I mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. Do you remember what I think they call in the German Foreign Office a "conduit de language" that was issued by Ribbentrop about that time and put out by Baron von Weizsecker?
A. No, I do not know that that, or at any rate I can not remember it.
Q. Let me try to remind you, to see if this draws it to your recollection.
"That the Polish problem will be solved by Hitler in 48 hours; the Western Powers will be unable to give any assistance to Poland; the British Empire is doomed within the next ten years; France will bleed to death if she tries to intervene." Minister?
A. A conduit de language of that kind I can not remember, but it appears to me to be rather a conduit de language for propaganda purposes.
Q. Do you not remember that von Ribbentrop issued instructions that no official of the Foreign Office was to issue any different views?
A. That is right, namely, that one was to adhere to that ruling on speeches.
Q. And do you remember what he told Baron von Weizsecker to say would happen to any one who expressed different views?
A. No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that severe penalties would have been threatened to a person like that, but I do not remember the actual case.
Q. Do you not remember that he waid they would be shot by him personally?
A. That such an utterance may have been made on some occasion when he was furious I consider perfectly possible, but that it was meant seriously I do not believe.
Q. What I thought you might remember -- I just suggest it to you -- was the distress and difficulty that Baron von Weizsecker had in deciding how he was to say it to the official conference at the Foreign Office. Don't you remember that?
A. At that time I had not yet been admitted to the morning conferences.
I was not present so I can not tell you anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary may have had quite some trouble in translating that statement into official language.
Q. Well, now, I want to deal quite shortly with the points that have been put to you about August 1939. I only want to get the facts quite clear. the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet Treaty?
A. No, because I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and therfore not with Hitler.
Q. So did you come back with the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 24th?
A. Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to Berchtesgaden.
Q. I see, Well, now, on the 25th, you remember that Hitler saw Neville Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave him what has been called a note cerbale? Do you remember that?
A. I think that I was not present at that conference because at that time I was in Moscow. I think it could be ascertained on the strength of the date. I was present at a conference between Hitler and the British Ambassador; during the time of our Moscow hourney, I was not present. I think that is the conference you are referring to.
Q. This is the day after the defendant came back from Moscow.
A. No, I was not. I remained in Berlin. I did not go up there.
Q. I just want to remind you of the day. If you were not present, I will pass from it, but were you present when Signor Atolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a communication from Mussolini?
A. Yes, I was there.
Q. You were there?
A. Yes.
Q. That is the day I am asking you about. Do you remember that a communication came from Signor Atolico that afternoon that the Italian Army and air force were not in a condition to go to war?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. I want you to try to help me beacuse it is rather important as to the time. Wasn't that about three o'clock in the afternoon?
A. That could be so, but with the number of conference which took place at the time, the question of hours and dates is a bit mixed up.
Q. And do you remember the news the Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming through about four o'clock?
A. Yes, certainly I remember that.
Q. And do you remember about four o'clock M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview with Hitler?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Now, were you aware that on that day the orders for an attack on Poland the next morning were countermanded?
A. That military orders had been withdrawn is something I remember, but just what orders these were I never learned.
Q. I would not ask you about that, Herr Schmidt, but you knew that orders had been countermanded. I wondered if you could help me on this point: Was not the countermanding of the orders at 6:;5-- 1815 hours -- after the interview with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, was not that the time when they were countermanded?
A. I can not recall that. If that was the time, I do not know.
Q. And equally could you help the Tribunal on this point: Weren't they issued about two o'clock -- 1400 hours -- after the interview with Sir Neville Henderson? Do you know that?
A. No.
Q. I see. You can not help us on that point. of the 30- 31 August between Sir Neville Henderson and the defendant Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told us that the defendant Ribbentrop was very excited. When he read these terms over, did he raise his voice at times, shouting?
A. No.
Q. How did he show his nervousness, then?
A. During some incidents which had taken place previously, one of which I had previously been trying to describe, during those incidents the nervousness became apparent but not during the reading of the document.
