THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of the press. What have we got to do with the reactions of the press?
DR. HORN: The witness was describing Ribbentrop's reactions to the Parl Harbor attack. Ribbentrop did not know that the Japanese were about to attack America or Pearl Harbor: that such an agreement between Japan and Germany ever existed. It is not correct, therefore, that Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war against the U.S.A.
THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not saying that you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister knew nothing about the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not what I said. What I said was that the Tribunal was not interested and thought it was irrelevant for you to go into the reactions of the press. BY DR. HORN: pact between Germany and England. Can you tell us how these negotiations proceeded and what Ribbentrop's honest opinions and aims were in that connection? took place perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been overcome. The aims-
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this is the naval agreement of 1935. In my recollection--I am just trying to check it-that was one of the matters which we discussed on the application for witnesses and the Tribunal ruled against going into the negotiations, antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came up on application for witnesses. One or two witnesses were asked for, who were going to give the negotiations/ I think, to deal with this exact point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, namely, the state of mind of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one or two -- there is Lord Monsell, for example, who was on the list of witnesses -- who were denied by the Court, and a number of others were denied on the same point. My Lord, it is in the Tribunal's statement of the 26th of February, and my Lordship will see on page 2, I think, certainly the witness Monsell, who happens to be the one most familiar to myself, but I am sure there were other witnesses, too.
I know that we discussed this point quite fully on the application for witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who were refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Who was relevant on this question as to the initiative of the Treaty. And then there is Sir Robert Craigie, No. 24. There is Lord Monsell -
THE PRESIDENT: He was refused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points. No. 25.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, my Lord, I think these are the three.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those three witnesses -- Schuster, Craigie and Monsell -- whom you alleged were to give evidence on this 1935 Treaty, were all refused. As to the witness you are now examining, no such application was made respecting him, nor even an interpreter in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: I was under the impression that the other witnesses had been refused because they were cumulative and I wasn't going to question the witness on the Naval Pact. I was merely going to bring out Ribbentrop's attitude in the course of and following the conclusion of the Pact, and I want to prove to the Tribunal that Ribbentrop was not at that time aiming deliberately at an aggressive war, nor was he a part of a conspiracy for an aggressive war at that time. And furthermore, I wish to prove by it that this Pact was not, as the previously mentioned British Ambassador, Nevil Henderson, was trying to put it, "eye wash."
THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador Craigie was to the effect that the witness would give evidence that in 1935 Ribbentrop approached England with a proposal that the Naval Treaty should be signed and Ribbentrop's initiative brought about an agreement on that Treaty by France.
Isn't it in connection with that, that you were going to ask this witness questions?
DR. HORN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval Treaty of 1925, then you can go on.
and Hitler which took place at Klessheim, at which Ribbentrop was also present and during which the question of solving the Jewish problem in Hungary was discussed. What did Ribbentrop say to you about that question? When Hitler insisted that Horthy ought to proceed more energetically regarding the Jewish problem, and when Horthy rather excitedly had answered, "But what am I supposed to do? Am I supposed to beat them to death?" -- after that there was a certain lull, and the Foreign minister had turned to Horthy and said, "Yes. There are only two possibilities -- either that or to intern the Jews. He said, and that was rather a rare case. He said later on to me that Hitler's demands in this connection were rather far-reaching. Hitler, Hendersonand Ribbentrop, during which Ribbentrop and Hitler once more expressed their wish that an agreement with Poland should be achieved, with Britain acting as an intermediary. Is it true that after that, you took the draft of the note prepared during that conference to Henderson in the British Embassy by order of Ribbentrop and thatyou asked that the realization of those proposals should be looked after by Henderson personally and that he should put it through if possible?
A Yes, that is correct; that is quite right.
DR. HORN: May I hand to the Tribunal a copy of that telegram from Sir Nevil Henderson, addressed to Lord Halifax? Ribbentrop during a renewed discussion with Sir Nevil Henderson again said that an agreement between Germany and Britain for a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain's greatest wish, which was supposed to have been said by Chamberlain to Ribbentrop previously, and that Ribbentrop once more said to Henderson the same thing, is that true?
DR. HORN: And may I hand to the Tribunal the corresponding note as an exhibit?
THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you?
DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that.
THE PRESIDENT: What number -
DR. HORN: One number has already been fixed by the Prosecution. It is TC-72. And the second document has also been submitted by the Prosecution. I am merely handing it to the Tribunal at this time, since I have just referred to them.
Q Witness, one last question: In your considerable experience as an interpreter, you have had a great deal of opportunity to observe Hitler in contact with foreigners. What impression, according to your ow n observations, did Hitler make upon foreign statesmen?
