Military Tribunal in the matter of: The
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Horn.
DR. PAUL SCHMIDT--resumed. BY DR. HORN: on 30 August 1939 between the defendant von Ribbentrop and the British Ambassador Henderson?
Q Where did that conference take place? Berlin.
Q In what capacity did you participate in that conference?
A It took part as interpreter and reporter. That is to say, I took the record. who did you work forin that capacity? conferences, and in that capacity I worked for all foreign ministers, from von Stresemann to Ribbentrop as an interpreter, as well as for a number of German chancellors like Hermann Mueller, Marx, Bruenig, Hitler, and for other members of the cabinet, delegates and so on and so forth, who represented Germany during international conferences. In other words, I have taken part in all international conferences since 1923 as an interpreter whenever Germany was represented. and Sir Nevil Henderson, to work as an interpreter? in German.
Q Was Ambassador Henderson able to speak German fairly well?
AAmbassador Henderson's knowledge of German was fairly good, but not absolutely perfect, so that it could occur that in moments of excitement he did not quite understand certain matters, as proved by an event which occurred during that conference which you have just mentioned. Sometimes it wouldn't be easy for him to make himself understood in German, but during these conversations he used to address/Ribbentrop in German and preferred that language. Henderson which contained the German proposals regarding the settlement of the difficulties existing between Germany and Poland? And now I am asking you, Witness, whether Henderson asked you during that discussion to translate to him the contents of that memorandum handed him by Ribbentrop? attitude, indicated that he understood the contents of that memorandum fully?
A That is, of course, very hard to say. You can't look into somebody's brain, but I doubt that he understood that document in its details. give explanations of the text to Henderson? Foreign Minister commented upon individual points whichmight not have been quite clear, and gave explanations to Henderson.
Q Did Henderson ask for such explanations personally?
read and he was listening to the comment which was given. ference? somewhat loaded with electricity. Both participants were extremely nervous. Henderson was not at all quiet and I had never before and only once afterwards seen the Foreign Minister as nervous as he was during that conference. which occurred during the first part of the discussion. This concerned the case that the individual points on Germany's part were to be explained precisely which could be held against Poland and the Foreign Minister had done that in great detail and had finished with the words:
"You can see, therefore, Sir Neville Henderson, that the situation is damned serious." words, "damned serious" he got up, half raised himself from his seat and with a sort of warning finger, he pointed it at the Foreign Minister and said:
"You have just said 'damned'. That is not the language of a statesman in so serious a situation."
THE PRESIDENT: What charge has this relevancy to in the Indictment.
DR. HORN: That point of the Indictment that von Ribbentrop handed over that decisive memorandum on the 30th of August, 1939, and read it so quickly that Ambassador Sir Neville Anderson was not in a position to appreciate the contents of that memorandum and pass it on to his government, causing his government at the same time to pass it on to the Polish Government so as to insure continuation of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. England at that time had offered its good services and agency to both governments.
THE PRESIDENT: Which passage of the Indictment are you referring to? You may be right, I do not know. I only want to know which passage in the Indictment you are referring to.
DR. HORN: I am referring to the Preamble--I beg your Pardon--to the preparation or failing to prevent aggressive wars of which Ribbentrop is accused as a conspirator.
THE PRESIDENT: That is on page 9, is it not, from F (c) 4? There is nothing about the way in which this document was handed over to Sir Neville Henderson. I do not know but presumably you have got the Indictment. Where is it in the Indictment?
DR. HORN: It has been presented by the Prosecution and it has furthermore been mentioned, stated in the House of Commons by Chamberlain, namely that this memorandum was read at top speed by von Ribbentrop so that the transmission or even the reception of the contents and transmission of its contents through diplomatic channels which England had expressly offered was not possible. The defendant von Ribbentrop is therefore under direct accusation that this last possibility of further negotiation with Poland was prevented by him and thestatement of the witness is to prove that this guilt of the defendant von Ribbentrop does not exist.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Horn, you made the point that it was read in that way. There is no charge about it in the Indictment at all. It may be that the Prosecution referred to it in the course ofhistory. You have made the point, surely it is not necessary to go on at length about it.
DR. HORN: In that case may I proceed? BY DR. HORN: were extremely excited?
Q To what causes do you attribute that excitement?