Q. I see, but you remember and were very much astounded at the refusal to hand over the vital document to the British Ambassador?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. Well, I want to see if you can help us with one or two other incidents. I has been suggested by a witness that we heard yesterday that the defendant Ribbentrop knew very little about concentration camps. I want to make it clear that was suggested. I think perhaps you can help us on one or two inhabitants of concentration camps that he knew about.
Do you remember a man called Martin Luther? Not the religious gentleman but a contemporary?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that the defendant Ribbentrop brought him into his office, the Bureau Ribbentrop, in 1936?
that it happened in that office.
Q Yes. I think it was not received with great joy by the older members of the German Foreign Office. marks that Mr. Luther had had to deal with in the past? promotion to Consul of the Embassy, Minister and finally Secretary of State, did he not? defendant Ribentrop? Buentner -- suggesting that Ribbentrop's state of mind was not such that he ought to continue as Foreign Secretary, and suggesting that Werner Best, I believe it was, should be appointed. Do you remember that ?
A Yes, I remember that; but I did not know that he suggested Best as successor.
Q At any rate, he suggested that Ribbentrop should go. I think he was quite blunt about it, I believe he suggested that his mental powers were no longer up to it.
A Well, I didn't see that report, and I only heard rumors about it. However, such rumors did reach me. rop, Ribbentrop had Luther put in a concentration camp, had he not?
A Whether Ribbentrop's initiative was responsible for that, or whether it came from some other party, I do not know, but it was said in our de department that Luther had landed in a concentration camp.
Q Yes. Well, the sequence of events was that Luther had this disagreement with Ribbentrop, and shortly afterwards he appeared in a concen tration camp.
And not only did he go into a concentration camp, but isn't it correct that even the SS asked that he should come out of the concentration camp, and Ribbentrop would not agree to it?
A I can't say anything about that because the whole matter was, of course, treated rather confidentially in the office by von Ribbentrop, and the members of the Foreign Office, of which I was one, did not have his confidence to such an extent that they were informed of all such details. In other words, regarding the whole Luther affair, I have had to find prohibited information through prohibited channels, and I therefore, cannot give you any authentic information; I can only repeat what I have heard unofficially. the point I am putting to you is that everyone in the Foreign Office knew that Luther had landed in a concentration camp and, quite clearly, the defendant Ribbentrop knew that he had landed in a concentration camp. That is right, is it not? if I may comment as to his extraordinary innocence about concentration camps. to whom the Schloss Fuschl used to belong? I think the name is either Raemitz, or Raenitz. Do you remember?
Q Well, the Schloss Fuschl -- would you tell me how it is pronounced? tioned. Frau von Raemitz was a sister of August Tissen, was she not?
A I can't say anything about that, since all these questions refer to that. My connections with him were purely official and limited, at that, to routine matters and political interpretation in the Foreign Office.
I only heard about the other matters a marche, but so that I could make authentic statements about them, no, of course not.
Q Well, I will only ask you one question. After the Schloss had become the property, or at any rate had come to the use of the Foreign Minister didn't Herr von Raemitz spend several years in a concentration camp, where he ultimately died? You know that, did you not?
A I knew it as a rumor; it was rumored that was the way things happened.
Q I don't believe so, that authentic details regarding conditions in concentration camps were known. Of course, particularly as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, that was treated as taboo by those people who were responsible for concentration camps. Since we, in any case, were regarded as not quite reliable and not quite belonging to them, such matters, of course, were particularly, deliberately, covered up from us and distorted. Therefore, any concrete details never became known to us at all. were a large number of concentration camps in which a vast number of people were shut up? press, which we read, of course, and the foreign radio, which appeared on our table, translated, every morning. radio, whoever else in that dock did not know about concentration camps, the defendant Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, did know. Isn't that right? access to that foreign news material. Just how he valued that, whether he considered it true or completely false, or exaggerated, that I cannot say, of course. He did, of course, receive the reports as such too, but under the heading of foreign reports, and, during the war, reports from hostile countries.