A Naturally it isn't quite so easy to answer that question, since you can't look into the hearts and minds of people. But as an observer you can certainly draw certain conclusions from the attitude -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn't think really that this is a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler's demeanor had on foreign statesmen. It doesn't influence us in the least.
DR. HORN: In that case I withdraw my question. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other Defendants' Counsel who wish to ask questions?
DR. STAHMER: For the Defendant, former Reich Marshal Goering. BY DR. STAHMER:
place about one year before the beginning of the war, between Lord Londonderry and Field Marshal Goering at Karinhall?
Q Please, will you give the Tribunal the content of that discussion? accurately, butI only remember that the talk concerned the Anglo-German approach, or rather the limitation of any conflict existing between Germany and England, and apart from that, of course, quite a number of technical questions regarding aviation and air forces. is still very clearly in my memory, namely,when at the end of a certain argument which was to make clear how desirable it was that Germany and England should be friends and avoid conflicts, he said the following: If I had two countries and entered *---* against each other, then a victor and a vanquished would of course exist, but the winner in that dreadful conflict will at the moment of victory have just enough strength to strike the last blew against the defeated and will then tumble to the ground just like the defeated nation, and for that reason I think that our two countries should be anxious to understand each other without a conflict and without a war. 1938?
Q Was the then Field Marshal Goering present? when the circle of these present grew he also negotiated -
Q In what way did he participate? himself. But he did intervene in such a way that indicated that difficulties arising from certain technical points for the conduct of the negotiations were being removed by his intervention or that he wished to do so. In other words, that he was anxious that the Agreement of Munich should not collapse over such technical points of procedure which played an important part in the second part of the negotiations.
Halifax and the then Field Marshal Goering -- and I think subsequently, after a conference between Lord Halifax and Hitler at the Berghof?
Q What course did that conference take? with Lord Halifax came off very badly. The co-partners did in no way manage to come any nearer to each other and in the case of Goering especially, when the same points were mentioned at Obersalzburg. The questions which were in the foreground at the time, namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten-German question, and finally the question of the Polish Corridor and Danzig -- all these problems were prevalent. And at Obersalzburg Hitler had treated these matters without showing willingness to compromise and he had demanded more or less that the solution as he imagine it would have to be accepted by England, whereas Goering at that conference always attached importance or emphasized that a peaceful solution, that is to say, a solution through negotiation, appeared desirable to him, and that everything should be done to achieve it. He also said that he believed if negotiations were conducted intelligently all three questions could be solved at once.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Defense Counsel for the General Staff and OKW. BY DR. LATERNSER: Hitler, weren't you? Did you ascertain on such occasions that high military leaders tried to influence him in such a way as would mean an enlargement of German territories in a peaceful way? During political negotiations, at the beginning when large problems were concerned, they were not present and they were not consulted until the conferences took place which were dealing with purely military problems, and then, of course they only stated their attitude toward military questions, but did not talk about any political matters.
Q. On the occasion of such discussions, did you find that high military leaders were anxious to accept political leaders upon the Reich Government?
A. No, no, I did not find that, and you could not have found it, since they were hardly ever present.
DR. LATERNSWER: I have no further questions. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q. Witness, I want you first of all to tell the Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your views. Do you remember on 28 November making an affidavit at Oberursel; do you remember?
A. I can not remember the date, but I do remember that I did make an affidavit.
Q. And would you look at it. Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, the number of conferences -GB-288.
Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis of your experience. Would you follow it While I read:
"Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the foreign Office, I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under discussion and I endeavored to keep myself apprised as to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was possible to have ready access to key officials and to key personnel in their offices." pression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign policy:
"The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent from the start namely, the domination of the European continent, to be achieved first by the incorporation of all German-speaking groups in the Reich and, secondly, by territorial expansion under the slogan of 'Lebensraum'. The execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step was apparently carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent with the ultimate objectives mentioned above."
Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, before I go on to deal with particular matters, I want you to develop your impressions a little further. You have told us that you acted under or with every Foreign Minister since Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a considerable difference between the style of living of the Nazi ministers and those who had preceded them?
A. As far as the style of living is concerned, there were certain differences, yes.
Q. Let us take the defendant Ribbentrop. Before the defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had he one house in Berlin, Dahlem; I think "Metze" Allee 79. Was that his possession?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, when he was Foreign Minister, had he six houses? Let me remind you and take them one by one. You can tell me if I am right. There was a house in Sonneburg, somewhere near Berlin, with an estate of 750 hectares and a private golf course. That was one, was it not?