A To the tension which prevailed during those negotiations; to the numerous conferences which had taken place during the preceding days practically uninterruptedly and which had made considerable demands upon the nervous resistance of all participants. states in his book, said in the worst possible expression that he would never ask the Polish Ambassador for his visit?
A I cannot remember that. The Foreign Minister merely said that he could only consider the Polish Foreign Minister as a partner for discussions if the Polish Ambassador would arrive with the necessary authority to negotiate.
Q Ambassador Lipski did not have that authority, did he? Foreign Minister when Ambassador Lipski was there -- he answered that question with a clean "no." He had no authority to negotiate. therefore not receive the ambassador, is that right? had with the Polish Ambassador and in the course of which the question was put to the Polish Ambassador whether he had authority to negotiate and on that the Polish Ambassador answered "no." Subsequently, the Foreign Minister said that in that care a conference would not be possible. discussed to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the impression that Ribbentrop did not hand the text of that memorandum to Ambassador Henderson because he did not wish to or because he could not do so? since during the preparation and preparatory conferences which Hitler had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point, before the conference with the British Ambassador took place, I was not present. Therefore, I can only talk on the strength of my impressions which I gathered during the discussion with the British Ambassador and can draw conclusions regarding what may have been told the Foreign Minister by Hitler and what may have been his instructions regarding that discussion and to that I can say the following. be handed to him the Foreign Minister said:
"No, I cannot give you the document."
He used whose words. That was, of course, a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Henderson could have expected that a document which has just been read would subsequently be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised by the answer of the Foreign Minister and looked up since I thought that I had misunderstand. I looked at the Foreign Minister and heard that he said for the second times:
"I cannot give you the document." and that he was aware of the rather difficult position into which he put himself through this answer. A certain uncomfortable smile was on his lips when he said the words, "I cannot give you the documents", though he said it in a quiet voice. would ask me to translate the document to him but that request was not made. I looked at Henderson invitingly, since I wanted to translate that document, knowing how extremely important a quick and complete transmission of the contents of that document would be to his government. If I had been asked to translate I would have translated very slowly, practically at dictation speed, so as to use that, shall we say, back door to enable the British Ambassador not only to understand the principal lines of the document but also the details of the German suggestions and to take them down and pass them on to his government. But even upon my inviting glance Henderson did not react so that soon after that the discussion came to an end and events took their course. ultimatum to the German Government?
Q To whom did you hand that ultimatum? three o'clock, had telephoned the Reich Chancellor, where I was to go with the Foreign Minister, to be available for possible conferences, and the information was given that the British ambassador had received instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly nine o'clock a.m., he would have to make important announcements to the Foreign Minister on behalf of the British Government. He asked, therefore, to be received by Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply that he personally would not be available but that a member of the Foreign Office, in this case I, would be given authority to take his place and receive the announcement from the British Government and through the British ambassador. That is how it happened that I, at nine o'clock in the morning, received the British ambassad in Ribbentrop's office. My invitation to sit down was turned down by Henderson, and standing he read to me the well known ultimatum of the British Government, addressed to the German Government, according to which, unless certain conditions were met on the part of Germany, the British Government would at eleven o'clock that morning consider themselves at war with Germany. After we had exchanged a few farewell words, I took the document and went to the Reich Chancellery.
Q And to whom did you give it there in the Reich Chancellery?
A I gave it to Hitler. That is to say, I found him during conference with the Foreign Minister in his office and I translated the document into German for him. When I had completed my translation, there was at first silence.
Q Was Hitler alone in that room? the Foreign Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both gentlemen were absolutely silent for about oneminute. I could clearly see that that development of things was by no means agreeable to them. For some time Hitler sat in his chair deep in thought and he looked in front of him, looking rather concerned. Then the silence was ended with a rather sudden question of his addressed to the Foreign Minister, and he said "What are we going to do now?"
Subsequently they began to discuss the next diplomatic stops which were to be taken, whether this or that ambassador would have to be recalled, and so forth, and I, of course, left the room since I had nothing else to do. When I entered the anti-room, I had seen some members of the cabinet and higher officials who had assembled there to whom, upon their questioning looks when I had entered, since they knew I had seen the British ambassador, I could only say that no second Munich conference would take place. faces that my remark had been understood. When I now told them that I had just handed over a British ultimatum to Hitler, a very depressed silence fell upon the room. The faces became very serious suddenly. I still remember that Goering, for instance, who stood in front of me, turned to me and said, "If we lose this war, then Heaven help us."