Q Doctor, I won't pursue that further at the moment, I want you to just tell me this. You have given us your account of the interview between Hitler and the defendant Ribbentrop and Horthy when the question of the Jews was discussed, on the 17th of April, 1943.
I just wanted on record thatyour account is based on the fact that you actually made the minutes; the minutes are signed by you.
Q I want to pass to another point. From 1943 to 1945, were you still going to Hitler's headquarters for occasional interpreting and attending of meeting and the like?
Q For example--I don't know if you can remember it, but I am sue you will try--on the 27th of February, 1944, do you remember a visit of Marshal Antonescu?
Q Were you present at that?
A I remember I was always present during all business of Antonescu's since the discussion couldn't take place any other way. But regarding the date, I couldn't tell you anything exactly at the moment.
Q It was actually the 27th of February. I wanted to try and fix it by an incident which might remind you of it, that Antonescu was there. Now, do you remember on that occasion that the defendany Doenitz was present?
It is possible, but I haven't any exact recollection. During the military discussions it is quite possible that he was present there, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Exhibit, my Lord, is GB-207, and it is dealt with on page 2705 of the shorthand notes. The document was originally D-648. set-up. There has been considerable evidence given before the Tribunal that the Reichsregierung, as such, did not meet after the beginning of the war. Several people have told us that. Instead of a cabinet meeting, wasn't it a fact that the government of Germany was carried on by these constant meetings at Hitler's headquarters?
A I consider that a possibility, but I haven't got exact knowledge, since I was never present during such internal conferences or took part in them. I only went to headquarters whenever a foreigner was there whom I had to accompany.
Q You only came when there was a foreign visitor, but you knew that these meetings were continuously taking place and that the defendant Goering, the defendant Speer, the defendant Keitel, the defendant Jodl, the defendant Doenitz were constantly attending these meetings.
I don't know either.
Q I didn't mean to play with words with you at all. I only used the word to describe what was happening. If you prefer to call it a conference, I am willing to do that. people you have just named were present at the headquarters. That is something I certainly admit.
Q I think you agree with me, don't you, that as far as one can find any organism or organization through which the government of the Reich was being carried on, it was this succession of meetings or conferences at Hitler's headquarters; isn't that so?
A Well, I don't know whether you can call that governmental activities If I drew a parallel with a conference during which I was present with these foreign gentlemen, then you will find that the person who spoke and who achieved decisions was none other then Hitler. In other words, if it was the same with those conferences, then you could call it a government discussion or conference, but it was a one-man government. The others were only there as an audience or to be interrogated regarding individual points. That is how I imagine it to be, but I was not present. which each service and each department and each organization--like the SS, through the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler--put their point of view and put the facts before Hitler on which decisions were come to, weren't they? And that is what happened for the last two years of the war. clusion, yes, but it could have been that an order group took place, that is, a reception of orders at headquarters. Both possibilities exist, but just which is applicable is something I can't make a statement about.
Q At any rate, I think you will agree with this, won't you, Herr Schmidt, that there was no other place at which the government of Germany took place except that?
Q- Would you be good enough to look at your affidavit? I will just read the rest of it.
It is quite short, but I went it to be on the record. Paragraph 4:
"The attempted putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on the 25th of July 1934, seriously disturbed the career personnel of the foreign office, because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods both in foreign and domestic policy.
"This concern over the repercussions of the attempted putsch was seen heightened by recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the France-Soviet pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by Hitler.
"The announcement in March of the establishment of a German air force and the introduction of conscription was followed on the 2nd of May, 1935, by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the foreign office regarded this as a very serious further warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the Western powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time the career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the foreign minister, von Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.
"6. The reentry of the German military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communique of the21st of February 1936 reaffirmed that the French-Soviet pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno treaties and the Covenant of the League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in 'Mein Kampf' offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon.
