told him on my return from England and France, were of interest to him, and without referring to special conferences or discussions, I was received repeatedly by Hitler.
I spoke with him repeatedly and in that way it came about, more or less in a natural way, that outside and beyond the official channels or politics he was interested in having my opinion; and asked my advice on things which I had seen in the foreign countries.
He was ready to listen to my advice. Above all, he had a vital interest, of course, for questions English. I told him about public opinion and about personalities, and brought Frenchmen and Englishmen to him, and now he could do something which he loved to do, to exchange thoughts unofficially. with France in the years 1933 to 1935? What were your efforts in that direction? and brought this question up for discussion. I tried through my own private channels to tell the Frenchmen in Paris that a reasonable and quiet solution of the Saar question in the spirit of the plebiscite as laid down in the Versailles Treaty would be and should be a good omen for relations between the two countries. I spoke with many numbers of people during these years in Paris and made connections with members of the French cabinet. I would like to add that I had discussions and conversations with the then French president Poumergue, with the then assassinated Foreign Minister Barthou, with Mr. Laval, and above all with Mr. Daladier. complete agreement with Daladier on that. Then a little later I noticed that at those visits of Frenchmen with Hitler it was again and again mentioned, "Yes, now we have Mein Kampf to deal with, and your attitute and your policies toward France are established in that book." I tried to tell the Fuehrer to give forth an official revision of this chapter of Mein Kampf. The Fuehrer said, and I remember it verbatim, that he had decided, through his practical policies, to prove to the world that he had changed his view in this respect, that things which had been written down could not be changed, that they were historical fact, and his then view, or his former view toward France, had been determined by France's attitude toward Germany at that time.
But now one could turn over a new leaf in the history of the two countries and their relations to each other. perhaps through a public announcement a revision of his view as expressed in his book Mein Kampf -- to change the view and to affirm his new view to the world. interview. I don't exactly recall just when; it was sometime in 1933, though, I believe this article appeared in "Le Matin" and created quite a bit of excitement. I was very glad, for with this article all doubts were removed and a tremendous step toward an understanding with France had been reached. Then I contemplated what could be done subsequently and how, from the simple matters now, a connection between French and German statesmen could be arranged.
Q At that time wasn't there an intermediary meeting between Hitler and Daladier? Didn't you contemplate a meeting of that sort and did you make efforts in that behalf?
At that time Daladier was the Premier. I had suggested to him that he meet Adolf Hitler so that quite frankly, man to man, a discussion could be carried on, to see whether Franco-German relations could nor be put on an entirely new and different basis. Mr. Daladier was quite taken with this start. I reported this to Hitler and Hitler was ready to meet Daladier. I went to Paris so that the last arrangements could be made with that.
MR. DODD: If your Honor pleases, I am reluctant to interfere in any respect with this examination of the Defendant, but my colleagues and I feel that this particular part of the examination is quite immaterial and in any event much too detailed, and that we will never get along here. If Counsel would abide by the instruction of the Court given this morning, we could move along much more directly and much more quickly.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that the objection is really well founded. The Defendant is dealing with a period between 1933 and 1935, and the efforts which he made for good relations with France. Well, now, that is very remote from any question which we have to decide in this case, and therefore to deal with it in this detail seems to the Tribunal a waste of time.
DR. HORN: Then I will put other questions, which concern his direct cooperation.
Q What caused Hitler to appoint you Plenipotentiary for Disarmament? April. The reasons are as follows: and he believed that equality of armament would be possible only if and when negotiations could be carried on with France and England; and this, of course was my position also, at that time, in my efforts to establish good relations between Germany and England, since this was the pet wish of the Fuehrer. On this mission I went to London and while there made contacts with British political figures.