A. Yes, that there was a house at Sonneburg I knew, but how large it was I did not know.
Q. Then there was one at Tanneck Bei Dueren, a house, that he used for horse breeding?
A. Of that house I have not know.
Q. And then there was one near Kitzbuehl that he used for chamois hunting?
A. That is not known to me in detail.
Q. Not in detail, but its existence was known?
A. I should like to say that I consider that it is not at all improbable that the house existed, but I have not heard any details about it.
Q. Then, of course, there was the Schloss Fuschl; that is in Austria, is it not?
A. Near Salzburg, yes.
Q. Near Salzburg, yes. That was taken over as a state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances a little later.
not?
A. The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr von Ribbentrop sometimes went hunting there, but I do not know regarding questions of the proprietor.
Q. Then he also used a hunting lodge, near Podersan, of Count Czernin near Podersan, in Bohemia, in the Sudetenland?
A. I do not know the name. There was a hunting house of somthing like that where receptions took place, for instance, for Count Ciano. I think it had a different name.
Q. That is the one -- where Ciano visited. That is the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right that it previously belonged to Count Czernin.
Tell me, was the salary fixed *---* Reich Ministers?
A. I did not quite understand that question, I am afraid.
Q. Let me put it quite clearly. Was a salary -- that is, a fixed annual remuneration -- appointed for Reich Ministers?
A. Yes, that is quite right.
Q. How much was that?
A. That I cannot tell you, I am afraid.
Q. That was kept secret?
A. It is not that I do not want to give you any information, but I did not want to concern myself with how large a salary the Reich Minister received.
Q. You do not know? If you say that you do not know, that is good enough for me.
I think, perhaps, you can answer this question. Had any previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to run six country houses and estates of various sizes on his salary, anyone that you had worked with?
A. Whether he could have done it -- that is something I can not give you any information about, but he did not.
Q. He did not. We will leave it there for a moment.
Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is about four months before the war, when the Polish question was just coming up.
I mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. Do you remember what I think they call in the German Foreign Office a "conduit de language" that was issued by Ribbentrop about that time and put out by Baron von Weizsecker?
A. No, I do not know that that, or at any rate I can not remember it.
Q. Let me try to remind you, to see if this draws it to your recollection.
"That the Polish problem will be solved by Hitler in 48 hours; the Western Powers will be unable to give any assistance to Poland; the British Empire is doomed within the next ten years; France will bleed to death if she tries to intervene." Minister?
A. A conduit de language of that kind I can not remember, but it appears to me to be rather a conduit de language for propaganda purposes.
Q. Do you not remember that von Ribbentrop issued instructions that no official of the Foreign Office was to issue any different views?
A. That is right, namely, that one was to adhere to that ruling on speeches.
Q. And do you remember what he told Baron von Weizsecker to say would happen to any one who expressed different views?
A. No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that severe penalties would have been threatened to a person like that, but I do not remember the actual case.
Q. Do you not remember that he waid they would be shot by him personally?
A. That such an utterance may have been made on some occasion when he was furious I consider perfectly possible, but that it was meant seriously I do not believe.
Q. What I thought you might remember -- I just suggest it to you -- was the distress and difficulty that Baron von Weizsecker had in deciding how he was to say it to the official conference at the Foreign Office. Don't you remember that?
A. At that time I had not yet been admitted to the morning conferences.
I was not present so I can not tell you anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary may have had quite some trouble in translating that statement into official language.
Q. Well, now, I want to deal quite shortly with the points that have been put to you about August 1939. I only want to get the facts quite clear. the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet Treaty?
A. No, because I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and therfore not with Hitler.
Q. So did you come back with the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 24th?
A. Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to Berchtesgaden.
Q. I see, Well, now, on the 25th, you remember that Hitler saw Neville Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave him what has been called a note cerbale? Do you remember that?
A. I think that I was not present at that conference because at that time I was in Moscow. I think it could be ascertained on the strength of the date. I was present at a conference between Hitler and the British Ambassador; during the time of our Moscow hourney, I was not present. I think that is the conference you are referring to.
Q. This is the day after the defendant came back from Moscow.
A. No, I was not. I remained in Berlin. I did not go up there.
Q. I just want to remind you of the day. If you were not present, I will pass from it, but were you present when Signor Atolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a communication from Mussolini?
A. Yes, I was there.
Q. You were there?
A. Yes.
Q. That is the day I am asking you about. Do you remember that a communication came from Signor Atolico that afternoon that the Italian Army and air force were not in a condition to go to war?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. I want you to try to help me beacuse it is rather important as to the time. Wasn't that about three o'clock in the afternoon?