I personally knew about it and dis-
cussed it approximately two or three weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risks of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the foreign office. It was common knowledge in the foreign office, however, thatNeurath was the only person in government circles consulted by Hitler, who felt confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France.
"Neurath's position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have mere faith in Neurath than in the general run of old-school diplomats whom he, Hitler, tended to hold in disrespect."
Then there is a paragraph about the sanctions in Italy which I don't think is a relevant matter before the Tribunal; and then, in paragraph 8, I will go on:
"Plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength, made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Goering visited Rome early in 1937 he declared that union of Austria and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or later. Mussolini heard these words in German, remained silent, and protested when I translated them into French.
"The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a Party matter, in which von Papen's role was to preserve smooth diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The speech delivered by Papen on 18 February 1938, following the Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement as a first step towards the establishment of a general European commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This wasgenerally recognized in the foreign office as a clear prophecy of a greater Germany which would embrace Austria." this affidavit voluntarily and without compulsion. That is right, isn't it, Schmidt?
Now, just one more point and then I have finished with you. It is correct, is it not, that in his period as foreign minister the Defendant Ribbentrop brought a number of people who had rank in the SS, or, in the old days, in the SA into the foreign office and made them part of the staff?
A Yes. Principally they were members of the so-called service department -- that is to say, a formal organization. They were taken over by the department. Some of them; not all of them, but some of them.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Prosecutor want to cross-examine? Dr. Horn, do you want to reexamine?
DR. HORN: I have nofurther questions to put to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.
DR. LOEFFLER (Counsel for the SA): Mr. President, just one question to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Keep the witness.
DR. LOEFFLER: May I have your permission to put one question to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you say whom you are appearing for?
DR. LOEFFLER: Dr. Loeffler, Defense Counsel for theSA. BY DR. LOEFFLER: and you were there personally, Were you also present during the visit of statesmen during the Olympic Games of 1936? social installations and the works created by the National Socialist--in particular social works -- before or after 1936? is something I cannot remember at themoment; but that such wishes were expressed and that they were fulfilled becomes clear from a number of facts -for instance, Lloyd George's visit at the Obersalzberg and, later on, his inspection of social installations in Germany. A number of interested foreign persons took an interest -- a very lively one, in my opinion -- for social works in Germany.
Q Were you present personally during such visits? Do you remember an inspection during which you were present?
A Mostly I wasn't present. I only recollect that, for instance, the Worker's Front had an organization which was called "Joy at Work". That was theinternational organization. They ran a congress annually at Hamburg, and during thatCongress I often acted as interpreter. on foreign statesmen? impression on visitors.
Q Do you remember the visit of the Prince of Wales to Germany?
A Yes. I acted as interpreter there.
THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the charges in the Indictment? Dr. Loeffler, your duty was to ask any question you have got at the same time as I asked you whether you had any questions to ask. You said No, or you indicated that you had not. You now get up and say you have one question to ask and you have asked about --. I don't know how many you are going to ask, but they are all, in the opinion of the Tribunal, I think, irrelevant.
DR. LOEFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I am putting are caused by the cross examination carried out by Sir David.
Sir David has mentioned the SA, and I want to put corresponding counter questions to the witness, and apart from that -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Sir David hadn't asked any question as to thesocial conditions of Germany, and he didn't ask any questions about the Olympic games of 1936. In any event, you are not the right person to reexamine.
DR. LOEFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I have put are important, because through those visits which were made here and through the statements made by the foreign statesmen the impression was made among us as if important statesmen abroad were expressing their recognition to the leaders of National Socialist Germany. And as to the question of whether guilty or not guilty of millions of Germans whom I represent here, it is of the greatest importance, since these millions of Germans are regarding the attitude of those foreign statesmen as decisive and important.