Goebbels stood in a corner by himself and had a very serious, if not depressed, expression. That atmosphere of depression was prevalent with all these present, and that was something which I considered most remarkable for the first dry of the war in that ante-room of the Chancellory, and it is still today in my memory.
Q You didn't have the impression, therefore, that these men expected a declaration of war?
A No, I didn't have that impression. reacted to the news that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor?
A I didn't have a direct opportunity, no, but the Foreign Office knew generally that the Foreign Minister, just like the whole Foreign Office, was completely surprised by the news of Pearl Harbor. As far as I am concerned, that impression was confirmed by news regarding a member of the press section. The press section had a department concerning itself with radio news, and in the case of important news, the official on duty had orders to inform the Foreign Minister personally and at once. When the first news regarding pearl Harbor was received by that section of the press, the official on duty considered it important enough to report to his chief, that is to say, the chief of the press section, who in turn intended to pass it on to the Foreign Minister. But, as I was told, the Foreign Minister turned him down rather harshly and he said that that was surely some invention of the press or "some red herring", and that he didn't wish to be disturbed by cur press section with stories like that. was received, I think a Reuter report, and that had been received by that department. At that stage the chief of the press section gathered his courage together, in spite of the order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, and informed him of this news.
THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting and irrelevant to the Tribunal.
DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused of having prepared the aggressive war against the United States of America.
THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of the press. What have we got to do with the reactions of the press?
DR. HORN: The witness was describing Ribbentrop's reactions to the Parl Harbor attack. Ribbentrop did not know that the Japanese were about to attack America or Pearl Harbor: that such an agreement between Japan and Germany ever existed. It is not correct, therefore, that Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war against the U.S.A.
THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not saying that you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister knew nothing about the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not what I said. What I said was that the Tribunal was not interested and thought it was irrelevant for you to go into the reactions of the press. BY DR. HORN: pact between Germany and England. Can you tell us how these negotiations proceeded and what Ribbentrop's honest opinions and aims were in that connection? took place perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been overcome. The aims-
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this is the naval agreement of 1935. In my recollection--I am just trying to check it-that was one of the matters which we discussed on the application for witnesses and the Tribunal ruled against going into the negotiations, antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came up on application for witnesses. One or two witnesses were asked for, who were going to give the negotiations/ I think, to deal with this exact point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, namely, the state of mind of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one or two -- there is Lord Monsell, for example, who was on the list of witnesses -- who were denied by the Court, and a number of others were denied on the same point. My Lord, it is in the Tribunal's statement of the 26th of February, and my Lordship will see on page 2, I think, certainly the witness Monsell, who happens to be the one most familiar to myself, but I am sure there were other witnesses, too.
I know that we discussed this point quite fully on the application for witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who were refused.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Who was relevant on this question as to the initiative of the Treaty. And then there is Sir Robert Craigie, No. 24. There is Lord Monsell -
THE PRESIDENT: He was refused.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points. No. 25.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, my Lord, I think these are the three.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those three witnesses -- Schuster, Craigie and Monsell -- whom you alleged were to give evidence on this 1935 Treaty, were all refused. As to the witness you are now examining, no such application was made respecting him, nor even an interpreter in the Foreign Office.
DR. HORN: I was under the impression that the other witnesses had been refused because they were cumulative and I wasn't going to question the witness on the Naval Pact. I was merely going to bring out Ribbentrop's attitude in the course of and following the conclusion of the Pact, and I want to prove to the Tribunal that Ribbentrop was not at that time aiming deliberately at an aggressive war, nor was he a part of a conspiracy for an aggressive war at that time. And furthermore, I wish to prove by it that this Pact was not, as the previously mentioned British Ambassador, Nevil Henderson, was trying to put it, "eye wash."
THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador Craigie was to the effect that the witness would give evidence that in 1935 Ribbentrop approached England with a proposal that the Naval Treaty should be signed and Ribbentrop's initiative brought about an agreement on that Treaty by France.
Isn't it in connection with that, that you were going to ask this witness questions?
DR. HORN: No.
THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval Treaty of 1925, then you can go on.
and Hitler which took place at Klessheim, at which Ribbentrop was also present and during which the question of solving the Jewish problem in Hungary was discussed. What did Ribbentrop say to you about that question? When Hitler insisted that Horthy ought to proceed more energetically regarding the Jewish problem, and when Horthy rather excitedly had answered, "But what am I supposed to do? Am I supposed to beat them to death?" -- after that there was a certain lull, and the Foreign minister had turned to Horthy and said, "Yes. There are only two possibilities -- either that or to intern the Jews. He said, and that was rather a rare case. He said later on to me that Hitler's demands in this connection were rather far-reaching. Hitler, Hendersonand Ribbentrop, during which Ribbentrop and Hitler once more expressed their wish that an agreement with Poland should be achieved, with Britain acting as an intermediary. Is it true that after that, you took the draft of the note prepared during that conference to Henderson in the British Embassy by order of Ribbentrop and thatyou asked that the realization of those proposals should be looked after by Henderson personally and that he should put it through if possible?
A Yes, that is correct; that is quite right.
DR. HORN: May I hand to the Tribunal a copy of that telegram from Sir Nevil Henderson, addressed to Lord Halifax? Ribbentrop during a renewed discussion with Sir Nevil Henderson again said that an agreement between Germany and Britain for a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain's greatest wish, which was supposed to have been said by Chamberlain to Ribbentrop previously, and that Ribbentrop once more said to Henderson the same thing, is that true?
DR. HORN: And may I hand to the Tribunal the corresponding note as an exhibit?
THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you?
DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that.
THE PRESIDENT: What number -
DR. HORN: One number has already been fixed by the Prosecution. It is TC-72. And the second document has also been submitted by the Prosecution. I am merely handing it to the Tribunal at this time, since I have just referred to them.
Q Witness, one last question: In your considerable experience as an interpreter, you have had a great deal of opportunity to observe Hitler in contact with foreigners. What impression, according to your ow n observations, did Hitler make upon foreign statesmen?
A Naturally it isn't quite so easy to answer that question, since you can't look into the hearts and minds of people. But as an observer you can certainly draw certain conclusions from the attitude -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal doesn't think really that this is a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler's demeanor had on foreign statesmen. It doesn't influence us in the least.
DR. HORN: In that case I withdraw my question. I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other Defendants' Counsel who wish to ask questions?
DR. STAHMER: For the Defendant, former Reich Marshal Goering. BY DR. STAHMER:
place about one year before the beginning of the war, between Lord Londonderry and Field Marshal Goering at Karinhall?
Q Please, will you give the Tribunal the content of that discussion? accurately, butI only remember that the talk concerned the Anglo-German approach, or rather the limitation of any conflict existing between Germany and England, and apart from that, of course, quite a number of technical questions regarding aviation and air forces. is still very clearly in my memory, namely,when at the end of a certain argument which was to make clear how desirable it was that Germany and England should be friends and avoid conflicts, he said the following: If I had two countries and entered *---* against each other, then a victor and a vanquished would of course exist, but the winner in that dreadful conflict will at the moment of victory have just enough strength to strike the last blew against the defeated and will then tumble to the ground just like the defeated nation, and for that reason I think that our two countries should be anxious to understand each other without a conflict and without a war. 1938?
Q Was the then Field Marshal Goering present? when the circle of these present grew he also negotiated -
Q In what way did he participate? himself. But he did intervene in such a way that indicated that difficulties arising from certain technical points for the conduct of the negotiations were being removed by his intervention or that he wished to do so. In other words, that he was anxious that the Agreement of Munich should not collapse over such technical points of procedure which played an important part in the second part of the negotiations.
Halifax and the then Field Marshal Goering -- and I think subsequently, after a conference between Lord Halifax and Hitler at the Berghof?