A. That could be so, but with the number of conference which took place at the time, the question of hours and dates is a bit mixed up.
Q. And do you remember the news the Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming through about four o'clock?
A. Yes, certainly I remember that.
Q. And do you remember about four o'clock M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview with Hitler?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. Now, were you aware that on that day the orders for an attack on Poland the next morning were countermanded?
A. That military orders had been withdrawn is something I remember, but just what orders these were I never learned.
Q. I would not ask you about that, Herr Schmidt, but you knew that orders had been countermanded. I wondered if you could help me on this point: Was not the countermanding of the orders at 6:;5-- 1815 hours -- after the interview with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, was not that the time when they were countermanded?
A. I can not recall that. If that was the time, I do not know.
Q. And equally could you help the Tribunal on this point: Weren't they issued about two o'clock -- 1400 hours -- after the interview with Sir Neville Henderson? Do you know that?
A. No.
Q. I see. You can not help us on that point. of the 30- 31 August between Sir Neville Henderson and the defendant Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told us that the defendant Ribbentrop was very excited. When he read these terms over, did he raise his voice at times, shouting?
A. No.
Q. How did he show his nervousness, then?
A. During some incidents which had taken place previously, one of which I had previously been trying to describe, during those incidents the nervousness became apparent but not during the reading of the document.
Q. I see, but you remember and were very much astounded at the refusal to hand over the vital document to the British Ambassador?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. Well, I want to see if you can help us with one or two other incidents. I has been suggested by a witness that we heard yesterday that the defendant Ribbentrop knew very little about concentration camps. I want to make it clear that was suggested. I think perhaps you can help us on one or two inhabitants of concentration camps that he knew about.
Do you remember a man called Martin Luther? Not the religious gentleman but a contemporary?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that the defendant Ribbentrop brought him into his office, the Bureau Ribbentrop, in 1936?
that it happened in that office.
Q Yes. I think it was not received with great joy by the older members of the German Foreign Office. marks that Mr. Luther had had to deal with in the past? promotion to Consul of the Embassy, Minister and finally Secretary of State, did he not? defendant Ribentrop? Buentner -- suggesting that Ribbentrop's state of mind was not such that he ought to continue as Foreign Secretary, and suggesting that Werner Best, I believe it was, should be appointed. Do you remember that ?
A Yes, I remember that; but I did not know that he suggested Best as successor.
Q At any rate, he suggested that Ribbentrop should go. I think he was quite blunt about it, I believe he suggested that his mental powers were no longer up to it.
A Well, I didn't see that report, and I only heard rumors about it. However, such rumors did reach me. rop, Ribbentrop had Luther put in a concentration camp, had he not?
A Whether Ribbentrop's initiative was responsible for that, or whether it came from some other party, I do not know, but it was said in our de department that Luther had landed in a concentration camp.
Q Yes. Well, the sequence of events was that Luther had this disagreement with Ribbentrop, and shortly afterwards he appeared in a concen tration camp.
And not only did he go into a concentration camp, but isn't it correct that even the SS asked that he should come out of the concentration camp, and Ribbentrop would not agree to it?
A I can't say anything about that because the whole matter was, of course, treated rather confidentially in the office by von Ribbentrop, and the members of the Foreign Office, of which I was one, did not have his confidence to such an extent that they were informed of all such details. In other words, regarding the whole Luther affair, I have had to find prohibited information through prohibited channels, and I therefore, cannot give you any authentic information; I can only repeat what I have heard unofficially. the point I am putting to you is that everyone in the Foreign Office knew that Luther had landed in a concentration camp and, quite clearly, the defendant Ribbentrop knew that he had landed in a concentration camp. That is right, is it not? if I may comment as to his extraordinary innocence about concentration camps. to whom the Schloss Fuschl used to belong? I think the name is either Raemitz, or Raenitz. Do you remember?
Q Well, the Schloss Fuschl -- would you tell me how it is pronounced? tioned. Frau von Raemitz was a sister of August Tissen, was she not?
A I can't say anything about that, since all these questions refer to that. My connections with him were purely official and limited, at that, to routine matters and political interpretation in the Foreign Office.
I only heard about the other matters a marche, but so that I could make authentic statements about them, no, of course not.
Q Well, I will only ask you one question. After the Schloss had become the property, or at any rate had come to the use of the Foreign Minister didn't Herr von Raemitz spend several years in a concentration camp, where he ultimately died? You know that, did you not?
A I knew it as a rumor; it was rumored that was the way things happened.