It isn't, therefore, irrelevant, but for us, in fact, decisive, and he is the only witness who can really make authentic statements about the correctness of that. two more questions to ask, which I would like -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) The Tribunal thinks that the questions you are puttind to not arise out of the cross examination and are entirely irrelevant, and they will not hear any further questions from you.
MR. KUBUSCHOK: Dr. Kubuschok, for the defendant Papen.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, as you know perfectly well, this is not the time to put questions on behalf of von Papen. You have had your opportunity, and you have not done it.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I am merely proposing to rectify some words which were probably misrepresented through translation. I didn't receive copies of the affidavit, but I heard that in that affidavitaspeech of von Papen's of the 18th of February 1938 was mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. If that is correct you can correct anything in the translation you want to.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I would assume that here the name "Hitler" and "Papen" have been mixed up.
I heard "Papen" was in the translation, but Papen never made such a speech, and any conclusions drawn from that speech are incorrect.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you will receive the affidavit. You will have an opportunity to look at the affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall look at the affidavit, and, if necessary, apply to have it rectified.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If there is any mistake in the affidavit it must be corrected
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It really says Papen, but that is completely wrong since he has never made such a speech. This is on Page 4. It says "The speech delivered by Papen."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is what the affidavit said. Learned counsel says it is completely wrong, he didn't make a speech. But with the greatest respect to learned counsel, I must suggest if he wants to refute the affidavit, he will have the opportunity of recalling von Papen and giving evidence then.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, could this be a case where that one little question could be put to the witness as to whether he really meant Papen?
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; put the question to the witness. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: Papen on the 18th of February 1938 made a speech? Where was that supposed to have been made? I made that affidavit; because If the speech wasn't made -- well, at any rate, at the moment I don't remember it. But I don't remember any such speech as I pictured in that affidavit. It is, therefore, perfectly possible that I have made a mistake. And perhaps that mistake is excusable if you take into consideration that this affidavit was submitted to me at a time when I was in a hospital seriously ill and in bed. It can well have happened that when I was reading through the affidavit themistake did not become apparent, and that it is actually a mistake.
Q That means that the fact and conclusions drawn from it, therefore, are a mistake; is that right?
AAfter what I have said, yes. I can't recollect thatspeech, and I think it is due to a mistake of mine that it appeared in that document. I say it again: I attribute it to the circumstances under which the affidavit was submitted to me and signed by me, as I was seriously ill, in other words.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn. The witness can now retire.
_________________________
DR. HORN: May I once more express the request to the Tribunal whether it can be ascertained by tomorrow morning the translations of my documents will be available. My further presentation of evidence wall depend on that since if I have the translations in the morning, then I would now start to examine the defendant von Ribbentrop as a witness. If translations cannot be completed by tomorrow, then I world ask the Tribunal now to continue with submitting my documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, this trial has been going on for many months, and it is taking a very much longer time than anybody anticipated, at any rate longer than any member of the Tribunal anticipated, and they cannot have it put off any longer. You must go on. Have you got any further witnesses to call?
DR. HORN: No, I haven't any further witnesses, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you not going to call the defendant von Ribbentrop?
DR. HORN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Why can't you put him in the box now?
DR. HORN: I can examine him, but I asked the President whether I could have the assistance of the Tribunal to have the documents by the morning so that I would not start to examine the defendant as a witness and then submit the documents when the Prosecution have their documents too, and they can raise their objections here at the same time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, as soon as the documents are translated, you shall have them, of course. We have sent out to find out whether they will be available by tomorrow morning, but we have got 35 minutes how before 5:00 o'clock. We want to occupy the time.
DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. In that case I shall name the defendant as witness now.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on please, Dr. Horn?
DR. HORN: Yes. In that case I shall continue by presenting documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, you said you were going to call the defendant von Ribbentrop. We haven't got the documents here, and you must do as you said.
DR. HORN: In that case I request to be given permission to examine the defendant as a witness.
_________________ (JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP, a witness, took the stand and testified as fellows): BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you say your full name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. HORN: important points of your development.