Q What course did that conference take? with Lord Halifax came off very badly. The co-partners did in no way manage to come any nearer to each other and in the case of Goering especially, when the same points were mentioned at Obersalzburg. The questions which were in the foreground at the time, namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten-German question, and finally the question of the Polish Corridor and Danzig -- all these problems were prevalent. And at Obersalzburg Hitler had treated these matters without showing willingness to compromise and he had demanded more or less that the solution as he imagine it would have to be accepted by England, whereas Goering at that conference always attached importance or emphasized that a peaceful solution, that is to say, a solution through negotiation, appeared desirable to him, and that everything should be done to achieve it. He also said that he believed if negotiations were conducted intelligently all three questions could be solved at once.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Defense Counsel for the General Staff and OKW. BY DR. LATERNSER: Hitler, weren't you? Did you ascertain on such occasions that high military leaders tried to influence him in such a way as would mean an enlargement of German territories in a peaceful way? During political negotiations, at the beginning when large problems were concerned, they were not present and they were not consulted until the conferences took place which were dealing with purely military problems, and then, of course they only stated their attitude toward military questions, but did not talk about any political matters.
Q. On the occasion of such discussions, did you find that high military leaders were anxious to accept political leaders upon the Reich Government?
A. No, no, I did not find that, and you could not have found it, since they were hardly ever present.
DR. LATERNSWER: I have no further questions. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:
Q. Witness, I want you first of all to tell the Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your views. Do you remember on 28 November making an affidavit at Oberursel; do you remember?
A. I can not remember the date, but I do remember that I did make an affidavit.
Q. And would you look at it. Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, the number of conferences -GB-288.
Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis of your experience. Would you follow it While I read:
"Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the foreign Office, I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under discussion and I endeavored to keep myself apprised as to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was possible to have ready access to key officials and to key personnel in their offices." pression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign policy:
"The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent from the start namely, the domination of the European continent, to be achieved first by the incorporation of all German-speaking groups in the Reich and, secondly, by territorial expansion under the slogan of 'Lebensraum'. The execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step was apparently carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent with the ultimate objectives mentioned above."
Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, before I go on to deal with particular matters, I want you to develop your impressions a little further. You have told us that you acted under or with every Foreign Minister since Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a considerable difference between the style of living of the Nazi ministers and those who had preceded them?
A. As far as the style of living is concerned, there were certain differences, yes.
Q. Let us take the defendant Ribbentrop. Before the defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had he one house in Berlin, Dahlem; I think "Metze" Allee 79. Was that his possession?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Now, when he was Foreign Minister, had he six houses? Let me remind you and take them one by one. You can tell me if I am right. There was a house in Sonneburg, somewhere near Berlin, with an estate of 750 hectares and a private golf course. That was one, was it not?
A. Yes, that there was a house at Sonneburg I knew, but how large it was I did not know.
Q. Then there was one at Tanneck Bei Dueren, a house, that he used for horse breeding?
A. Of that house I have not know.
Q. And then there was one near Kitzbuehl that he used for chamois hunting?
A. That is not known to me in detail.
Q. Not in detail, but its existence was known?
A. I should like to say that I consider that it is not at all improbable that the house existed, but I have not heard any details about it.
Q. Then, of course, there was the Schloss Fuschl; that is in Austria, is it not?
A. Near Salzburg, yes.
Q. Near Salzburg, yes. That was taken over as a state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances a little later.
not?
A. The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr von Ribbentrop sometimes went hunting there, but I do not know regarding questions of the proprietor.
Q. Then he also used a hunting lodge, near Podersan, of Count Czernin near Podersan, in Bohemia, in the Sudetenland?
A. I do not know the name. There was a hunting house of somthing like that where receptions took place, for instance, for Count Ciano. I think it had a different name.
Q. That is the one -- where Ciano visited. That is the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right that it previously belonged to Count Czernin.
Tell me, was the salary fixed *---* Reich Ministers?
A. I did not quite understand that question, I am afraid.
Q. Let me put it quite clearly. Was a salary -- that is, a fixed annual remuneration -- appointed for Reich Ministers?
A. Yes, that is quite right.
Q. How much was that?
A. That I cannot tell you, I am afraid.
Q. That was kept secret?
A. It is not that I do not want to give you any information, but I did not want to concern myself with how large a salary the Reich Minister received.
Q. You do not know? If you say that you do not know, that is good enough for me.
I think, perhaps, you can answer this question. Had any previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to run six country houses and estates of various sizes on his salary, anyone that you had worked with?
A. Whether he could have done it -- that is something I can not give you any information about, but he did not.
Q. He did not. We will leave it there for a moment.
Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is about four months before the war, when the Polish question was just coming up.