Q I don't believe so, that authentic details regarding conditions in concentration camps were known. Of course, particularly as far as the Foreign Office was concerned, that was treated as taboo by those people who were responsible for concentration camps. Since we, in any case, were regarded as not quite reliable and not quite belonging to them, such matters, of course, were particularly, deliberately, covered up from us and distorted. Therefore, any concrete details never became known to us at all. were a large number of concentration camps in which a vast number of people were shut up? press, which we read, of course, and the foreign radio, which appeared on our table, translated, every morning. radio, whoever else in that dock did not know about concentration camps, the defendant Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, did know. Isn't that right? access to that foreign news material. Just how he valued that, whether he considered it true or completely false, or exaggerated, that I cannot say, of course. He did, of course, receive the reports as such too, but under the heading of foreign reports, and, during the war, reports from hostile countries.
Q Doctor, I won't pursue that further at the moment, I want you to just tell me this. You have given us your account of the interview between Hitler and the defendant Ribbentrop and Horthy when the question of the Jews was discussed, on the 17th of April, 1943.
I just wanted on record thatyour account is based on the fact that you actually made the minutes; the minutes are signed by you.
Q I want to pass to another point. From 1943 to 1945, were you still going to Hitler's headquarters for occasional interpreting and attending of meeting and the like?
Q For example--I don't know if you can remember it, but I am sue you will try--on the 27th of February, 1944, do you remember a visit of Marshal Antonescu?
Q Were you present at that?
A I remember I was always present during all business of Antonescu's since the discussion couldn't take place any other way. But regarding the date, I couldn't tell you anything exactly at the moment.
Q It was actually the 27th of February. I wanted to try and fix it by an incident which might remind you of it, that Antonescu was there. Now, do you remember on that occasion that the defendany Doenitz was present?
It is possible, but I haven't any exact recollection. During the military discussions it is quite possible that he was present there, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Exhibit, my Lord, is GB-207, and it is dealt with on page 2705 of the shorthand notes. The document was originally D-648. set-up. There has been considerable evidence given before the Tribunal that the Reichsregierung, as such, did not meet after the beginning of the war. Several people have told us that. Instead of a cabinet meeting, wasn't it a fact that the government of Germany was carried on by these constant meetings at Hitler's headquarters?
A I consider that a possibility, but I haven't got exact knowledge, since I was never present during such internal conferences or took part in them. I only went to headquarters whenever a foreigner was there whom I had to accompany.
Q You only came when there was a foreign visitor, but you knew that these meetings were continuously taking place and that the defendant Goering, the defendant Speer, the defendant Keitel, the defendant Jodl, the defendant Doenitz were constantly attending these meetings.
I don't know either.
Q I didn't mean to play with words with you at all. I only used the word to describe what was happening. If you prefer to call it a conference, I am willing to do that. people you have just named were present at the headquarters. That is something I certainly admit.
Q I think you agree with me, don't you, that as far as one can find any organism or organization through which the government of the Reich was being carried on, it was this succession of meetings or conferences at Hitler's headquarters; isn't that so?
A Well, I don't know whether you can call that governmental activities If I drew a parallel with a conference during which I was present with these foreign gentlemen, then you will find that the person who spoke and who achieved decisions was none other then Hitler. In other words, if it was the same with those conferences, then you could call it a government discussion or conference, but it was a one-man government. The others were only there as an audience or to be interrogated regarding individual points. That is how I imagine it to be, but I was not present. which each service and each department and each organization--like the SS, through the Reichsfuehrer SS, Himmler--put their point of view and put the facts before Hitler on which decisions were come to, weren't they? And that is what happened for the last two years of the war. clusion, yes, but it could have been that an order group took place, that is, a reception of orders at headquarters. Both possibilities exist, but just which is applicable is something I can't make a statement about.
Q At any rate, I think you will agree with this, won't you, Herr Schmidt, that there was no other place at which the government of Germany took place except that?
Q- Would you be good enough to look at your affidavit? I will just read the rest of it.
It is quite short, but I went it to be on the record. Paragraph 4:
"The attempted putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on the 25th of July 1934, seriously disturbed the career personnel of the foreign office, because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods both in foreign and domestic policy.
"This concern over the repercussions of the attempted putsch was seen heightened by recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the France-Soviet pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by Hitler.
"The announcement in March of the establishment of a German air force and the introduction of conscription was followed on the 2nd of May, 1935, by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the foreign office regarded this as a very serious further warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the Western powers, declaring that they were not going to be intimidated. At this time the career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the foreign minister, von Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler.
"6. The reentry of the German military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communique of the21st of February 1936 reaffirmed that the French-Soviet pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno treaties and the Covenant of the League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in 'Mein Kampf' offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was decided upon.