A I was born on the 30th of April 1893 at Wesel. I came from an old family of soldiers. My mother came from the country.
I went to school at Kassel and Metz at Alsace-Lorraine. There, in Alsace- Lorraine, I had my first contact with French cultural circles, and at that tiem we learned to love that country. for that were differences at that time connected with the person of the Emperor, the Kaiser. My father at that time already had a strong foreign political interests and social interests, and I had a great admiration for him.
At that time we moved to Switzerland, and after living there for about one year I went to London as a young man, and there for about one year I studied, mainly languages.
the British Empire. After about one year, in 1910, I went to Canada, originally I was to go to the German colonies but I went to Americaninstead. I wanted to see the world. I remained in Canada for several years, approximately two, and I worked as railway worker and later on I went to work in banks and in the building trade.
In 1914, the first World War surprised me in Canada. I,like, all Germans at the time, had only one thought -- "Every man is needed at home and how can we help our fatherland"? So I travelled to New-York and in September 1914, after a certain amount of difficulty, I arrived in Germany.
After active service at the front, during approximately four years, and after I was wounded, I was sent Constantinople, to Turkey, where I experienced the collapse of Germany after the first World War, At that time, my first impression was what the dreadful consequences of a lost war were. Our then Ambassador Count Bernsdorf and later Ambassor Dickhof, were the representatives of the Reich in Turkey. They were ordered to Berlin and the connections they had with President Wilson were to be explored and it was hoped by all of us that perhaps on the strength of that, some peace could be achieved and some understanding and reconciliation. Adjutant of the General von Segt for the Peace Delegation at Versailles. Subsequently, when the Treaty of Versailles was settled, I read that document one night and it was my impression that no government in the world could possibly sign such a document. That was my first impression of foreign policy at home. turned to work as a businessman. Through my commercial contacts, my business contacts, I learned to know, I got to know England and France quite intimately during the subsequent years. Several contacts with politicians were established already then. I tried to help my own country by voicing my views against Versailles. It was very difficult at the beginning but in 1919 and 1921, I found a certain amount of understanding in those countries in my own modest way. Later on, that is to say, since 1929 or 1930, I have seen that after seeming prosperity during the years 1927, 1928 and 1929 there was a sudden economic earthquare and that matter went downhill very fast.
I was at the time, that in practice the consequences of Versailles were such that German economic life was brought down more and more, so I looked around. At that time, I was closely attached to the German Peoples Party and when I saw how parties became more numerous in Germany. I rememberethat in the end we had something like thirty parties in Germany. I saw thatunemployment was growing steadily and that the government was losing the confidence more and more. I can recollect exactly those years of efforts made by the Chancellor Bruenig, which were certainly meant honestly but which nevertheless had no chance of success. Other governments came. It is known that they, too, could not succed. Exports and imports in Germany no longer tallied. The gold reserconfidence in the measures introduced by the government. That, roughly, was the picture which I saw in Germany in the year 1930 and 1931. I also saw how strikes increased, how people became more and more discontented, and how more and more demonstrations took place on the streets and how conditions became more and more chaotic. I do not think that I am exaggerating if I say that the picture which I found in the year 1931, 1932 and 1933, particularly 1932 in Germany was not unlike the first signs of civil war. For me as a German and I think I have always been a patriot -- that made an incredible impression Actually, I was not very close to the political world but during those years I told myself that something had to be done and that everyone, wherever he m might be, would have to help, would have to assist, so as to create a national front on a broad basis which would once more have the trust of men and the masses of the workers of our people. At the same time, I was aware that most of the men who were responsible for Versailles did not want that but this was a factor which no one, today even, can dispute. I have already mentioned what disappointment I experienced as a young officer through personal contact and in particular, to the then German Ambassador Dickhof, who is a relative of mine by marriage, the disappointment which we all experienced, all those of us in the German armed forces and the German people, and in government circles even more, that these points of Wilson's had been so quickly departed from.